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Attached is a report on the reactor building Southeast ECCS pump room flooding incident which took place at Plant Hatch Unit 1 on December 21, 1985. This submittal is for information only since the subject event is not reportable per 10 CFR 50.72, 50.73 or the plant Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

L. T. Gucwa

CBS/lc

Attachment

c: Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.  
Mr. H. C. Nix, Jr.  
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Report on ECCS Pump Room Flooding  
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On 12/21/85, an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pump room was flooded to a level of about 14 feet when an air operated maintenance isolation valve on a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump suction line opened. When power to the solenoid control valve was removed, as a result of performing a Loss of Offsite Power (LOSP) Test, the maintenance valve returned to the open position. Water flowed from the torus, through the opened maintenance isolation valve and into the pump room from a disassembled RHR motor operated pump suction valve. The details of this event are described below.

The plant was in a refueling mode and all fuel was removed from the reactor vessel. RHR "A" loop pump suction valve (1E11-F004A) was disassembled for repair after failing a local leak rate test (LLRT). Maintenance isolation valve (1E11-F065A), which is located between 1E11-F004A and the torus, was shut and its control switch was "red tagged" (an administrative control which prohibited switch operation) in the control room. 1E11-F056A is an air operated butterfly valve which opens on loss of power to its solenoid valve.

At approximately 0054 CST, a scheduled Loss of Offsite Power test was started per plant procedures. A "Loss of Coolant Accident" (LOCA) signal was simulated for diesel generator (D/G) "1A". That diesel started as required. Plant personnel then deenergized 4160 volt bus "1E" to simulate a loss of offsite power. The D/G "1A" output breaker then immediately closed automatically which reenergized bus "1E". At approximately 0110 CST, D/G "1A" was tripped locally, as required by the test procedure, to demonstrate proper D/G logic function. During the time that the bus was deenergized power had been lost to the control solenoid for 1E11-F065A, and that isolation valve opened allowing water to flow from the torus into the southeast ECCS pump room via the disassembled 1E11-F004A valve. Following the planned deenergization of 4160 volt bus "1E", due to the D/G trip, the plant communication systems were lost. During this period of time the licensed operators in the main control room were unable to communicate with plant personnel in the D/G building until approximately 0120 CST, at which time, following reset of the trip, the diesel generator automatically restarted reenergizing 4160 volt bus "1E". Following reenergization of bus "1E", valve 1E11-F065A reclosed. By the time that valve 1E11-F065A had reclosed the water level in the southeast ECCS pump room had already equalized (at a level of 14 feet in that room) with the torus water level.

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When power was returned to bus "1E" resulting in page system restoration, two calls to the main control room were promptly made reporting flooding in the southeast ECCS pump room. A Hi Hi sump level alarm had also been received and the sump isolation valves had automatically isolated. The isolation signal was then overridden manually and the sump isolation valves were opened to allow the water to drain to the northeast ECCS pump room sump where it could be pumped to radwaste. After the water level in the southeast ECCS pump room was sufficiently lowered the source of the flood water was identified.

All of the equipment affected by the flooding has been identified and work activities have been scheduled and are now in progress which will restore this equipment to operability.

The equipment which was flooded was not required to be operable since adequate redundant systems were available to meet all design and Technical Specification requirements for the refueling mode of operation. In addition, there was no significant release of radioactive materials within or outside of the plant boundaries due to the low activity levels of the torus water which flooded the ECCS pump rooms. Therefore, there were no plant safety consequences, nor were the health and safety of the public affected as a result of this event.

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