

The Light company

Houston Lighting & Power South Texas Project Electric Generating Station P. O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483

February 27, 1997
ST-HL-AE-5591
File No.: G26
10CFR73.71
STI: 30196594

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

South Texas Project
Unit 1
Docket No. STN 50-498
Safeguards Event Report 97-S01
Regarding Disabled Security Door Intrusion Alarm

Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, South Texas Project submits the attached Unit 1 Safeguards Event Report 97-S01 regarding a disabled security door intrusion alarm. This event did not have an adverse effect on the health and safety of the public.

If you should have any questions on this matter, please contact Mr. S. M. Head at (512) 972-7136 or me at (512) 972-7800.

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G. L. Parkey
Plant Manager,
Unit 1

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PDR ADOCK 05000498
S PDR

KJT/

Attachment: SER 97-S01 (South Texas, Unit 1)

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Project Manager on Behalf of the Participants in the South Texas Project



IE74/
per: DCD

Houston Lighting & Power Company
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station

ST-HL-AE-5591
File No.: G26
Page 2

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of
digits/characters for each block)ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS
MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE
LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD
COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE
INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33),
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC
20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT

FACILITY NAME (1)

South Texas, Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000 498

PAGE (3)

1 OF 3

TITLE (4)

Disabled security door intrusion alarm

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
01	30	97	97	-- S01	-- 00	02	27	97	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
OPERATING MODE (9)		1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		100	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)	
			20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		X 73.71	
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Scott M. Head - Sr. Consulting Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(512) 972-7136

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On January 30, 1997, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 100% power. At 0507 hours, the intrusion alarm to the Fuel Handling Building truck bay security door was discovered to be disabled. The door was posted and a search of the Unit 1 power block was conducted with no discrepancies found. After the intrusion alarm was reenabled, operational tests were completed to place the security door in service and the security post was secured at 0856 hours on January 30, 1997. The intrusion alarm had been inadvertently disabled at the Central Alarm Station since 1616 hours on January 27, 1997 during startup and testing of the upgraded Nuclear Security System. The cause of this event is that the risk assessment for the testing plan did not ensure adequate compensatory actions were in place to prevent error. Corrective actions included modifying the startup and testing plan to maintain the concurrence function at the testing station, enhanced continuous monitoring of the testing station and review of security system status at the end of each day of testing. Plant procedures will be changed to require written testing plans prior to the implementation of future upgrades of the Security System.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
South Texas, Unit 1	05000 498	97	-- S01 --	00	2 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On January 30, 1997, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 100% power. At 0507 hours, the intrusion alarm to the Fuel Handling Building truck bay security door was discovered to be disabled. This resulted in a condition where a failure in a safeguard system could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a vital area without application of appropriate compensatory measures. The door was posted at 0514 hours. A search of the Unit 1 power block was initiated and completed at 0612 hours with no discrepancies found. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was notified of this event at 0603 hours.

At 0534 hours on January 30, 1997, the intrusion alarm to the Fuel Handling Building truck bay security door was reenabled. Operational tests were completed at 0536 hours. The security door was placed in service and the security post secured at 0856 hours on January 30, 1997.

A review of this occurrence found that the intrusion alarm to the Fuel Handling Building truck bay security door was inadvertently disabled at the Central Alarm Station at 1616 hours on January 27, 1997 during startup and testing of the upgraded Nuclear Security System. The Fuel Handling Building truck bay security door had just been successfully tested and placed back in service. During the preparatory steps for the next door to be tested, the Fuel Handling Building truck bay security door was inadvertently disabled at the Central Alarm Station. This error went undetected until the discovery on January 30, 1997.

During the startup and testing of the upgraded Nuclear Security System, control of the security doors was split between one organization at the Central Alarm Station and a second organization at the Transition Alarm Station and the Secondary Alarm Station. The concurrence function at the Central Alarm Station was disabled so that the stations monitoring the remainder of the system would not be distracted by testing. The result of this condition was the status of the system under test could not be fully monitored at any other alarm station so that the disabled intrusion alarm for the Fuel Handling Building truck bay security door was not detected at any other alarm station.

CAUSE OF EVENT:

The cause of this event is that the risk assessment for the testing plan did not ensure adequate compensatory actions were in place to prevent error. Numerous repetitive tasks were required to be performed in which self checking alone was not an adequate barrier to prevent error.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
South Texas, Unit 1	05000 498	97	-- S01 --	00	3 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

Failure in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a vital area for which compensatory measures have not been employed is reportable pursuant to 10CFR73.71. There were no safety consequences.

There is reasonable assurance that an unauthorized access had not occurred. A search of the Unit 1 power block found no discrepancies. The Fuel Handling Building truck bay security door consists of two large leaf doors with a small personnel access door in one of the larger doors. The personnel access door is strongbacked and the two larger doors are chained and padlocked inside the Fuel Handling Building. The strongback and these locks were found in place when the intrusion alarm to the door was discovered disabled.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

1. The startup and testing plan for upgraded Nuclear Security System was formalized to include the following:
 - a. The concurrence function at the testing station (Central Alarm Stations 1 and 2) to allow verification of system status at alternate station (Central Alarm Station 3) is now maintained.
 - b. Continuous monitoring at the testing station has been enhanced by requiring the presence of a second checker.
 - c. Nuclear Security System status is now reviewed at the end of each day of testing.
2. Plant procedures will be changed by June 1997 to require written testing plans prior to the implementation of future upgrades of the Security System.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

There have been no reports within the last three years by the South Texas Project to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding inadvertent disabling of security door intrusion alarms.