PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
EUGENE WATER & ELECTRIC BOARD
AND
PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Operating License NPF-1
Docket 50-344
License Change Application 127

This License Change Application requests modifications to Operating License NPF-1 for the Trojan Nuclear Plant to amplify the surveillance requirements for Component Cooling Water System valves.

PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

By B D Withers

Bart D. Withers
Vice President
Nuclear

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of September 1985.

Carole A. Hodgdon
Notary Public of Oregon

My Commission Expires: August 9, 1987

LICENSE CHANGE APPLICATION 127

The following changes to Facility Operating License NPF-1 are requested (proposed replacement pages are provided as Attachment 1).

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE

Surveillance Requirement 4.7.3.1.c is revised to include the following signals for automatic valve closure, as appropriate:

1. A Containment isolation signal,

2. A Containment isolation signal coincident with a low CCW surge tank level, or

3. A high-high Containment pressure signal.

REASON FOR CHANGE

The CCW to RCP supply and return valves (MO-3294, MO-3296, MO-3300, and MO-3320) originally were designed to close upon receipt of a Containment isolation signal. This was changed to close the valves on a Containment high-high pressure signal or a Containment isolation coincident with a low CCW surge tank level.

The proposed revision to Surveillance Requirement 4.7.3.1.c addresses this change.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

Termination of CCW to the RCPs on a Containment isolation signal alone requires an evaluation by the operators as to whether continued operation of the RCPs is necessary. If the RCPs are required to operate, manual action must be taken to restore CCW to the RCPs. Failure to act promptly can result in damage to the RCPs due to loss of cooling water.

By isolating CCW flow to the RCPs on a Containment high-high pressure signal or a Containment isolation signal coincident with a low CCW surge tank level, a spurious or bona fide Containment isolation signal by itself will not require the operators to give immediate attention to the RCPs. This is because CCW is still flowing to the RCPs. In addition, the RCPs will now be available for transients and accidents for which they previously could have been made inoperable.

This change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident, does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident, nor does it reduce a margin of safety since: (1) the likelihood of RCP damage has been reduced, (2) the availability of the RCPs during selected transients is enhanced, and (3) the integrity of safety-related portions of the CCW System is still assured. Based on the above, this change does not pose a significant hazard.

This change is consistent with the recommendations of NRC Generic Letter 83-10d.

SAFETY/ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION

Safety and environmental evaluations were performed as required by 10 CFR 50 and the Trojan Technical Specifications. This review determined that an unreviewed safety question does not exist since Plant operations remain consistent with the Updated FSAR, adequate surveillance is maintained, and there is no conceivable impact upon the environment.

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