

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No.: 50-395  
License No.: NPF-12

Report No.: 50-395/96-14

Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G)

Facility: V. C. Summer Nuclear Station

Location: P. O. Box 88  
Jenkinsville, SC 29065

Dates: December 1-28, 1996

Inspectors: B. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector  
T. Farnholtz, Resident Inspector  
W. Holland, Reactor Inspector, RII (Section M8.1)

Approved by: G. Belisle, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5  
Division of Reactor Projects

ENCLOSURE 2

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### V. C. Summer Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50-395/96-14

This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 4-week period of resident inspection; in addition, it includes the results of an announced inspection by a regional reactor inspector.

#### Operations

- In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious (Section 01.1).
- A review of the licensee's cold weather protection program revealed no discrepancies or concerns. Appropriate actions were taken prior to the onset of sub-freezing temperatures (Section 02.2).
- A violation was identified concerning the failure to properly store ladders in accordance with the approved engineering analysis which represented a failure to follow Station Administrative Procedure (SAP)-142, Station Housekeeping Program. This violation was a repeat of a similar violation issued in August 1996 (Section 02.3).
- An Unresolved Item (URI) was identified concerning the status and the proposed disposition of three different components that had been in the Removal and Restoration (R&R) log book for several years (Section 02.4).
- The inspectors concluded that the Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC) was satisfying the Technical Specification (TS) required function of reviewing matters related to nuclear safety (Section 07.1).

#### Maintenance

- Maintenance activities were generally completed thoroughly and professionally (Section M1.1).
- Personnel conducting observed surveillance tests were knowledgeable and performed the testing as required (Section M2.1).
- An URI was identified concerning a missed surveillance test on the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater (TDEFW) pump and the licensee's review for other missed surveillance tests on the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pumps (Section M2.2).
- The licensee's root cause analysis of the scaffolding erection problems that occurred in the A diesel generator room was thorough and accurately determined the root causes of the problems (Section M7.1).
- Maintenance and surveillance activities relating to remote shutdown equipment (control room evacuation panel) were being performed in a good manner. This conclusion was based on both inspection and review of the licensee's Quality Assurance surveillances of this area. A weak Fire

Emergency Procedure was identified. Additionally, a weakness was identified for lack of routine monitoring of the Refueling Water Storage Tank level indication in the Auxiliary Building and the source range nuclear instrumentation in the Intermediate Building (Section M8.1).

#### Engineering

- A review of engineering action on Reactor Building Cooling Unit motor failure, a review of Engineering and Operations interfaces and the Temporary Accept As Is program was conducted. No concerns or discrepancies were identified (Section E1.1).

#### Plant Support

- Radiological controls observed during the conduct of tours and observation of plant activities were acceptable (Section R1.1).
- Security and safeguards activities observed during the conduct of tours and observation of plant activities were good (Section S1.1).

## Report Details

### Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 maintained full power throughout the inspection period.

## I. Operations

### 01 Conduct of Operations

#### 01.1 General Comments (71707)

Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. Specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.

### 02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

#### 02.1 Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71707)

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the reactor building instrument air system. No discrepancies were identified.

#### 02.2 Cold Weather Preparations

##### a. Inspection Scope (71714)

The inspectors conducted an independent review of the licensee's preparation for the onset of cold (sub-freezing) weather. This inspection was conducted in accordance with Inspection Procedure 71714.

##### b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed the requirements of Operations Administrative Procedure (OAP)-109.1, Guidelines for Extreme Temperature Conditions, Revision 0. This procedure describes the necessary actions to prevent damage to components from extreme hot or cold temperatures. Prior to the onset of sub-freezing weather, the licensee performed the appropriate section of this procedure (Section 6.1). This included preparing the Service Water System, Industrial Cooling Water System, Condensate System, auxiliary boiler, and the various onsite buildings for prolonged exposure to sub-freezing ambient temperatures. The inspectors independently examined the level sensing lines for the Condensate Storage Tank and the Refueling Water Storage Tank to ensure that the heat tracing and insulation were in good condition. In addition, the inspectors verified that power was available to the heat tracing panels and that they were operating properly.

The inspectors reviewed all open Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs) having to do with freeze protection. There were a total of four open MWRs. Three were either working or in planning. The fourth MWR (91I3015) was

written on a heat trace panel for the waste evaporator which is no longer in use. The licensee indicated that they were evaluating options to retire this equipment and clear the open MWR.

c. Conclusions

A review of the licensee's cold weather protection program revealed no discrepancies or concerns. Appropriate actions were taken prior to the onset of sub-freezing temperatures.

