

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE REPORT FOR SPECIAL INSPECTION
50-245/85-31; 50-336/85-36

Docket Nos.: 50-245; 50-336
Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Facility: Millstone Units 1 and 2
Meeting At: Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania
Date: January 9, 1986

Prepared By: R. J. Summers
R. J. Summers, Project Engineer

1/24/86
Date

Approved By: E. C. McCabe
E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B

1/24/86
Date

Meeting Summary

The enforcement conference was held to discuss the findings of NRC Special Inspection 50-245/85-31; 50-336/85-36. The licensee presented the results of their review of the event and the corrective measures they have taken and plan to take to prevent recurrence.

DETAILS

1. Licensee Attendees

J. Opeka, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Operations
E. Mroczka, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
W. Romberg, Millstone Station Superintendent
J. Kelley, Millstone Station Services Superintendent
R. Kacich, Licensing Supervisor
R. Asafayco, Quality Services Supervisor
N. Tasker, Director, System Security (NUSCo)

2. NRC Attendees

T. Murley, Regional Administrator
J. Allan, Deputy Regional Administrator
R. Starostecki, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
W. Kane, Deputy Director, DRP
J. Gutierrez, Regional Counsel
E. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B, DRP
J. Joyner, Chief, Nuclear Material and Safeguard Branch, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards (DRSS)
R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section, DRSS
J. Shedlosky, Senior Resident Inspector
W. Madden, Physical Security Inspector, DRSS
R. Summers, Project Engineer, DRP
D. Holody, Enforcement Specialist

3. Licensee Presentation and Discussion

The licensee made a presentation addressing their investigation into the discovery on November 13, 1985, of a handgun in a tractor trailer cab upon exit search from the Millstone Station protected area. The licensee's presentation included a review of the event and corrective actions taken and to be taken in the future. A copy of the licensee's presentation materials are appended.

4. Meeting Results

NRC Region I acknowledged the efforts the licensee has taken and plans to take to prevent recurrence of this type of event. Any enforcement actions taken in regard to this event will be forwarded under separate correspondence.

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE

USNRC REGION 1

JANUARY 9, 1986

Reference: Special Inspection

A Problem Description

On November 13, 1985 at approximately 1310 hours a .38 caliber revolver was found in a Tri-State Motor Transport tractor trailer cab as it was exiting the Millstone Station protected area. The weapon was discovered inside a locked briefcase which was located in the sleeper section of the cab, between the cab wall and the mattress, covered by two pillows. During the inbound search the assigned guard failed to locate the briefcase and therefore did not discover the weapon.

The following is a summary of events that occurred concerning the Tri-State vehicle.

The Tri-State vehicle in question arrived at the Vehicle Access Point on the Unit 1 and 2 side at approximately 0945 hours. The officer assigned to vehicle sign in/vehicle searches notified the Radwaste Department and obtained authorization for the vehicle to enter the protected area.

Once the vehicle was "frisked" by Health Physics it was allowed to enter the inbound search pen via gate 12 (Appendix A Vehicle Access Program). The driver was then questioned by the search officer as to whether or not he was carrying any weapons, explosives, drugs or liquor; to which he replied in the negative. The driver then opened all his cargo storage doors and he and his passenger proceeded to the personnel access point to be processed.

A few minutes into the search the driver came out of the personnel access point and asked the search officer if he could enter his vehicle to retrieve his passenger's handbag, as she needed her identification for processing. The search officer directed him to enter the search pen via gate 12 (outside the protected area). At this time the driver advised the search officer that he remembered that he had some "little bottles" in the vehicle. When the officer questioned him further he determined that the driver was referring to small bottles of liquor. The officer advised the driver that the liquor could not be brought into the protected area, however, the bottles could be locked in the property hold box in the personnel access point until he left the protected area. The officer then questioned the driver again to determine if there were any other prohibited items in the vehicle. The driver again replied no.

