




DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE MEDICAL OPERATIONS AGENCY
BROOKS AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS



31 January 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR USNRC REGION IV

FROM: HQ AFMOA/SGOR
8901 18th St
Brooks AFB TX 78235-5217

SUBJECT: Response to NRC Inspection Report 030-28641/96-17 and Notice of Violation (USNRC Ltr, 2 Jan 97)

Subject letter (attached) documents the response to the Notice of Violation resulting from the NRC inspection conducted 21 Nov 1996. The report contains the following elements concerning the violation:

- a. The reason for the violation.
- b. The corrective steps taken and the results achieved.
- c. The corrective steps taken to avoid future violations.
- d. The date when full compliance will be achieved.

This correspondence references Permit No. 42-23539-01AFP and Docket No 030-28641. If you have any questions, please contact Capt Hicks at DSN 240-3331 or commercial (210) 536-3331. Telefax: DSN 240-4382, (210) 536-4382. E-Mail: hicks_j@msa01.brooks.af.mil.

PAUL H. FEESER, Maj, USAF, BSC
Acting Chief
USAF Radioisotope Committee Secretariat
Office of the Surgeon General

Attachments:
97 AMW/CC Ltr, 30 Jan 97

100011

9702100250 970131
PDR ADOCK 03028641
C PDR

IE07



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR EDUCATION AND TRAINING COMMAND



30 Jan 97

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AFMOA/SGOR


FROM: 97 AMW/CC
100 Inez Blvd, Suite 1
Altus AFB OK 73523-5047

SUBJECT: Docket No. 030-28641, Permit No. 42-23539-01 AFP
Response to NRC Inspection Report 030-28641/96-17 and Notice of Violation

1. This letter with attached report is provided in response to the HQ AFMOA/SGOR ltr, 8 Jan 97, regarding Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report 030-28641/96-17, and accompanying Notice of Violation, dtd 2 Jan 97. The NRC inspection concluded there was an inadvertent shipment of dismantled aircraft parts containing depleted uranium counterweights to a scrap yard. The attached detailed response addresses the reason for the violation, the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, the corrective steps taken to avoid further violations, and the date when full compliance will be achieved.
2. The activity that lead to the inadvertent shipment of depleted uranium material was caused by the location of the aircraft counter weights manufactured from depleted uranium not being identified in all the relevant technical orders. The orders were not designed to cover the dismantling process undertaken by Altus AFB (AAFB) personnel. Conflicting guidance as to proper disposition of aircraft scrap was an additional factor that contributed to the inadvertent shipment to the scrap dealer (See Atch).
3. Swift and comprehensive response actions were initiated as soon as AAFB personnel learned aircraft counter weights manufactured from depleted uranium were located in disassembled tail sections. The initial installation response focused upon determining the location of all such material, recovering it, and ensuring any public health concerns were addressed. State radiation control offices, as well as the NRC, were promptly notified. The Air Force Radiological Assessment Team from Armstrong Laboratories at Brooks AFB assisted in the health assessment. It is the opinion of these experts that the individuals involved in the project received an estimated dose equivalent less than one tenth of a chest x-ray, one millirem. All of the material inadvertently shipped was recovered.
4. Corrective actions have included follow up testing of individuals who had participated in the dismantling project. The samples analyzed at Armstrong Laboratories, Brooks AFB, on five individuals, reveal "none detected." The three other crew members were notified and to date, two have agreed to be tested. The results of these tests are expected to be similar to the others.
5. To prevent further occurrences, AAFB is no longer conducting major aircraft dismantling operations. Future needs for training fuselages will be met by acquiring them from the Aerospace Maintenance Regeneration Center (AMARC) in Arizona, or other such organization. The base recycling center has been advised that it can not process scrap aircraft parts. The aircraft maintenance function at AAFB has

recently undergone a conversion from military personnel to civil service employees. These individuals have been advised of the possible hazards associated with significant military equipment. An improvement to Air Force Technical Orders has also been requested.

