



GPU Nuclear, Inc.
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November 26, 1995
6730-96-2349

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report 96-010: Failure of Remote Shutdown Equipment
to Operate Due to Contact Failure

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 96-010. This event did not impact the health and safety of the public.

The original due date of this report was November 15, 1996. On November 5, 1996, we asked the Senior Resident Inspector for an extension. On November 7, 1996, a fourteen (14) day extension was granted. The new due date of this report is November 29, 1996. This additional time was used to complete a reportability review of this event.

If any additional information of assistance is required, please contact Mr. Terry Sensue, Regulatory Affairs Engineer, at 609-971-4680.

Very truly yours,

Michael B. Roche
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

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PDR ADOCK 05000219
S PDR

MBR/TS/gl 020080

Attachment

cc: Administrator, Region I
NRC Project Manager

IE221,

NRC FORM 366 (4-95)			U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION			APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/98 <small>ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.</small>																									
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)																															
FACILITY NAME (1) <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">OYSTER CREEK, UNIT 1</div>				DOCKET NUMBER (2) <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">50-219</div>		PAGE (3) <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">1 OF 4</div>																									
TITLE (4) <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Failure of Remote Shutdown Equipment to Operate Due to Contact Failure</div>																															
EVENT DATE (5) <table border="1" style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width:33%;">Month</td> <td style="width:33%;">Day</td> <td style="width:33%;">Year</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">10</td> <td style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">16</td> <td style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">96</td> </tr> </table>			Month	Day	Year	10	16	96	LER NUMBER (6) <table border="1" style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width:33%;">Year</td> <td style="width:33%;">Sequential Number</td> <td style="width:33%;">Revision</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">96</td> <td style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">-- 010 --</td> <td style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">0</td> </tr> </table>			Year	Sequential Number	Revision	96	-- 010 --	0	REPORT DATE (7) <table border="1" style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width:33%;">Month</td> <td style="width:33%;">Day</td> <td style="width:33%;">Year</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>		Month	Day	Year				OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) <table border="1" style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width:60%;">Facility Name</td> <td style="width:40%;">Docket Number</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FACILITY NAME</td> <td>DOCKET NUMBER</td> </tr> </table>		Facility Name	Docket Number	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
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OPERATING MODE (9) <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">N</div>			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)																												
POWER LEVEL (10) <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">0.0</div>			20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)																						
			20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)																						
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71																						
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER <small>Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A</small>																						
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)																								
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)																								
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																															
NAME <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Mike Godknecht, System Engineer</div>						TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">609-971-4189</div>																									
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																															
Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to NPRDS		Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to NPRDS																					
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)						EXPECTED SUBMISSION		MONTH	DAY	YEAR																					
YES <small>(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).</small>				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		NO																									
ABSTRACT (16) <small>(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)</small>																															
<p>On October 16, 1996, while performing a routine refueling outage surveillance on the Appendix R Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP) during the 16R Refueling Outage, one valve of the Isolation Condenser System did not operate as expected. This valve is designed to achieve an open position when an RSP relay is activated. The apparent cause of the occurrence was dirty contacts on the control relay for this valve in the RSP. The contacts on the affected relay were cleaned and the valve circuit was retested satisfactorily. The safety significance of this occurrence is considered minimal because other systems were available to remove decay heat from the reactor and keep the core covered during an Appendix R fire in the Control Room. Engineering is evaluating the problem with the contacts on the relays used in the Remote Shutdown System to determine the appropriate action to take to prevent recurrence.</p>																															

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DATE OF OCCURRENCE

This event occurred on October 16, 1996, at approximately 1500 hours.

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

While performing a routine refueling outage surveillance on the Appendix R Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP), one valve of the Isolation Condenser (EIIS-BL) failed to operate as expected and as stated in the Appendix R Technical Data Report. This event was initially reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(a)(i). However, upon further review this event is not reportable under 10 CFR . Also, this equipment is not included in the Oyster Creek Technical Specifications. This event is being reported in accordance with Section 2E of the Oyster Creek NGS Facility Operating License.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

The plant was in Cold Shutdown in Refueling Outage 16R.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

While performing a surveillance on the RSP, it was found that Isolation Condenser Valve V-14-37 (EIIC-ISV) would not operate from the RSP. This valve is designed to automatically reopen when the RSP is activated if it were to close during an Appendix R scenario. The RSP was actuated several times but the valve did not open. Maintenance personnel subsequently cleaned the contacts on the relay that controls the transfer of the valve functions to the RSP. The valve was retested and operated as required.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The apparent cause of the occurrence was dirty contacts on the control relay for V-14-37 in the RSP.

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ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The Remote Shutdown System is designed to assist the operators in operating important plant systems and components to place and maintain the reactor in Hot Shutdown and then cool down the reactor to Cold Shutdown during an Appendix R fire in the Control Room. The Isolation Condenser is used to remove decay heat and eventually cool down the reactor when in an isolated condition.

However, for the first ten minutes of this scenario, before the Isolation Condenser can be actuated from the RSP, the Electromatic Relief Valves (EMRVs) or Safety Valves (EIIC-RV) provide the decay heat removal function as designed. If the Isolation Condenser failed to actuate from the RSP, the EMRVs or Safety Valves would continue to provide for decay heat removal until other means could be used to put the Isolation Condenser in-service. The analysis for this scenario does not take credit for makeup for the inventory lost via the relief valves. This makeup would be from the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System (EIIS-AA). By design, both CRD pumps can be controlled from the Remote Shutdown System and both pumps were proven to be operable. Thus, both decay heat removal and inventory makeup were available to maintain the reactor in Hot Shutdown with a water level above the top of active fuel.

Therefore, the safety significance of this event with the reactor at power is considered minimal.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The contacts on the affected relay were cleaned and the valve circuit was retested satisfactorily.

Engineering is evaluating the problem with the contacts becoming dirty on the relays used in the Remote Shutdown System. The Engineering evaluation includes:

1. Performing surveillances on the Remote Shutdown System more frequently to ensure operability of system relays.
2. Developing additional methods of operating relay contacts to ensure oxide layers are not formed.
3. Researching the relay contact material to determine if different contacts can be installed that are not susceptible to oxide formation.

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FAILURE DATA

Potter-Brumfield Relays, 125 vdc, 8PDT, Model # MDR138-8

SIMILAR EVENTS

None