

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Fermi-2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 OF 0 3										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3	
TITLE (4) Blocked HPCI Lube Oil Line												OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (5)									
EVENT DATE (6)			LER NUMBER (8)			REPORT DATE (7)			FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)									
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR													
07	22	85	85	041	00	08	21	85				0 5 0 0 0									
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																					
OPERATING MODE (9)			20.402(b)			20.408(e)			XX			20.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)						
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.408(a)(1)(i)			20.38(a)(1)						20.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(a)						
0 0 3			20.408(a)(1)(ii)			20.38(a)(2)						20.73(a)(2)(vi)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 356A)						
			20.408(a)(1)(iii)			20.73(a)(2)(i)						20.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)									
			20.408(a)(1)(iv)			20.73(a)(2)(ii)						20.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)									
			20.408(a)(1)(v)			20.73(a)(2)(iii)						20.73(a)(2)(x)									
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)												TELEPHONE NUMBER									
NAME L. P. Bregni, Compliance Engineer												AREA CODE 3 1 3 5 8 6 - 5 3 1 3									
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS												
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)			MONTH			DAY			YEAR		
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO											
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																					

On July 21, 1985, after about two hours into a startup test of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system, a HPCI oil low pressure alarm annunciated in the control room, and the HPCI turbine was manually tripped. An investigation revealed that a blank gasket had been left in the oil cooler piping; most likely during troubleshooting in June 1984, when water was found in the HPCI oil sump. The blank gasket was removed, the piping inspected, and the system was restarted at 1420 hours on July 22, 1985. There was no damage to the HPCI system. During the event the plant was in Operational Condition 2 (Startup) and reactor power was at 3 percent. The safety significance of this event is minimal since the system could have operated for about 1-1/2 hours. Also all other emergency core cooling systems were available if required.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Fermi-2	0500034185	0	41	0	0	2	OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

At 1940 hours on July 21, 1985, the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) turbine was started to perform startup test DEMO.HUA.715. This is a demonstration run of the HPCI speed control governor at a nominal reactor pressure of 1000 psig. About eighty-five minutes into the test, the HPCI low oil pressure alarm annunciated in the control room. HPCI oil pressure decreased to about 5 psig and the turbine was manually tripped. The next day, July 22, 1985, while trying to determine the cause for the low lube oil pressure, a blank gasket was found in the lube oil cooler discharge line. The incident was evaluated and determined to be reportable as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the HPCI system. When this occurred the plant was in Operational Condition 2 (startup) and reactor power was at 3 percent. The HPCI system had been declared operable since July 16, 1985.

The blank gasket was found in the line between the discharge of the oil cooler and one inlet of oil temperature control valve E41-F128. This is a three-way valve that allows oil flow to bypass the oil cooler until the oil reaches a temperature of ninety degrees F. At that point the valve begins to open allowing some flow to the oil cooler and is full open at 110 degrees F. When the system was started the oil was cool and the temperature control valve diverted oil to the bypass line and around the oil cooler. As the system heated up, the temperature control valve began to open the port that would allow oil to flow to the oil cooler and close the port allowing oil to flow around the oil cooler. Because the blank flange blocked flow through the oil cooler, oil flow began to reduce causing oil pressure to decrease to the alarm setpoint of 6 psig.

The blank gasket was most likely left in the line during investigation of a problem involving water in the HPCI oil, documented in 10CFR50.55(e) Item 121, reported in Detroit Edison letter EF2-70037, dated November 5, 1984. While investigating the source of water in the HPCI oil, a blank flange was installed on the oil cooler inlet and outlet piping, and the shell side of the cooler was pneumatically tested to 100 psig. Contrary to the requirements of administrative procedure 12.000.25, "Temporary Modifications Procedure", a temporary modification was not used to control and document the installation of the blank flange. Also, the use of a gasket to seal the blind flange was not described in the work order package. Not specifying the use of a gasket in the work package may have contributed to the fact that the blank gasket was not detected during close-out inspection of the piping. Consequently the blank gasket was inadvertently left in the line and the controls for ensuring its removal were not used.

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Fermi-2	0 5 0 0 0 3 4 1	8 5	— 0 4 1	— 0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

Maintenance personnel responsible for the preparation of work packages will be counseled regarding the importance of specifying proper controls when breaching system boundaries. This LER will be reviewed with Maintenance Technical Coordinators and Maintenance Foremen.

The gasket was removed from the line and an inspection was made of the inlet flange for a similar gasket. None was found. Proper oil flow through the system was verified and the oil system was restarted at 1420 hours on July 22, 1985.

A check was made to ensure that the installed blank gasket did not invalidate any tests that were performed on the HPCI system. The preoperational test of the HPCI oil system was performed with the bypass line blanked off and oil passing through the oil cooler. No low oil pressure conditions were noted during performance of this test. This test was completed on January 20, 1983, which means the blank gasket was not installed before that date. The portions of the HPCI system preoperational test that could have been affected by the blank gasket were completed before January 1983. No other tests performed before or after the suspected date of installing the blank gasket would be affected by the gasket.

The safety significance of this event is minimal since the HPCI system could have operated for about 1-1/2 hours before the oil pressure would have decreased to the alarm setpoint. At that point the system would have been manually tripped and the cause investigated. Also, all other emergency core cooling systems were available if required.

**Detroit
Edison**

2000 Second Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48226
(313) 237-8000

August 21, 1985
NP850042

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Reference: Fermi 2
NRC Docket No. 50-341
NRC Operating License No. NPF-43

Subject: Transmittal of Licensee
Event Report 85-041

Please find enclosed LER No. 85-041-00, dated August 21, 1985, for a reportable event which occurred on July 22, 1985. As indicated below, a copy of this LER is being sent to the Administrator Region III.

If you have any questions, please contact us.

Sincerely,

R. S. Lenart for RSL

R. S. Lenart
Plant Manager

Enclosure: NRC Forms 366, 366A

cc: P.M. Byron
M.D. Lynch

Regional Administrator
USNRC Region III
799 Roosevelt Rd.
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Director/Coordinator
Monroe City-County Office of Civil Preparedness
965 South Raisinville Road
Monroe, MI 48161

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