

From: Daniel Holody, *RI*
To: WND2.WNP6.MAS, WND2.WNP6.JRG, WND2.WNP6.JXL
Date: 12/12/95 8:00am
Subject: RA Action Item 95-222 -Forwarded

Jim/Joe/Mark

Region I DRP has reviewed the licensee response to the 600k cp and finds it acceptable. (See attached). OE can acknowledge check.

Dan

Marie - this closes Action Item 95-222

CC: MRF1

*TO: Mark Satorius, OE
Joe Gray, OE
Jim Sieferman, OE*



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

December 13, 1995

EAs 95-062; 95-065; 95-117

Mr. E. James Ferland
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Public Service Electric and Gas Company
80 Park Place
Newark, New Jersey 07101


Martin
Kane
Cooper
Nicholson
Marschall
Joustra
Smith
Chawaga
Screnci/Dricks

DJH 12/18/95

Gentlemen:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated November 15, 1995 and your wire transfer of \$600,000 in payment for the civil penalty proposed by NRC in a letter dated October 16, 1995. Your corrective actions will be examined during future inspections.

Sincerely,


James Lieberman, Director
Office of Enforcement

Docket Nos. 50-272; 50-311
License Nos. DPR-70; DPR-75

cc: T. Martin, RI

is in PDR

AP 01 13 1995

X/17

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[REDACTED]

JUN 30 1994

Docket Nos. 50-272, 50-311, 50-354

Mr. Steven E. Miltenberger
Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Public Service Electric and Gas Company
P. O. Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Dear Mr. Miltenberger:

Subject: Inspection 50-272/94-16; 50-311/94-16; 50-354/94-15 (06/13-17/94)

This refers to the above subject safeguards inspection of Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations by Mr. R. J. Albert of this office. Areas examined are described in the enclosed report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of observations of activities, interviews, and selective examinations of procedures and records. Our preliminary findings were discussed with Mr. P. Moeller and other members of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

The inspection found your security program to be directed toward protecting public health and safety. Assessment aid upgrades were notable. However, in access control, we identified an apparent violation and two potential weaknesses. The apparent violation involved an inadequate vehicle search as described in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). Please respond to this matter in accordance with that Notice, with particular emphasis on preventing recurrence.

One potential weakness involved a personnel search officer not responding to an individual who alarmed a portal metal detector alarm. A security supervisor recognized what had occurred, intervened and resolved the alarm. The other potential weakness involved the assurance of adequate searches of packages at the warehouse entry point: it was not evident that package contents were being sufficiently assessed.

Parts of the enclosed report contain security program details exempt from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 (Safeguards Information). Those portions will not be placed in the NRC Public Document Room and will receive limited distribution. This letter and the rest of the report will be placed in the Public Document Room, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a).

[REDACTED]

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions 3

FOIA 96351

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
Public Service Electric and
Gas Company

2

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By:
John D. Kinneman

 James H. Joyner, Chief
Facilities Radiological Safety
and Safeguards Branch
Division of Radiation Safety
and Safeguards

Enclosures:

1. Notice of Violation
2. NRC Inspection Report 50-272/94-16; 50-311/94-16; and 50-354/94-15 (Safeguards Information (SGI) is contained in Sections 4.2 and 4.3)

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NE-04

cc w/encl (w/o SGI):

J. J. Hagan, Vice President, Operations/General Manager - Salem Operations
S. LaBruna, Vice President - Engineering and Plant Betterment
C. Schaefer, External Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co.
R. Hovey, General Manager - Hope Creek Operations
F. Thomson, Manager, Licensing and Regulation
R. Swanson, General Manager - QA and Nuclear Safety Review
J. Robb, Director, Joint Owner Affairs
A. Tapert, Program Administrator
R. Fryling, Jr., Esquire
M. Wetterhahn, Esquire
P. J. Curham, Manager, Joint Generation Department,
Atlantic Electric Company
Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate
William Conklin, Public Safety Consultant, Lower Alloways Creek Township
K. Abraham, PAO (2)
Public Document Room (PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector (w/SGI)
State of New Jersey

Public Service Electric and
Gas Company

4

bcc w/encl (w/o SGI):
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
K. Gallagher

bcc w/encl (w/o SGI): (Via E-Mail)
W. Dean, OEDO
C. Miller, PDI-2, NRR
M. Shannon, ILPB
J. Stone, NRR
M. Callahan, OCA

