



November 15, 1996

**United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555**

This Special Report is submitted in accordance with LaSalle Unit 1 and 2 Operating Licenses NPF-11 and NPF-18, Appendix A, and Technical Specifications 3.7.6, 3.3.7.9 and 6.6.C.

Technical Specification 3.7.6 "Fire Rated Assemblies"

Technical Specification 3.7.6 requires that all fire rated assemblies, including walls, floor/ceilings, cable tray enclosures and other fire barriers separating safety-related fire areas or separating portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area, and all sealing devices in fire rated assembly penetrations (fire doors, fire windows, fire dampers, cable and piping penetration seals and ventilation seals) shall be OPERABLE at all times.

At 1030 hours, on October 11, 1996, Fire Doors 849 and 260 were declared inoperable. The doors were opened for a period greater than seven days, to support activities performed during the Unit 2 Refueling Outage (L2R07). Door 849 is located within Fire Zone 4E3 Unit 1 Division 2 Essential Switchgear Room (Auxiliary Building elevation 731'). This door serves to divide this zone into two subzones 4E3-1 and 4E3-2. Door 260 serves to divide Fire Zone 4E3 Unit 1 Division 2 Essential Switchgear Room (Auxiliary Building elevation 731') from Fire Zone 4E4 Unit 2 Division 2 Essential Switchgear Room (Auxiliary Building elevation 731').

The doors were opened to route a temporary power cable in support of Temporary Alteration TALT 1-0099-96 "TALT Power Division II Battery Charger for 242Y Bus Drop".

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An hourly Fire Watch was established in accordance with the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.6. This watch remained in effect until both doors were closed. This compensatory measure along with the operable fire detection existing on both sides of the doors and the oversight of the Fire Protection Administrative Program ensured the level of fire protection was not reduced. The doors were returned to service on October 25, 1996 at 1329 hours.

Technical Specification 3.3.7.9 "Fire Detection Instrumentation"

Technical Specification 3.3.7.9 requires as a minimum, the fire detection instrumentation for each fire detection zone of Unit 1 and Unit 2 shown in Table 3.3.7.9-1 shall be OPERABLE whenever the equipment protected by the detection instrument is required to be OPERABLE.

At 2045 hours, on October 8 1996, fire detection zones 2-34 and 2-35 were declared inoperable. At 2230 hours, the following day, October 9, 1996, fire detection zones 2-23, 2-24, 2-17, 2-17P, 2-22, and 2-22P were also declared inoperable. All eight zones were impaired for a period greater than fourteen days to support activities performed during the Unit 2 Refueling Outage (L2R07). These detection zones are located in the Unit 2 Reactor Building at elevations 820', 761', 740', and 710'.


At 1630 hours, on October 11 1996, fire detection zone 2-28 was declared inoperable. This zone was also impaired for a period greater than fourteen days to support activities performed during the Unit 2 Refueling Outage (L2R07). This detection zone is located in the Unit 2 Diesel Generator Building at elevations 674'.

During the Refueling Outage, a number of activities such as cutting and welding are in progress. These activities have in the past caused the detection zones to alarm. The increased frequency of these false alarms has the potential to distract and desensitize workers to fire alarms.

In accordance with the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.3.7.9, a one hour Fire Watch has been established. This watch will remain in effect until the detection zones are restored. This compensatory measure along with the additional fire protection measures provided when activities such as cutting and welding occur and the oversight of the Fire Protection Administrative Program ensure the level of fire protection will not be reduced. The zones will be returned to service upon completion of activities requiring cutting and welding.

If there are any questions or comments concerning this letter, please refer them to me at (815) 357-6761, extension 2212.

Respectfully,



D. J. Ray
Station Manager
LaSalle County Station

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