REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

FLOW PATH - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source:

a. A flow path from the boric acid ~~tanks~~ system via either a boric acid transfer pump or a gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the boric acid storage tank in Specification 3.1.2.5a. is OPERABLE, or

b. The flow path from the refueling water storage tank via a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the refueling water storage tank in Specification 3.1.2.5b. is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the Boric Acid Transfer Pump Room temperature and the boric acid storage tank solution temperature are greater than or equal to 67°F when a flow path from the boric acid tanks is used, and

b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

FLOW PATHS - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.2 At least two* of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

a. The flow path from the boric acid ~~tanks~~ system via a boric acid transfer pump and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and

b. Two flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging pumps to the RCS.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the RCS OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the RCS to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 2% $\Delta k/k$ at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.2 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the Boric Acid Transfer Pump Room temperature and the boric acid storage tank solution temperature are greater than or equal to 67°F when it is a required water source;

b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;

c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection test signal; and

d. At least once per 18 months by verifying that the flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.2a. delivers at least 33 gpm to the RCS.

*Only one boron injection flow path is required to be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 350°F.

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BORATED WATER SOURCE - SHUTDOWN

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. A Boric Acid Storage System with:

1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 6000 gallons,

2) A boron concentration between 6300 and 7175 ppm, and

3) A minimum solution temperature of 67°F.

b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:

1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 250,000 gallons,

2) A minimum boron concentration of 2000 ppm, and

3) A minimum solution temperature of 35°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1) Verifying the boron concentration of the water,

2) Verifying the contained borated water volume, and

3) Verifying the Boric Acid Transfer Pump Room temperature and the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is less than 35°F.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.6 As a minimum, the following borated water source(s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2:

a. A Boric Acid Storage System with:

1) A minimum ~~contained~~ usable borated water volume of 21020 gallons,

2) A boron concentration between 6300 and 7175 ppm, and

3) A minimum solution temperature of 67°F.

b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:

1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 1,166,000 gallons,

2) A boron concentration between 2000 and 2200 ppm,

3) A minimum solution temperature of 40°F, and

4) A maximum solution temperature of 50°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With the Boric Acid Storage System inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 2% Δk/k at 200°F; restore the Boric Acid Storage System to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

b. With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

TABLE 3.3-4

ESF ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SET POINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE(TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR(S)	TRIP SET POINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
Item #8. Loss of Power					
a) 4.16 KV Emergency Bus under voltage (loss of voltage)	N.A.	N.A.	±2%	2800 VOLTS for 2 sec.	2720 VOLTS
b) 4.16 KV Emergency Bus under voltage (Grid Degraded voltage)	N.A.	N.A.	±0.1%	3710 VOLTS 8 second delay for alarm 8 second or less if ESF Actuation signal coincide with Bus Degradation 300 sec delay for trip	3706 VOLTS

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

INSTRUMENT LOCATION	TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS* HEAT (x/y)	FLAME (x/y)	SMOKE (x/y)
1. Containment**			
a. Elevation 24'6"	8/0		
b. RCP Cubicle D	4/0		
c. RCP Cubicle A	4/0		
d. RCP Cubicle C	4/0		
e. RCP Cubicle B	4/0		
f. Electrical Penetration Area, El. 24'6"			16/0
g. Outer Annulus, El. 3'8" and 24'6"			16/0
2. Auxiliary Building			
a. East MCC Rod Area			0/16
b. West MCC Rod Area			0/16
c. North Floor Area, El. 4'6"			14/0
d. RPCCW Pump Area, El. 24'6"			9/0
e. Charging Pump Area			3/0
f. General Area, El. 43'6"			13/0
g. General Area, El. 66'6"			17/0
h. East MCC Rod Area - CO_2			0/12
i. West MCC Rod Area - CO_2			0/12
3. ESF Building			
a. RSS Pump Area			4/0
b. RSS Pump Area			4/0
c. RHR HX Area (North)			8/0
d. RHR HX Area (South)			4/0
e. General Area, El. 4'6"			2/0
f. FWA Pump Area			2/0
g. QSS Pump Area			4/0
h. FWA Pump Area			4/0
i. FWA Pump Area			5/0
j. North HVAC Area			2/0
k. South HVAC Area			2/0
l. H_2 Recombiner Bldg.			5/0

*(x/y): x is number of Function A (early warning fire detection and notification only) instruments.
y is number of Function B (actuation of Fire Suppression Systems and early warning and notification) instruments.

