


OPPD

Omaha Public Power District
1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102
402/536-4000

September 5, 1984
LIC-84-301

Mr. J. T. Collins, Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011



Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Dear Mr. Collins:

Special Report on the Inoperability
of Wide Range Noble Gas Stack
Monitor RM-063L,M,H

The Omaha Public Power District, holder of Operating License DPR-40, submits this special report pursuant to the requirements of Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specification 2.21, "Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation."

This specification, and Table 2-9, require that RM-063L,M,H be operable. If the number of operable channels is less than one for each of the three detectors for greater than 72 hours, the preplanned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameters must be initiated. If the channels are not restored within seven days, a special report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission must be submitted with 14 days following the event, outlining the action, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedules for restoring the system to operable status. This report is pursuant to Technical Specification 5.9.3.

On August 22, 1984, RM-063L,M,H was removed from service for calibration. Seventy-two hours of inoperability expired on August 25, 1984, at which time the preplanned alternate means of determining stack parameters was considered to be in place. This consisted of use of normal stack monitors, RM-060, 061, 062 and 052 to monitor these parameters to the upper end of their ranges. Should the release levels be greater than the monitors' ranges, post accident procedure OI-PAP-7 would be implemented for stack sampling and stack dose rate to curie conversion. Seven days of inoperability expired on August 29, 1984.


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Mr. J. T. Collins
LIC-84-301
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The cause of continued inoperability was the unavailability of sources necessary for the completion of the monitor calibration. The calibration consists of checking and adjusting electronic parameters and exposing the L, M and H detectors to Bal33 button sources supplied by the monitor vendor, Victoreen, in order to confirm that the detectors' sensitivities continued to correspond to the vendor's factory calibration using Xel33. The method of confirming the Bal33 - Xel33 correlation was selected over the method of using accident levels of Xel33 due to the adverse ALARA consequences of extremely high levels of Xel33. The Bal33 sources supplied by Victoreen were properly stored and locked in the Fort Calhoun Station health physics source safe. During a recent monthly inventory, health physics personnel incorrectly determined the sources to have been unused and surplus and disposed of them in accordance with approved plant procedures. Instrumentation and Control personnel were unaware that the discarded sources were integral to the correlation process and initiated an "on-the-spot" procedure change to substitute other sources in order to continue the electronic portion of the calibration.

The discovery of the missing sources by people knowledgeable of their necessity was made on August 28, 1984. Immediate action was to order equivalent sources from Victoreen. On receipt of the sources, which is expected by September 6, 1984, the calibration process will be continued. Completion of the calibration and return to operability of RM-063L,M,H is expected by September 14, 1984. A source disposal review mechanism is being investigated to assure critical sources remain available for use. This determination will be completed by October 1, 1984.


R. L. Andrews
Division Manager
Nuclear Production

RLA/DJM/rjb

cc: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Mr. E. G. Tourigny, NRC Project Manager

Mr. L. A. Yandell, Senior Resident Inspector