



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

November 15, 1996

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of)
Tennessee Valley Authority)

Docket No. 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE
DPR-79 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 96-04

The enclosed special report provides details concerning the Unit 2 lower airlock between the auxiliary building and the reactor building that was nonfunctional as a fire barrier. This airlock was intentionally removed from service to allow movement of personnel and equipment into the reactor building to support forced outage activities. The airlock was nonfunctional as a fire barrier for a time period greater than the TS allowable timeframe.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please telephone Steve Gilley at (423) 843-7427.

Sincerely,

R.H. Shell
Manager
SQN Site Licensing and Industry Affairs

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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cc (Enclosure):

Mr. R. W. Hernan, Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint, North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739

NRC Resident Inspector
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
2600 Igou Ferry Road
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000

Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711

ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPORT 96-04

Special Report 96-04

Description of Condition

On October 12, 1996 with Unit 2 in mode 5 for a forced outage, the Unit 2 lower airlock located on elevation 690 in the auxiliary building was breached.

The airlock remained breached in excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The airlock was opened to facilitate the movement of personnel and equipment between the auxiliary building and the Unit 2 reactor building in support of forced outage activities.

Corrective Action

In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement(a), a roving firewatch was immediately established and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving firewatch was maintained until the fire barrier was reestablished on October 21, 1996.