

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
Kewaunee Nuclear Power PlantDOCKET NUMBER (2)
050003051 OF 02

TITLE (4)

INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF ESF COMPONENTS DUE TO MOMENTARY POWER LOSS

EVENT DATE (8)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (9)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)									
0	7	2	5	8	5	0	1	6	0	0	8	2	6	8	5	0	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (10)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
POWER LEVEL (10) 100	20.402(b)			20.406(c)			X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)		
	20.406(a)(1)(i)			50.36(e)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(c)		
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(e)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
20.406(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(ix)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME
Thomas J. Vukovich, Plant Nuclear EngineerTELEPHONE NUMBER
AREA CODE
414 388-2560

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
N/A

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 25, 1985 at 1101 CDT, with the plant at 100% power, a control operator observed the position indication lights for several containment isolation valves and steam exclusion dampers change position. Immediately, an investigation into the cause of the event was initiated and after verifying that plant conditions were normal, the operators returned the equipment to its normal operating configuration.

At the time of the event a QC Technician was verifying wire codes in Relay Rack 170, AC Safeguard Bus 5 Distribution Fuse Panel (RR170) from an approved procedure under cognizance of the Shift Supervisor. The event occurred when power was momentarily interrupted to RR170 due to manipulation of an improper crimp on the RR170's power lead.

The power interruption caused several containment isolation valves to perform their isolation function and a momentary loss of system redundancy. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an automatic initiation of an Engineered Safety Feature.

A procedure was developed to allow crimping RR-170's power lead without interrupting power and was successfully completed on August 2, 1985. A preventative maintenance procedure is being written to visually inspect wire terminations in selected terminal boxes, relay racks, and other electrical enclosures. This procedure will be performed during the 1986 refueling outage and at periodic intervals thereafter.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant	0500030585	—	016	—	00	02	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

On July 25, 1985 at 1101 CDT, with the plant at 100% power, a control operator observed the position indication lights for several containment isolation valves (V) and steam exclusion dampers (DMP) change position. The auxiliary building (AB) supply and exhaust fans (FAN) had stopped, and the 1B Containment Fan Coil (CFC) breaker (BKR) open alarm was received.

Immediately an investigation was initiated as to the cause of the event and, after verifying that plant conditions were normal, the operators returned the equipment to its normal operating configuration.

Prior to the event the Shift Supervisor had authorized a contracted Quality Control Technician to continue an approved procedure and verify wire codes in the relay racks. The Technician was working in Relay Rack 170, AC Safeguard Bus 5 Distribution Fuse Panel (RR170) when the equipment repositioned.

A work request was initiated to determine the cause of the event and electricians discovered that the terminal connection of the 120V AC power supply to RR170 was improperly crimped. It was determined that the QC Technician was verifying the code of this wire when the event occurred.

A procedure was developed to re-crimp the 120V AC power supply to RR170 without interrupting power. This procedure was successfully completed on August 2, 1985. Additionally, a preventative maintenance procedure is being written to visually inspect wire terminations in selected terminal boxes, relay racks, and other electrical enclosures. This procedure will be performed during the 1986 refueling outage and at periodic intervals thereafter.

Although RR170 feeds many Train A safeguards components the power interruption was of such short duration that all the equipment did not respond. The affected equipment included:

- Steam Exclusion Dampers - Closed
- SG Blowdown Sample Valves - Closed
- Containment Air Sample Valves - Closed
- Post LOCA H₂ to Recombiner Valves - Closed

Position indication for various valves and the 1B CFC breaker was also momentarily lost; however, their position was unaffected.

The power interruption caused the above containment isolation valves to perform their isolation function and a momentary loss of system redundancy. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature System; containment isolation.

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION

P.O. Box 19002, Green Bay, WI 54307-9002



August 26, 1985

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Docket 50-305
Operating License DPR-43
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant
Reportable Occurrence 85-016-00

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, "Licensee Event Report System", the attached Licensee Event Report for reportable occurrence 85-016-00 is being submitted.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "D. C. Hintz", followed by a small flourish.

D. C. Hintz
Manager - Nuclear Power

GWH/js
Attach.

cc - INPO Records Center
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