RI:DRSS

Albert
06/30/94

RI:DRSS

McCabe
06/30/94

RI:DRSS

Boyer
06/30/94

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DE-04

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Public Service Electric and Gas Company
Salem Nuclear Generating Station,
Units 1 and 2
Hope Creek Generating Station
Unit 1

Docket Nos.: 50-272; 50-311; 50-354

License Nos.: DPR-70; DPR-75; NPF-57

During NRC inspection on June 13-17, 1994, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, that violation is listed below:

Section 4.2.2.4, Vehicle Search, of the NRC-Approved Artificial Island Security Plan, revision 4, dated November 30, 1993, states that "Vehicles are searched for weapons, explosives, incendiary devices and other contraband by an SFM [Security Force Member] at a guardhouse prior to entering the protected area. The search consists of inspecting the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area."

Contrary to the above, on June 16, 1994, an SFM failed to search a vehicle properly until questioning by the NRC prompted supervisory direction to correct the search deficiency.

This is a Severity Level IV violation. (Supplement III)

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Public Service Electric and Gas Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Deck, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued to show cause why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

Any Safeguards Information, as defined in 10 CFR 73.21, contained in your submittal should be included in an enclosure so that the transmittal letter without the Safeguards Information can be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a).

Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania
this 30th day of June, 1994

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

NE-04

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT

License/Docket Nos.: DPR-70/50-272; DPR 75/50-311; NPF-57/50-354


Report Nos: 50-272/94-16; 50-311/94-16; 50-354/94-15


Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company

Facility Name: Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations

Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey

Inspection Dates: June 13-17, 1994

Inspector: 
R. J. Albert, Physical Security Inspector

Approved By:  6.30.94
E. C. McCabe, Chief, Safeguards Section

SCOPE

THE INFORMATION ON THIS PAGE
IS DEEMED TO BE APPROPRIATE
FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE PURSUANT
TO 10CFR 73.21

Announced physical security inspection of: Previously Identified Items; Protected Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Alarm Stations and Communications; and Security Training.

RESULTS

The licensee's security program was found to be directed toward public health and safety. However, a potential violation was identified in the area of vehicle searches. In addition, potential weaknesses were identified in personnel and package searches.

SGS-R1-1407
Copy 1 of 3 Pages

DETAILS

1.0 Key Personnel Contacted

1.1 Licensee

- *R. Binetti, Psychological Services Administrator
- *R. Fisher, Screening Supervisor
- *J. Fleming, Senior Staff Engineer
- *M. Ivanick, Senior Security Regulatory Coordinator
- *L. Krajewski, Site Access Administrator
- *J. Loed, Security Support Staff Assistant
- *S. Mannon, Licensing Engineer
- *P. Moeller, Manager - Site Protection
- *D. Renwick, Nuclear Security Manager
- *M. Samuels, Medical Administrator
- *R. Savage, Lead Auditor
- *B. Weiser, Senior Staff Engineer

1.2 Contractor

- *R. Matthews, Security Program Manager, The Wackenhut Corporation

1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region I

- *C. Marschall, Senior Resident Inspector
- *E. McCabe, Chief, Safeguards Section

- *present at the exit meeting

The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel.

2.0 Previously Identified Items

2.1 Personnel with Infrequent Unescorted Station Access

(Closed) Deviation (DEV) 50-272/93-11-01, 50-311/93-11-01, and 50-354/93-07-01: Contrary to a commitment to the NRC, the licensee failed to consistently identify persons with infrequent unescorted station access and take appropriate action. As a result, some individuals had continued unescorted station access even though they had not accessed the station for more than 60 days and were not available for random testing. In accordance with the licensee's commitment, those individuals' unescorted access should have ended at the 60-day mark.

During this inspection, the inspector discussed this matter with the licensee and reviewed supporting documentation. Based on discussions and documentation provided, the licensee had tracked personnel with infrequent unescorted station access and suspended access in accordance

with its commitment to the NRC. No further action is required. DEV 50-272/93-11-01, 50-311/93-11-01, and 50-354/93-07-01 is closed.

2.2 Supervisory Training

(Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-272/93-11-02, 50-311/93-11-02, and 50-354/93-07-02: Failure to train in a timely manner 20 newly appointed supervisors with responsibilities for implementing the Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) Program. Those supervisors should have received appropriate training before or within 3 months of being assigned those duties, in accordance with 10 CFR 26.22, Training of Supervisors and Escorts.

