

Maine Yankee

RELIABLE ELECTRICITY SINCE 1972

329 BATH ROAD • BRUNSWICK, MAINE 04011 • (207) 798-4100

March 28, 1997

MN-97-48

JRH-97-69

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Attention: Document Control Desk

Washington, D. C. 20555

Reference: (a) License No. DPR-36 (Docket No. 50-309)


Subject: Maine Yankee Licensee Event Report 97-006, Pressure Tank Improperly
Stored Near Pump House

Gentlemen:

Please find enclosed Maine Yankee Licensee Event Report 97-006 . This report is
submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii).

Please contact us should you have any questions regarding this matter.

Very truly yours,



James R. Hebert, Manager
Licensing & Engineering Support Department

mwf

Enclosure

c: Mr. Hubert Miller
Mr. J. T. Yerokun
Mr. D. H. Dorman
Mr. Patrick J. Dostie
Mr. Uldis Vanags

9704090162 970328
PDR ADOCK 05000309
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EXPIRES 04/30/98

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of
digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS
MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE
LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD
COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION
AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND
TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF

FACILITY NAME (1)

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

50-3C9

PAGE (3)

1 OF 3

TITLE (4)

Propane Tank Improperly Stored Near Pump House.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
02	26	97	97	-- 006	-- 00	03	28	97	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
OPERATING MODE (9)		01	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		00	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)	
			20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		X 50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71	
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Mark A. Levesque, Nuclear Safety Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(207) 621-0573

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES

(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

X

NO

EXPECTED
SUBMISSION
DATE (15)

MONTH

DAY

YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On February 26, 1997, the plant was in the Refueling Operations Mode. In response to a question raised by the NRC Senior Resident, site Security personnel notified the Control Room that a 1000 gallon propane tank was found in close proximity to safety related components in the Circulating Water Pump House. The Control Room notified engineering personnel and plant management. Immediate actions were taken to empty the propane tank.

Further review revealed that the tank was installed as part of a heating system for the new outage cafeteria building that was installed in the protected yard. The temporary building and propane tank were installed without an approved work order, adequate engineering review, or adequate safety analysis.

Long term corrective actions include an evaluation of the potential affects of a 1000 gallon propane explosion on nearby safety related components. Project approval training needs will be evaluated to ensure future modifications of this nature receive the appropriate level of engineering review.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company	50-309	YEA	SEQUENTIAL	REVISI	2 OF 3
		97	-- 006 --	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS:

On February 26, 1997, the plant was in the Refueling Operations Mode.

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On February 26, 1997, in responding to a question raised by the NRC Senior Resident, site Security personnel notified the Control Room of the potential hazard that a newly installed propane tank presented to safety related components located in the nearby Circulating Water Pump House [NN]. An investigation determined that on February 21, 1997, 820 gallons of liquid propane had been delivered to an empty 1000 gallon propane tank [TK] which had recently been installed on site as part of a heating system for a temporary outage cafeteria building. Further review revealed that the temporary building and propane tank were installed without an approved work order, adequate engineering review, or adequate safety analysis.

A review of the work order process and engineering modification procedures revealed that the appropriate channels exist to ensure that activities such as this receive appropriate engineering review and analysis. However, personnel with direct oversight of this temporary facility modification did not ensure that the activity made it into the formal review processes established at Maine Yankee.

SAFETY EVALUATION:

Based on area walkdowns, the closest safety related components to the propane tank were Service Water System components [BI]. The initial concern was the potential affect an accidental explosion could have had on the components or the building structure that houses the components, the Circulating Water Pump House. Engineering analysis of a blast caused by 1000 gallons of propane within 100 feet of safety components determined that both the Circulating Water Pump House building structure and the buried Service Water piping would have survived the accidental explosion.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CAUSAL FACTORS:

The apparent causal factors associated with this issue are:

- 1) Personnel assigned to the project were not adequately trained in the use of the Work Order process.
- 2) Personnel assigned to the project were not adequately trained on the procedural requirements associated with acceptable engineering review and analysis methods.
- 3) Procedural weaknesses exist in the Maine Yankee procedure associated with the control of flammables as it relates to large compressed gas cylinders.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The Control Room notified engineering personnel and plant management. The vendor associated with the tank took immediate actions to empty the tank of its propane. A formal root cause evaluation is being conducted to identify additional causal factors and potential additional corrective actions.

Long term corrective actions will include an evaluation of the potential affects of a 1000 gallon propane explosion on nearby safety related components in the Circulating Water Pump House. Project approval training needs will be evaluated to ensure future modifications of this nature receive the appropriate level of engineering review.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS AND CAUSAL FACTORS:

- 1) LER 96-013, "Primary Vent Stack APD Seismic Qualification Questioned"
- 2) LER 96-018, "Inadequate Tornado Design of Emergency Diesel Generator Room Ventilation Dampers"
- 3) LER 96-022, "Containment Primary Component Piping Design Inadequacy Due to Lack of Thermal Relief Valves"
- 4) LER 95-002, "Cracked Cam Followers in General Electric SBM Switches"
- 5) LER 95-011, "Seat Ring Degradation in Contromatics Butterfly Valves"