



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

30-8280

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY TANK - AUTOMOTIVE AND ARMAMENTS COMMAND
ARMAMENT AND CHEMICAL ACQUISITION AND LOGISTICS ACTIVITY
ROCK ISLAND, ILLINOIS 61299-7630

November 5, 1996

Office of the Director, Armament and
Chemical Acquisition and Logistics Activity

Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
NRC, Region III
801 Warrenville Road
Lisle, IL 60532-4351

Dear Sir:

This letter is a follow-up to our last meeting, March 29, 1996 in which we discussed some of our program initiatives and accomplishments on our ongoing Radiation Protection Program (RPP). At that time you indicated further meetings were not necessary, but you were interested in receiving a periodic update. As you may recall our radioactive commodities are for military use and widely located at many different sites. Our constant challenge is to keep the lines of communication open and to advise the local Radiation Protection Officers (RPOs) of important matters pertaining to license compliance. We strive to assure license compliance through inspection programs and field assistance via phone contact and actual site visits. The following paragraphs indicate some of our main accomplishments since our last meeting.

The ACALA Safety Office coordinated the conduct of radiation safety program inspections at nine different sites during the period April 1996 through September 1996. Entrance and exit interviews with local officials are arranged and a draft report is provided at the exit. Major items which cannot be corrected during the visit are reviewed during reinspection when necessary to confirm appropriate action is taken. A copy of the final report is provided to the Army Inspector General.

ACALA Health Physicists (HP)s performed the following reviews and investigations:

a. A confirmation on-site review was performed at Marine Corps Base (MCB), Kaneohe, HI during a scheduled RPP inspection there in April 1996. The review stemmed from an incident which surfaced in December 1995 where a shipment contaminated with Tritium was received at Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB), Barstow, CA. The shipment was traced to its origin at MCB, Kaneohe, HI. An ACALA HP confirmed improvements to the RPP at

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MCB, Kanehoe on their control and handling of shipments plus training of involved personnel and their required SOPs.

b. In June 1996 a U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Center (MCRC) reported a marine overpressurized an M1A1 Collimator during purging of moisture. An ACALA HP assisted in site cleanup and reviewed the technical manuals with the MCRC personnel to confirm the proper purging method plus arrangements for disposition of radioactive waste.

c. In August 1996 an Army post reported a soldier overpressurized an M1A1 Collimator during purging of moisture. The local MCRC was given instructions by an ACALA HP in site cleanup and arrangements for disposition of radioactive waste. As a result of this incident a NET ALERT message was issued to world wide major commands emphasizing the need to use the proper purging method. The major commands were requested to disseminate the NET ALERT to all subordinate units. The major command of the Army post which had the incident identified a need for more training by the training command; e.g., for unit RPO level basics on how to conduct a survey. We will be coordinating with the other commands on this training.

d. In July 1996 a demilitarization facility reported lost accountability for 18 detector cells. On-site visit was made with recommendations for improvements to their RPP. An investigation was conducted by local officials per Army Regulation 15-6 due to loss of radioactive material. The results of the investigation are currently under review pending final action to be taken.

A Radioactive Materials Handling Course (40 hrs) was presented during FY 96 by instructors from the ACALA National Maintenance Point to 336 students covering several Army and Marine Corps locations world wide. Presently a session is being conducted in Germany. This training directly supports the ACALA NRC licenses by providing required training to the soldier. Each year that the course has been presented the number of students trained has increased. Some locations have the training presented annually at their site. Plans are being finalized to continue this training in FY 97.

The ACALA Safety Office contracted for our annual Tritium Course (24 hrs) which was given by a certified HP at four sites (Baltimore, MD, Chicago, IL, Phoenix, AZ, and Anchorage, AK) to enhance opportunity for different locations to send students.

Letters of appreciation were received from customers for the assistance provided by ACALA HPs on radioactive material repair processes at a maintenance facility and on serving as a guest lecturer at a radiation safety course at another command. An ACALA HP was provided a Certificate of Recognition from the Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command for implementing an effective RPP in the previous command and in transition of the RPP for radioactive commodities to ACALA.



The Artillery Product Center in ACALA has initiated an Operating and Support Cost Reduction (OSCR) study for battery powered light emitting diode technologies as an alternative to replace Tritium illumination sources in fire control instruments. This study has support from the field and if successful could lead to \$70.98 million in logistics cost savings over 10 years as well as some elimination of potential exposure to radiation.

The ACALA Safety Office continued to provide a paperless Radiation Safety Information Bulletin (RSIB) to the field via electronic mail on a quarterly basis to advise users of inspection findings, policy changes, and lessons learned. A copy of the latest RSIB is at enclosure 1. The RSIB along with past issues is available on the INTERNET via the ACALA Home Page at address: <http://147.217.198.7/ssn/radiation/rad.html>. The Safety Office also has a home page with useful radiation information, points of contact and hot links with other web sites and databases.

A memorandum has been sent to the major commands which possess devices covered by the ACALA licenses. The addressees are advised of inspections, incidents, and lessons learned plus ACALA initiatives to improve communications on radiation matters. A copy is at enclosure 2.

We welcome any suggestions you may have. It is my intent to continue pursuing our improvement initiatives on managing the provisions of our licenses and to seek non-radioactive alternatives for use in our commodities. We plan to continue using reasonably available technology to communicate with and protect our soldiers from radioactive hazards.

Sincerely,


Jimmy C. Morgan
 Director, Armament and Chemical
Acquisition and Logistics Activity

2 Enclosure(s)

ARMAMENT AND CHEMICAL ACQUISITION
AND LOGISTICS ACTIVITY (ACALA)

Rock Island, IL 61299-7630

ACALA RADIATION SAFETY
INFORMATION BULLETIN

Prepared By:
ACALA Safety Office, AMSTA-AC-SF

September 1996

I. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
LICENSE UPDATE

ACALA is the NRC license holder for six(6) radioactive commodity licenses and four(4) radioactive commodity Department of Army Authorizations (DARA) for the Army.

Mr. Jimmy C. Morgan, Director, ACALA is the certifying officer and Mr. John A. Mattila, Chief, Safety Office is the license manager.