6. Based upon the information available to me, the base has been in compliance with the applicable rules since 23 Aug 96. All follow-on corrective actions will be completed by 28 Feb 97. If you have any questions about this reply, please contact the base Radiation Safety Officer, Capt Colby D. Adams, at DSN 866-5255.



DAVID R. LOVE, Brig Gen, USAF
Commander

Attachment:
97 AMDS/SGPB rpt, 30 Jan 97



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR EDUCATION AND TRAINING COMMAND

24 Jan 97

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AFMOA/SGOR

FROM: 97 AMDS/SGPB
301 N 1st St
Altus AFB OK 73523

SUBJECT: Reply to NRC Inspection Report 030-28641/96-17 and Notice of Violation

1. This letter is the response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter, NRC Inspection Report 030-28641/96-17, and accompanying Notice of Violation. The NRC inspection at Altus AFB was conducted in response to notification made by the United States Air Force Radioisotope Committee (RIC) to the NRC about an incident that occurred at Altus AFB. It addresses the reason for the violation, the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, the corrective steps taken to avoid further violations, and the date when full compliance will be achieved.

2. The notice of violation refers to the period between 13 May 96 and 20 Aug 96. During this period Altus AFB (AAFB) personnel used power saws to cut and disassemble aircraft parts. While cutting the tail sections of the aircraft, they also cut through depleted uranium (DU) counterweights contained inside the tail section elevators of C-141 aircraft.

Reason for the violation: Investigation by AAFB personnel and an NRC inspector indicated that major structural alterations like the removal of aircraft wings are nonroutine events at AAFB. Personnel interviewed did not know of a previous occurrence at AAFB. One of the base's most qualified technicians was tasked as the project lead. This individual had 16 years experience, including 11 years of experience in a unit that converted active aircraft to museum pieces, and had participated in the removal and re-installation of complete C-141 tail assemblies. The maintenance crew, eight personnel including the project leader, performed their tasks in a manner consistent with the expertise and technical guidance available to them. Inconsistency in the technical data regarding the presence of DU was the most significant factor that led to the incident.

The inconsistency involved the Air Force Technical Orders (TO) that were consulted before the crew cut up the aircraft assemblies. In order to determine the most efficient method for cutting up the wings and tail assemblies, the project leader referenced Air Force Technical Order (TO) 1C-141B-4-2, an illustrated structural manual. This TO did not identify the counterweights located in tail section elevators as being constructed from DU. The cutting of the assemblies was accomplished 13-17 May.

It was not until Aug, 3 months after the cutting was accomplished, that the project leader was shown another TO with diagrams that specified DU counterweights in the tail sections of C-141 aircraft. The TO he was shown, TO 1C-141B-3, is a structural repair manual. The project leader did not refer to this TO before because they were dismantling the aircraft and not conducting repairs.

3. Background to the incident. To help explain the response to the incident, the following background information needs to be given.

The project leader had initially contacted the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Organization (DRMO) at Ft. Sill OK in May 96 regarding the turn-in of the wings and tail assemblies. They informed him that it would be necessary to reduce the size of the assemblies to 8-foot by 8-foot pieces so they could be hauled by flatbed truck. In June, DRMO personnel inspected and photographed the cut assemblies. At this time the DRMO representatives informed the project leader that the disposal of the assemblies would probably take 2 months to complete through normal DRMO procedures. DRMO representatives suggested that the project leader contact the AAFB recycling center to attempt to process the assemblies as scrap metal. It was thought that this method would be quicker.

The project leader contacted the base recycling center. Ultimately, an agreement was reached between AAFB and Ft. Sill DRMO that allowed AAFB to directly sell recyclable materials.

On Wednesday, 14 Aug 96, a scrap hauler purchased portions of the cut-up assemblies as scrap metal. The hauler then transported the scrap to a scrap dealer in Joplin MO. Among those pieces, the hauler had taken one piece of an elevator that contained approximately 30 pounds of DU. Air Force personnel were not aware that the scrap hauler had taken any pieces containing DU.

