



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos.: 50-413/85-34 and 50-414/85-31

Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414

License Nos.: NPF-35 and CPPR-117

Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: August 5 - 8, 1985

Inspector: *J. J. Blake*
for W. P. King

8/21/85
Date Signed

Approved by: *J. J. Blake*
J. J. Blake, Section Chief
Division of Reactor Safety

8/21/85
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 27 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Safety-Related Pipe Supports and Construction Deficiency Reports.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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PDR ADOCK 05000413
Q PDR

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *E. M. Couch, Project Manager
- *T. B. Bright, Engineering Manager
- *E. B. Miller, Senior QA Engineer
- *R. M. Dulin, Senior Design Engineer
- *W. G. Goodman, QA Inspection Superintendent
- *R. L. Williams, Design Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included QC inspectors and design engineers.

NRC Resident Inspectors

- P. K. Van Doorn
- P. Skinner

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 8, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

(Open) Unresolved Item 414/85-31-01, Snubber Installation Discrepancies, paragraph 5.

(Open) Unresolved Item 414/85-31-02, Failed Containment Spray Pipe Support, paragraph 5.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

(Closed) Unresolved Item 413/83-51-02, Overlap Modelling Technique - The unresolved item was left open by RII Report 50-413/85-08 pending submittal of an FSAR change for the quick pipe piping analysis procedure used by the licensee. During the inspection FSAR change number 12 forwarded by DPC memorandum to NRR on May 17, 1985 was reviewed. FSAR Change 12 contained a description of the quick pipe analysis method. The unresolved item was closed.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. Two new unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 5.

5. Safety-Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems (50090) Unit 2

RII Inspection Report Numbers 50-414/82-08, 82-27, 83-04, 83-19, 83-24, and 85-07 documented inspections of Unit 2 pipe supports and restraints. A follow-on inspection was performed to verify the adequacy of installation inspection and documentation of safety-related pipe support and restraint systems.

Documentation for the installation and inspection of the following RHR System auxiliary building pipe supports/restraints were reviewed and the supports/restraints were reinspected with the assistance of QC. QC reinspection was observed and discussed with the QC inspectors.

<u>Support/Restraint No.</u>	<u>Drawing Revision</u>	<u>Type</u>
2-R-ND-0001	Rev. 2	#13 Spring Can
2-R-ND-0006	Rev. 3	#5 Spring Can
2-R-ND-0010	Rev. 2	#3 Snubber
2-R-ND-0016	Rev. 3	#3 Snubber
2-R-ND-0017	Rev. 2	#8 Spring Can
2-R-ND-0021	Rev. 2	#1 Snubber
2-R-ND-0022	Rev. 2	#1 Snubber
2-R-ND-0025	Rev. 2	#8 Spring Can
2-R-ND-0027	Rev. 1	#1 Snubber
2-R-ND-0038	Rev. 2	#9 Spring Can
2-R-ND-0039	Rev. 2	#1 Snubber
2-R-ND-0043	Rev. 2	#1 Snubber
2-R-ND-0047	Rev. 2	#3 Snubber
2-R-ND-0049	Rev. 2	#1 Snubber
2-R-ND-0413	Rev. 2	# 1/2 Snubber
2-R-ND-0481	Rev. 0	# 1/2 Snubber

The inspector observed that a lock nut for the snubber of pipe support 2-R-ND-0021 was loose. In addition, pipe insulation caulk was observed to have been applied on the exterior sliding parts of the snubber of pipe support 2-R-ND-0016. No similar conditions were noted on the remainder of the pipe supports inspected. In addition, a visual observation of other snubbers and spring cans did not result in similar findings and indicated that the conditions were isolated cases. The licensee issued nonconforming item report (NCIR) 19891 to document the noted conditions during the inspection. Pending licensee corrective action for the NCIR, this was identified as Inspector Followup Item 50-44/85-31-01, Snubber Installation Discrepancies.

During the above noted inspection, containment spray pipe restraint 2-R-NS-0080 was observed to have been damaged. The baseplate and concrete expansion anchors appeared to have been pulled out of the wall by approximately one inch. Adjacent pipe supports showed signs that the piping had moved a similar amount. A subsequent QC inspection of the piping also showed signs of damage as it runs through an adjacent penetration sleeve. The licensee issued NCIR 19890 during the inspection to document the noted conditions. Pending licensee investigation of cause and determination of corrective action, the above noted condition was identified as Unresolved Item 50-414/85-31-02, Failed Containment Spray Pipe Support.

Within the areas examined, no violation or deviations were identified.

6. (Open) Construction Deficiency Report (CDR) Numbers 414/85-06 and 85-08, Overpressurization of the Chemical and Volume Control System and Residual Heat Removal System.

The licensee submitted supplemental reports for CDRs 85-06 and 85-08 to provide engineering evaluation of the overpressurization of the subject systems. NCIRs 19631 and 19632 provide the basic discrepancy reports and corrective action. The NCIRs and the licensee's engineering evaluation for acceptance of overpressurized portions of affected systems were reviewed. The inspector had the following observations:

- a. Due to the magnitude and complexity of affected overpressurized items, there appeared to be a need to organize the documentation such that all inspections performed and all evaluation performed are reviewed and determined to be complete. Examples: Visual inspection results need to be documented on the NCIR; licensee action items resulting from vendor evaluations needed to be completed.
- b. Valves within the over-pressurized area were evaluated by Impell, Dresser and Fisher for 600 psig. NCIR 19631 indicates piping was pressurized to 700 psig. There appeared to be a need to confirm the maximum pressure that the affected systems were subjected to and to assure correct evaluation to that pressure.
- c. Since significant portions of overpressurized systems had been evaluated to be acceptable, there appeared to be a need for the licensee to subject the affected portions of the over pressurized system to additional scrutiny during normal hot functional testing. Example: Mechanical connections should be observed for leakage pending licensee completion of corrective action and further NRC inspection, the CDRs were left open.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.