

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 0 6				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2	
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TITLE (4)

CONTROL ROD POSITION VERIFICATION SURVEILLANCE DEFICIENCY

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
0 7	1 9	8 5	8 5	0 1 3	0 0	0 8	1 6	8 5			0 5 0 0 0	
OPERATING MODE (9) 1			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 9 3			20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)
			20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		X	50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
			20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME H. E. MORGAN, STATION MANAGER		TELEPHONE NUMBER 7 1 4 4 9 2 - 7 7 0 0	
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 19, 1985, at 1406, during an investigation into a spurious rod bottom light, it was discovered that 3 of 18 switches to the Control Rod Position Recorder YR-404 were aligned to the non-indicating positions which prevented the print-out of 6 rod positions. At 1409, the switches were returned to their normal position and the shiftly surveillance for control rod position verification was performed satisfactorily.

Subsequent investigation determined that the three switches were inadvertently left in the bypass position on July 17, 1985 at 2336, therefore, this condition existed for 4 shifts without being detected. This is contrary to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 4.1.1.E and 4.1.1.F, which require shiftly verification that all control rod position indicators are operable and are within insertion limits.

The cause of this event was procedural inadequacy and the lack of specific training on the implementation of Operating Instruction S01-12.1-5, "Control Rod Position Verification." Operators assumed that all rod positions were printing out on recorder YR-404. Although S01-12.1-5 requires individual rod positions to be verified, no formal method to accomplish this is provided.

As corrective action, a Special Order was issued to restrict the operation of the bypass switches to YR-404 and to stress the importance of attention to detail while performing routine surveillances. S01-12.1-5 will be revised as appropriate. Specific on-the-job training on the use of S01-12.1-5 and on the operation of YR-404 will be conducted.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER		
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 0 6	8 5	- 0 1 2	- 0 1 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.1.1.E requires that all control rods be determined to be above the rod insertion limits by verifying that each analog detector indicates at least 21 steps above the rod insertion limits at least once per shift. Also, Surveillance Requirement 4.1.1.F requires that each rod position indicator (EIIS Component Code ZI) be determined to be operable by verifying at least once per shift that the rod position indication system (Analog Detection System) and the step counter indication system (Digital Detection System) agree within 35 steps.

On July 19, 1985, at 1406 with Unit 1 operating at 93% power, a spurious rod bottom light for control rod M-6 was received. The control rod positions were printed out on Control Rod Position Recorder YR-404 (EIIS System Code AA); however, it was noted that control rod M-6 position did not print out. Investigation found 3 of 18 recorder switches (EIIS Component Code ZIS) aligned to the non-indicating position which prevented the print-out of 6 rod positions. At 1409, the switches were returned to their normal position and the shiftly surveillance procedure S01-12.1-5, "Control Rod Position Verification" was performed satisfactorily.

Subsequent investigation determined that the three bypass switches were inadvertently left in the bypass position by a Control Room Operator performing the shiftly surveillance S01-12.1-5 on July 17, 1985 at 2336, and therefore, this condition was not identified for 4 shifts. Surveillance Requirements 4.1.1.E and 4.1.1.F were not being met as a result of a procedural inadequacy. Although Operating Instruction S01-12.1-5, "Control Rod Position Verification," directs the operator to verify that the position of each control rod is within limits, the procedure does not contain a checklist listing all rods, which would set forth accomplishing this in a formal manner. Instead, the operators assumed that all rod positions were printing out and consequently did not verify individually that each control rod position was within limits. A lack of specific training on both the implementation of S01-12.1-5 and on the operation of the newly installed recorder YR-404 also contributed to this event.

As immediate corrective action, a Special Order was issued to restrict the use of the bypass switches and to stress the importance of attention to detail while performing routine surveillances. Operating Instruction S01-12.1-5 will be revised to require each rod position indication (analog) and each subgroup position indication (digital) to be recorded and to formally verify that the acceptance criteria is met. Specific on-the-job training on the use of S01-12.1-5 and on the operation of YR-404 will be conducted for current Unit 1 licensed Reactor Operators. Also, S01-12.1-5 will be revised to include a precaution for the operation of YR-404 bypass switches.

There is no safety significance to this event since the Rod Position Deviation Monitor remained operable during this event and would have initiated an alarm in the event of a misaligned rod.

Southern California Edison Company



SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

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SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

H. E. MORGAN
STATION MANAGER

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August 16, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-206
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 85-013
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving the Control Rod Position Indication System. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the health and safety of the public was affected by this event.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

H. E. Morgan/maw

Enclosure: LER No. 85-013

cc: F. R. Huey (USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, USNRC Region V)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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