**The fire detection instruments located within the containment are not required to be OPERABLE during the performance of Type A containment leakage rate tests.

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

INSTRUMENT LOCATION	TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS* HEAT (x/y)	FLAME (x/y)	SMOKE (x/y)
4. Control Building			
a. Switchgear Room A			0/19
b. Cable Tray A, El. 4'6"			0/19
c. Battery Room A			8/0
d. Switchgear Room B			0/20
e. Cable Tray B, El. 4'6"			0/17
f. Battery Room B			6/0
g. NE Cable Spreading Room			0/8
h. SE Cable Spreading Room			0/11
i. NW Cable Spreading Room			0/8
j. SW Cable Spreading Room			0/11
k. Computer Room Floor			2/0
l. East Instrument Rack Room Floor			3/0
m. West Instrument Rack Room Floor			5/0
n. Computer Room	0/4		4/0
o. East Instrument Rack Room			7/0
p. West Instrument Rack Room	0/17		12/0
q. Control Room	1/0		27/0
r. HVAC Room			9/0
s. Chiller Room			3/0
t. Switchgear Room A - CO_2			0/16
u. Switchgear Room B - CO_2			0/15
v. Cable Spreading Room - CO_2			0/15
w. Cable Spreading Room - CO_2			0/19
5. Emergency Diesel Building			
a. Diesel Generator A Area	14/0	4/0	1/0
b. Diesel Generator B Area	14/0	4/0	1/0
c. Fuel Oil Tank Vault A	0/3		2/0
d. Fuel Oil Tank Vault B	0/3		2/0
6. Intake Structure			
a. Circ. Water Pump Area			6/0
b. Service Water Pump Area A			4/0
c. Service Water Pump Area B			4/0
7. Service Building			
a. North Cable Tunnel			0/6
b. South Cable Tunnel			0/17
c. North Cable Tunnel - CO_2			0/5
d. South Cable Tunnel - CO_2			0/6

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

INSTRUMENT LOCATION	TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS*		
	HEAT (x/y)	FLAME (x/y)	SMOKE (x/y)
B. Fuel Building			
a. General Area			4/0
b. Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Area			17/0

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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.1 Each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

a. The isolation valve open,

b. A contained borated water volume of between ~~[6190]~~ 6852 and ~~[6560]~~ 7084 gallons,

c. A boron concentration of between 1900 and 2100 ppm, and

d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between ~~615~~ 636 and ~~665~~ 694 psia.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3*.

ACTION:

a. With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours.

b. With one accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.1.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours by:

1) Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks to be within the above limits, and

2) Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is open.

b. At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume by verifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution; and

*Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

ECCS Throttle Valves Valve Number	Valve Number
3SIH*V8	3SIH*V107
3SIH*V9	3SIH*V108
3SIH*V21	3SIH*V109
3SIH*V23	3SIH*V111

h. By performing a flow balance test, during shutdown, following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying that:

1) For centrifugal charging pump lines, with a single pump running:

a) The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to ~~346~~ 339 gpm, and

b) The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 560 gpm.

2) For Safety Injection pump lines, with a single pump running:

a) The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 462 gpm, and

b) The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 670 gpm. for the A pump and 650 gpm for the B pump.

3) For RHR pump lines, with a single pump running, the sum of the injection line flow rates is greater than or equal to 3976 gpm.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed, and

b. An overall air lock leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.05 L_a at P_a, 54.1 psia (39.4 psig).