On Monday, 19 Aug 96, the project leader was shown documentation that indicated the elevators on the tail assemblies contained DU counterweights. The project leader knew the scrap hauler was supposed to pick up more scrap from AAFB on the following day, 20 Aug 96. Maintenance personnel returned to ensure he would not take any elevator pieces. The scrap hauler did not disturb or remove any pieces containing DU.

On Tuesday, 20 Aug 96, maintenance personnel inspected the multiple piles of cut-up parts and could not locate two pieces of elevator parts which they thought might contain some DU. At this time, the project leader notified the scrap yard in Joplin MO that there could be pieces containing DU at his facility. They asked the scrap yard proprietor to not disturb the shipment that had come from AAFB. The project leader and another crew member left AAFB that afternoon to go to Joplin MO.

4. Response actions: Approximately 2130, Tuesday evening, 20 Aug 96, aircraft maintenance personnel notified the base Radiation Protection Officer (RPO) that some DU had possibly been transported off AAFB. The base RPO, in turn, reported the incident to the on-call representative of the Radioisotope Committee.

That same evening, Tuesday, 20 Aug 96, the project leader and crew member from AAFB located one elevator endpiece at the scrap yard in Joplin. The piece was undamaged and the DU was intact. There was no evidence that the DU inside the piece had been damaged. They did not find any other cut-up elevator pieces at the scrap yard.

Wednesday, 21 Aug 96, the RIC notified the NRC of the possibility of DU leaving the base. The base RPO notified the Missouri Radiation Control Officer and the Oklahoma Radiation Office of possible DU in Joplin MO. Neither office expressed concern. Each offered their assistance, if needed, and asked to be kept informed.

Please note that the NRC inspection report, dated 2 Jan 97, stated that the notification to the NRC was made on 20 Aug 96, a day earlier than it actually occurred. This is significant because it makes it appear that the base' response to ensure public health and safety after discovering a possible inadvertent transfer of DU was not as swift as it was.

On Wednesday, 21 Aug 96, the RPO at AAFB needed qualified personnel to be in the field at the Joplin scrap dealer to assist in recovering any DU that had been transported to Joplin. He coordinated a short-notice

temporary duty assignment for the base RPO and two technicians from Tinker AFB OK (TAFB) to travel to Joplin MO. The TAFB RPO and technicians traveled to Joplin that afternoon, Wednesday, 21 Aug 96, arriving in Joplin at 2100.

Also on Wednesday, 21 Aug 96, the AAFB RPO coordinated a response of the Air Force Radiological Assessment Team (AL/OEBZ) from Brooks AFB TX. They were asked to assist in the health assessment of the cutting incident.

On Wednesday, 21 Aug 96, the base's focus was on the recovery of the inadvertently transferred DU. The other pieces of the elevators were still on AAFB and were considered to be secure. The base recycling center was not notified that they could not sell the aircraft parts as scrap until after they escorted a contractor to the site on Wednesday, 21 Aug. The contractor did not disturb or remove any DU at the site.

On Thursday, 22 Aug 96, two consultants from AL/OEBZ traveled to AAFB arriving that afternoon. On 22 Aug 96 the consultants gathered information about the cutting performed on the elevator sections and the current situation. That afternoon the consultants gave the base their preliminary assessment of the situation.

On Thursday, 22 Aug 96, the TAFB RPO and technicians conducted a survey of the scrap yard in Joplin. They confirmed that the already located elevator piece contained DU. They found no further evidence of any other DU at the scrap yard (Atch 1). That afternoon the AAFB RPO coordinated with the Tinker AFB RPO and the project leader to transport the elevator piece back to Altus AFB. The project leader and the crew member transported the piece back to Altus AFB that evening.

All of the DU that was located in the aircraft tail sections was recovered and accounted for at AAFB, Friday, 23 Aug 96. That morning at AAFB the elevator sections were pieced back together by maintenance personnel who then accounted for all of the elevator sections.

