

ENCLOSURE 2

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)
UNITS 1, 2, AND 3

REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) BASES (TS-388)
MARKED PAGES

I. AFFECTED PAGE LIST

<u>Unit 1</u>	<u>Unit 2</u>	<u>Unit 3</u>
3.7/4.7-29	3.7/4.7-29	3.7/4.7-28

II. MARKED PAGES

See Attached.

JUL 10 1995

confirmation that the valve will at least "nearly close" (within 3° of full closure). The green light circuit confirms the valve will fully open. If none of the lights change indication during the cycle, the air operator must be inoperable or the valve disc is stuck. For this case, a check light on and red light off confirms the disc is in a nearly closed position even if one of the indications is in error. Although the valve may be inoperable for full closure, it does not constitute a safety threat.

If the red light circuit alone is inoperable, the valve shall still be considered fully OPERABLE. If the green and red or the green light circuit alone is inoperable the valve shall be considered inoperable for opening. If the check and green or check light circuit alone is inoperable, the valve shall be considered inoperable for full closure unless all vacuum breakers can be demonstrated to be fully closed by alternate means such as monitoring the decay rate of drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure. If the red and check light circuits are inoperable the valve shall be considered inoperable and open greater than 3°. For a light circuit to be considered OPERABLE the light must go on and off in proper sequence during the opening-closing cycle. If none of the lights change indication during the cycle, the valve shall be considered inoperable and open unless the check light stays on and the red light stays off in which case the valve shall be considered inoperable for opening.

The 12 drywell vacuum breaker valves which connect the suppression chamber and drywell are sized on the basis of the Bodega pressure suppression system tests. Ten OPERABLE to open vacuum breaker valves (18-inch) selected on this test basis and confirmed by the green lights are adequate to limit the pressure differential between the suppression chamber and drywell during postaccident drywell cooling operations to a value which is within suppression system design values.

The containment design has been examined to determine that a leakage equivalent to one drywell vacuum breaker opened to no more than a nominal 3° as confirmed by the red light is acceptable.

On this basis an indefinite allowable repair time for an inoperable red light circuit on any valve or an inoperable check and green or check light circuit alone or a malfunction of the operator or disc (if nearly closed) on one valve, or an inoperable green and red or green light circuit alone on two valves is justified.

During each operating cycle, a leak rate test shall be performed to verify that significant leakage flow paths do not exist between the drywell and suppression chamber. The drywell pressure will be increased by at least one psi with respect to the suppression chamber pressure ~~and held constant~~. The two psig setpoint will not be exceeded. The subsequent suppression chamber pressure transient (if any) will be monitored with a sensitive pressure gauge. If the drywell pressure cannot be increased by one psi over the suppression chamber pressure it would be because a significant leakage path exists; in this event the leakage source will be identified and eliminated before power operation is resumed.

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3.7/4.7 BASES (Cont'd)

confirmation that the valve will at least "nearly close" (within 3° of full closure). The green light circuit confirms the valve will fully open. If none of the lights change indication during the cycle, the air operator must be inoperable or the valve disc is stuck. For this case, a check light on and red light off confirms the disc is in a nearly closed position even if one of the indications is in error. Although the valve may be inoperable for full closure, it does not constitute a safety threat.

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ENCLOSURE 3

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)
UNITS 1, 2, AND 3

REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) BASES (TS-388)
REVISED PAGES

I. AFFECTED PAGE LIST

<u>Unit 1</u>	<u>Unit 2</u>	<u>Unit 3</u>
3.7/4.7-29	3.7/4.7-29	3.7/4.7-28

II. REVISED PAGES

See Attached.

Technical Specification 388

Unit 1

Remove

3.7/4.7-29

3.7/4.7-30

Insert

3.7/4.7-29

3.7/4.7-30*

*Denotes Overleaf Page

3.7/4.7 BASES (Cont'd)

confirmation that the valve will at least "nearly close" (within 3° of full closure). The green light circuit confirms the valve will fully open. If none of the lights change indication during the cycle, the air operator must be inoperable or the valve disc is stuck. For this case, a check light on and red light off confirms the disc is in a nearly closed position even if one of the indications is in error. Although the valve may be inoperable for full closure, it does not constitute a safety threat.