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one containment air lock door inoperable:

1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed,

2. Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days,

3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours, and

4. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

b. With the containment air lock inoperable, except as the result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. Within 72 hours following each closing, except when the air lock is being used for multiple entries, then at least once per 72 hours, by verifying that the seal leakage is less than 0.01 L_a as determined by precision flow measurements when measured for at least 30 seconds with the volume between the seals at a constant pressure of 54.1 psia (39.4 psig).

b. By conducting overall air lock leakage tests at not less than P_a, 54.1 psia (39.4 psig), and verifying the overall air lock leakage rate is within its limit:

1) At least once per 6 months,* and

2) Prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY when maintenance has been performed on the air lock that could affect the air lock sealing capability.**

c. At least once per 6 months by verifying that only one door in each air lock can be opened at a time.

or by verifying no detectable seal leakage by pressure decay when the volume between the door seals is pressurized to greater than or equal to 54.1 psia (39.4psig) for at least 15 minutes

*The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.
**This represents an exemption to Appendix J, paragraph III.D.2.(b)(ii), of 10 CFR Part 50. [Applicant must request this exemption.]

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PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.6 Flood protection shall be provided for ~~all Safety-Related Systems, components, and structures~~ the service water pump cubicles and Intake Structure when the water level ~~of the [usually the ultimate heat sink]~~ exceeds ~~4.0 ft~~ Mean Sea Level, USGS datum, at the Unit 3

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With the water level at ~~14.0 ft~~ above ~~elevation~~ Mean Sea Level, USGS datum:

~~a. [Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours], and~~

b. ~~Initiate and complete within ___ hours, the following flood protection measures:~~

~~1. [Plant dependent], and~~

~~2. [Plant dependent].~~

Shut the water tight doors of both service water pump cubicles within 15 minutes

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.6 The water level at the Unit 3 Intake Structure shall be determined to be within the limits by:

a. Measurement at least once per 24 hours when the water level is below elevation 8 ft Mean Sea Level, USGS datum, and

b. Measurement at least once per 2 hours when the water level is equal to or above elevation ____ Mean Sea Level, USGS datum.

8 ft above

* This specification not required if the facility design has adequate passive flood control protection features sufficient to accommodate the Design Basis Flood identified in Regulatory Guide 1.59, August 1973.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.12 FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.12 All fire rated assemblies (walls, floor/ceilings, cable tray enclosures, and other fire barriers) separating safety-related fire areas or separating portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area and all sealing devices in fire rated assembly penetrations (fire doors, fire windows, fire dampers, cable, piping, and ventilation duct penetration seals shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the above required fire rated assemblies and/or sealing devices inoperable, within 1 hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable assembly and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.12.1 At least once per 18 months the above required fire rated assemblies and penetration sealing devices shall be verified OPERABLE by performing:

a. A visual inspection of the exposed surfaces of each fire rated assembly.

b. A functional test of at least 10% of fire dampers installed in fire rated floor/wall assemblies. If functional testing acceptance criteria is not met, functional testing of an additional 10% of fire dampers will be performed. This testing process will continue until a 10% sample of fire dampers has been found to satisfy acceptance criteria. Functional testing of fire dampers will be performed so that a 100% verification of the operability of the fire dampers will be achieved every 15 years.

c. A visual inspection of at least 10% of the total number of fire rated penetration seals that are normally accessible for visual inspection. If apparent changes in appearance or abnormal degradations are found, a visual inspection of an additional 10% of the accessible penetration seals shall be made. This inspection process shall continue until a 10% sample with no apparent changes in appearance or abnormal degradation is found. Samples shall be selected such that each penetration will be inspected every 15 years.

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REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.6 The refueling machine and auxiliary hoist shall be used for movement of drive rods or fuel assemblies and shall be OPERABLE with:

a. The refueling machine used for movement of fuel assemblies having:

1) A minimum capacity of ~~[2750]~~ 4000 pounds, and

2) An overload cutoff limit less than or equal to ~~[2700]~~ 3900 pounds.

b. The auxiliary hoist used for latching and unlatching drive rods having:

1) A minimum capacity of ~~[610]~~ 3000 pounds, and

2) A load indicator which shall be used to prevent lifting loads in excess of ~~[600]~~ 1000 pounds.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of drive rods or fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel.

ACTION:

With the requirements for crane and/or hoist OPERABILITY not satisfied, suspend use of any inoperable manipulator crane and/or auxiliary hoist from operations involving the movement of drive rods and fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.6.1 Each manipulator crane used for movement of fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 100 hours prior to the start of such operations by performing a load test of at least ~~[2750]~~ 4000 pounds and demonstrating an automatic load cutoff when the crane load exceeds ~~[2700]~~ 3900 pounds.

