


The Light company

Houston Lighting & Power P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 (713) 228-9211

August 21, 1985
ST-HL-AE-1336
File No.: G12.261

Mr. Robert D. Martin
Regional Administrator, Region IV
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011



South Texas Project
Units 1 & 2
Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499
Final Report Concerning
Control of Safeguards Information

Dear Mr. Martin:

On July 22, 1985, pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e), Houston Lighting and Power Company (HL&P) notified your office of a potentially reportable item concerning control of safeguards information. As a result of subsequent review of this item we have determined that, were it to have remained uncorrected, no significant adverse impact on the safety of plant operation would have existed. Thus, we have determined that the item is not reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). Attached is our final report on this item.

If you should have any questions on this matter, please contact Mr. Michael E. Powell at (713) 993-1328.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. H. Goldberg".

J. H. Goldberg
Group Vice President, Nuclear

CAA/as

Attachment: Final Report Concerning
Control of Safeguards Information

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cc:

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Office of the Secretary
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

South Texas Project
Units 1 & 2
Final Report Concerning
Control of Safeguards Information

I. Summary

Drawings containing safeguards information (SGI) issued in the field to the constructor were left unattended, and were not logged correctly. In the home office, an SGI letter was found attached to a calculation and an unknown number of uncontrolled copies were distributed.

In the field, the Field Document Control Center (FDCC) recovered the subject SGI and relocated it to a central check-out station controlled by FDCC personnel. At the home office, the original calculation containing the SGI letter has been retrieved and stored properly. An effort is underway to retrieve the copies of the calculation.

As stated in the safety analysis below, we have determined that, were this item to have remained uncorrected, no significant adverse impact on the safety of the plant operation would have existed.

II. Description of Deficiency

HL&P Quality Assurance personnel in the field, while working on another task assignment in the Unit 2 contractor's trailer complex, noticed that the safe (cabinet) used for storing SGI in the office was standing open for a period of time and was unattended. The safe contained a variety of SGI drawings. Safeguards drawings were also noted lying on desks adjacent to the safe. A check was then conducted of the Unit 1 contractor's trailer complex. SGI was properly attended, however, drawings were not being logged in accordance with established procedures.

In the home office, an SGI letter was found to be attached to an unclassified calculation and an unknown number of copies were distributed.

Both of these occurrences are a result of failure of personnel to follow established procedures regarding control of SGI documents.

III. Corrective Action

The FDCC recovered all SGI that was issued to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 contractor's trailers. A central check-out station controlled by FDCC has been established.

In the home office, the original calculation containing the SGI letter has been retrieved and stored properly. An effort is underway to retrieve the copies of the calculations.

IV. Recurrence Control

Since we have determined that a significant safety hazard would not exist if this deficiency would have remained uncorrected, recurrence controls per 10CFR50.55(e) are not needed. The project is performing investigations and reviews to assure that control of SGI per 10CFR73.21 is effective. Additional details of these actions can be made available for review in our offices.

V. Safety Analysis

Plant safety could be potentially compromised if sufficient information to defeat the plant security system and gain access to plant protected areas was obtained by unauthorized individuals. Our evaluation indicates that this has not occurred for the following reasons:

- 1) All the subject SGI drawings were accounted for.
- 2) Only a fraction of the final design features of the overall security system was potentially exposed. The functional effectiveness of the following security measures have not been compromised:
 - a) the intrusion detection equipment associated with the perimeter barrier;
 - b) the access control procedures; and
 - c) the physical presence of the guard force.
- 3) No evidence of theft or attempted theft was discovered.

Thus, we have determined that, were this deficiency to have remained undetected, no significant adverse impact on the safety of plant operations would have existed.