

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 1				PAGE (3) 1 OF 3						
TITLE (4) Containment Isolation Valves Not in Appendix J Program																				
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)										
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)							
0	1	0	7	8	6	8	6	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	5	0	0	0	0
OPERATING MODE (9) N			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																	
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0 1 0			20.402(b)				20.405(e)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)				73.71(b) 73.71(e) OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)					
			20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(a)(1)													
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(a)(2)													
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)													
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)													
			20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)													
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																				
NAME James P. Pelletier, Plant Manager										TELEPHONE NUMBER 8 0 2 2 5 7 - 7 1 1										
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																				
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC										
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR						
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO																				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During the 1985/86 Recirculation Pipe Replacement Outage, plant personnel determined by direct observation/evaluation that small bore piping ($1\frac{1}{2}$ in.) entering containment through penetration X-48 was not accounted for in the Vermont Yankee Primary Containment Leak Rate Testing Program, and subsequently not leak tested. The cause resulted from a failure of plant personnel to perform a thorough evaluation of all containment spare penetrations during development of the Appendix J program.

Technical Specification section 4.7.A.2 requires that containment integrity be demonstrated as required by Appendix J to 10CFR Part 50. Appendix J requires that all isolation valves, which penetrate containment, be addressed in a Reactor Containment Leakage Test program.

Vermont Yankee will update the Primary Containment Leak Rate Testing Program to reflect the ultimate configuration/testing requirements of penetration X-48 prior to startup following the 1985/86 outage.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION	0500027186	—	001	—	000	2	OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Description of Event:

On 1/7/86, with the plant shutdown and defueled for the 1985/86 pipe replacement outage, plant personnel determined by direct observation/evaluation that piping ($1\frac{1}{2}$ in.) entering containment through penetration X-48 was not accounted for in the Vermont Yankee Tech. Specs. and the Primary Containment Leak Rate Testing Program. The program listed penetration X-48 as a spare.

The small bore piping is part of the condensate and demineralized water transfer system. The line provides condensate water to hose connections at stations located in containment. Plant procedures controlling the system valve line up for the isolation valves show them to be normally closed.

Cause of Event:

The cause of the event resulted from the failure of plant personnel to perform a thorough evaluation of all containment spare penetrations during development of the Appendix J leak rate test program.

The Primary Containment Leak Rate Testing Program was developed consistent with plant Technical Specifications which does not identify the valves at penetration X-48 as containment isolation valves subject to Type C leakage tests (Ref. Table 4.7.2.a). The piping was most likely installed during original construction (1968-1972) to facilitate construction activities and was intended to be removed.

Analysis of Event:

Technical Specification Section 4.7.A.2 requires that the containment integrity be demonstrated as required by Appendix J to 10CFR Part 50. Appendix J requires that all isolation valves, which penetrate containment, be addressed in a Reactor Containment Leakage Test program. Although this criteria has not been formally met, no significant adverse safety consequences resulted from this event in that:

1. The normal position for the isolation valves at penetration X-48 is closed.
2. Containment was ensured by the water seal on the outboard isolation valve provided by the Condensate System that normally operates at pressures that exceed maximum design basis containment pressures (Pa).
3. Failure of the penetration would not reduce the plants ability to safety shutdown.
4. All past integrated leak rate Type A tests clearly show Primary Containment was satisfied without any additional local testing for this penetration.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 356A's) (17)


Corrective Action:

No immediate operator actions were necessary on X-48 due to the shutdown status of the plant.

Vermont Yankee has completed a verification program of all penetrations identified as spares in the Vermont Yankee Primary Containment Leak Rate Testing program and no other discrepancies were found.

Vermont Yankee will update the program to reflect the ultimate configuration (pipe cap addition or equivalent) and testing requirements (Appendix J update, plant procedures) of penetration X-48 prior to startup following the 1985/86 pipe replacement outage.

No similar events have been reported to the Commission in the last 5 years.



VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

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VERNON, VERMONT 05354

February 5, 1986

VYV86-030

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document No. 50-271
Washington, D.C. 20555

REFERENCE: Operating License DPR-28
Docket No. 50-271
Reportable Occurrence No. LER 86-01

Dear Sirs:

As defined by 10CFR50.73, we are reporting the attached Reportable Occurrence as LER 86-01.

Very truly yours,

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

James P. Pelletier
Plant Manager

HMM/drc

cc: Regional Administrator
USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
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King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406