ACALA Radiation Safety Officers (RSOs) are as follows:

License No. XB001141
Amendment 07
Commodity Export of Tritium Items
Rad Safety Officer (RSO)/DSN Betty Peterson/793-2962
Alternate RSO/DSN Gavin Ziegler/793-2995

License No. BML12-00722-04
Amendment 25 - License Terminated
Commodity Tritium and Promethium-147 Rifle Sights
M16A1, M16A2, M4, M3 (RAAWS))
RSO/DSN Betty Peterson/793-2962
Alternate RSO/DSN Tim Mohs/793-6228

License No. BML12-00722-06
Amendment 30 - Incorporates Items Formerly
Licensed Under BML 12-00722-04
into BML 12-00722-06
Commodity Tritium Artillery Fire Control Items
RSO/DSN Betty Peterson/793-2962
Alternate RSO/DSN Tim Mohs/793-0354

License No. BML12-00722-13
Amendment 27
Commodity Americium-241 M43A1 Detector
RSO/DSN Jeff Havenner/793-2965
Alternate RSO/DSN Betty Peterson/793-2962

License No. BML12-00722-14
Amendment 23
Commodity Nickel-63 Chemical Agent Monitor CAM)
RSO/DSN Jeff Havenner/793-2965
Alternate RSO/DSN Betty Peterson/793-2962

License No. SUB 1340
Amendment 13
Commodity U238 Check Source, M7, M8
RSO/DSN Betty Peterson/793-2962
Alternate RSO/DSN Jeff Havenner/793-2965

DARA DA 12-88-05
Amendment 02
Commodity Model 97 Explosive Detector
RSO/DSN Jeff Havenner/793-2965

Encl 1

DARA DA 12-93-01
Amendment
Commodity Tritium Sights for M11 Pistol
RSO/DSN Betty Peterson/793-2962
Alternate RSO/DSN Gavin Ziegler/793-2995

II. RECENT FIELD INCIDENTS

The following listing is a brief summary of some radioactive item incidents reported to the ACALA Safety Office during Jun-Sep 96.

Date	24 Jun 96
Location	Training Grounds
Item	M8A1 Chemical Agent Alarm
Problem	Loss noted after training exercise.
Result	Found by Range Control
Date	25 Jun 96
Location	Combined Support Maintenance Shop
Item	M1A1 Collimator
Problem	Broken Collimator leaking white powder with no illumination showed up at CSMS.
Result	Collimator was double bagged. Wipes test taken. Final results were below required limits.
Date	9 July 96
Location	Maintenance Shop
Item	Muzzle Reference Sensor (MRS)
Problem	New MRSS were found to be leaking when removed from foil package. Stock was approximately four years old.
Result	Bioassay and wipe tests taken. Final results were below required limits.
Date	24 Jun 96
Location	
Item	M1A1 Collimator
Problem	Over pressurized during charging, broke source.
Results	ACALA RSO traveled to site to oversee containment and clean up minor contamination.
Date	9 Feb 96
Location	
Item	M43A1 Chemical Agent Detector Cell Assemblies
Problem	Loss of Americium Sources--Cell Module of M43A1. ACALA received a report that 18 cells were unaccounted for. Personnel searched installation.
Result	ACALA RSO onsite visit to investigate. AR 15-6 investigative action taken due to loss of Radioactive Material.
Date	28 JUL 96
Location	Firing Range
Item	Muzzle Reference Sensor (MRS)
Problem	MRS lost during night firing and observed missing the next morning.
Result	Range searched with nothing found. Wipes of tube taken. No measurable contamination was found.
Date	20 Aug 96
Location	Artillery
Item	M1A1 Collimator on M119 Howitzer
Problem	Over purged device, blew glass out of one end. Soldiers double bagged device immediately. RPO took wipe tests.
Result	ACALA issued: NET ALERT M1A1

INFINITY COLLIMATOR RUPTURE, 21 AUG 96

Date . 28 Aug 96
Location Supply Room.
Item M43A1 Chemical Agent
Problem Believe that alarm, which had been rolled over
was accidentally disposed of as normal trash
in post landfill.
Results Two day search of landfill turned up nothing.
Additional control procedures being established.

Date 3 Sep 96
Location Battery, Field Art
Item M8A1
Problem Run over by tank. Side swiped - slightly
damaged (condition code: H).
Result: Controlled disposal as rad waste.

Date 21 Aug 96
Location Firing Range
Item MRS
Problem End of gun tube blown off. Nothing found of
MRS except info plate.
Result Personnel in tank were bioassayed. Final
results were below required limits

Date 6 Sep 96
Location
Item 2 M1A1 Collimators
Problem Broke during purging.
Result: Investigation on going as to disposition of
broken collimators.

Date 15 Jul 96
Location Optics Repair Shop
Item M137 Panoramic Telescope
Problem Optics Shop worker broke source while
performing source replacement in air hood.
Result No internal contamination/area decontaminated.

III. RECENT MESSAGES

The following excerpts are from a NET ALERT message
on the M1A1 Infinity Collimator rupture during purging
Following the NET ALERT are excerpts from Ground
Precautionary Message (GPM) TACOM-ACALA No.
96-06 on the M16A1 Rifle requirement to remove and
properly dispose of any low light tritium sights:

EXCERPT FROM NET ALERT M1A1 INFINITY COLLIMATOR RUPTURE

A. ON AUGUST 20, 1996, AN M1A1 INFINITY COLLIMATOR
BURST AS A RESULT OF OVER PRESSURIZATION DURING AN
ATTEMPT TO PURGE AND CHARGE THE DEVICE WITH DRY
NITROGEN. THE PRESSURE WAS SUFFICIENTLY HIGH SO AS TO
CAUSE ONE OF THE GLASS LENSES TO SHATTER AS WELL AS
BREAKING THE 10 CURIE TRITIUM RADIOACTIVE SOURCE
THERE WERE NO INJURIES.

B. PRELIMINARY SAFETY INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT
INDIVIDUALS WERE IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTING TO USE A HIGH
PRESSURE GAUGE ON THEIR PURGING APPARATUS. THIS
CAUSED THE PRESSURE INSIDE THE BODY OF THE COLLIMATOR
TO EXCEED THE MAXIMUM 3 PSI AND CAUSED THE GLASS TO
RUPTURE.