Through its auditing program, the licensee identified problems with supervisory training in two separate audits. The licensee's ultimate corrective measure was to modify General Employee Training (GET) so that everyone with unescorted station access would be trained at the supervisory level beginning on October 22, 1992, and annually thereafter. The first cycle of this training was to occur by the end of October 1993. However, the NRC found that, since the training was being conducted as personnel cycled through annual requalification, a potential still existed for newly appointed supervisors to not be trained in a timely manner. Specifically, supervisors who were promoted after October 22, 1992 without receiving modified-GET training, and who were promoted over three months before receiving that training, would have to be identified and trained before their requalification date. Such tracking and training would have had to occur until July 31, 1993, at which time the requalification cycle would be within 3 months of completion, and anyone appointed after that time would automatically receive training at the supervisory level.

During this inspection, the inspector discussed this matter with the licensee and reviewed supporting documentation. Based on discussions and documentation provided, the inspector determined that the licensee had appropriately tracked and trained supervisors who were responsible for implementing certain aspects of the FFD program. No further action is required. VIO 50-272/93-11-02, 50-311/93-11-02, and 50-354/93-07-02 is closed.

2.3 Protected Area Assessment Aids

(Open) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-272/93-28-01, 50-311/93-28-01, and 50-354/93-28-01: During a previous inspection, the inspector determined that the protected area (PA) assessment aids had deteriorated to a point where even aggressive maintenance was no longer properly effective. The licensee was in the final phase of upgrading assessment aids but had not finalized a start date.

During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's progress in this area as follows:

- Six existing fixed cameras were upgraded by February 1994.
- Another six fixed cameras were scheduled for upgrading by mid-July 1994.

- Six more fixed cameras were expected to be on hand by the end of July 1994 and to be installed by the end of October 1994.
- The upgrade of assessment aids will likely be suspended from October - December 1994 to support a refueling outage at Salem 2. Following the outage, upgrade work should resume. Certain alarm station monitors and two indoor cameras were expected to be upgraded between January and April 1995.
- In May 1995, final fixed-camera upgrades should begin. The remaining five fixed cameras slated for upgrade should be completed by the end of July 1995.
- The final phase of the upgrade should begin in July 1995 with the replacement of seven pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras. The PTZs project should be completed by the end of September 1995.

The licensee indicated that the above assessment-aid-upgrade schedule is tentative, dependent on budgetary constraints, and may be impacted by a refueling outage for Salem 2 in 1995. IFI 50-272/93-28-01, 50-311/93-28-01, and 50-354/93-28-01 remains open pending completion of assessment-aid upgrades.

2.4 Vehicle Search

(Open) IFI 50-271/93-28-02, 50-311/93-28-02, and 50-354/93-28-02: During a previous inspection, the inspector noted that factory-sealed items were exempt from search but the guidance was not clear on how to verify factory seals. In addition, lesson plans and the instructors interviewed indicated that a vehicle was to be searched from start to finish by a single search officer when, in actuality, a team search approach had evolved.

During this and a previous inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective measures, including a procedure change specifying one search officer per vehicle and enhanced training on vehicle searches. The licensee's corrective measures have effectively resolved vehicles being searched by a single search officer, but some concerns still remain with vehicle searches in general and with guidance on what constitutes a factory seal. The licensee did not provide the inspector with definitive guidance for the security force on factory seals (see Detail 4.2 of this report). Further, the quality of vehicle searches continues to be an issue (see Detail 4.3 of this report). Therefore, IFI 50-271/93-28-02, 50-311/93-28-02, and 50-354/93-28-02 remain open.

2.5 Performance Testing

(Closed) IFI 50-272/93-28-03, 50-311/93-28-03, and 50-354/93-28-03. The licensee's method of performance testing appeared to be intimidating to the security force in some instances.

During this inspection, the inspector reviewed this matter with the licensee and reviewed the associated memorandum of understanding between security management and the auditing group. This matter was found to have been adequately addressed. IFI 50-272/93-28-03, 50-311/93-28-03, and 50-354/93-28-03 is closed.

2.6 Alarm Station Operators

(Closed) IFI 50-272/93-28-04, 50-311/93-28-04, and 50-354/93-28-04. During a previous inspection, some alarm station operators did not readily demonstrate knowledge of security equipment outages and the compensatory measures in place. The licensee took immediate action to ensure that alarm station operators were more sensitive to security equipment status and the compensatory measures in place.

During this inspection, the inspector observed alarm-station activities and talked with alarm station operators. The operators were knowledgeable about security equipment status and compensatory measures that were in place. In addition, operators were observed verifying the status of alarm station equipment and reporting deficiencies when they were identified. IFI 50-272/93-28-04, 50-311/93-28-04, and 50-354/93-28-04 is closed.

