NRC Form 366 (9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 6	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)

Discovery of Unsealed Fire Barriers

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 7	2 4	8 5	8 5	0 2 9	0 0	0 8	2 3	8 5	NA	0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	1
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 9 1

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: *(Check one or more of the following)* (11)

	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER *(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)*
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
	20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Lonnie F. Daughtery/Compliance Superintendent	AREA CODE 6 0 1 4 3 7 - 2 3 3 4

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES *(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)*	X NO				

ABSTRACT *(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines)* (16)

While performing an unrelated DCP walkdown in the Control Building, penetrations CE359G and CE361G were discovered open. These penetrations function as fire barriers and should have been sealed.

Penetration CE359G was last documented opened and closed in June 1983. CE361G was last documented opened and closed in February 1984. Upon discovery fire watches were established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.7. The seals will be restored on MWO's F54706 and F54707.

The cause of the open penetrations could not be determined.

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NRC Form 366A (9-83)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 6	8 5	— 0 2 9	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Description of Reportable Occurrence:

On July 24, 1985, at 1440 hours during a walkdown of an unrelated Design Change Package (DCP-81/5003) in Room No. 0C702 of the Control Building, penetrations CE359G and CE361G were discovered open. The two penetrations are fire barriers between 0C702 and 0C703. An investigation determined that the last documented opening and closing of CE359G and CE361G was in June 1983 and February 1984 respectively.

This situation is closely related to the concerns of LER 84-014-0 and 84-014-1 which reported similar problems in April and October of 1984. As a result of that LER, a comprehensive walkdown of 688 penetrations was performed. The 688 penetrations included in the walkdown represented approximately 1/3 of the total number of silicone foam filled penetrations in Unit 1. Due to the results of the walkdown inspection, as described in LER 84-014-1, MP&L believed there was a sufficient confidence level in the operability of the fire barriers to warrant no additional actions.

Penetrations CE359G and CE361G are of the same type but were not included in the above walkdown. MP&L believes that the two breached penetrations are isolated cases, however, additional investigation of the problem will be conducted.

Initial Conditions:

The plant was operating at 91% power.

Status of Redundant or Backup Systems:

There is no backup system to perform the function of fire seals (barriers).

Nature of Occurrence:

Documentation was found that opened and closed CE359G in June 1983. MWO F33749 was issued to route conduit through CE359G but the penetration was improperly identified in the MWO as CE360G at first and then as CE183G. Improper identification of the penetrations in the MWO was due to a problem with penetration labeling (penetrations were not permanently labeled at that time so they weren't easily identifiable). No documentation to open this penetration after June 1983 was found.

CE361G was opened to install conduit on February 11, 1984. It was closed by MWO F40184 on February 15, 1984. No documentation to open this penetration after February 15, 1984 was found.

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TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)* (17)

Immediate Corrective Action:

LCO-85/701 was issued until the penetrations are closed. Fire watches were established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.7. MWO's F54706 and F54707 were issued to seal CE359G and CE361G respectively.

Apparent Cause:

There is no record of CE359G or CE361G being properly opened after June 1983 or February 15, 1984 respectively. The location of both penetrations is in a confined area which is difficult to enter. An estimate of the length of time these penetrations were opened cannot be determined.

The cause of this situation was apparently a failure to follow proper procedures for penetration control at sometime in the past.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

A review of present programmatic controls on penetrations concluded they were adequate. The "Implementation of Modifications and New Design Requirements" procedure was revised in April of 1984 as a result of LER 84-014 to include guidance in performing walkdown inspections prior to design change package closeout. This guidance includes verification that cable/raceway fire protection is installed or restored.

Quality Assurance will conduct an independent evaluation of the GGNS program for controlling penetrations. Also, MP&L is presently conducting the 18-month inspection of 10% of the penetrations as required by Technical Specification 4.7.7.1.c.

Safety Assessment:

The unsealed penetrations resulted in a temporary degradation of a fire boundary.

MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
Helping Build Mississippi
P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39215-1640

August 23, 1985

NUCLEAR LICENSING & SAFETY DEPARTMENT

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Unit 1
Docket No. 50-416
License No. NPF-29
File: 0260/L-835.0
Discovery of Unsealed Fire Barriers
LER 85-029-0
AECM-85/0257

Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 85-029-0 which is a final report.

Yours truly,

L. F. Dale
Director

EBS/SHH:dmm
Attachment

cc: Mr. J. B. Richard (w/a)
Mr. O. D. Kingsley, Jr. (w/a)
Mr. R. B. McGehee (w/a)
Mr. N. S. Reynolds (w/a)
Mr. H. L. Thomas (w/o)
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