

NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 5 1 9	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 1 2
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TITLE (4) Nonstandard Four-Inch Pipe Penetrations Through Secondary Containment
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EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
0 6	2 5	8 5	8 5	0 3 3	0 1	0 1	3 1	8 6	Browns Ferry - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1 0	
									Browns Ferry - Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 9 1 6	

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
	20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0 1 0	20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)			Information

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)									
NAME Stephen B. Jones, Compliance Engineer								TELEPHONE NUMBER 2 0 5 7 1 2 9 1 - 2 5 3 1 8	

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)								EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO												

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 25, 1985, a nonstandard secondary containment penetration was observed in the residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) tunnel of each unit. The penetrations route piping used for supplying external compressed air for outage work and are isolated with hand control valves (HCV) on either side of the containment penetrations. The valves were placed under administrative controls pending engineering analysis to determine whether the penetration configuration meets design requirements for permanent installation. This analysis determined the penetrations were seismically qualified, although some work would be required on the unit 2 and unit 3 penetrations to fully qualify them as permanent features.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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EXPIRES: 8/31/86

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9 8 5 - 0 3 3 - 0 1 0 2 OF 0 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

Units 1 and 2 were in a refueling outage, and unit 3 was in an extended maintenance outage. All three units were affected.

On June 25, 1985, a nonstandard secondary containment penetration (PEN) was observed in the residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) (BI) tunnel of each unit. This penetration has been utilized to allow connection of externally supplied air for torus outage work and integrated leak rate test work during outages. The piping extended the full length of the RHRSW tunnel and was found supported by lumber. The secondary containment penetration piping is isolated by hand control valves (HCV) on each side of the containment penetrations.

Upon identification of the potential problem, the shift engineer verified that the valves were closed and issued a clearance to ensure positive administrative control. The penetrations had been installed on unit 1 in September of 1977, on unit 2 in February of 1978, and on unit 3 in March of 1979. They were originally installed to facilitate torus modifications and were intended to be temporary. Supports were added to seismically qualify the valves; although, the arrangement was apparently not fully analyzed as a permanent installation.

The long connector pipe has been removed from all three units. This piping extension is utilized as a compressed air source for torus work and removed for the integrated leak rate test.

Secondary containment penetrations on all three units were determined to be qualified for all plant events by an engineering analysis. However, in order to qualify the penetrations as permanent features some additional work is required. The material used on all the penetrations will be field verified.

The unit 2 seal plate anchors will be pull tested since the anchors are slightly closer to the penetration than construction specifications recommend. The unit 3 seal plate anchorage will be modified to increase the load safety factor from 2.9 to the standard 5.0 value.

Responsible Plant Section - Modifications

Previous Events - None

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
P.O. Box 2000
Decatur, Alabama 35602

January 31, 1986

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555


Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRO-50-259/85033 R1

The enclosed report provides additional details concerning nonstandard
four-inch pipe penetrations through secondary containment. This report
is submitted for informational purposes.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



Robert L. Lewis
Plant Manager
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosures

cc (Enclosures):

Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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NRC Resident Inspector, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

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