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May 13, 2020

Docket No: 50-424

NL-20-0329

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 2020-001-00
Safety-Related electrical bus deenergizing results in
Emergency Diesel Generator Starting

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), Southern Nuclear Operating Company is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report, 2020-001-00 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1. This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Matthew Horn at (706) 848-1544.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Jesse Thomas" with a stylized "IV" at the end.

Jesse Thomas
Vice President
Vogtle 1&2

JT/KCW

Enclosure: Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2020-001-00

Cc: Regional Administrator
NRR Project Manager – Vogtle 1 & 2
Senior Resident Inspector – Vogtle 1 & 2
RType: CVC7000

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 2020-001-00
Safety-Related electrical bus deenergizing results in
Emergency Diesel Generator Starting

Enclosure

Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2020-001-00

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-6 A10M), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503; e-mail: oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control number.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form
<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/>)

1. Facility Name Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1	2. Docket Number 05000424	3. Page 1 OF 2
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4. Title
Safety-Related electrical bus deenergizing results in Emergency Diesel Generator Start Signal

5. Event Date			6. LER Number			7. Report Date			8. Other Facilities Involved	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Rev No.	Month	Day	Year	Facility Name	Docket Number
03	21	2020	2020	- 001	- 00	05	13	2020	N/A	05000
									Facility Name	Docket Number
									N/A	05000

9. Operating Mode	11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)			
6	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10. Power Level	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)
000	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(1)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(2)(ii)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(2)(iii)
		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A)	

12. Licensee Contact for this LER

Licensee Contact Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Matthew Horn, Regulatory Affairs Manager	Telephone Number (Include Area Code) 706-848-1544
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13. Complete One Line for each Component Failure Described in this Report

Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable To ICES	Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable To ICES
N/A					N/A				

14. Supplemental Report Expected

☐ Yes (If yes, complete 15. Expected Submission Date) ☒ No

15. Expected Submission Date

Month	Day	Year
N/A	N/A	N/A

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 14 single-spaced typewritten lines)

At 1644 EDT, on March 21, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 6, at 000 percent power, approximately 83 degrees Fahrenheit, and depressurized, an actuation of the Unit 1 B-Train Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) occurred during Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) testing. The reason for the EDG auto-start signal was a loss of voltage on the Bravo train, safety related, electrical bus due to the EDG output breaker opening. The EDG output breaker opened due to a Human Performance Error when testing steps were performed out of order. The causes were lack of adherence to accepted procedure use standards and ineffective oversight. The corrective actions include revisions to the ESFAS testing procedures to add clarifying direction on the order of procedure step performance and for resetting the EDG lockout relay and safety injection signal, and dynamic learning activities and oral boards will be performed to verify proper supervisor oversight proficiency.

The EDG was already running at the time of the loss of voltage on the bus. Due to the automatic actuation of systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B), specifically the Emergency Diesel Generator System, this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The operating crew responded correctly to the event. The applicable abnormal operating procedures were properly entered, and documentation met expectations.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET**

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form
<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-m/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/>)

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104**EXPIRES: 04/30/2020**

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-6 A10M), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503; e-mail: oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control number.

1. FACILITY NAME		2. DOCKET NUMBER		3. LER NUMBER		
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1		05000424		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.
				2020	- 001	- 00

NARRATIVE**A. Event Description**

At 1644 EDT, on March 21, 2020, with plant operating conditions before the event consisting of Unit 1 in Mode 6, at 000 percent power, approximately 83 degrees Fahrenheit, and depressurized, an actuation of the Unit 1 B-Train Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)[EK] occurred during Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)[JE] testing. The reason for the EDG auto-start signal was a loss of voltage on the Bravo train safety related electrical bus due to the EDG output breaker opening. The EDG was already running at the time of the loss of voltage on the bus.

The EDG output breaker opened because steps in the ESFAS procedure were performed out of sequence by a Vogtle Licensed Operator. Specifically, the Safety Injection (SI) signal was reset before the lockout relay for the EDG was reset. This caused the EDG to disconnect from the electrical bus and deenergize the bus. This caused a valid undervoltage signal to be sent to the EDG. In addition, necessary oversight from the Vogtle Senior Reactor Operator was not provided to prevent steps from being performed out of order.

There were no structures, components, or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.

Because of the automatic actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator System, which is listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B), this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

B. Cause of Event

The causes were lack of adherence to accepted procedure use standards and ineffective oversight.

C. Safety Assessment

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event. Specifically, Spent Fuel pool cooling was maintained via the 1A Spent Fuel Cooling system, core cooling was maintained via 1A Residual Heat Removal system, "A" train safety related 4160 volt power supplies remained unaffected, there was no radiological release as a consequence of the event, and the shutdown risk assessment remained unaffected.

The operating crew responded correctly to the event. The applicable abnormal operating procedures were properly entered, and documentation met expectations. The event was within the analysis of the UFSAR Chapter 15. There was not a release of radioactivity.

D. Corrective Actions

The corrective actions included completing revisions to the ESFAS testing procedures to add clarifying direction on the order of procedure step performance and for resetting the EDG lockout relay and safety injection signal. Dynamic learning activities and oral boards are planned to verify proper supervisor oversight proficiency.

E. Previous Similar Events

None