

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)						DOCKET NUMBER (2)									PAGE (3)			
Duane Arnold Energy Center						0 5 0 0 0 3 3 1									1 OF 0 2			
TITLE (4) Fire Watch Not Completed as Required by Technical Specification																		
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)								
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES						DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
									None						0 5 0 0 0			
0 7 2 1 8 5	8 5	-	0 2 7	-	0 0 0 8 2 0 8 5							0 5 0 0 0						
OPERATING MODE (9)		N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)															
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 2 4	20.402(b)			20.406(a)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)						
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)			50.38(a)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(e)						
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)			50.38(a)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vi)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Test, NRC Form 365A)						
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)		X	50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)									
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)									
			20.406(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)									
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																		
NAME												TELEPHONE NUMBER						
Wendell Keith, Technical Support Engineer												AREA CODE 3 1 9 8 5 1 - 7 3 0 6						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																		
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUF- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUF- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS								
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																		
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												NO		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
												X						

On July 21, 1985 with the plant in the Run mode at 24% power, it was determined that a fire watch on the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Deluge System required by Tech. Spec. 3.13.C.2.a had been prematurely cancelled three days earlier. Upon completion of maintenance on the HPCI deluge system on 7/15/85, valve tagout cards had been removed. A separate set of tagout cards was reinstalled on the valves when the HPCI deluge valve was found to be still leaking. A later shift, which was unaware of the second tagout card, cancelled the fire watch on the HPCI deluge system based on closure of the first tagout. Upon determining that a tagout still existed on the system, the hourly fire watch was immediately resumed and maintained until system operability was restored.

This event was caused by ineffective communications between Operations personnel and a lack of valve position verification prior to terminating the fire watch. All these events occurred during the week of plant startup from a 5 1/2 month refueling and maintenance outage. The need to communicate between shifts is being reemphasized with all Operations personnel. The increased amount of Control Room activity associated with plant startup or maintenance in support of startup contributed to this event.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Duane Arnold Energy Center	05000331	85	027	00	02	OF	02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On 5/15/85, a Maintenance Action Request (MAR) was written to check the HPCI deluge (EIIS system KP) test valve which was leaking. Tagout Form 85-1115 was written by Operations personnel and tags were hung to close the HPCI Fire Suppression Deluge System isolation valve and open the HPCI Fire Suppression Deluge System main drain to minimize flow to Radwaste. As the plant was shutdown for refueling and maintenance, HPCI was not required to be operable and no fire watch was required at that time. Because HPCI was not required to be operable, an entry was not made in the Control Room logs and the HPCI deluge system was not entered in the list of significant inoperable equipment maintained on a daily basis in Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) BS-5, "Control Room Panel Shift Check List". On 6/29/85, a second tagout form (85-1502) was written by Maintenance personnel referencing the same Maintenance Action Request as the Operations tagout (85-1115). On 7/14/85, the second tagout cards were hung and the valve was disassembled and cleaned. Upon reassembly of the valve, both sets of tagouts were removed on 7/15/85 to test the valve. As the HPCI deluge test valve was still leaking, the valves were left as-is (isolation valve closed) and the Operations tagout cards rehanged. No further maintenance action was undertaken at this time. On 7/18/85, another Operations shift noted that the originally referenced Maintenance Action Request had been completed and a set of tags removed. Based on this information, the hourly fire watch was cancelled. The remaining two month old Operations tagout was overlooked at this time.

On July 19, 1985, the reactor pressure reached 150 psig, thus requiring the HPCI deluge system to be operable. On July 21, 1985, the HPCI deluge system was found isolated. This was in violation of Technical Specification 3.13.C.2.a which requires an hourly fire watch when the HPCI deluge is inoperable and is required to be operable. The plant was additionally in Day 2 of a 14 day LCO in accordance with Tech. Spec. 3.13.C.2.b due to the deluge system being declared inoperable. The hourly fire watch was immediately established and was maintained until the leaking valve was replaced on 7/30/85. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) which requires reporting of "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plants' Technical Specifications..."

Following an investigation by the Operations Department, it was determined that this event was caused by ineffective communications between shifts of Operations personnel and a lack of valve position verification prior to terminating the fire watch. If the initial system isolation had been recorded, it is possible that this event would have been avoided. The need to communicate between shifts through the use of Control Room logs and the shift turnover data maintained on a daily basis in STP BS-5 is being reemphasized with all Operations personnel. In addition, the need for appropriate valve lineup verification has been reemphasized prior to cancelling fire watches. These events occurred during startup from an extended refueling and maintenance outage. The increased amount of Control Room activity associated with startup or maintenance in support of plant startup contributed to this event.

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company

August 20, 1985
DAEC-85-740


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Duane Arnold Energy Center
Docket No. 50-331
Op. License DPR-49
Licensee Event Report No. 85-027

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 please find attached a copy of the
subject Licensee Event Report.

Very truly yours,



Daniel L. Mineck
Plant Superintendent - Nuclear
Duane Arnold Energy Center

DLM/WRK/kp

attachment

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator
Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

NRC Resident Inspector - DAEC

File A-118a

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