02.3 Plant Tour

a. Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors performed plant tours of accessible portions of the plant. During the plant tours the inspectors visually inspected major components to identify any general conditions that might degrade system operation.

b. Observations and Findings

On December 11, during a tour of the 436 foot level of the Auxiliary Building, inside the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA), the inspectors observed a ladder storage area in an area designated room 36-17(SE). A posted sign adjacent to the ladders read as follows: "ladder storage area, maximum number of ladders to be stored in this area: 3." The inspectors observed four ladders lying on their sides. Three of the ladders were secured by a chain to a nearby handrail while the fourth ladder was not secured in any way. The inspectors informed the Shift Engineer of this situation and the fourth ladder was removed.

The inspectors reviewed Designated Storage Area Change Request Number 129 and the associated engineering analysis for this storage area. The analysis indicated that the primary concern for this storage area was to ensure that the maximum floor load limit was not exceeded. In this case, the area was only analyzed for three ladders. The analysis also specified that the ladders should be chained to eliminate fall down concerns.

Station Administrative Procedure (SAP)-142, Station Housekeeping Program, Revision 11, Section 6.11, provides the requirements for the designation of storage areas in the plant. As required by the procedure, an engineering analysis had been performed, attached to the storage request, and had appropriately identified limitations due to floor loading concerns. SAP-142 also requires that the storage area request originator ensure that all provisions, recommendations, or limitations identified in the engineering review are complied with. In this case, the procedure was not followed because the maximum number of ladders allowed to be stored in this area was exceeded and all the ladders were not chained as required. This failure to follow SAP-142 is a violation of TS 6.8.1.a and is identified as Violation 50-395/96014-01.

This NRC identified violation is a repeat of a previously issued violation which was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-395/96008 dated August 16, 1996 (Violation 50-395/96008-01, failure to follow station housekeeping program procedure). The licensee responded to this Notice of Violation in a letter dated August 29, 1996. The corrective actions taken to avoid further violations described in this letter indicated that management reviewed the incident with the civil maintenance supervisors to heighten their awareness of compliance with engineering designated requirements. The violation on December 11, 1996, could have reasonably been prevented by corrective actions for the violation issued on August 16, 1996, and the corrective actions for similar examples of storage problems identified after August 16, 1996, by the licensee's Quality Assurance group.

c. Conclusions

A violation was identified concerning the failure to properly store ladders in accordance with the approved engineering analysis which represented a failure to follow SAP-142, Station Housekeeping Program. This violation was a repeat of a similar violation issued in August 1996.

02.4 Review of System Status and Removal and Restoration (R&R) Log Book

a. Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors conducted a review of the daily system status controls audit and the R&R Log Book.

b. Observations and Findings

On December 24, the inspectors reviewed the daily system status controls audit required by Station Administrative Procedure, SAP-205, Status Control And Removal And Restoration, Revision 8. The audit verifies that the R&R log book, the computer status of all systems required to function during accident conditions Bypassed Inoperable Status Indication, and main control board orange tags are in agreement as to system status. The audit also verifies that the R&R check sheets are accurate. The inspectors found that the audit was complete and accurately verified system status.

During this review the inspectors also identified three R&Rs in the R&R log book that had existed for several years. These included Action R&R #910742 dated July 30, 1991, for the B Train Waste Gas Recombiner; Tracking R&R #880794 dated November 13, 1988, for Pressurizer Group 1 Backup Heaters; and Tracking R&R #930013 dated January 7, 1993, for the Waste Evaporator, Evaporator Level Control. Procedure SAP-205 defines Action R&Rs as normally R&R entries for which TS Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) requirements are met only by reliance on the action requirements and that action must be completed to restore the equipment to full LCO requirements within a specified time period or additional actions must be initiated. A Tracking R&R is normally an R&R entry



which is prepared at the Shift Supervisor's discretion to track systems or components to ensure timely and proper restoration.

Station Administrative Procedure, SAP-205, requires an evaluation of non-outage R&Rs in effect for greater than 30 days. The procedure states that the evaluation should document the reason why the equipment has not been restored to operable status and what the final disposition is to be. The inspectors reviewed the current evaluations attached to these R&Rs and found they were not clear as to why these R&Rs had existed for so long, what was necessary to restore this equipment, and what the final disposition was expected to be. The inspectors were concerned that the appropriate controls had not been applied to track and disposition this equipment.

