Previous Report Date 07/24/85

NRC Form 366 (9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Browns Ferry - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Nonstandard Four-Inch Pipe Penetrations Through Secondary Containment

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									Browns Ferry - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 0
0 6	2 5	8 5	8 5	0 3 3	0 1	0 1	3 1	8 6	Browns Ferry - Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
N		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
0 1 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	Information
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Stephen B. Jones, Compliance Engineer	2 0 5 7 2 9 - 2 5 3 8

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 25, 1985, a nonstandard secondary containment penetration was observed in the residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) tunnel of each unit. The penetrations route piping used for supplying external compressed air for outage work and are isolated with hand control valves (HCV) on either side of the containment penetrations. The valves were placed under administrative controls pending engineering analysis to determine whether the penetration configuration meets design requirements for permanent installation. This analysis determined the penetrations were seismically qualified, although some work would be required on the unit 2 and unit 3 penetrations to fully qualify them as permanent features.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Browns Ferry - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9	8 5	— 0 3 3	— 0 1	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Units 1 and 2 were in a refueling outage, and unit 3 was in an extended maintenance outage. All three units were affected.

On June 25, 1985, a nonstandard secondary containment penetration (PEN) was observed in the residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) (BI) tunnel of each unit. This penetration has been utilized to allow connection of externally supplied air for torus outage work and integrated leak rate test work during outages. The piping extended the full length of the RHRSW tunnel and was found supported by lumber. The secondary containment penetration piping is isolated by hand control valves (HCV) on each side of the containment penetrations.

Upon identification of the potential problem, the shift engineer verified that the valves were closed and issued a clearance to ensure positive administrative control. The penetrations had been installed on unit 1 in September of 1977, on unit 2 in February of 1978, and on unit 3 in March of 1979. They were originally installed to facilitate torus modifications and were intended to be temporary. Supports were added to seismically qualify the valves; although, the arrangement was apparently not fully analyzed as a permanent installation.

The long connector pipe has been removed from all three units. This piping extension is utilized as a compressed air source for torus work and removed for the integrated leak rate test.

Secondary containment penetrations on all three units were determined to be qualified for all plant events by an engineering analysis. However, in order to qualify the penetrations as permanent features some additional work is required. The material used on all the penetrations will be field verified.

The unit 2 seal plate anchors will be pull tested since the anchors are slightly closer to the penetration than construction specifications recommend. The unit 3 seal plate anchorage will be modified to increase the load safety factor from 2.9 to the standard 5.0 value.

Responsible Plant Section - Modifications

Previous Events - None

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
P.O. Box 2000
Decatur, Alabama 35602

January 31, 1986

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-259/85033 R1

The enclosed report provides additional details concerning nonstandard four-inch pipe penetrations through secondary containment. This report is submitted for informational purposes.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Robert L. Lewis
Plant Manager
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosures
cc (Enclosures):
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Irspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

IE22
1/1