The search officer then completed searching the vehicle. The search included the cargo areas, the inside of the cab on both sides, the overhead, the sleeping compartment, under the seats, the engine compartment and the exterior undercarriage area. The search officer apparently performed an inadequate search as he did not discover the briefcase in the sleeping compartment.

The vehicle with the driver, passenger and escort entered the protected area at 1000 hours. The cab was then hooked up to a trailer. The driver, passenger and escort exited the vehicle, locked it and went to the radwaste trailer where they remained until approximately 1235 hours. When all the required paperwork was ready the driver, passenger and escort went to the radwaste office for approximately 10 to 15 minutes then returned to the vehicle and drove to the exit search pen.

While the driver and passenger were processing out through the personnel access point a different search officer performed an exit search of the vehicle. During this exit search the officer discovered a briefcase in the sleeping compartment between the wall of the cab and the mattress, covered by two pillows. The briefcase was locked. After completing the vehicle search the officer requested that the driver be sent into the search pen to open the locked briefcase. The search officer asked the driver if there was anything inside the briefcase she "should know about" prior to him opening it. He replied, no. The driver unlocked the briefcase combination lock and advised the officer that she could open it. When the officer lifted the top she noticed the barrel of a gun. She shut the briefcase, told the driver to move back slowly with his hands up and had gate 14 opened to allow him out of the pen.

B Cause Of Problem

NNECo determined that this incident was due to inadequate performance by the inbound search officer due to the following:

- ° The licensee personnel and the Contractor Training Department did an indepth review of the training program and concluded that it was satisfactory.
- ° A review of the vehicle search history shows that security officers find prohibited item prior to vehicle entry and take appropriate action.
- ° The weapon was found during the exit search which is of the same quality and uses the same standards as the entrance search.

C Corrective Action

Completed Actions

- ° The inbound search officer, who has a long history of good service, was suspended for three days, then retrained and requalified in all access control and search tasks (personnel and vehicle access).
- ° An awareness bulletin was promulgated by the contractor force management for review by all security personnel.

- ° A special program was established by the contractor force where their supervisors monitor a specific number of vehicle searches each shift and document the results. On the spot corrections are made as necessary.
- ° The contractor reviewed the existing training program for vehicle searches and concluded that the training program is satisfactory.
- ° The Tri-State Motor Transport Company has been informed of the incident by letter and advised of station policy.
- ° The Tri-State Motor Transport Company has been advised of NRC enforcement action and requesting a response detailing their corrective action.
- ° Signs have been posted at each vehicle access stating weapons and firearms must be declared to security prior to protected area entry.

Planned Actions To Be Completed Prior To April 1, 1986

- ° As an enhancement to the training program, arrangements have been made to lease a cab over engine with a sleeping compartment to be used for hands-on guard training.
- ° A letter will be re-issued to trucking firms that frequently do business at Millstone advising them of station policy and NRC requirements. This letter will be re-issued periodically.
- ° A bank of lockers that can be utilized by drivers to store items they do not want searched or brought into the protected area will be placed outside the protected area and away from the search area.

D Conclusion/Summary

NNECo has determined that the incident was an isolated event that has been adequately corrected and should not recur based on the following:

- ° NNECo identified the problem.
- ° The guard who discovered the weapon reported it promptly and properly followed procedures.
- ° As indicated by past discoveries the searches have been effective in prohibiting unauthorized material from being taken into the protected area.
- ° The matter was promptly reported to the NRC.
- ° Appropriate corrective action has been taken and will be reinforced by additional actions prior to April 1, 1986.