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During each operating cycle, a leak rate test shall be performed to verify that significant leakage flow paths do not exist between the drywell and suppression chamber. The drywell pressure will be increased by at least one psi with respect to the suppression chamber pressure. The two psig setpoint will not be exceeded. The subsequent suppression chamber pressure transient (if any) will be monitored with a sensitive pressure gauge. If the drywell pressure cannot be increased by one psi over the suppression chamber pressure it would be because a significant leakage path exists; in this event the leakage source will be identified and eliminated before power operation is resumed.

3.7/4.7 BASES (Cont'd)

With a differential pressure of greater than one psig, the rate of change of the suppression chamber pressure must not exceed 0.25 inches of water per minute as measured over a 10-minute period, which corresponds to about 0.09 lb/sec of containment air. In the event the rate of change exceeds this value then the source of leakage will be identified and eliminated before power operation is resumed.

The water in the suppression chamber is used for cooling in the event of an accident; i.e., it is not used for normal operation; therefore, a daily check of the temperature and volume is adequate to assure that adequate heat removal capability is present.

The interior surfaces of the drywell and suppression chamber are coated as necessary to provide corrosion protection and to provide a more easily decontaminable surface. The surveillance inspection of the internal surfaces each operating cycle assures timely detection of corrosion. Dropping the torus water level to one foot below the normal operating level enables an inspection of the suppression chamber where problems would first begin to show.

The primary containment preoperational test pressures are based upon the calculated primary containment pressure response in the event of a LOCA. The peak drywell pressure would be about 49 psig which would rapidly reduce to less than 30 psig within 20 seconds following the pipe break. Following the pipe break, the suppression chamber pressure rises to 27 psig within 25 seconds, equalizes with drywell pressure, and decays with the drywell pressure decay.

The design pressure of the drywell and suppression chamber is 56 psig. The design leak rate is 0.5-percent per day at the pressure of 56 psig. As pointed out above, the pressure response of the drywell and suppression chamber following an accident would be the same after about 25 seconds. Based on the calculated containment pressure response discussed above, the primary containment preoperational test pressures were chosen. Also based on the primary containment pressure response and the fact that the drywell and suppression chamber function as a unit, the primary containment will be tested as a unit rather than the individual components separately.

The calculated radiological doses given in Section 14.9 of the FSAR were based on an assumed leakage rate of 0.635-percent at the maximum calculated pressure of 49.6 psig. The doses calculated by the NRC using this bases are 0.14 rem, whole body passing cloud gamma dose, and 15.0 rem, thyroid dose, which are respectively only 5×10^{-3} and 10^{-1} times the 10 CFR 100 reference doses. Increasing the assumed leakage rate at 49.6 psig to 2.0 percent as indicated in the specifications would increase these doses approximately a factor of three, still leaving a margin between the calculated dose and the 10 CFR 100 reference values.

Technical Specification 388

Unit 2

Remove

3.7/4.7-29

3.7/4.7-30

Insert

3.7/4.7-29

3.7/4.7-30*

*Denotes Overleaf Page

3.7/4.7 BASES (Cont'd)

confirmation that the valve will at least "nearly close" (within 3° of full closure). The green light circuit confirms the valve will fully open. If none of the lights change indication during the cycle, the air operator must be inoperable or the valve disc is stuck. For this case, a check light on and red light off confirms the disc is in a nearly closed position even if one of the indications is in error. Although the valve may be inoperable for full closure, it does not constitute a safety threat.

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3.7/4.7 BASES (Cont'd)

With a differential pressure of greater than one psig, the rate of change of the suppression chamber pressure must not exceed 0.25 inches of water per minute as measured over a 10-minute period, which corresponds to about 0.09 lb/mec of containment air. In the event the rate of change exceeds this value then the source of leakage will be identified and eliminated before power operation is resumed.

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Technical Specification 388

Unit 3

Remove

3.7/4.7-28

3.7/4.7-29

Insert

3.7/4.7-28

3.7/4.7-29*

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3.7/4.7 BASES (Cont'd)

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