C. RECOMMEND YOU REVIEW TM 750-116, GENERAL
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PURGING AND CHARGING OF FIRE CONTROL
INSTRUMENTS. THE LOW PRESSURE GAUGE USED FOR THE
M1A1 COLLIMATOR SHOULD READ FROM 1 - 15 PSI,
GRADUATED IN 1 PSI INCREMENTS. ANY HIGHER PRESSURE
GAUGE DOES NOT ALLOW FINE ENOUGH CONTROL. UNITS ARE

REMINDED THAT PURGING AND CHARGING OF THE M1A1 COLLIMATOR MUST BE DONE IN A WELL VENTILATED AREA, OPEN TO THE OUTDOORS TO REDUCE THE CHANCES OF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE AND CONTAMINATION IN CASE OF A RUPTURE. TOO OFTEN, SOLDIERS, MARINES AND CIVILIANS, FROM WORKER TO SUPERVISOR, APPEAR TO BE UNAWARE OF THE PROPER PROCEDURES, AS THESE ACCIDENTS CONTINUE TO OCCUR. LET'S GET THE WORD OUT

4. POC IS MR. JEFF HAVENNER, DSN 793-2965 OR MS. BETTY PETERSON, DSN 793-2962, FAX 793-6758, EMAIL ADDRESS AMSTA-AC-SF@RIA-EMH2.ARMY.MIL

EXCERPT FROM GROUND PRECAUTIONARY MESSAGE (GPM), ACALA CONTROL NO. 96-06, REMOVAL AND DISPOSAL OF M16/M16A1 RIFLE LOW LIGHT, TRITIUM FRONT SIGHTS.

2. PROBLEM:

M16 AND M16A1 RIFLE, LOW LIGHT, TRITIUM FRONT SIGHTS HAVE EXCEEDED THEIR SERVICE LIFE AND ARE NO LONGER AUTHORIZED FOR USE. THEREFORE, IF LOW LIGHT, TRITIUM FRONT SIGHTS ARE FOUND IN USE, REMOVE AND REPLACE WITH STANDARD FRONT SIGHTS (NSN 1005-01-134-3625).

3. USER ACTIONS:

A. ALL UNITS SHALL CHECK ON HAND M16/M16A1 RIFLES AND ANY LOW LIGHT TRITIUM SIGHTS SHALL BE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH STANDARD FRONT SIGHTS. REMOVED LOW LIGHT TRITIUM SIGHTS SHALL BE TURNED IN TO THE LOCAL/INSTALLATION RADIATION PROTECTION OFFICER (RPO) AS RADIOACTIVE WASTE.

B. UPON COMPLETION OF THE ABOVE ACTION, NOTIFY THE ACALA SAFETY OFFICE VIA MAIL; DIRECTOR, ACALA ATTN: AMSTA-AC-SF, ROCK ISLAND, IL 61299-7630, OR EMAIL TMOHS@RIA-EMH2.ARMY.MIL.

C. WHEN RECEIVING AN M16 OR M16A1 FROM THE SUPPLY SYSTEM, CHECK THE FRONT SIGHT AND REPLACE ANY LOW LIGHT TRITIUM SIGHTS FOUND WITH A STANDARD SIGHT.

4. CHANGE 1 TO ARMY TM 9-1005-249-23&P, AFTO 11W3-5-5-24 AND CG COMDTINST M8370.9 WILL SHOW BOTH THE LOW LIGHT TRITIUM AND STANDARD FRONT SIGHTS FOR RECOGNITION PURPOSES.

5. SUPPLY STATUS: N/A

6. ACALA/POINT OF CONTACT:

A. ACALA AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT, SMALL ARMS PRODUCT CENTER POC IS MR. NEAL CHRISTIANSON, AMSTA-AC-AIR, DSN 793-0034, COMMERCIAL (309) 782-0334, OR EMAIL NCHRISTI@RIA-EMH2.ARMY.MIL.

B. ACALA RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER POC IS MR. TIM MOHS, AMSTA-AC-SF, DSN 793-6228 COMMERCIAL (309) 782-6228, OR EMAIL TMOHS@RIA-EMH2.ARMY.MIL.

Common practices to be aware of in connection with the above incidents are:

A. In any repair process, assume contamination may occur during any point, from beginning to end. Therefore, develop decon procedures for removal of

contamination if it occurs, and analyze the process to prevent contamination, e.g., install protective hoods, monitors, provide adequate ventilation of work area, the use of PPE.

B. Follow technical manual procedures for properly regulating pressures when purging devices containing Tritium illumination sources.

C. Control radioactive commodities at all times, and allow only authorized personnel to operate or maintain these items.

D. When placing equipment into use, pick appropriate location that can be recalled for recovery of material.

IV. INSPECTIONS AND SURVEYS

ACALA/NRC license inspections are conducted by the Test Measurement Diagnostic Equipment Activity (TMDE). In addition, the NRC performs it's own inspections of the ACALA/NRC licenses. The NRC inspected one facility using ACALA licensed commodities during the period of Jul-Sep 96. The facility inspected had no adverse findings, but was unable to locate their Fire Control (Tritium) license. Check your files...Do you have all of your licenses?

NRC inspections can be expected to increase during the next fiscal year. Don't become lax on Radiation Protection issues. ACALA provides training on all licensing issues...be ready for NRC inspections, take advantage of the training we offer!

ACALA\TMDE inspections of the NRC licenses were conducted at five (5) sites during June, July and August. Starting in November we will begin inspecting one or two sites per month. Your turn is coming! Sites visited will receive a notification letter well in advance, with a list of the records to be review and areas we would need to visit. An entrance and exit briefing will be held with command level representatives to discuss expectations and results of the inspection. A draft report is provided for the command at the exit briefing.

FINDING OF SPECIAL INTEREST:

During a visit to one site, it was noted that material shipments were no longer being received at a central warehouse. The drivers would present their shipping papers at the warehouse and the warehouseman would then direct the driver to deliver the material to the ordering unit. When radioactive materials were received, no notifications of the radiation protection officer (RPO) were made because the materials were not offloaded. Therefore, radioactive materials were not checked or monitored by an RPO prior to receipt at the unit level.

When radioactive materials were received at the unit level, no one knew to contact the RPO. It had never been done that way before, and the responsibility had not been shifted down to the unit level. Therefore, radioactive materials were opened at the unit level and issued to the users with no RPO involvement, as required by license/NRC.

The lesson to learn? When changes are contemplated/implemented in the handling of materials entering, being stored or leaving your facility, make sure the change will not adversely affect control of your radioactive materials! Secondly, take advantage of ACALA sponsored training...it will help you prevent oversights of important

radioactive material control issues!

COMMON DENOMINATORS

Inspections are continuing to turn up many common deficiencies. These deficiencies could be eliminated easily, if you would take advantage of the Radioactive Material Handling Safety course offered through ACALA. See another portion of the bulletin for further information.

