10 CFR 50.73

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station
P. O. Box 402
Mineral, Virginia 23117

November 6, 1996

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

NAPS: MPW
Docket Nos. 50-338
50-339
License Nos. NPF-4
NPF-7

Dear Sirs:

Pursuant to North Anna Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Units 1 & 2.

Report No. 50-338/96-009-00

This Report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Matthews
Station Manager

Enclosure:

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

R. D. McWhorter
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
North Anna Power Station

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1/1

NRC FORM 366 (5-92) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 5/31/95

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HOURS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2	05000338	1 OF 3

TITLE (4)
REACTOR TRIP BYPASS BREAKER MISSED SURVEILLANCE DUE TO INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE TEST PROCEDURE

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									North Anna Unit 2	05000339
10	10	96	96	009	00	11	06	96	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)	100		20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(B)
			20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(C)
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
			20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Mr. W. R. Matthews	(540) 894-2101

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	YES (If yes, completed EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On October 10, 1996, at 1100 hours, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power and Unit 2 in Mode 5 for a scheduled refueling outage, it was determined that a missed surveillance had occurred with the reactor trip bypass breakers. Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, Table 4.3-1, Notation 8 requires the local manual shunt trip be tested prior to placing the reactor trip bypass breakers in service. However, testing had previously been conducted with the reactor trip bypass breakers racked to the connect position and momentarily closed before the manual shunt trip was tested. Therefore, the breakers were actually inservice and connected to the rod control system during previous testing of the local manual shunt trip. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) for a condition prohibited by the plant TS.

The cause of the event has been determined to be inadequate surveillance test procedures which did not require operabilty verification prior to placing the reactor trip bypass breakers in service.

This event posed no significant safety implications because the reactor trip bypass breaker manual shunt trip is proven operable immediately upon closing the bypass breaker during solid state protection testing. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not aifected at any time during this event.

1.0 Description of the Event

As a consequence of the Salem ATWS event, Item 4.3 of Generic Letter (GL) 83-28, established the requirement for the automatic actuation of the shunt trip attachment for reactor trip breakers. Subsequently, Item 4.3 became the subject of GL 85-09 and concluded that Technical Specification (TS) changes should be proposed. The changes should explicitly require independent testing of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments during power operation and independent testing of the control room manual switch contacts during each refueling outage. Technical Specification Amendment Nos. 81 and 69 were approved, June 9, 1986, by the NRC for North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2, implementing the GL criteria. The changes provided further definition of reactor trip breaker operability and clarification of surveillance test requirements for the reactor trip and reactor trip by pass breakers, and the manual scram switches.

On October 10, 1996, it was determined that testing of the local manual shunt trip (EIIS System- JD, Component-CL) had previously been conducted with the reactor trip bypass breakers (EIIS System-JD, Component-BKR) racked in and momentarily closed before the manual shunt trip was tested. In this configuration the bypass breaker is actually in service for a very short time and connected to the rod control system (EIIS System-AA) prior to testing the local manual shunt trip. Therefore, operability was not being verified prior to placing the bypass breaker in service.

2.0 Significant Safety Consequences and Implications

This event posed no significant safety implications because the reactor trip bypass breaker manual shunt trip is proven operable immediately upon closing the bypass breaker during solid state protection testing. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected at any time during this event.

Since the reactor trip bypass breakers were not tested prior to placing them in service this event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for a condition prohibited by the plant Technical Specifications.

3.0 Cause of the Event

The cause of the event has been determined to be inadequate surveillance test procedures which did not require operabilty verification prior to placing the reactor trip bypass breakers in service. The surveillance procedure test sequence was revised in February 1985, following the approval to change the normal position of the bypass breaker to "racked in and open." When TS Amendment Nos. 81 and 69 were approved in June 1986, changes to the surveillance procedures were determined not necessary. The probable cause for not

revising the test procedures was a mis-interpretation of the term "in service" and how it applied to the bypass breakers. A subsequent revision to UFSAR Section 7.2.2.2.1.7, Reactor Trip Breaker Testing, also failed to note the improper test sequence due to the mis-interpretation of the term "in service."

4.0 Immediate Corrective Actions

Documented the condition in the station deviating reporting system.

5.0 Additional Corrective Actions

The procedure controlling reactor trip bypass breaker testing was revised to ensure the bypass breakers are operable prior to placing them in service. The UFSAR will be revised to indicate the proper sequence for testing the reactor trip bypass breakers.

6.0 Actions to Prevent Recurrence

None

7.0 Similar Events

None

8.0 Additional Information

None