

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
P. O. Box 2000
Decatur, Alabama 35602

August 13, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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
Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 3-
DOCKET NO. 50-296 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68 - REPORTABLE
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-296/85018

The enclosed report provides details concerning a containment isolation because of random relay failure. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


Robert L. Lewis

Acting Plant Manager
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosures

cc (Enclosures):

Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BFN

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PDR ADOCK 05000296
S PDR

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 3										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6 1 OF 0 1 2										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 1 2					
TITLE (4) Containment Isolation Because of Random Relay Failure																									
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)															
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)											
0	7	2	4	8	5	3	5	0	1	8	0	0	0	8	1	3	8	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
OPERATING MODE (9) N		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)																							
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0 1 0		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)											
		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.38(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)											
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.38(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Test, NRC Form 366A)											
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)															
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)															
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)															
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																									
NAME R. C. Steele										TELEPHONE NUMBER 2 1 0 5 7 1 2 9 1 - 3 5 1 8 3															
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS															
AY	J	C	F	U	M	1	7	5	No																
AT	J	C	R	L	Y	G	0	8	0	Yes															
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)					MONTH DAY YEAR										
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO															

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces - i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 24, 1985, during unit 3 cold shutdown, an inadvertent containment isolation occurred when a reactor protection system (RPS) motor generator (MG) set tripped because of a defective relay coil. The defective coil also caused a fuse failure in the RPS MG set control circuit. The defective relay and the failed fuse were replaced, and the isolation signal reset.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0500029685	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		85	018	00	02	OF	02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

Units 1 and 2 were in refueling outages, and unit 3 was in cold shutdown.

On July 24, 1985, reactor protection system (RPS) motor generator (MG) set "B" tripped causing the following to occur:

- A. On half-scrum signal when RPS trip channels B1 and B2 deenergized
- B. Control room emergency ventilation (VI) initiation
- C. Refuel zone (VG) isolation
- D. Standby gas treatment (BH) initiation
- E. Primary containment isolation system (PCIS) initiation of group 2 (shutdown cooling) (BO), group 3 (reactor water cleanup) (CE), and group 6 (ventilation) (VB).

Investigation into the RPS MG set "B" trip revealed that the electrical coil in relay (RLY) 1K (General Electric type CRL20) had failed, causing fuse (FU) 1FU to blow, and the MG set to trip. The isolation was reset, and the affected safety related equipment returned to normal alignment. The defective relay and the blown fuse were replaced, and the RPS MG set "B" placed in service. The relay failure is considered random, and no recurrence control required.

During the event, the affected safety system performed as designed with no adverse effects noted.

Responsible Plant Section - N/A

Previous Events - BFRO-50-259/82057