APPENDIX A
VEHICLE ACCESS PROGRAM

The Vehicle Access Points at Millstone are both located adjacent to a personnel access point. Each Vehicle Access Point has inbound and outbound search pens which isolate and control the vehicles during the search process. CCTV is used to monitor the search pens and to inspect the tops of the vehicles. The monitors for the CCTV system are located at the vehicle access booths which are manned by an armed guard when the access point is in use. Normal vehicle processing is as follows:

- ° Vehicles stop outside the search pen areas for authorization and logging in.
- ° Once authorization has been obtained the vehicle is allowed to enter the inbound search pen providing that the pen is empty or that searches have not been initiated on vehicles previously let in the pen.
- ° The driver and any passengers are required to leave the search pen and go to the personnel access point for processing. The gates to the search pen are closed while the search is being conducted.
- ° When the search is completed the officer requests that the protected area gate be open and allows the driver and any passengers or escorts (now badged) into the pen from the protected area side.
- ° Once the vehicle exits the pen the protected area gate is closed. Written security procedures prohibit opening both sets of gates in a search pen except during an emergency.
- ° Upon exiting the same process is used in reverse using the outbound pen.

Sign-
in
Booth

Gate 12

Search
Pen

IN

Gate 13

Personnel
Access
Point

UP

DN

Gate 14


OUT

Search
Pen

UP

Gate 15

2



VEHICLE SEARCH INFORMATION

<u>DATE</u>	<u>WEAPON OR PROHIBITED ITEMS</u>
04-09-84	WINE
04-09-84	BEER
12-31-84	KNIFE
01-10-85	BEER
02-05-85	WEAPON
02-19-85	WEAPON
03-04-85	WEAPON AND AMMO
03-05-85	WEAPON
04-03-85	BEER
04-12-85	LIQUOR
05-15-85	BEER
10-01-85	WEAPON
11-13-85	LIQUOR
12-09-85	WEAPON
12-11-85	WEAPONS



Interoffice memorandum

to: Burns Supervisory Personnel from: Ronald C. Petersen
Chief of Security

RCP date: November 14, 1985

subject: Vehicle Searches

copies:

U3-821

As all are aware, a loaded handgun came on site on November 13 through V&P. This was a one-hour NRC reportable event, and NRC disposition is pending.

The amount, quality, and speed of corrective action taken following an event such as this can have a major effect on the final NRC disposition. As a part of our corrective action, the following practice will begin with the second shift on November 14.

Supervisors will begin monitoring individual vehicle searches at each vehicle access point. The number of searches monitored should be as many as practical, but not fewer than four per shift. Searches monitored should focus on tractors with sleeping compartments whenever possible. The supervisor is to carefully observe the search, ensure that the search is adequate, and correct any minor deficiencies on the spot. If an inadequate search is observed, ensure that a proper search is performed and report the incident to the shift commander for final resolution. All observations are to be documented on Burns Routine Reports and will include the date, time, and location of search, the officer performing the search, and comments concerning the thoroughness and adequacy of the search.

This is a temporary measure to be continued until further notice.

RCP:sk



Interoffice memorandum

to: All Burns Security
Personnel

from: Ronald C. Petersen *RCP*
Chief of Security

date: November 14, 1985

subject: Awareness - Vehicle Searches

copies:

U3-821

On November 13, 1985 at approximately 0945 hrs., a tractor with a sleeping compartment entered site through VAP. Questioning of the driver revealed the presence of several small liquor bottles, which were properly removed and held. The search revealed no other material or conditions calling for denial of access, and the cab entered the Protected Area.

On the same date at approximately 1310 hrs., the same vehicle was exiting the Protected Area when the outbound search revealed the presence of a locked briefcase. The search officer, observing proper procedure and precaution had the driver unlock the briefcase. The officer opened the briefcase and discovered a loaded .38 caliber handgun. The briefcase was found between the mattress and the wall of the cab, covered by two pillows. Investigation indicates this to be the location of the briefcase when the vehicle came in, and when it was not discovered by the in-bound search officer.

The result was that a loaded weapon was inside the protected area in a blue pass vehicle driven by a non-picture V badge individual. This was a one-hour NRC reportable event, and the final disposition by the NRC is pending.

The above described incident highlights the need to ensure that every search be complete and thorough, and that search officers be aware of all areas within a vehicle where prohibited items may be hidden. Vehicle searches are a routine function, with the vast majority of searches revealing no prohibited items. We cannot let this fact lull us into a false sense of security. As evidenced by the above incident, a loaded weapon could be present on any vehicle we search. The consequences of not finding one are potentially severe.

