

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Point Beach Unit 1															DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 6					PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3						
TITLE (4) Auto Start of Diesel Generators After Loss of Low Voltage Station Transformer 1X04																										
EVENT DATE (5)				LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)				OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)														
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES								DOCKET NUMBER(S)									
																	0 5 0 0 0									
0	7	25	8	5	8	5	0	0	4	0	0	8	2	2	8 5								0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9)				THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																						
POWER LEVEL (10)				20.402(b)				20.406(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)										
				20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)										
				20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)										
				20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)														
				20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)														
				20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)														
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																										
NAME															TELEPHONE NUMBER											
C. W. Fay, Vice President-Nuclear Power															4 1 4 2 7 7 - 2 8 1 1											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs																	
C	E	A	X	F	M	R	W	1	2	0	Y															
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)															EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)					MONTH	DAY	YEAR				
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)																										
<input type="checkbox"/> NO																										
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																										

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 0604 hours on July 25, 1985, a 20% runback was initiated from a rod position indicator (RPI) rod bottom bistable on Unit 1. This bistable provided a runback signal because of a momentary loss of power to 1Y06 which feeds the RPI system. The cause of the power failure was due to a lockout of the 1X04 low voltage station transformer. This lockout was caused by a sudden pressure trip device actuation. The lockout of 1X04 caused a loss of power on the 4.16 kV buses 1A03/1A04 and the safeguards 4.16 kV buses 1A05/1A06. The 1A05/1A06 buses and associated loads were picked up by an auto start of the diesel generators G01 and G02. An Unusual Event was declared at 0625 hours and a shutdown was commenced as required by Technical Specifications. At 0849 hours, the transformer was returned to service. The Unusual Event was terminated at 0857 hours after 1X04 was returned to service. The unit was started back up to full power operation at 1/2% per minute at 0858 hours.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Point Beach Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 6	8 5	- 0 0 4	- 0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1, at 0604 hours, on July 25, 1985, experienced a 20% runback which was initiated by a signal from the rod position indication rod bottom bistable. This signal was caused by a loss of power to 1Y06 which at this time was receiving its power from motor control center 1B32 which receives its 480 volt supply from 1B03. 1B03 is fed through a step-down transformer from the 4.16 kV bus, 1A05 (see attached drawing). The cause of the momentary power failure was due to a lockout on the 1X04 low voltage (13.8/4.16 kV) station transformer from the actuation of a sudden pressure trip device. The 1X04 transformer feeds 4.16 kV buses 1A03/1A04 which feed 1A05/1A06. Upon loss of voltage to the 1A05/1A06 buses, the diesels G01 and G02 auto started and supplied power to the 1A05/1A06 buses and their associated loads. Due to the sustained loss of offsite AC to the safeguards buses for greater than 15 minutes, an Unusual Event emergency classification was declared in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 1.1, "Plant Operations Manager Initial Response" and Category 8 of EPIP 1.2, "Initial Classification". The declaration was made at 0625 hours. Notifications of offsite agencies were begun at 0634 hours, with the final agency call to the NRC beginning at 0637 hours. The Senior Resident Inspector was notified at 0644 hours and the Duty Shift Superintendent was informed that the notifications were complete at 0645 hours.

According to Technical Specification 15.3.7.B.1.c, "if the 13.8/4.16 kV auxiliary transformers are reduced to only one, the reactor associated with the out-of-service transformer must be placed in a hot shutdown condition." Technical Specification 15.3.0.a also provides that "The affected unit, which is critical, shall be placed in hot shutdown condition within three hours." This required the Unit 1 reactor to be in hot shutdown by 0904 hours. A procedure was prepared which would allow the unit to be taken off line and shut down while maintaining power to 1A01 and 1A02, the unit non-vital buses.

At 0649 hours, 1A03/1A04 were reenergized from 1A02/1A03 by Operations personnel. 1A05 and 1A06 remained powered from the G01 and G02 diesels respectively. The Resident Inspector arrived in the control room at approximately 0700 hours and monitored the control room response to the event.

