NORTHEAST UTILITIES

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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January 17, 1986

Docket No. 50-423
F0974A

Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

References: (1) W. G. Counsil letter to T. E. Murley, F0570A, dated July 5, 1984.

(2) W. G. Counsil letter to T. E. Murley, F0583A, dated September 19, 1984.

(3) J. F. Opeka letter to V. Noonan, Evaluation of Environmental Effects of Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment, dated December 20, 1985.

(4) J. F. Opeka letter to V. Noonan, Evaluation of Environmental Effects of Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment, dated January 7,1986.

(5) J. F. Opeka letter to V. Noonan, Evaluation of Environmental Effects of Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment, dated January 14, 1986.

Dear Dr. Murley:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3
Reporting of Potential Significant Deficiencies
in Accordance with 10CFR50.55(e):
High Energy Line Breaks Outside Containment (SD-57)

In a June 5, 1984 telephone conversation between your Mr. T. Rebelowski and our Mr. R. R. Viviano, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), reported a potential significant deficiency in the construction of Millstone Unit No. 3 as required by 10CFR50.55(e). The potential significant deficiency involved two potential safety issues. One of the issues, the number of reactor coolant pumps which need to be operating in Mode 3, was determined not to be a significant deficiency for Millstone Unit No. 3 (see Reference (1)). The other potential safety issue, high energy line breaks outside of containment, required additional review.

Reference (2) noted that the safety issue concerned the potential impact of superheated steam on the environmental qualification of equipment outside of containment following a high energy line break.

In Reference (3), NNECO provided the Staff information regarding the impact of release of superheated steam from a postulated main steam line break (MSLB) on environmental qualification of equipment located outside containment. Specifically, Reference (3) included the following information:

- Description of design basis for postulated breaks
- Temperature and pressure profiles development criteria
- Temperature and pressure profiles and results

In Reference (4), NNECO submitted additional information concerning environmental effects on equipment required to safely shutdown the plant and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.

Representatives from NNECO met with the Staff on January 8, 1986 to discuss the Staff's concerns regarding our Reference (4) submittal.

In Reference (5), NNECO submitted clarifying information concerning the margin and responses to the Staff's questions that were raised at the January 8, 1986 meeting.

As such, we consider the information provided in the above references sufficient to close SD-57 as well as satisfy License Condition 2.6(3) MSLB Outside Containment.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

J. F. Opeka
Senior Vice President

cc: Mr. J. M. Taylor, Director
Division of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555