

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
Turkey Point Unit 3DOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0PAGE (3)
1 OF 0 2TITLE (4)
Reactor Protection System Actuation - Reactor Trip

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
0	7	2	9	8	5	8	5	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N/A										0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0										
N/A										0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0										

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10)	1	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)					
1	0	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)					
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)					
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)						
		20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME: **Randall D. Hart, Licensing Engineer**
TELEPHONE NUMBER: **3 0 5 2 4 5 - 2 9 1 0**

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
☐ YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☒ NO
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
MONTH: **8** DAY: **1** YEAR: **1985**

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Event: On July 29, 1985, Unit 3 experienced a reactor trip from 100% power. The trip occurred during the performance of Operating Procedure (OP) 12304.2, "Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Periodic Channel Functional Test". While verifying the over-power high range reactor trip bistable for nuclear instrumentation system (NIS) channel N-43, the setpoint was increased to 108% and a reactor trip signal was generated in train "A" of the reactor protection system. This opened reactor trip breaker "A", generating a reactor trip and subsequent turbine trip. The logic for this trip signal is 2 out of 4 channels. OP 12304.2 was stopped and the unit was stabilized at hot standby conditions.

Cause of Event: The most probable cause of the trip was due to dirty contacts on one NIS channel so that when N-43 was increased above the trip setpoint, a reactor trip signal was generated.

Corrective Actions:

- 1) Several reactor protection system periodic tests were performed satisfactorily.
- 2) The power range trip relays were removed, cleaned and re-installed.
- 3) A resistance check on the power range trip relay contacts for reactor protection system train "A" and a test to determine the voltage drop across the closed contacts were performed.
- 4) A test was conducted in an attempt to recreate this sequence of events on July 30, 1985. The test results were similar to the sequence of events that occurred during the reactor trip.
- 5) Upon completion of the post-trip review and identification of the most probable root cause, Unit 3 was placed on the line on August 1, 1985. Prior to exceeding 30% power, the previously performed NIS periodic tests were again satisfactorily completed.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Turkey Point Unit 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 5	0 2 2	0 0	0 2	0 2	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Event:

On July 29, 1985, Unit 3 experienced a reactor trip from 100% power at 11:16 a.m. At 9:20 a.m., Operating Procedure (OP) 12304.2, "Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Periodic Channel Functional Test", was commenced. While verifying the over-power high range reactor trip bistable for nuclear instrumentation system (NIS) channel N-43 the setpoint was increased to 108% and a reactor trip signal was generated in train "A" of the reactor protection system. This opened reactor trip breaker "A", generating a reactor trip and subsequent turbine trip. The logic for this trip signal is 2 out of 4 channels. OP 12304.2 was stopped and the unit was stabilized at hot standby conditions.

This trip caused in a reduction in feedwater flow which resulted in the "C" steam generator level decreasing to the low-low level setpoint (15%), and an automatic initiation of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. At 11:36 a.m., the AFW pumps were secured.

Cause of Event:

The most probable cause of the trip was due to dirty contacts on one NIS channel so that when N-43 was increased above the trip setpoint, a reactor trip signal was generated.

Analysis of Event:

A post-trip review was performed to assess the proper operation of safety-related equipment. The post-trip review established that the transient behavior of pertinent plant parameters for the reactor coolant system (RCS) and SGs responded as expected for a reactor trip of this kind. Specifically, the RCS pressures and temperatures were determined to be following an expected pattern based on the conditions leading up to the transient. Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Actions:

- 1) OP 12304.2 was re-commenced for NIS channel N-43. This time no problems were encountered on N-43. The rest of OP 12304.2 was completed satisfactorily.
- 2) The reactor protection racks were visually inspected and no problems were encountered.
- 3) The power range trip relays were removed, cleaned and re-installed.
- 4) A resistance check on the power range trip relays contacts for reactor protection system train "A" and a test to determine the voltage drop across the closed contacts were performed. No significant problems were found.
- 5) A test was conducted in an attempt to recreate this sequence of events on July 30, 1985. The test results were similar to the sequence of events that occurred during the reactor trip.
- 6) OP 1004.2, "Reactor Protection System - Periodic Test", and OP 1804.2, "Axial Flux, Rod Deviation, and Rod Position Indication System Monthly Test", were performed and satisfactorily completed prior to Unit 3 restart.
- 7) Upon completion of the post-trip review and identification of the most probable root cause, Unit 3 was placed on the line at 1:39 p.m., on August 1, 1985. Prior to exceeding 30% reactor power, OP 12304.2, OP 1004., OP 14004.4, "Pressurizer Pressure and Water Level Protection Channels - Periodic Test", a turbine trip test and turbine valve test were satisfactorily completed.



FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

AUG 27 1985

L-85-334

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Reportable Event 85-22
Turkey Point Unit 3
Date of Event: July 29, 1985
Reactor Protection Actuation - Reactor Trip

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours,

J. W. Williams, Jr.
Group Vice President
Nuclear Energy Department

JWW/PLP:dkw

Attachment

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Region II, USNRC
Harold F. Reis, Esquire
PNS-LI-85-298/1

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