The following list highlights some of the common findings noted during recent ACALA/TMDE inspections. Check out the list and review your own Radiation Protection Program to ensure you won't contribute to the "common denominator" list during your inspection.

A. RPO positions lack priority, appropriate authority, and in some cases documentation of the appointment. AR 385-11

B. Failure to properly document annual inventory of radioactive material. AR 385-11, par. 2-11

C. Failure to have a signed, SOP in place. AR 40-5, par. 9-9a(2)(a), TB 385-4, par. 5-6, 10CFR 20.1101

D. Failure to post required caution signs, and notices to radiation workers. 10 CFR 19.11, 20.1901, and 1902

E. Failure to notify local fire department of the location and type of stored radioactive materials. AR 385-11, par. 5-7c

F. Failure to designate controlled segregated areas in packing and shipping areas. 10 CFR 20.1802

G. Failure to control work areas; poor health and safety practices (food and drinks located in areas where radiological work is performed) AR 40-5, par. 9-9b, AR 700-68, par. 4-3b

V. TACOM-ACALA TRAINING DURING FY 97

A. RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL HANDLING SAFETY TRAINING

The Radioactive Material Handling Safety training is a comprehensive course covering all aspects of CAMs, detectors and fire control devices. This training will provide the information you need to properly handle radioactive commodities and carry out your Radiation Protection Program (RPP). The course teaches/reviews all the NRC license and Army DARA regulations. It is essential to preparing you for any inspection by ACALA or the NRC, and making your RPP strong!

The ACALA Training Team has presented twelve sessions of the Rad Safety class (336 attendees) during FY96, and are presently conducting a session in Germany. Five training sessions were held at Rock Island Arsenal (81 attendees); three in the spring and two in the summer. Nine sessions were conducted at various locations across the country (255 attendees). If you missed this important training in 1996, even more sessions are scheduled for FY97. Put the info I furnished about this course here. Take out para below. So far, there are 15 sessions scheduled for next year. If you are interested in attending a session contact Mr. Darrell Bast at DSN 793-1697, or e-mail Dbbast@ria-emh2.army.mil. Mr. Bast's office will direct you to the session you need!

The RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL HANDLING COURSE, will again be presented by TACOM-ACALA. Below are the scheduled dates

and location.

Course Schedule FY 97

4 - 8	Nov 96	Rock Island, IL
6 - 10	Jan 97	Rock Island, IL
10 - 14	Mar 97	Rock Island, IL
5 - 9	May 97	Rock Island, IL
14 - 18	Jul 97	Rock Island, IL
8 - 12	Sep 97	Rock Island, IL

The per diem funding for these courses is the sole responsibility of the unit, there is no tuition cost.

Please request spaces after you have obtained the funds to send the student(s). When you request spaces in our courses please give a primary course date and an alternate course date. If you decide to cancel the student(s) give this office as much advance notice as possible, so that we may fill the spaces with other students.

If you request spaces in one of the courses, TACOM-ACALA needs a DD1556 filled out 2 months in advance of the course start date. Send 1556's to:

Director, TACOM-ACALA
ATTN: AMSMC-AC-NMFT (Mr. Bast)
Rock Island, IL 61299-7630.

This course may also be taught at your location. The host location is responsible for the cost of per diem and transportation for the two instructors, and the shipping of manuals and training aids.

The POC for this course is Mr. Darrell E. Bast,
AMSTA-AC-NMFT, DSN 793-1697/2542,
COMMERCIAL (309) 782-1697/2542, e-mail
dbast@ria-emh2army.mil.

B. Tritium Training will again be presented during FY 97. We plan to hold the course earlier in the FY. We will provide information on tritium training as soon as it becomes available.

The POC for this training is Mr. Tim Mohs,
AMSTA-AC-SF, DSN 793-6228,
COMMERCIAL (309) 782-6228, e-mail
tmohs@ria-emh2.army.mil.

VI. WHAT DO YOU MEAN NONMISSION CAPABLE?

Why do we go so far as to say that a device like an M8A1 or Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) is non-mission capable (not available for use) if it is not wipe tested each year? The simple explanation is that this is a condition of the licenses for these items imposed upon the Army by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The license document (for M8A1 and CAM) includes a paragraph stating that "the sources...shall be tested for leakage and/or contamination at intervals not to exceed 12 months. Any source received from another person not accompanied by a certificate indicating that a test was performed in the last six months before the transfer shall not be put into use tested." This restriction is not based upon any rule that we voluntarily put in our license application but a requirement placed upon the Army by the NRC itself. In effect the NRC is telling us if the device is not wipe tested it cannot be used until it is.

Wipe tests prove that the radioactive source within the

device is still in good shape and is not breaking down or leaking with age. A negative result on a wipe test (nothing detectable above normal background) says that an M8A1 or CAM can be safely handled by soldiers without unknowingly exposing them to needless radiation. A positive wipe test, a result above 20 disintegrations per minute (dpm) for M8A1 or 100 dpm for the CAM will cause additional actions to be taken.

What about Radiation Testing and Tracking System (RATTS)? Well the RATTS is a database and as such is simply a recorder of information. RATTS is intended to give us, the licensee, visibility over who has each device (radioactive source) and whether or not it is being wipe tested so that when the NRC comes to our door, we can show them that we have some positive control over the sources. RATTS, we know, has been the subject of controversy. The argument has been made that calling an M8A1 or CAM nonmission capable for lack of a wipe test penalizes units for something that is the fault of the RATTS. Well, not meaning any offense, but that is nonsense.

If you can document that wipe tests have been performed on your M8A1 or CAM as required, you can use the device regardless of what might be in the RATTS database. Proof can be the maintenance form requesting the test and the result received from the laboratory. The Rock Island Test lab always sends results back to the maintenance activity performing the test. If you get notices from RATTS that a wipe test is overdue and you did the test as required, get this straightened out with the reporting activity in the Directorate of Logistics (Serialization Officer) of your installation. If you are getting overdue wipe test notices for devices you no longer have then records of those turn ins have not been properly recorded in the RATTS and, again, the reporting activity is the proper person to see, along with the property book officer.

VII. M43A1 Chemical Detector Turn In: Know the Code

We have been getting word from item managers for some time that M43A1 Chemical Agent Detectors (CAD) are being turned in on reports of excess coded H (unrepairable). Since the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has taken over the supply shipping and receiving function for all the services, they have established a policy that no radioactive commodities will be accepted that are in Code H condition. This is to prevent depots under DLA control from becoming warehouse sites for radioactive waste. Any M43A1 CAD that is unrepairable, therefore, must be turned over to the post Radiation Protection Officer (RPO) to store for disposal as radioactive waste.