On Friday, 23 Aug 96, the consultants continued to gather information. The information gathered by the consultants on the number and sizes of the cuts on the DU counterweights was relayed to a health physicist for an assessment of the project crew's exposure. The health physicist's resulting worst case exposure estimate was a dose of less than one millirem (Atch 2). This estimated dose is less than 1/300 of the annual dose received from naturally occurring background sources in the United States. An average chest x-ray results in a dose of about 10 millirem and a person on a plane flying from Los Angeles to London receives a dose of about 4 millirem.

On Saturday, 24 Aug 96, the AAFB RPO and the AL/OEBZ consultants sealed the exposed DU on the elevators with plastic and tape. The consultants left that afternoon to travel back to Brooks AFB. The elevators were later triple-bagged and placed in locked storage.

That weekend, 24-25 Aug 96, the five members of the cutting crew still stationed at AAFB were given a 24-hour urinalysis for possible uptake of the DU. The samples were analyzed at Armstrong Laboratories, Brooks AFB. The results for all five members came back "none detected". The three other crew members were notified and to date two personnel have agreed to be sampled. The results of these tests are expected to be similar to the others.

On 28 Aug 96, the base RPO called the contractor who hauled the aircraft assemblies to Joplin MO. The RPO offered to survey the contractor's vehicle the next time the contractor came to Altus AFB. The contractor acknowledged the offer and agreed to notify the base RPO the next time he was at the base. The contractor did not notify the base RPO during his subsequent visits. After the NRC inspection, the base RPO


again called the contractor to offer a survey of the vehicle. The contractor did not object and once again agreed to notify the base RPO of his next visit. The base recycling organization was contacted and has agreed to notify the base RPO in advance of the contractor's next visit. The contractor is expected to perform a scrap pickup in late Jan or early Feb. We will survey his vehicle at that time.

5. Prevention efforts: To prevent further occurrences, Altus AFB is no longer completing major aircraft dismantling operations. Future needs for training fuselages will be met by acquiring the fuselage from the Aerospace Maintenance Regeneration Center (AMARC) in Arizona, or another such organization, after alterations have been made.

Further research conducted by the Altus AFB RPO and the base legal office after the incident revealed that items requiring demilitarization, such as aircraft parts, cannot be recycled through the base recycling center. Air Force Instruction 32-7080, 12 May 94, states that "Items excluded from recycling by Code of Federal Regulation, Part 32, 172.2 include ships, planes, or weapons that must be demilitarized before sale." This has been clarified and does include aircraft assemblies. A DoD letter of clarification of the policy on recycling (Atch 3) was also located and briefed to the responsible parties. Although the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Organization at Ft. Sill approved the previous recycling of aircraft parts, the base recycling center is no longer recycling such material as scrap metal.

The aircraft maintenance function at AAFB has recently undergone a conversion to civil service contract. A letter about the possible hazards associated with significant military equipment (SME) is being distributed to all personnel now performing aircraft maintenance at AAFB (Atch 4). The aircraft maintenance function has also initiated a change to the Air Force TO 1C-141B-4-2. The change requests a warning about the presence of DU counterweights (Atch 5).

6. Based on the information available, the base has been in compliance with the applicable rules since 23 Aug 96, and all follow-on corrective actions are expected to be completed by 28 Feb 97. If you have any questions about this reply, please call me, at DSN 866-5255.


COLBY D. ADAMS, Capt, USAF, BSC
Base Radiation Safety Officer

Attachments:

1. Trip Report for Joplin MO
2. Dose Reconstruction for Workers
3. Policy for DoD Recycling
4. Dismantling Significant Military Equipment Letter
5. Technical Order Improvement Report and Reply



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 72 MEDICAL GROUP (AFMC)
TINKER AIR FORCE BASE OKLAHOMA

MEMORANDUM FOR 97 AMDS/SGPB
301 N. First St
Altus AFB OK 73523-5005

20 AUG 1996

FROM: 72 AMDS/SGPB
7701 2nd St, Door C, Suite 110
Tinker AFB OK 73145-9200

SUBJECT: Trip Report for Radiation Survey Conducted in Joplin, MO

1. PURPOSE: A radiation survey was requested by Lt Adams to locate depleted uranium (DU) counterweights that are used in C-141 aircraft ailerons and elevators. The survey was conducted at the Twelfth Street Scrap Yard in Joplin, MO.