Pending further review of this issue with the licensee to determine equipment status and the proposed disposition of each R&R, this issue will be identified as an Unresolved Item, URI 50-395/96014-02.

c. Conclusions

An URI was identified concerning the status and the proposed disposition of three different components that had been in the R&R log book for several years.

07 **Quality Assurance in Operations**

07.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities

a. Inspection Scope (40500)

The inspectors observed the monthly Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC) meeting to verify that it met the TS requirements.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors attended the monthly PSRC meeting on December 17. The meeting was called to order by the Operations Manager with the required quorum present. An agenda was distributed to all PSRC members or alternates present to define the subject matter to be discussed at the meeting. The PSRC reviewed Condition Evaluation and Reporting reports, procedure revisions, a Radiation Emergency Plan change, safety evaluations, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) changes, and Non Conformance Notices (NCN). Personnel from specific areas were present at the meeting to provide more information and explain particular issues. The discussions were open and members participated by asking questions or voicing concerns. The inspectors concluded that the PSRC meeting satisfied the TS required function of reviewing matters related to nuclear safety.

c. Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that the PSRC was satisfying the TS required function of reviewing matters related to nuclear safety.

08 **Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)**

- 08.1 (Open) Unresolved Item 50-395/96007-05, conducting core alteration without containment integrity. On April 18, 1996, with the plant shutdown for a refueling outage the licensee performed FHP-604, Functional Testing of Fuel Handling Systems, Revision 10, Change A, in preparation for fuel movement. As part of this procedure the containment refueling bridge was indexed over the reactor vessel and the gripper was lowered within the pressure vessel. A question was raised as to whether this should be considered a Core Alteration. The Summer TS define a Core Alteration as the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. The Summer TS definition contains the language "movement or manipulation of any component" a literal interpretation would include lowering the fuel handling bridge gripper into the pressure vessel and therefore should be considered a Core Alteration. The licensee may not have established containment integrity when this evolution was performed. This URI will remain open pending completion of an NRC evaluation of this issue.
- 08.2 (Open) Unresolved Item 50-395/96007-03, paint coat in containment does not meet application specification. On May 7, 1996, the licensee identified (NCN 5452), during an inspection of the floors outside the RCS loops in containment, that qualified coatings had not been applied as described in safety related Civil Maintenance Procedure, CMP 500.001, Application of Protective Coating To Concrete Surfaces Inside The Reactor Building, Revision 4. The licensee identified that Keeler & Long paint H1 had not been applied as described in CMP 500.001. Only one coat of the H1 paint was applied when two coats were specified. The paint vendor reviewed the single coat of H1 paint concern for the licensee and determined that although a single coat of H1 paint had not been tested in this application on the containment floor a single coat was tested on containment walls and passed the ANSI N101.2 criteria. The vendor concluded that it was not critical to apply a second coat of paint and recommended that the licensee plan to apply another coat of paint during the next refueling outage. The inspector concluded that there was a high probability that a single coat of paint would probably pass the testing criteria and did not constitute a significant safety concern.

As part of the NCN review, the licensee performed a 10 CFR Part 50.59 screening. The licensee concluded that this NCN did not represent a change to the procedures or facility as described in the FSAR. The FSAR Section 6.2.1.6, Materials, states that safety related coating systems are used in containment for concrete and carbon steel surfaces. These



coating systems satisfy the quality assurance requirements of ANSI N101.4, 1972, "Quality Assurance for Protective Coatings Applied to Nuclear Facilities." The FSAR also states that selected coating manufacturers have documented test results certifying compliance with ANSI N5.12, 1974, "Protective Coatings (Paints) for the Nuclear Industry", and ANSI N101.2, 1972, "Protective Coatings (Paints) for Light Water Nuclear Reactor Containment Facilities." From the review of the 10 CFR Part 50.59 screening document and the wording in the FSAR it was not clear to the inspectors how the licensee reached their conclusion that this issue did not represent a change to the facility. This URI will remain open pending a more thorough review of the 10 CFR Part 50.59 screening.

## II. Maintenance

### M1 Conduct of Maintenance

#### M1.1 General Comments

##### a. Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities:

- PMTS P0205663, calibration of suction pressure indicator gauge on the A Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater (MDEFW) pump.
- PMTS P0205576, perform semi-annual lubrication check on the A MDEFW pump.
- PMTS P0201261, perform 2-year operational check of the A MDEFW pump 7.2 KV breaker.
- PMTS P0202876, perform 2-year molded case circuit breaker testing on the 480 volt EFW pump area cooling fan breaker.