We figure there could be several reasons for coding H the M43A1 CAD. The first being that it has been run over by a vehicle and smashed nearly flat. This would generally warrant a Code H but it also means you should notify the RPO who should come out and locate the cell module, gather up the pieces in a plastic bag and do wipe tests to make sure that the source itself was not damaged. In ten years we are not aware of one incident where a cell module was found to be leaking after getting run over.

Another reason might be that since January 1995, we have been restricting maintenance to pull and replace of major assemblies. This is a safety precaution established due to some possible leakage problems detected with the cell module. The aim is to prevent exposure of DS maintenance personnel to americium-241. People may

be figuring that since a repair exceeds what they are authorized to do, the M43A1 is "unrepairable" or code H. Incorrect. These devices are still repairable at the depot level. Even though we are currently restricting the level of work that the depot can perform, eventually enough detectors will be collected to do depot level overhaul at a facility equipped to handle materials contaminated with free Am-241.

Finally, some people just do what ever they figure is easiest and if someone is pressed for time, code H is as good as any. Only now the unit has to get rid of a code H M43A1 as radioactive waste and cannot get any turn in credit that may be due. So, at least as far as the M43A1 is concerned, save code H for one that has been hit by a tank. Anything less is probably repairable somewhere.

VIII. INTERNET INFORMATION

Visit ACALA's Home Page

ACALA's Home Page has a new address:
<http://www-acala1.ria.army.mil/>. At the Safety Office page, there is a list of "Safety Office POC's." A new page has been added: "Safety Links to Other Sites." (An interesting site to visit is <http://www.nrc.gov/>).

All other files that were formerly the Safety Office page have been moved to the Soldier Support Network (SSN). If you visited once before you may be seeing old information unless you empty your computer's cache directory or click the reload button.

To access the Soldier Support Network (SSN), go back to ACALA's Home Page and click on SSN. If you need a user-id and password, contact Roger Granbois, DSN 793-1941, e-mail: rgranbo2@ria-emh2.army.mil.

Once in the SSN, you can access Radiation Safety Information Bulletins (RSIB) and other information under "Bulletins" (click on "Radiation Information").

The following radiation related messages are currently posted on the SSN under "Priority Information Pages:"

Safety of Use Messages (SOUM) 95-04 & 94-01

Ground Precautionary Message (GPM) 96-01

Maintenance Advisory Message (MAM) 95-12

Field Alerts - Net Alert M1A1 Infinity Collimator Rupture, 21 Aug 96.

The following radiation related messages have recently been distributed and will be posted soon:

Ground Precautionary Message (GPM), ACALA Control No. 96-06, Removal And Disposal Of M16/M16A1 Rifle Low Light, Tritium Front Sights, 19 Sep 96 (see excerpts above under III. RECENT MESSAGES).

Additional Maintenance And Technical Guidance Information For The Prevention Of Accidental Rupture Purposes During Purging And Charging Of M1A1 Infinity Collimator TAMCN E0205, ID# 04914B, NSN 1240-00-332-1780, 10 Sep 96.

This area is under constant construction, - so drive carefully and come back often!

DISTRIBUTION

The ACALA Radiation Safety Information Bulletin is now on the World Wide Web under the Soldier Support Network. The internet address is as follows:

<http://147.217.198.7/ssn/radiation/rad.html>

Back issues of the bulletin are available from the ACALA Safety Office. Contact Ms. Lois Farson as listed below. Persons who want to be placed on direct e-mail distribution for this bulletin should send an E-mail message to:

amsta-ac-sf@ria-emh2.army.mil at SMTP-DDN or mail request to ACALA, ATTN: Ms. Lois Farson, AMSTA-AC-SF, Rock Island, IL 61299-7630 or fax DSN 793-6758 or (309) 782-6758 or voice DSN 793-6499 or (309) 782-6499. Forwarding this bulletin back with the customer feedback comments below filled in is a convenient way to accomplish this.

CUSTOMER FEEDBACK

This survey is intended to provide feedback on assistance provided by the ACALA Safety Office. Your comments are welcome on areas of the ACALA Radiation Protection Program that you feel could be improved or where more assistance or training would be beneficial. It is our goal to provide you the best service we can.

- 1) Type of Service provided to your organization
- 2) Timeliness of service provided.....
- 3) Improvement desired.....

Please forward above feedback to E-mail address amsta-ac-sf@ria-emh2.army.mil at SMTP-DDN. Although E-mail is preferred, the above mail, fax, or voice connections can also be used.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY TANK - AUTOMOTIVE AND ARMAMENTS COMMAND
ARMAMENT AND CHEMICAL ACQUISITION AND LOGISTICS ACTIVITY
ROCK ISLAND, ILLINOIS 61299-7630

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

23 OCT 1996

AMSTA-AC-SF (385a)

MEMORANDUM FOR See Distribution

SUBJECT: Armament and Chemical Acquisition and Logistics
Activity (ACALA) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) License
Compliance Issues/Actions

1. The ACALA is granted licenses by the NRC for several radioactive commodities which are issued to your commands. These items are various fire control instruments containing Tritium illumination lamps, The Chemical Agent Monitor which uses Nickel-63, and the M43A1 Chemical Agent Detector which uses Americium-241. The NRC licenses prescribe the conditions and restrictions under which the Army, and other services under Army license, can use, maintain, store, and transport these items. The following paragraphs summarize significant observations of our staff in assisting your commands and observing your license compliance during the period Apr 96 through Sep 96.
2. Your installations are required to report to the ACALA Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) incidents with radioactive items of supply which result in loss of material, accidental personnel exposure and/or contamination of personnel and equipment. Incidents reported during the second half of FY96 involved loss of devices, devices broken in field accidents, devices broken during purging operations, contamination of work areas and storage areas, improper packing and shipping of leaking devices, and receipt of contaminated packages. The sequence of events of these incidents can lead from the initial contamination advancing from the breakage site to maintenance and storage areas, and even across an ocean from the original location. On some previous occasions personnel have unknowingly carried radioactive contamination off-post and home to their families. The use of radioactive material by the Armed Services warrants emphasis in training your personnel to properly handle and control radioactive items of supply at all times.
3. We are concerned about more incidents occurring of Tritium vial breakage during the procedure to purge moisture from fire control instruments. These incidents continued despite training and official publications providing the proper procedures to use. As a result we issued a NET ALERT message (encl 1) emphasizing the proper purging method. The NET ALERT contained a request for addressees to disseminate the NET ALERT to all subordinate units.