The 1X04 transformer was inspected for indications of a transformer fault. Results of an explosive gas content test in the transformer cover gas indicated that no transformer fault had occurred. Also, the pressure relief device on the transformer had not actuated, indicating that no transformer fault had occurred. The cover gas pressure gauge showed a pressure of 3 psig, indicating that no fault had occurred. Moisture, due to heavy rains, was found in the sudden pressure device reset switch and in the relay cabinet general area and subsequently removed. The sudden pressure relay connections were inspected and some were found to be loose. The loose connections were tightened by resoldering. Based on the results of these inspections and the corrective actions, the Manager's Supervisory Staff made the decision at 0840 hours to reenergize 1X04. At 0845 hours,

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

the 1X04 transformer lockout was reset and at 0849 hours, the 13.8 kV side of the transformer was restored. The 1X04 feed to 1A03/1A04 was restored at 0857 hours. This allowed the termination of the Unusual Event. Since Technical Specification 15.3.7.B.1.c was again met, the LCO was terminated and Unit 1 was returned to full power at a rate of 1/2% per minute. Unit 1 had reached a power level of 20% before starting the return to full power at 0858 hours.


All safeguards equipment performed as designed.

The NRC was notified of the termination of the Unusual Event at 0913 hours.

Assessment

The sudden pressure lockout signal has subsequently been disabled by a temporary modification because further investigation revealed oil in the pressure switch. Transformer protection is still available from redundant lockout functions such as phase differential and overcurrent. The sudden pressure indication will still alarm in the control room; however, no lockout will occur from this relay.

Because the sudden pressure relay was found to contain oil, it must be replaced in accordance with vendor instructions. The oil has been removed and the relay will be replaced and returned to service during the next Unit 1 refueling outage. The Unit 2 2X04 sudden pressure relay and its associated circuitry at the transformer location will be inspected for similar conditions during the next Unit 2 refueling outage during the fall of 1985.



ATTACHMENT

EVALUATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS

As mentioned in LER 85-004-00 for Point Beach Unit 1, notification of offsite agencies of the Unusual Event precipitated by the equipment casualty involving the low voltage station auxiliary transformer 1X04 was completed with a call to the NRC using the ENS phone at 0637 hours. At approximately 0645 hours, the ENS phone in the control room rang and was picked up by the Duty Operating Supervisor (DOS). The call was from the NRC duty officer in Bethesda, Maryland. He requested more information concerning the Unusual Event. The DOS provided answers to all questions asked by the duty officer. A subsequent call from the NRC duty officer was received at about 0800, again asking for more information about the incident. This call was received by the Duty Technical Advisor (DTA), who provided all the information requested by the duty officer. When the Unusual Event was terminated, the General Superintendent made the notification call to the NRC. During this call, he provided additional facts to the NRC duty officer. As mentioned in the LER, the NRC Resident Inspector was present in the control room after 0700 and was kept up to date with changing conditions and plant status.

In light of the several call backs from the NRC duty officer, an evaluation has been done of the technique used by Point Beach Nuclear Plant staff for notification of offsite agencies and the NRC and its adequacy in fulfilling the information needs of each offsite agency. The areas that were investigated are as follows:

- State and county standard notification form (Initial Incident Report form) adequacy in providing basic information.
- Call-back communication capabilities for notification confirmation, especially in the case of an Unusual Event notification.
- Adequacy of the Initial Incident Report form for use on the ENS phone with the duty officer in Bethesda, Maryland.
- Adequacy of the EPIPs for providing adequate information to the NRC duty officer or other NRC personnel seeking detailed information about the incident.
- Use of EPIP 1.1 and EPIP 1.2 to flag the need for further communication needs to fulfill the 10 CFR 50.72 reporting requirements outside those requiring notification concerning the initial classification of an emergency.

- Identification of a person in the control room to accept a call back or request for an open line from the NRC duty officer.
- Identification of further information which could be included on the Initial Incident Report form (e.g., inclusion of initiating conditions from the classification table in EPIP 1.2).
- Identification of technique for updating of offsite agencies on a routine and timely basis.

The State of Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government (DEG) has given no indication of needing more information in the early stages of an emergency. This is especially the case for an Unusual Event. DEG has, however, a need for detailed information about protective action recommendations resulting from radiological conditions outside the plant. This information is available on the existing Initial Incident Report form used by Point Beach Nuclear Plant in the notification of an emergency classification with the State and Manitowoc and Kewaunee counties. The classification notification allows the State and counties to activate emergency response centers and provide staff for those centers at a level appropriate to the severity of the emergency.

DEG and the county sheriffs in Manitowoc and Kewaunee Counties are notified with a normal telephone communications system for Unusual Events. For classifications higher than an Unusual Event, the NAWAS (North American Warning System) is used. In the case of an Unusual Event, the phone designated as the primary call-back line is the one that was used for the initial notification during this event. This situation resulted in some of the calls coming back to the plant to confirm the authenticity of the Unusual Event call receiving a busy signal. This resulted in some delay for the offsite agencies in obtaining confirmation. Another phone will be used in the future to make these offsite agency notifications, such that the call-back line will be free for receiving calls.