##### b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be professional and thorough. All work observed was performed with the work package present and in active use. Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present whenever required by procedure. When applicable, appropriate radiation control measures were in place.

##### c. Conclusions

The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be professional and thorough.

## M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment

### M2.1 Surveillance Observation

#### a. Inspection Scope (61726)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance tests:

- STP-105.014, Train A Slave Relay Go Circuit Testing, Revision 14.
- STP-503.003, Functional Test of SW TO EF Cross Connect Circuits, Revision 5.

#### b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors found that the tests were conducted using correct procedures and test equipment. For STP-503.003 the inspectors observed the pre-job briefing with the electricians, the interfacing between the groups required to conduct the test, and the control of the test activity. The inspectors concluded that personnel conducting the observed surveillance tests were knowledgeable and performed the testing as required.

#### c. Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that personnel conducting the observed surveillance tests were knowledgeable and performed the testing as required.

### M2.2 Missed TS Surveillance Test On The Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater (TDEFW) Pump

#### a. Inspection Scope (61726)

The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding a missed TS surveillance test on the TDEFW pump.

#### b. Observations and Findings

On December 2, the licensee identified that a TS required quarterly slave relay test for the TDEFW pump, due no later than November 30, had not been performed within the TS required time interval. The TS Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1, Table 4.3-2, Functional Unit 6.b, Emergency Feedwater, requires that a slave relay test for Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays be performed quarterly. The test of the A train slave relay (K634) had last been performed on August 7, 1996.

The surveillance requirement is documented in procedure, STP-220.002, Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Test, Revision 1. The inspectors reviewed this issue with the licensee and found that the

licensee was reviewing the surveillance history for all three EFW pumps to determine if other surveillances had been missed. Pending completion of the licensee's surveillance history review, this issue is identified as an Unresolved Item and is identified as URI 50-395/96014-03.

c. Conclusions

An URI was identified concerning a missed surveillance test on the TDEFW pump and the licensee's review for other missed surveillance tests on the EFW pumps.

**M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities**

**M7.1 Review of Scaffolding Problems Root Cause Analysis**

a. Inspection Scope (62707, 40500)

As a result of scaffolding erection problems in the A diesel generator room, the licensee initiated a root cause analysis which included a review of the scaffolding erection program. The inspectors reviewed this root cause analysis.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors concluded from their review of the root cause analysis that it was thorough and accurately determined the root causes of the scaffolding erection problems that occurred in the A diesel generator room (see NRC Inspection Report 50-395/96013). The root causes included a failure to identify to the crew erecting the scaffolding the safety-related equipment in the Diesel Generator (DG) room, a failure to use self-checking to ensure intended actions were correct before they were performed, a failure to identify in documentation that the Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) duct was safety-related, and a failure to ensure in verbal communications that all safety-related equipment in and around the job location was properly understood.

c. Conclusions

The licensee's root cause analysis of the scaffolding erection problems that occurred in the A diesel generator room was thorough and accurately determined the root causes of the problems.

## M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues

### M8.1 Remote Shutdown System

#### a. Inspection Scope (62700, 71707)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance and testing program for the Control Room Evacuation Panel (CREP) and associated circuitry for plant shutdown control in the event control room habitability is lost at the Summer Nuclear Station. Specific areas of review included the FSAR, TS, the Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER), selected work order packages, selected surveillance packages, selected preventative maintenance activities, and procedures directly related to operation of the CREP and associated equipment. The inspectors also reviewed recent quality assurance surveillance observations relating to maintenance calibration activities.

#### b. Observations and Findings

During inspection preparation, the inspectors reviewed the FSAR, Section 9.5.1 and noted that it referenced the FPER as the design basis document for the evaluation of the potential effects of a fire on any location in the plant. The FPER also was used to demonstrate that a fire would not adversely affect safe shutdown. During the review of the FPER, the inspectors noted that significant reliance was placed on manual operator action for system alignments to support safe shutdown operations during fire scenarios. The inspectors reviewed the Fire Emergency Procedures (FEP) associated with control room evacuation due to a fire. Procedures reviewed were:

#### Procedure No.

#### Title

FEP-1.0, Revision 9  
FEP-4.0, Revision 2  
FEP-4.1, Revision 1

FIRE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SELECTION  
CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION DUE TO FIRE  
PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM HOT STANDBY TO  
COLD SHUTDOWN DUE TO FIRE IN CONTROL  
BUILDING