AMSTA-AC-SF (385a)

SUBJECT: Armament and Chemical Acquisition and Logistics Activity (ACALA) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) License Compliance Issues/Actions

4. Elimination of radioactive commodities can reduce your logistics burden. However, your cooperation is needed to assure obsolete radioactive items are replaced with their new non-radioactive components and proper disposition made of the old radioactive material. For example, we have issued Ground Precautionary Message (GPM) TACOM-ACALA Control No. 96-06, Removal and Disposal of M16A1 Rifle Low Light, Tritium Front Sights (encl 2) to emphasize that these sights have exceeded their service life and are no longer authorized for use. You should be sure that the GPM has been disseminated to all your subordinate units for compliance. This office is to be notified of completion of the required actions by mail or e-mail tmohs@ria-emh2.army.mil.

5. Maintenance of a proper Radiation Protection Program (RPP) is a challenge due to frequent personnel rotation and reduced numbers of personnel, but a good program of training, and proper facilities and operations is essential to keep exposure as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). One way to keep program continuity is to insure that rotating personnel overlap whenever possible. In this way the person leaving, be it RSO, maintenance person, etc., provides the person taking over knowledge and skills to keep a good RPP program going.

6. The effectiveness of your RPP may be evaluated in a visit by the NRC themselves or by personnel from the U.S. Army Test, Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) Activity. You should be prepared to have the NRC inspect your RPP at any time. The inspections by TMDE are made in behalf of ACALA. We coordinate with TMDE to check a number of installations annually, including other services which are on the Army licenses held by ACALA. The TMDE inspections have advance notification, entrance and exit interviews with local officials, and a draft report is provided at the exit to the installation as well as the MACOM Radiation Protection Officer (RPO). Significant items which cannot be corrected during the visit require follow-up visit(s) to confirm appropriate action is taken. A copy of the final report is provided to the Army Inspector General. The TMDE inspections have shown effective RPP at several locations. Similar findings at multiple locations indicate problems which your command should take a look at and fix.

AMSTA-AC-SF (385a)

SUBJECT: Armament and Chemical Acquisition and Logistics Activity (ACALA) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) License Compliance Issues/Actions

Training can take care of a lot of problems. You are in the best position to know what improvements your RPP needs. You should check these out with your local RPOs and implement any needed changes with the management controls available to you. The following findings, any of which is a license violation, are certainly worth mentioning:

- a. RPOs not given authority, management support, or appointment of alternate RPO.
- b. Annual inventory of radioactive material not documented.
- c. Signed, implemented Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) not in place.
- d. Caution signs and notices to radiation workers not posted.
- e. Local fire department not notified of the location and type of stored materials.
- f. Controlled, segregated areas not designated at packing/shipping sites.
- g. Radiological work areas allow presence of food, drink, eating.
- h. Monitoring and surveys not performed properly in packing/shipping and storage sites.

These findings can be eliminated with training and emphasis on implementing an effective RPP.

7. An area of concern involves direct shipments of radioactive materials to units. Previously the RPOs would monitor these shipments upon receipt at a central warehouse. Now the units need to contact the RPOs when they receive radioactive materials so they can be checked by the RPOs before being used. We request you look into both the receipt and shipment of radioactive materials under your command to insure proper handling of these materials is occurring.

AMSTA-AC-SF (385a)

SUBJECT: Armament and Chemical Acquisition and Logistics Activity (ACALA) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) License Compliance Issues/Actions

8. The ACALA in an effort to assist the implementation of your RPP has made available two training courses, a Radioactive Materials Handling Course (RHMC) (5 days) and a Tritium Course (TC) (3 days). Contact the ACALA Safety Office for more information. These courses have no tuition cost to you, just per diem. Some locations have the RMHC training presented annually at their site. The TC was presented at four sites in FY96: Baltimore, MD; Chicago, IL; Phoenix, AZ; and Anchorage, AK to enhance opportunity for different locations to send students.

9. As a reminder your personnel should be aware that devices such as the M8A1 Chemical Agent Alarm and the Chemical Agent Monitor are required to be wipe tested (successfully) at intervals not to exceed 12 months and when transferring (shipment and receipt) in order to be considered mission capable. Also they should be aware that only unrepairable items being turned in are given Code H. This is because Code H (unrepairable) radioactive items must be turned to the post RPO to store for disposal as radioactive waste.

10. An ACALA Radiation Safety Information Bulletin (RSIB) has been issued for Jun 96 and for Sep 96. These paperless bulletins provide more information on what has been going on with items covered by ACALA NRC licenses and types of training and assistance that is available. The RSIB has been E-mailed to as many addressees as we know might be interested. You can be placed on distribution on request. The RSIB has also been on the INTERNET since Jan 96 at <http://147.217.198.7/ssn/radiation/rad.html>. It is part of ACALA's Soldier Support Network which also has Safety-of-Use Messages, GPMs, Equipment Improvement Reports, selected Technical Manuals, etc. The RSIB is one of our primary means of directly contacting RPOs to let them know what we are doing and get some feedback on what type of assistance they are interested in. If you have any questions about the RSIB or any of the items in the paragraphs above, please contact the POCs listed in the following paragraph.

11. The POCs are:

Mrs. Betty Peterson, AMSTA-AC-SF, DSN 793-2962, cc-mail
bpeterso@ria-emh2.army.mil


AMSTA-AC-SF (385a)
SUBJECT: Armament and Chemical Acquisition and Logistics
Activity (ACALA) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) License
Compliance Issues/Actions

Mr. Jeff Havenner, AMSTA-AC-SF, DSN 793-2965,
cc-mail jhavenne@ria-emh2.army.mil

Mr. Tim Mohs AMSTA-AC-SF, DSN 793-6228,
cc-mail tmohs@ria-emh2.army.mil

Mr. Gavin Ziegler, AMSTA-AC-SF, DSN 793-2995,
cc-mail gziegler@ria-emh2.army.mil.