4.9.6.2 Each auxiliary hoist and associated load indicator used for movement of drive rods within the reactor vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 100 hours prior to the start of such operations by performing a load test of at least ~~[610]~~ 3000 pounds.



FIGURE 3.1-1

ROD BANK INSERTION LIMITS VERSUS THERMAL POWER

FOUR LOOP OPERATION



FIGURE 3.1-2
ROD BANK INSERTION LIMITS VERSUS THERMAL POWER
THREE LOOP OPERATION



FIGURE 3.2-1a

AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE LIMITS AS A FUNCTION OF RATED THERMAL POWER
FOUR LOOP OPERATION



FIGURE 3.2-1b

AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE LIMITS AS A FUNCTION OF RATED THERMAL POWER
THREE LOOP OPERATION



FIGURE 3.2-2

K(Z) - NORMALIZED Fq(Z) AS A FUNCTION OF CORE HEIGHT

FOUR LOOP OPERATION



FIGURE 3.2-2.b

K(Z)- NORMALIZED $F_Q(Z)$ AS A FUNCTION OF CORE HEIGHT

THREE LOOP OPERATION

Material Property Basis

CONTROLLING MATERIAL	: PLATE METAL
COPPER CONTENT	: CONSERVATIVELY ASSUMED TO BE 0.10 WT%
PHOSPHORUS CONTENT	: 0.010 WT%
RT_{NDT} INITIAL	: 60°F
RT_{NDT} AFTER 10 EFPY	: 1/4T, 122°F 3/4T, 101°F

CURVE APPLICABLE FOR HEATUP RATES UP TO 60°F/HR FOR THE SERVICE PERIOD UP TO 10 EFPY AND CONTAINS MARGINS OF 10°F AND 60 PSIG FOR POSSIBLE INSTRUMENT ERRORS



FIGURE 3.4-2

MILLSTONE UNIT 3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEATUP LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE TO 10 EFPY

Material Property Basis

CONTROLLING MATERIAL	: PLATE METAL
COPPER CONTENT	: CONSERVATIVELY ASSUMED TO BE 0.10 WT %
PHOSPHORUS CONTENT	: 0.010WT %
RT_{NDT} INITIAL	: 60°F
RT_{NDT} AFTER 10 EFPY	: 1/4T, 122°F 3/4T, 101°F

CURVE APPLICABLE FOR COOLDOWN RATES UP TO 100°F/HR FOR THE SERVICE PERIOD UP TO 10 EFPY AND CONTAINS MARGINS OF 10°F AND 60 PSIG FOR POSSIBLE INSTRUMENT ERRORS



FIGURE 3.4-3

MILLSTONE UNIT 3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COOLDOWN LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE UP TO 10 EFPY



FIGURE 3.6-1

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR PARTIAL PRESSURE VERSUS SERVICE WATER TEMPERATURE



FIGURE 5.1-1
EXCLUSION AREA



FIGURE 5.1-2
LOW POPULATION ZONE
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STA.
UNIT 3



EXPLANATION

- A CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE
- B TURBINE BUILDING
- C FUEL BUILDING
- D WASTE DISPOSAL BUILDING
- E AUXILIARY BUILDING
- F SERVICE BUILDING
- G CONTROL BUILDING
- H MAIN STEAM VALVE BUILDING
- J ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES BUILDING
- K EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING
- L TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER
- M WAREHOUSE & UNIT 2 CONDENSATE POLISHING FACILITY
- N AUXILIARY BOILER
- O CONDENSATE POLISHING ENCLOSURE

LEGEND

PRIVATELY OWNED RECREATION AREA

0 250 500
SCALE-FEET

0 125 250
SCALE-METERS

FIGURE 5.1-3
SITE BOUNDARY FOR LIQUID & GASEOUS EFFLUENTS
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 3
ENVIRONMENT REPORT
OPERATING LISCENSE STAGE



* OVERALL CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FIRE PROTECTION

* * PROVIDES OPERATING AND ENGINEERING SUPPORT BY CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT

FIGURE 6.2.1 OFFSITE ORGANIZATION FOR FACILITY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT



FIGURE 6.2.2 FACILITY ORGANIZATION - MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 3