During review of FEP-4.1, the inspectors noted that step 3.4 required operators to "Borate the Reactor Coolant System per Attachment II." Attachment II of FEP-4.1 provided instructions to borate the reactor coolant system (RCS) using the normal boration equipment (boric acid tank, flowpath, valves, and piping). The inspectors reviewed section 3.4.2.2 of the FPER which listed equipment deleted as safe shutdown equipment in fire scenarios. Section 3.4.2.2 stated, in part, "Boration was previously to have been accomplished using boric acid tanks, pumps, and associated valves. Equipment formerly listed for boration has been either be(sic) deleted (boric acid tanks and pumps) or secured to prevent spurious operation.... Boration required for safe shutdown will now be accomplished by taking makeup water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST), which provides a source of makeup water with 2000 ppm concentration of boric acid to the suction side of the charging

pumps." The licensee informed the inspectors that initial conditions for FEP 4.1 had been established during performance of FEP 4.0. Step 3.3 of FEP 4.0 required, in part, that operators establish a flowpath from the RWST to the suction side of the charging pumps which the licensee considered met the intent of the FPER. The inspectors agreed that the above flowpath was established as stated; however, step 3.4 of FEP 4.1 required operators to establish a boration flowpath using equipment deleted as safe shutdown equipment by the FPER. Based on the above, FEP-4.1 could be potentially confusing to the operators, in that the operators could get bogged down trying to align a boration flow path that may not function correctly. The inspectors considered the procedure weak, in that, it relies on operator knowledge to understand that step 3.4 of FEP 4.1 is an additional means of boration and is not needed if the boration path (step 3.4) can not be established.

The Summer Nuclear Station CREP included two cabinets located in the intermediate building (XPN7200A and XPN7200B) and various local component controls and instrumentation. The CREP was installed and modified to current configuration prior to 1987. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's component history records and selected three modification packages for review. The documentation reviewed was:

<u>Work Request No.</u>	<u>Component</u>	<u>Work Performed</u>
208010013	XPN7200A	Equipment and wiring modifications to XPN7200A
208000017	XPN7200A	Install auxiliary panel and pull cable
208010014	XPN7200B	Delete indicator

No discrepancies were noted.

The inspectors also reviewed four completed work request packages and the most recent preventative maintenance packages for XPN7200A and XPN7200B. The documentation reviewed was:

<u>Work Request No.</u>	<u>Component</u>	<u>Work Performed</u>
94T3276	XPN7200B	Investigate for possible problem with circuit for XVT08152
9304214	XPN7200A	Repair as necessary (temperature indicator pegged low)
93I3338	XPN7200A	Replace fuse for power to ITY00430C



(cont'd)	<u>Work Request No.</u>	<u>Component</u>	<u>Work Performed</u>
	9303524	XPN7200B	Repair as necessary (wiring problem)
	<u>PM Task No.</u>	<u>Component</u>	<u>Work Performed</u>
	P0199833	XPN7200A	Inspect, clean, & check termination integrity (annual)
	P0199834	XPN7200B	Inspect, clean, & check electrical termination integrity (annual)

The inspectors verified that work activities were approved, controlled, and completed in accordance with procedural requirements. The documentation clearly discussed work request problems discovered and maintenance corrective actions implemented. Also, adequate post maintenance testing was documented for maintenance accomplished.

The inspectors reviewed TS surveillance requirements (SR) 4.3.3.5 and verified that instrumentation listed in Table 4.3-6 of the TS were installed at the locations described. In addition, field observations verified that required instrumentation on the CREPs was in operation and the interiors of the panels were in good condition. In addition, walkdowns were accomplished to verify that remote switches were installed at selected locations as required by the FPER. The inspectors also reviewed surveillance test documentation to verify that TS SR were being accomplished as required. The documentation reviewed was:

<u>Procedure No.</u>	<u>Title</u>
STP-113.001, Revision 4	REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTS CHANNEL CHECK (performed in October and November 1996)
STP-345.058, Revision 3	CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL (ILT03631A) CALIBRATION (performed February 12, 1996)
STP-345.064, Revision 4	RCS LOOP "C" COLD LEG TEMPERATURE INSTRUMENT (ITE00430A) CALIBRATION (performed February 20, 1996)

No discrepancies were noted.