2 Encls
as


JOHN A. MATTILA
Chief, Safety Office

DISTRIBUTION:

Cdr, FORSCOM, ATTN: AFPI-SO, Ft. McPherson, GA 30330-6000
Cdr, TRADOC, ATTN: ATBO-SO, Ft. Monroe, VA 23651-5000
Cdr, CECOM, ATTN: AMSEL-RER-SF, Ft. Monmouth, NJ
00703-5024
Cdr, IOC, ATTN: AMSIO-DMS, Rock Island, IL 61299-6000
Cdr, U.S. Army Pacific, ATTN: APSL, Ft Shafter, HI
96858-5100
Cdr, U.S. Army Europe & 7th Army, ATTN: AEAGA-S, Unit
29351, APO AE 09014
Cdr, U.S. Forces Korea/Eighth U.S. Army, ATTN: EASF, Unit
15236, APO AP 96205-009
Cdr, National Guard Bureau, ATTN: NGB-AVN-S, 111 S. George
Mason Dr, Arlington, VA 22204-1382
Cdr, U. S. Army Reserve Command, ATTN: AFRC-SA, 3800 SW
Camp Creek Parkway, Atlanta, GA 30331
Commandant, HQ Marine Corps, CODE 3D, 2 Navy Annex,
Washington, DC 20380-1775
Cdr, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow (B136), ATTN:
Otis Gentry, Box 110100, Barstow, CA 92311-5001
Cdr, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany (884), ATTN: CWC
861, Mike Roach, 814 Radford Blvd, Albany, GA 31704-1128
Cdr, Letterkenny Army Depot, ATTN: SIOLE-CS,
Letterkenny, PA 17201-4150
Cdr, Anniston Army Depot, ATTN: SIOAN-SF, Anniston, AL
36201-5046
Cdr, Defense Logistics Agency, ATTN: Env & Safety Office
(CAAE), 8725 John J. Kingman Road (STE 2553),
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6219

AMSTA-AC-SF (385a)

SUBJECT: Armament and Chemical Acquisition and Logistics
Activity (ACALA) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) License
Compliance Issues/Actions

CF:

Cdr, AMC, ATTN: AMCSF-P, Alexandria, VA 22333

Cdr, TACOM, ATTN: AMSTA-CZ, Warren, MI 48397-5000

CUSTOMER FEEDBACK

This survey is intended to provide feedback on assistance provided by the ACALA Safety Office. Your comments are welcome on areas of the ACALA Radiation Protection Program that you feel could be improved or where more assistance or training would be beneficial. It is our goal to provide you the best service we can.

1) Type of Service provided to your organization

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2) Timeliness of service provided

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3) Improvement desired

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Please forward above feedback to E-mail address
amsta-ac-sf@ria-emh2.army.mil at SMTP-DDN. Although E-mail
is preferred, the following mail or fax connections can also
be used.

Mail feedback to ACALA, ATTN: Ms. Lois Farson, AMSTA-AC-SF,
Rock Island, IL 61299-7630 or fax DSN 793-6758 or (309) 782-
6758

FROM
 :DIR ACALA ROCK ISLAND IL/AMSTA-AC-SF//
 TO
 :DA WASHDC//SARD-ZT/SARD-ZCS/SARD-ZP/SARD-ZR/SARD-ZS/
 : SARD-SA/DAAE-LO/DAAR-OT/DACS-SF/DAIG-SD/DALO-AOC/
 : DALO-SMT/DALO-SMM/DAMO-DR/DAMOFDG/DAMO-TRF/
 : SGPS-PSP/SARD/DAAE-ZB//
 :CDR AMC ALEXANDRIA VA
 :CDR USA CEG ASIA
 :CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFPI-SO//
 :CDR USA SEVEN HEIELBERG GE
 :COM USARCENT FWD DOHA KU
 :COM USARCENT SA DAHARAN//AFRD-FWD-G1//
 :CDR USARPAC FT SHAFTER HI
 :CDR USARC PROV FT GILLIAM GA
 :CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
 :CDR USAEIGHT SEOUL KOR
 :AIG 9004
 :AIG 9041
 :AIG 9119
 :AIG 11652
 :AIG 12285
 :AIG 12523
 :AIG 12585
 :CDR USAMRDC FT DETRICK MD//SGRD-ZA//
 :CDR USADC ARLINGTON VA//CSSD-ZA//
 :CDR USASC FT RUCKER AL//CSSC-S/CSSCS-M//
 :CDR IOC ROCK ISL IL//AMSIO-DMS/AMSIO-IQA-A/AMSIO-NG//
 :DIR LOGSA REDSTONE ARS AL
 :CDR ANAD ANNISTON AL//SDSAN-DM//
 :PEO ASM WARREN MI//SFAE-ASM-AB/E/I/K/L/S/Q//
 :PEO ASM FIELDING TEAM FT CARSON CO//SFAE-ASM-MFT//OMC
 : CAIRO EG//SFAE-ASM-AB-EF/MIA1TAFT//
 :PM ABRAMS WARREN MI//SFAE-ASM-AB-LD//SFAE-ASM-AB-LF//
 :CDR USA CEG EUR MANNHEIM GE//AERCE-MC//
 INFO
 :DIR ACALA ROCK ISLAND IL //AMSTA-AC-NM/AMSTA-AC-NC/
 : AMSTA-AC-LR/AMSTA-AC-AR/AMSTA-AC-FA//
 :
 TEXT
 :UNCLAS
 SUBJECT: NET ALERT MIA1 INFINITY COLLIMATOR RUPTURE

 1. THIS NET ALERT HAS BEEN FORWARDED FOR ACCIDENT PREVENTION PURPOSES ONLY. A RETURN RESPONSE IS NOT REQUIRED. THE PURPOSE IS TO PROVIDE RAPID NOTIFICATION OF ACCIDENTS INVOLVING FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, OR PROCESSES THAT MAY EXIST AT MULTIPLE LOCATIONS, INCLUDING YOUR LOCATION. REQUEST MACOM COMMANDERS IMMEDIATELY RETRANSMIT THIS MESSAGE TO ALL SUBORDINATE UNITS, ACTIVITIES, OR ELEMENTS AFFECTED OR CONCERNED. RETRANSMITTAL SHOULD REFERENCE THIS MESSAGE.

2. RECEIVED FROM ARMY SOURCES:

M1A1 INFINITY COLLIMATOR RUPTURE

A. ON AUGUST 20, 1996, AN M1A1 INFINITY COLLIMATOR BURST AT FT DRUM, NY AS A RESULT OF OVER PRESSURIZATION DURING AN ATTEMPT TO PURGE AND CHARGE THE DEVICE WITH DRY NITROGEN. THE PRESSURE WAS SUFFICIENTLY HIGH SO AS TO CAUSE ONE OF THE GLASS LENSES TO SHATTER AS WELL AS BREAKING THE 10 CURIE TRITIUM RADIOACTIVE SOURCE. THERE WERE NO INJURIES.