Let's learn from this incident and prevent any re-occurrence through thoroughness and awareness.

RCP:sk

NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

General Offices • Selden Street, Berlin, Connecticut

P.O. BOX 270
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270
(203) 666-6911

November 22, 1985

MP-8404

Tri State Motor Transport Co.
Lock Box No. 462
Joplin, MO. 64802

Gentlemen:

Recent events at Millstone Nuclear Power Station in Waterford, Conn., have indicated a need for a re-statement of Northeast Utilities policy regarding possession of weapons at this station.

Briefly stated, the policy is that no weapon is to be brought into the station's protected area.

If an individual applying for protected area access has a weapon in his possession, and a valid permit for that weapon issued by the State of Connecticut, the weapon is to be surrendered to the guard force prior to entry. The weapon will be returned upon exit.

If an individual applying for protected area access has a weapon in his possession, and has no valid permit for that weapon issued by the State of Connecticut, that person is in violation of Connecticut state law. The weapon will be confiscated by the Security Officer and, together with the person possessing the weapon, turned over to the police for disposition.

Your drivers can save themselves a great deal of trouble by not attempting to bring any weapon into nuclear power stations under control of Northeast Utilities. Please bring this letter to their attention.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

Wayne D. Romberg
Station Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

WDR/PLW:mo

cc: P. L. Weekley

NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

General Offices • Selden Street, Berlin, Connecticut

P.O. BOX 270
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270
(203) 666-6911

December 11, 1985
MP-8471

Tri State Motor Transport Co.
Lock Box No. 462
Joplin, MO. 64802

Gentlemen:

On November 22, 1985 I addressed a letter to you restating the Northeast Utilities policy regarding possession of weapons at this station. The incident that prompted the letter was the introduction of a pistol into the station's protected area by a Tri State driver, Mr. Roosevelt Murray.

At about 1:10 PM on November 13, 1985 a .38 caliber revolver was discovered in the "sleeper" section of the tractor trailer cab as the cab was being inspected for departure from the station. The revolver was in a briefcase between the mattress and the wall of the cab, covered by two pillows.

Our subsequent investigation revealed that the officer who performed the search when the truck was entering the station did not find the weapon. However, this officer questioned Mr. Murray prior to the vehicle search, asking him if he was carrying any weapons, explosives, drugs or liquor. The driver replied "no". Subsequently, the driver admitted to having four small bottles of liquor which were removed from the vehicle prior to its entering the station's protected area.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has also investigated the incident. NRC enforcement action is likely, and may result in a significant fine of Northeast Utilities.

Please advise me as soon as possible that you have brought my earlier letter to the attention of all of your drivers. Also, I would appreciate your advising me of any other corrective action that you have taken, or that you intend to take in the future. A reply before January 1, 1986 would be helpful to me in my discussions with NRC officials.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

Wayne D. Romberg
Wayne D. Romberg
Station Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

WDR/RJA:mo

cc: E. J. Mroczka
J. J. Kelley
R. J. Asafaylo
- - -

Security Program

November, 1983 - Present

Units 1, 2, and 3

<u>Violations</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Level</u>
Failure to fulfill security plan commitment (Outage Access) didn't record card key access on one authorized personnel entry to VA (SRI) 50-245/84-11	5-11-84	IV
Failure to provide effective surveillance of isolation zone. (Truck Parked next to fence blocking view of camera) (SRI) 50-245/85-02 50-336/85-03	2-20-85	IV
Failure to detect unauthorized weapon transported on site in attache case in Truck Sleeper Compartment. (LIC ID'd - special inspection by SRI - 50-245/85-31 and 50-336/85-36	11-13-85	
Failure to lock door of unattended vehicle. Re: 50-423/85-74	12-5-85	V

SALP ASSESSMENT

Category I - Units 1 and 2

Category I - Unit 3 (Recommended to DRP)