2. TRAVELERS:

Capt Ronald E. Porte, Bioenvironmental Engineer
SSgt Jerome B. Espiritu, Bioenvironmental Engineering Craftsman
SrA Loretta B. Fisher, Bioenvironmental Engineering Journeyman

3. ITINERARY:

Depart Tinker AFB, OK at 1700 hours, 21 Aug 96
Arrive Joplin, MO at 2100 hours, 21 Aug 96
Depart Joplin, MO at 1500 hours, 22 Aug 96
Arrive Tinker AFB, OK at 1900 hours, 22 Aug 96

4. DISCUSSION:

a. The survey was conducted using four ADM-300A, Radiological Assessment Kits. The survey was conducted using two meters to measure beta/gamma and two x-ray probes.

<u>Kit Serial #</u>	<u>Calibrated</u>	<u>Meter Serial #</u>	<u>Probe Serial #</u>
ADM-690506	3/25/96	ADM-690531	
ADM-690503	3/25/96	ADM-690528	
ADM-690504	3/25/96	ADM-690529	XP-690346
ADM-690505	3/25/96	ADM-690530	XP-690347

Attach 1

b. MSgt German and SrA Morton, from Altus AFB, had already located a section of an aileron before we arrived in Joplin, MO. This aileron section was confirmed to contain DU counterweights. At this time, there was one aileron section still unaccounted for. Natural background radiation levels were 15-25 microRoentgens per hour ($\mu\text{R/hr}$) for beta/gamma and 25-125 counts per minute (cpm) using the x-ray probe.

c. The next step was to follow the path that the material from Altus AFB took through the scrap yard. Measurements were taken at all locations where the material was processed. There was only one location in the scrap yard that had levels higher than natural background radiation. This is the furnace area, where the aluminum is melted down and separated from higher melting point metals. Measurements at the furnace using the x-ray probe were 175-225 cpm.


d. The scrap yard also analyzes by spectroscopy each aluminum ingot that is produced out of the furnace. The aluminum ingots produced during the period in question contained 0.00% lead.

5. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. The slightly higher levels of radiation may be attributed to instrument noise from working in a harsh environment. The furnace operates at 1400°F (760°C). The temperature around the furnace was not measured. However, the ADM-300As operating temperature environment is between -30°C and 50°C .

b. The aileron section was crated and transported back to Altus AFB by MSgt German and SrA Morton. Prior to transporting the crate back to Altus AFB, the crate was surveyed and swipe tested. There was no removable alpha contamination and the beta/gamma measurements were below $50 \mu\text{R/hr}$.

c. Based on the results of the survey it is unlikely that any other DU counterweights were received by the Twelfth Street Scrap Yard from Altus AFB. If there are any questions concerning the survey conducted, please call me at DSN 884-7844.



RONALD E. PORTE, Capt, USAF, BSC
Bioenvironmental Engineer

cc:
HQ AFMOA/SGOR
AL/OEBZ

204 000000 98-00-00

THEORY WORK

Altus AFB Dose Reconstruction for Workers Exposed to Depleted Uranium Aerosols

Background: Recently, our office, AL/OEBZ, responded to an incident involving Depleted Uranium (DU) at Altus AFB. It was learned that DU counterbalances were mistakenly cut with hand-held rotary saws during work procedures on an airplane wing section. Two individuals from our office were sent to the site to investigate. They identified potentially exposed personnel, located missing DU, packaged waste radioactive material, assisted the base Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) in determining storage and transportation requirements, and performed decontamination of two slightly contaminated vehicles.

Tasking: 1Lt Colby Adams, the Altus AFB Bioenvironmental Engineer (RSO), asked our office to perform dose calculations for those workers involved in the incident.

