

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit #1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 2					PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3	
TITLE (4) RPS Actuation due to low RPV level																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 7	2 4	8 5	8 5	0 3 1	0 0	0 8	2 3	8 5					0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9) 4			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)													
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0 1 0			20.402(b)				20.406(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)	
			20.406(a)(1)(i)				60.36(c)(1)				<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)	
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)				60.36(c)(2)				<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)				60.73(a)(2)(ii)				<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)				60.73(a)(2)(iii)				<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
			20.406(a)(1)(v)				60.73(a)(2)(iii)				<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(x)					
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME Gary G. Rhoads, Operational Compliance Engineer										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 5 1 6 9 2 9 - 8 3 0 0						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 26, 1985 at 0645 A.M., a Low Reactor Water Level caused a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation. The plant was in Operational Condition 4 with the Reactor Mode Switch in Refuel, and the temperature at approximately 119 Degrees F with all rods fully inserted. The Low Reactor Water Level resulted from an Operator inadvertently opening the Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Suppression Pool suction valve before the associated Shutdown Cooling valve had fully closed. This resulted in a direct drain path from the Reactor Vessel to the Suppression Pool. At the time of the event the Reactor Mode Switch was placed in Shutdown and the Trip was reset. Approximately 10 - 15 minutes later Reactor Water Level was restored to normal and the Emergency Shutdown Procedure was completed. Plant Management was notified of the event and at 1025 A.M. the NRC was notified per 10CFR50.72.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit #1	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 2	8 5	- 0 3 1	- 0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

On July 26, 1985 at 0645 A.M., a Low Reactor Water Level caused an RPS actuation. The plant was in Operational Condition - 4 with the Reactor Mode Switch in Refuel. All rods were fully inserted at the time the event commenced.

In order to perform maintenance on the undervoltage relays for Emergency Bus 103, the fuses supplying power to the undervoltage relays were removed. Concurrent with the fuse removal, the Nuclear Station Operator was lining up the "A" loop of Residual Heat Removal system to the Shutdown Cooling mode of operation. A loss of Emergency Bus 103 occurred. While control room personnel investigated the loss of Emergency Bus 103, the operator was instructed to restore the "A" loop of RHR to the LPCI (standby) mode of operation. The loss of Emergency Bus 103 was determined to be caused by an Equipment Operator following an improperly completed Station Equipment Clearance Permit (SECP). The permit erroneously called for removing the bus program undervoltage sensing relay fuses before removing the fuses to the undervoltage initiation relays. This caused a bus undervoltage signal. While restoring the "A" RHR loop to the LPCI standby mode from the Shutdown Cooling mode the operator inadvertantly placed the Control Switch for RHR Suppression Pool suction valve (1E11*MOV031A) in the open position before the RHR Shutdown Cooling suction valve (1E11*MOV032A) had fully closed. This resulted in a direct drain path from the Reactor Vessel to the Suppression Pool. Approximately 7500 gallons of Vessel inventory had drained to the Suppression Pool. A Low Reactor Water Level Trip, (+12.5 inches), occurred. This also caused 1E11*MOV047A and 1E11*MOV048A, the Shutdown Cooling suction valves, to isolate securing the drain path. Upon securing of the draining, Vessel level stabilized at approximately -10 inches, (10 inches below instrument zero). Level was restored to +39 inches within 10 to 15 minutes.

At the time of the event, the Reactor Mode Switch was placed in Shutdown and the trip reset. Level was restored using Station Procedure SP 29.023.01 and the Emergency Shutdown Procedure, SP23.010.01, was completed. Plant Management was notified of the event and the NRC was notified per 10CFR50.72 at 1025 A.M. There was no safety significance to the event. All plant systems operated as designed. No ECCS systems were challenged or required for the event. The operators carried out all required actions.

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Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit #1	0500032285	—	031	—	000	3	OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

To prevent recurrence of this event the following corrective action has been completed:

- 1) All Operations Section personnel have met with the Vice President-Nuclear Operations to discuss the generic implications of the subject event. The importance of proper communications between control room personnel was stressed during this discussion.
- 2) All personnel in the Operations Section have been trained in the operation of the RHR Shutdown Cooling and Suppression Pool suction valve interlocks. They have also been trained in the Emergency Bus program logic and the consequences of pulling the fuses serving that logic.
- 3) A modification request has been sent to Engineering requesting the installation of interlocks to prevent the opening of the RHR Suppression Pool suction valves while the Shutdown Cooling suction valves are open.
- 4) A Change was made to the RHR operating procedure to help preclude this event from happening.
- 5) The individual responsible for generating the SECP has been briefed in the proper completion of Station Equipment Clearance Permits.



LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY

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August 23, 1985

PM-85-178

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, enclosed is a copy of Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1's Licensee Event Report 85-031.

Sincerely yours,

for William E. Steiger, Jr.
Plant Manager

WES/gr

Enclosure

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator
John Berry, Senior Resident Inspector
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Records Center
American Nuclear Insurers

SR.A21.0200

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bcc: J.D. Leonard, Jr.
J.L. Smith
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