The inspectors also reviewed the safety evaluation reports referenced in the FPER and noted that two remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation components not referenced in TS 3.3.3.5 were used to monitor important safe shutdown parameters during fire scenarios requiring control room evacuation. These components were source range nuclear instrument

indication and Auxiliary Building (AB) RWST level indication. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's surveillance requirements for these components and noted that calibrations were being accomplished on the same frequency as instrumentation listed in TS SR 4.3.3.5. However, no channel checks were being documented as accomplished on the AB RWST level indicator. In addition, no documentation was available which indicated that the source range nuclear instrumentation, located adjacent to XPN7200B was being periodically monitored. The apparent lack of routine monitoring of RWST level indication in the AB and the source range nuclear instrumentation in the Intermediate Building was identified as a weakness.

The inspectors reviewed three Quality Assurance Technical Service's surveillances of maintenance calibration or preventative maintenance activities which had been accomplished during 1996. No deficiencies were identified by Quality Assurance in these areas. The inspectors considered the licensee's performance in the calibration area was good based on both inspection results and QA surveillances.

c. Conclusions

Maintenance and surveillance activities relating to remote shutdown equipment (control room evacuation panel) were being performed in a good manner. This conclusion was based on both inspection and review of the licensee's Quality Assurance surveillances of this area. A weak fire emergency procedure was identified. Additionally, a weakness was identified for lack of routine monitoring of the RWST level indication in the Auxiliary Building and the source range nuclear instrumentation in the Intermediate Building.

### III. Engineering

E1 **Conduct of Engineering**

E1.1 General Comments (37551)

General engineering activities were reviewed to determine their effectiveness in preventing, identifying, and resolving safety issues, events, and problems. These included a review of engineering action on Reactor Building Cooling Unit motor failure, a review of Engineering and Operations interfaces and the Temporary Accept As Is program. No concerns or discrepancies were identified.

E7 **Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities (37551)**

E7.1 Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Commitments

A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the FSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compared plant practices, procedures and/or parameters to the FSAR description. While performing the inspections

discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the FSAR that related to the areas inspected. No discrepancies were identified.

#### IV. Plant Support

##### **R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls**

###### **R1.1 General Comments (71750)**

The inspectors observed radiological controls during the conduct of tours and observation of plant activities and found them to be acceptable.

##### **S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities**

###### **S1.1 General Comments (71750)**

The inspectors observed security and safeguards activities during the conduct of tours and observation of plant activities and found them to be good.

#### V. Management Meetings

##### **X1 Exit Meeting Summary**

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 7 and 15, 1997. On January 9, 1997, a teleconference between licensee management and Region II management concerning a proposed violation involving an inadequate fire emergency procedure. After additional reviews, the procedure was determined to be adequate but a weakness in procedure content was identified.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

##### **X2 Management Meeting Summary**

On December 16 NRC management presented the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) results to the licensee at a meeting on site. Following the SALP presentation the NRC held a meeting with state and local government officials.

## PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

F. Bacon, Manager, Chemistry Services  
L. Blue, Manager, Health Physics  
M. Browne, Manager, Planning and Scheduling  
S. Byrne, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations  
R. Clary, Manager, Quality Systems  
M. Fowlkes, Manager, Operations  
S. Furstenberg, Manager, Maintenance Services  
D. Lavigne, General Manager, Nuclear Support Services  
G. Moffatt, Manager, Design Engineering  
K. Nettles, General Manager, Strategic Planning and Development  
H. O'Quinn, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services  
A. Rice, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Operating Experience  
G. Taylor, Vice President, Nuclear Operations  
T. Taylor, General Manager, Engineering Services  
R. Waselus, Manager, Systems and Component Engineering  
R. White, Nuclear Coordinator, South Carolina Public Service Authority  
G. Williams, Associate Manager, Operations

## INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 37551: Onsite Engineering  
IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems  
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations  
IP 62700: Maintenance Implementation  
IP 62707: Maintenance Observations  
IP 71707: Plant Operations  
IP 71714: Cold Weather Preparations  
IP 71750: Plant Support  
IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations

## ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-395/96014-01	VIO	failure to follow station housekeeping program procedure (Section 02.3).
50-395/96014-02	URI	status and proposed disposition of three different components in the R&R log book for several years (Section 02.4).
50-395/96014-03	URI	missed surveillance test on TDEFW pump and review of other missed surveillance tests on EFW pumps (Section M2.2).

Closed

None.

Discussed

50-395/96007-05	URI	conducting core alteration without containment integrity (Section 08.1).
50-395/96007-03	URI	paint coat in containment does not meet application specification (Section 08.2).