

Previous Report Date 12/20/85

NRC Form 366  
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/88

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9	PAGE (3) 1 OF 013
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TITLE (4) Open Fire Barrier Penetrations
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EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
1	1	2	2	8	5	8	5	0	5	5	0	1	0	1	3	1	8	6	Browns Ferry - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 0
																		Browns Ferry - Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6	

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 01010	20.402(b)	20.405(e)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)						
	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(e)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)						
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(e)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)						
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Stephen B. Jones, Compliance Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 2 0 5 7 2 9 1 - 2 5 3 8
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During maintenance activities, a spare sleeve penetration in a fire barrier was found to be unsealed. The penetration was a two-inch horizontal sleeve through a concrete wall which separates a computer room from the unit 1 battery board room. The penetration was concealed above a suspended ceiling which hindered earlier detection. The penetration has been sealed. A subsequent investigation discovered that piping penetrations were not being inspected because of a procedural deficiency. All fire barrier penetrations have been identified and inspected. All penetrations found in an unacceptable configuration will be properly sealed.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/86

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Browns Ferry - Unit 1	0500025985	-	055	-	010	2	OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

Units 1 and 2 were in refueling outages, and unit 3 was in an extended maintenance outage. The condition described below affects all three units.

During maintenance activities on November 22, 1985, an electrician discovered that an open penetration (PEN) existed in a fire barrier wall. The open penetration is an unused sleeve of approximately two-inch inside diameter and is in the wall between the future process computer (CPU) room and the unit 1 battery (BTRY) room. It is located approximately nine feet and six inches above the floor and one foot and four inches above the ceiling. The open fire barrier penetration was not previously discovered because it was concealed above a suspended ceiling. The penetration was sealed by 1710 on the same day of discovery. A subsequent investigation into the cause of the open fire barrier penetration noted that surveillance instructions (SI) did not include provisions for routine inspection of piping penetrations through fire barriers. Fire watches were established at all identified fire barriers when the procedural deficiency was identified.

Prior to 1981, fire penetration inspections were not on the surveillance schedule. In 1981, section 3.11.E of the Technical Specifications (TS) which was based on the Browns Ferry Fire Recovery Plan (FRP) was incorporated as a revision to TS. Personnel associated with this TS and the FRP indicated that the provisions in section 3.11.E were intended to add fire doors and damper inspections to the surveillance schedule. This is because piping itself would not be expected to transport a fire through a penetration. The wording of TS 3.11.E, however, implies that all penetrations are to be inspected annually. Because of this wording misapplication, the resulting surveillance procedure did not require piping fire barrier penetration inspection.

The plant safety engineer identified all fire barriers and established an inspection criteria for both electrical and piping penetrations. The fire detection and fire suppression systems in the vicinity of identified fire barriers were verified operable, and a roving fire watch was then established. Of the additional 190 identified fire barrier piping penetrations, 114 were found not to fully meet the inspection criteria. A design change request has been written to determine and implement corrective action for the piping penetrations. All fire barrier penetrations will be brought into an acceptable configuration as soon as practicable. Compensatory measures will be maintained until the penetrations are in compliance. Once the design of the piping penetration barriers are finalized, an inspection criteria will be established and the SI revised to include piping penetration inspections.

The fire barrier between the battery room and the computer room is to protect the battery room from a fire in the computer room. Both rooms have automatic smoke detectors (KP), hose stations (KP), and portable fire extinguishers (KO). The battery room also has a manual-closed-head sprinkler system (KP). The small fire load in the computer room in conjunction with the fire protection systems made the probability of a fire spreading through the fire barrier remote. Fire could

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

only be propagated through a barrier with unacceptable piping or conduit penetrations by gases since the piping or conduit would not be expected to transport a fire through a penetration. All of the fire barriers have fire detection systems on at least on side of the barrier making it highly improbable that a fire could cross a barrier before it was detected.

Responsible Plant Section - N/A

Previous Similar Events - None

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant  
P.O. Box 2000  
Decatur, Alabama 35602

January 31, 1986

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555


Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET  
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE  
REPORT BFRO-50-259/85055 R1

The enclosed report provides additional details concerning the open  
fire barrier penetration. This report is submitted in accordance to  
10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



Robert L. Lewis  
Plant Manager  
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosures

cc (Enclosures):

Regional Administrator  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

INPO Records Center  
Suite 1500  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

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