

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 3										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6 1 OF 0 2										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2	
TITLE (4) Containment Isolation Because of a Fuse Removal																					
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)								
0 7	3 0	8 5	8 5	0 2	1	0 0	0 8	2 7	8 5					0 5 0 0 0							
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																			
N		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.38(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)							
0 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.38(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)							
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)											
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)											
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)											
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																					
NAME R. C. Steele										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 2 0 1 5 7 1 2 9 - 2 1 5 3 1 6											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD											
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR							
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO											

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 30, 1985, an inadvertent containment isolation occurred when a fuse was pulled to deenergize a valve circuit in order to perform a modification. The unexpected isolation occurred because the modification instructions and the tag-out request did not adequately address all events expected due to deenergizing the circuit. The fuse was reinstalled and the isolation reset. To control future recurrences, the tag-out requests will be revised to address the effects on the circuits involved.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6 8 5 - 0 2 1 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Units 1 and 2 were in refueling outages, and unit 3 was in an extended maintenance shutdown.

On July 30, 1985, an inadvertent containment isolation occurred when fuse 16A-F20 (FU) was pulled to deenergize the control power to the vent to standby gas treatment flow control valve (FCV-84-20). The FCV-84-20 was being deenergized on a tag-out request to allow circuit modifications to be performed. When the fuse was pulled, the following occurred:

- a. Standby gas treatment (BH) initiation
- b. Control room emergency ventilation (VI) initiation
- c. Unit 3 reactor zone (VB) isolation
- d. Refueling zone (VA) isolation
- e. Primary containment isolation (JM) group 6 isolated

Deenergizing the FCV-84-20 control circuit by pulling fuse 16A-F20 also deenergized relays 16A-K38, 16A-K24, 16A-K65A, 16A-K65B, and 16A-K72 (these relays are associated with the atmospheric control system outboard valves trip circuits) resulting in the isolation. The containment isolation occurred unexpectedly because the modification instructions and the tag-out request did not adequately address the effects of deenergizing the control power to flow control valve FCV-84-20 circuit.

The 16A-F20 fuse was reinstalled, and the isolation reset. During the event, the affected safety system performed as designed with no adverse effects noted. To prevent the occurrences of similar events the tag-out requests will be revised to address the effects on the circuits involved.

Responsible Plant Section - N/A

Previous Events - None

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

P. O. Box 2000
Decatur, Alabama 35602

August 27, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555


Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 3 -
DOCKET NO. 50-296 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68 - REPORTABLE
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-296/85021

The enclosed report provides details concerning containment isolation
because of a fuse removal. This report is submitted in accordance with
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



Robert L. Lewis
Acting Plant Manager
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosures

cc (Enclosures):

Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
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Atlanta, Georgia 30303

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
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Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BFN

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