Upon evaluation, we have concluded that the initial notification to the NRC cannot be made in 15 minutes and still provide the detailed information desired by the NRC duty officer. There are two ways in which the notification can be made in a manner that meets the requirements of the licensee and the NRC.

First, the initial notification call can be provided in a 15 minute time frame with the understanding that the purpose of the call is for notification only. This allows all offsite agencies the opportunity to activate facilities and personnel to a level required by the classification. All agencies, to our knowledge, trigger activation and staff augmentation based on classification. A followup call with detailed information can then be made after a reasonable time has passed during which detailed information can be gathered. The time frame envisioned for this followup call would be about one hour after the initiation of the event.

Alternately, the initial notification calls can be made to the State and counties within the 15 minute requirement of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.IV.D.3 and the NRC notified within the one hour requirement of 10 CFR 50.72.a(3). This technique would meet the requirements of the regulations but would delay the initial notification to the NRC and therefore delay the activation of the emergency response facilities and organization within the NRC. This method, however, would provide detailed information to the NRC at the same time as the initial notification call.

It is our belief that the first method would result in faster activation of each agency's emergency response facilities and result in provisions for detailed information in the same time frame as the second method. We will revise EPIP 1.1, "Plant Operations Manager Initial Response" and DCS 2.1, "Requirements & Guidance for Immediate Notification to NRC of 'Significant Events' at PBNP" to reflect the following process for initial notification and subsequent detailed information provision. The initial notification procedure as set down in EPIP 1.1 will continue to function as in the past. A note will appear in EPIP 1.1 that warns that the initial notification does not fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. The security commander, who now makes these initial offsite notifications, will be instructed to explain to the duty officer in Bethesda that a followup call will be coming with the detailed information required by 10 CFR 50.72. The security commander will not give plant data in his initial notification. A form similar to that transmitted in IE Notice 80-28 will be made available for accumulation of data prior to making the ENS 10 CFR 50.72 notification. A copy of this form will be available at the location of the ENS phone log.

This method of notification will provide earlier warning of an event and, therefore, earlier activation than the method of withholding notification until all details are available. It should be emphasized that some incidents may only require detailed information to be provided within four hours. However, it is our goal that, for those events which need classification and activation of our Emergency Plan, detailed information be provided to the NRC within one hour of the beginning of the event, regardless of whether they fall under the one hour or four hour 10 CFR 50.72 reporting requirements.

Detailed information may be assembled and provided to the NRC by the third licensed reactor operator who normally stands an auxiliary operator watch outside the control room. An SRO or an extra technical advisor may also communicate as long as the time impact of questions from the duty officer is kept to a minimum. This person can also be available for any call backs from the NRC duty officer.

Table 1.2-1 "Emergency Classification" will include references to reporting categories in 10 CFR 50.72 by reference to DCS 2.1. This reference will provide the means to initiate this method of notification.

Our review has concluded that no further information is necessary in the initial classification notification since the primary goal of the classification notification is facility activation and personnel augmentation, not detailed information provision.

Training of personnel in our emergency response organization has been primarily emergency response facility oriented. This may have resulted in the Unusual Event classification and the attendant provisions for providing information to offsite agencies not being covered in as great a detail as other classifications. We will provide for training and revision of procedures where appropriate such that the Unusual Event is covered in more detail. This will include a discussion of the timeliness of periodic updates to all offsite agencies. The procedure changes discussed herein and training will be completed by January 1, 1986.



Wisconsin Electric POWER COMPANY

231 W. MICHIGAN, P.O. BOX 2046, MILWAUKEE, WI 53201

August 22, 1985

NRC-85-89

Mr. J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator
Office of Inspection and Enforcement,
Region III
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

DOCKET NO. 50-266
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 85-004-00
LOW VOLTAGE STATION TRANSFORMER 1X04 LOCKOUT
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report No. 85-004-00 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. This report provides a description of an equipment casualty involving the low voltage station transformer 1X04 which resulted in the auto-start of the diesel generators. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic initiation of any Engineered Safety Feature."

Attached to this letter is a discussion of the notification techniques used during this event which was initially classified as an Unusual Event. This discussion was requested by your staff, together with our evaluation of the methods used for notification of offsite agencies. Several improvements to our notification process have been examined during this evaluation and are described and discussed in this attachment. Please contact us if you have any questions regarding this evaluation or changes.

Very truly yours,

President

R. W. Britt
Enclosures

Copy to NRC Resident Inspector

AUG 26 1985

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