

# WOLF CREEK

NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

Clay C. Warren  
Chief Operating Officer

February 21, 1997

WO 97-0025

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Mail Station P1-137  
Washington, D. C. 20555


Subject: Docket No. 50-482: Licensee Event Report 97-003-00

Gentlemen:

The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71 (b) concerning the loss of a security key that presented a temporary degradation in a safeguard system.

If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact me at (316) 364-8831 extension 4485, or Mr. Richard D. Flannigan at extension 4500.

Very truly yours,



Clay C. Warren

CCW/jad

Attachment

cc: J. E. Dyer (NRC), w/a  
W. D. Johnson (NRC), w/a  
J. F. Ringwald (NRC), w/a  
J. C. Stone (NRC), w/a

9702260026 970221  
PDR ADOCK 05000482  
S PDR

P.O. Box 411 / Burlington, KS 66839 / Phone: (316) 364-8831

An Equal Opportunity Employer M/F/H/VET

IE74

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000482

PAGE (3)

1 OF 3

TITLE (4)

Missing High Security Key to Vital Area Doors

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
01	28	97	97	03	00	02	21	97	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
OPERATING		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) (11)								
MODE 1		20 402(b)		20 405(c)		50 73(a)(2)(iv)		X	73 71(b)	
POWER		20 405(a)(1)(i)		50 36(c)(1)		50 73(a)(2)(v)			73 71(c)	
100%		20 405(a)(1)(ii)		50 36(c)(2)		50 73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER	
		20 405(a)(1)(iii)		50 73(a)(2)(i)		50 73(a)(2)(viii)(A)				
		20 405(a)(1)(iv)		50 73(a)(2)(ii)		50 73(a)(2)(viii)(B)				
		20 405(a)(1)(v)		50 73(a)(2)(iii)		50 73(a)(2)(x)				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Richard D. Flannigan  
Manager Nuclear Engineering, Safety, and Licensing

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

316-364-8831 ext. 4500

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
		N/A							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED

MONTH

DAY

YEAR

YES	X	NO
-----	---	----

ABSTRACT:

On January 28, 1997, a security key which is used to unlock vital area doors could not be accounted for during key inventory activities performed during normal shift operations. Security personnel on shift at the time and personnel who were on the previous shift were contacted in an effort to locate the key. The key could not be found. The root cause for this event is inadequate administrative control of security keys. Corrective action included changing the lock core for all vital area doors, locking the key cabinet and revising the appropriate security procedure.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (M/NBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Wolf Creek Generating Station	05000482	97	003	00	2 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

**Plant Conditions Prior to the Event:**

MODE = 1

Reactor Coolant Pressure = 2234 psig

Reactor Power = 100%

**Basis for Reportability:**

Appendix G to 10 CFR 73 requires that any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed be reported within one hour of discovery and followed by a written report in thirty days.

The loss of a security key which can admit access into vital areas meets this criteria. Accordingly, the one-hour phone notification was made on January 28, 1997 at 2347 CST, and a Licensee Event Report is being submitted.

**Description of Event:**

On January 28, 1997, at 0810 CST, a routine security key inventory was performed and all security keys were accounted for. At 2041 CST, another inventory was performed, and key #8839 was identified as missing from the high security key box. The key had not been signed out on the key issue panel nor on the key issue log. Security procedure, SEC 01-206, "Mechanical Key Control and Issue," requires that all high security master keys shall be issued via the key data entry terminal at the Personnel Access Control Station (PACS) key issue window.

Key #8839 is a high security master key which will open all protected and vital area doors. Although the key would allow access, an alarm would be received in the central and secondary alarm stations on any vital door opened with the key.

Security personnel attempted to locate the key by performing an extensive search including the area surrounding the key cabinet, the security office area, and the security personnel lockers. Personnel from the off-going shift were contacted and questioned about the missing key. No additional information was gained.

Printouts from the security data management system identified fifty individuals entering PACS between the two key inventory times. Forty-three were security personnel and seven were other plant employees. All personnel entering PACs had valid reasons and no conclusive evidence was gained from the interviews conducted.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Wolf Creek Generating Station	05000482	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
		97	003	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Printouts for the security data management system were done to determine if any high security doors were opened by individuals that did not have a high security key signed out to them at the time. In each case a key had been logged out by an authorized person and entry and exit into the vital area expected.

**Root Cause:**

The root cause of this event is inadequate administrative control of the high security key box.

**Corrective Actions**

The Security locksmith was called out to the plant and started changing the high security key cores at 0100 CST, on January 29, 1997. Security personnel maintained heightened awareness until all the key cores were changed out at 0830 CST, the same day.

A reaffirmation letter was sent out to all security personnel on February 13, 1997, regarding control of high security keys. The letter informed security personnel that the high security key box is to be kept locked, and that the Security Shift Lieutenant will assign the key to the box to a security individual who will provide oversight of the key sign-out process.

The number of security keys has been reduced and the key box reorganized to make inventory activities easier.

Security procedure, SEC 01-206, "Mechanical Key Control and Issue," will be revised by March 14, 1997, to require that the security key box be kept locked and the key controlled by an individual designated by the Security Shift Lieutenant.

**Safety Significance:**

There was no safety significance to this event as no unauthorized entries were made into vital areas with the missing key. Since the event, all vital door key cores have been changed.

**Other Previous Occurrences:**

None