B. PRELIMINARY SAFETY INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT INDIVIDUALS WERE IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTING TO USE A HIGH PRESSURE GAUGE ON THEIR PURGING APPARATUS. THIS CAUSED THE PRESSURE INSIDE THE BODY OF THE COLLIMATOR TO EXCEED THE MAXIMUM 3 PSI AND CAUSED THE GLASS TO RUPTURE.

C. RECOMMEND YOU REVIEW TM 750-116, GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR PURGING AND CHARGING OF FIRE CONTROL INSTRUMENTS. THE LOW PRESSURE GAUGE USED FOR THE M1A1 COLLIMATOR SHOULD READ FROM 1 - 15 PSI, GRADUATED IN 1 PSI INCREMENTS. ANY HIGHER PRESSURE GAUGE DOES NOT ALLOW FINE ENOUGH CONTROL. UNITS ARE REMINDED THAT PURGING AND CHARGING OF THE M1A1 COLLIMATOR MUST BE DONE IN A WELL VENTILATED AREA, OPEN TO THE OUTDOORS TO REDUCE THE CHANCES OF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE AND CONTAMINATION IN CASE OF A RUPTURE. TOO OFTEN, SOLDIERS, MARINES AND CIVILIANS, FROM WORKER TO SUPERVISOR, APPEAR TO BE UNAWARE OF THE PROPER PROCEDURES, AS THESE ACCIDENTS CONTINUE TO OCCUR. LET'S GET THE WORD OUT.

4. POC IS MR. JEFF HAVENNER, DSN 793-2965 OR MS. BETTY PETERSON, DSN 793-2962, FAX 793-6758, EMAIL ADDRESS AMSTA-AC-SF@RIA-EMH2.ARMY.MIL

Author: DNGUYEN at ril081w2
Date: 9/25/96, 8:55 AM
Priority: Normal
Receipt Requested
TO: DNGUYEN
Subject: GPM, ACALA 96-06

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RUERNIG RUERNIH RUERNII RUERNIK RUERNIL RUERNIM RUERNIO RUERNIQ
RUERNIT RUERNIU RUERNIW RUERNIZ RUERPBB.

ZNR UUUUU

R 192134Z SEP 96

FM DIRACALA ROCK ISLAND IL /AMSTA-AC-SF//

TO AIG 9004

AIG 11652

AIG 12285

AIG 12266

RHFJFNJ/CDRUSACEGASIA CHARLESTON SC

INFO RUERNIF/DIRACALA ROCK ISLAND IL //AMSTA-AC-SF//

ACCT DA-BDCVLY

BT

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: GROUND PRECAUTIONARY MESSAGE (GPM), ACALA CONTROL NO. 96-06,
REMOVAL AND DISPOSAL OF M16/M16A1 RIFLE LOW LIGHT, TRITIUM FRONT
SIGHTS.

* "ATTENTION" *
* THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION THAT IS VITAL TO THE SAFETY *
* OF ARMY PERSONNEL AND THE OPERATION OR MAINTENANCE OF ARMY *
* EQUIPMENT. *

PAGE 02 RUERNIF1165 UNCLAS

1. DISTRIBUTION: THIS IS A "GROUND PRECAUTIONARY MESSAGE". MACOM
COMMANDERS WILL RETRANSMIT THIS MESSAGE TO ALL SUBORDINATE
COMMANDS/ACTIVITIES WITHIN 24 HOURS OF RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE AND
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE WITHIN 5 WORKING DAYS TO
DIRECTOR, ACALA, ATTN: AMSTA-AC-SF, ROCK ISLAND, IL 61299-7630,
PHONE NUMBER: DSN 793-6228, COMMERCIAL (309) 782-6228 OR EMAIL
TMOHS@RIA-EMH2.ARMY.MIL.

2. PROBLEM:

M16 AND M16A1 RIFLE, LOW LIGHT, TRITIUM FRONT SIGHTS HAVE EXCEEDED
THEIR SERVICE LIFE AND ARE NO LONGER AUTHORIZED FOR USE. THEREFORE,
IF LOW LIGHT, TRITIUM FRONT SIGHTS ARE FOUND IN USE, REMOVE AND
REPLACE WITH STANDARD FRONT SIGHTS (NSN 1005-01-134-3625).

3. USER ACTIONS:

A. ALL UNITS SHALL CHECK ON HAND M16/M16A1 RIFLES AND ANY LOW LIGHT
TRITIUM SIGHTS SHALL BE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH STANDARD FRONT
SIGHTS. REMOVED LOW LIGHT TRITIUM SIGHTS SHALL BE TURNED IN TO THE
LOCAL/INSTALLATION RADIATION PROTECTION OFFICER (RPO) AS RADIOACTIVE
WASTE.

B. UPON COMPLETION OF THE ABOVE ACTION, NOTIFY THE ACALA SAFETY
OFFICE VIA MAIL; DIRECTOR, ACALA, ATTN: AMSTA-AC-SF, ROCK ISLAND, IL

PAGE 03 RUERNIF1165 UNCLAS

61299-7630, OR EMAIL TMOHS@RIA-EMH2.ARMY.MIL.

Emo 2

C. WHEN RECEIVING AN M16 OR M16A1 FROM THE SUPPLY SYSTEM, CHECK THE FRONT SIGHT AND REPLACE ANY LOW LIGHT TRITIUM SIGHTS FOUND WITH A STANDARD SIGHT.

4. CHANGE 1 TO ARMY TM 9-1005-249-23&P, AFTO 11W3-5-5-24 AND CG COMDTINST M8370.9 WILL SHOW BOTH THE LOW LIGHT TRITIUM AND STANDARD FRONT SIGHTS FOR RECOGNITION PURPOSES.

5. SUPPLY STATUS: N/A

6. ACALA/POINT OF CONTACT:

A. ACALA AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT, SMALL ARMS PRODUCT CENTER POC IS MR. NEAL CHRISTIANSON, AMSTA-AC-ASIR, DSN 793-0034, COMMERCIAL (309) 782-0334, OR EMAIL NCHRISTI@RIA-EMH2.ARMY.MIL.

B. ACALA RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER POC IS MR. TIM MOHS, AMSTA-AC-SF, DSN 793-6228, COMMERCIAL (309) 782-6228, OR EMAIL TMOHS@RIA-EMH2.ARMY.MIL.

BT