3.0 Physical Barriers, Intrusion Detection and Assessment Aids

3.1 Protected Area (PA) Physical Barriers

The inspector physically inspected the PA barriers on June 14, 1994, and determined by observation that the barriers were installed and maintained in accordance with the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan (the Plan).

3.3 Intrusion Detection System

The inspector observed the intrusion detection system (IDS) on June 14, 1994, and observed licensee-conducted operability testing of selected zones from the secondary alarm station (SAS) on June 15, 1994. Based on those observations, the inspector determined that the IDS was installed and maintained as committed to in the Plan.

3.4 Assessment Aids

The inspector observed the PA perimeter assessment aids and determined that they were installed and operated as committed to in the Plan. Upgrades to the assessment aids were a noted improvement, but much remains to be done to further enhance performance.

3.5 Isolation Zones

The inspector verified that the isolation zones were adequately maintained to permit observation of activities on both sides of the PA barrier.

4.0 PA and Vital Area (VA) Access Control

4.1 Personnel Access Control



The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA and VAs. This determination was based on the following:

- The licensee properly identified personnel and checked authorization prior to issuance of badges and key cards.
- The licensee was implementing a search program for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials as committed to in the Plan.
- Individuals in the PA and VAs displayed their badges as required.
- Individuals requiring escorted access to the PA or VAs were under continuous and positive control of an authorized escort.

However, during observation of access control functions during a peak period, the inspector observed a personnel search officer fail to respond to an individual who had generated an alarm from a portal metal detector. A security supervisor who was overseeing access control activities recognized what the officer had allowed to occur, intervened and resolved the alarm. This is an inspector follow-up item (IFI 50-272/94-16-01, 50-311/94-16-01 and 50-354/94-15-01) and will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.

4.2 Access Control of Packages

The inspector determined that the licensee was generally exercising positive control over packages and material brought into the PA at the main access point and the warehouse. The inspector observed package and material processing and interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about package and material control procedures. No deficiencies were identified in this area at the main access control point.



[REDACTED]

This matter was brought to the licensee's attention and appeared to involve inadequate guidance for the warehouse search officer. This is an inspector follow-up item (IFI 50-272/94-16-02, 50-311/94-16-02, and 50-354/94-15-02) for review during subsequent inspections.

4.3 Access Control of Vehicles

The inspector assessed control of vehicle access into and within the PA. Vehicles were properly authorized prior to being allowed to enter the PA. Identification was verified by a security force member (SFM) at the main vehicle access control point. This was consistent with the commitments in the Plan. The inspector also reviewed the vehicle search procedures and determined that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan.

[REDACTED]

Physical Security Plan Section 4.2.2.4, Vehicle Search, states that "Vehicles are searched for weapons, explosives, incendiary devices and other contraband by an SFM (Security Force Member) at a guardhouse prior to entering the protected area. The search consists of inspecting the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area."

Failure to perform an adequate vehicle search at the main vehicle access control point as required by the Plan was an apparent violation of NRC requirements (VIO 50-272/94-16-03, 50-311/94-16-03, and 50-354/94-15-03).

[REDACTED]

5.0 Alarm Stations and Communications

The inspector observed operations of the central alarm station (CAS) and the secondary alarm station (SAS) and determined that they were maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.

The inspector verified that CAS/SAS operators were not involved in operational activities that would not interfere with the execution of assessment and response functions. The operators maintained internal communications and communications with the security force. The inspector also verified that each station maintained communications with local law enforcement authorities.

6.0 Security Training and Qualification

The inspector observed a training class complete initial firearms qualifications. That training was conducted in accordance with the licensee's Training and Qualification Plan. The inspector observed two members from the class receive remedial training after they were unsuccessful at initial attempts to qualify with either a handgun or shotgun. The instructors persevered, and both individuals successfully qualified.

The inspector pointed out to the licensee an inconsistency in shotgun-placement after a shooting string. All shotguns were presumed to be unloaded when they were removed from the firing line. Some were placed in shooting cases while others were laid atop barrels used as barricades at the firing line, with the shotguns pointing toward personnel who were down range scoring targets. The licensee agreed to review this matter.

7.0 Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee representatives indicated in Detail 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection on June 17, 1994. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the preliminary inspection findings were presented. The licensee representatives present acknowledged the inspection findings.