Calculation Limitations: It should be understood that any dose calculations would be merely fair approximations, at best, of the true values. This is due to the lack of important information on the following:

- (a) DU aerosol characteristics: concentration, AMAD, functional form of the particle distributions, solubility (or chemical form), etc.
- (b) length of exposure per worker.

Bioassay samples would be considered, in this case, to be the best way of determining worker dose.

Sources of Assumptions:

- (a) 1Lt Adams: Assume that a single worker was involved in the incident. In addition, assume that the worker was exposed to the DU for a total time of four hours. These assumptions represent the worst-case scenario.
- (b) Mr. Pepper McCary, Aerojet Ordinance (Manufacturer of DU penetrator rounds): During indoor milling operations of DU the airborne concentrations are typically measured to be 2-7% of the Derived Air Concentration (DAC). Maximum concentrations of 15% DAC have been recorded. Ventilation is not used during these operations.

Simplistic Calculations:

Assume DU aerosol concentrations of 7% the DAC:

$$(0.07 \text{ DAC}) (4 \text{ hr exposure}) (5000 \text{ mrem}/2000 \text{ DAC hr exposure}) = 0.7 \text{ mrem}$$

Therefore, a worst-case approximation of worker dose is about 1 mrem.



ACQUISITION

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

28 SEP 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
COMPTROLLER
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Policy for DoD Recycling

Please refer to my memorandum of August 18, 1993, on the above subject. The examples used in the attachment to that memorandum have created confusion over what items are properly included in our recycling programs. I have, therefore, revised the examples to list scrap (including ferrous and nonferrous scrap) and, specifically, firing range expended brass and mixed metals gleaned from firing range cleanup which do not require demilitarization as items qualified for the recycling program. Please disseminate this important clarification as broadly as possible to preclude disruption of existing recycling programs.


Sherri Wasserman Goodman
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Environmental Security)

Attachment

cc: USD (A)
cc: USD (P)

Attach 3

POLICY FOR DOD RECYCLING

1. **GOALS AND OBJECTIVES.** Prevent pollution and conserve resources on DoD installations by: reducing, reusing, recovering, and recycling to divert materials from the solid waste stream, and procuring recycled products made of post-consumer materials and other recycled materials, and procuring new materials that are more easily recycled.

2. GENERAL

a. **Recycling Fundamentals.** All installations, world-wide, shall have recycling programs as required by Executive Order 12780. In order to close the recycling loop, the Department and the Components will establish a preference program for the acquisition of products containing recycled materials and for products that are more easily recycled. Separate guidance implementing the Environmental Protection Agency Affirmative Procurement Guidelines will be issued by USD(A).

b. **Program Establishment.** Pursuant to Public Law 97-214, 10 U.S.C., Section 2577, each installation, and facility not on a military installation, world-wide, shall have, or be associated with, a Qualified Recycling Program (QRP) to service all tenant activities. This includes all leased and government owned/contractor operated space. Installations having several recycling programs shall incorporate them into the single installation QRP. Each DoD Component will ensure the government owned, contractor operated facilities participate in a recycling program. Each QRP shall have a designated coordinator.

c. **Program Review.** Each QRP shall be continually reviewed to identify materials appropriate for waste stream diversion, explore recycling methods and identify potential markets. Additional recyclable materials include not only materials generating a profit, but materials whose diversion from the waste stream generate a savings to the Department in disposal costs, or when diversion is required by state/local law or regulation.

d. **Accountability and Reporting.** QRPs selling materials directly, shall maintain operational records for annual fiscal year reporting requirements, review, and program evaluation purposes. These records are to include at a minimum, quantity and types of materials recycled and proceeds from sale and shall be consistent with guidance provided by the Comptroller.

3. RECYCLABLE MATERIALS

a. **Recyclable.** Recyclable material includes materials diverted from the solid waste stream and the beneficial use of

ture of goods sold or distributed in commerce or, the reuse of materials as substitutes for goods made of virgin materials. Examples of recyclable materials include (but not limited to): paper, food waste, plastic, glass, all cardboard and other packaging materials, newspapers, and empty food and beverage containers.

b. Recyclable Materials also include scrap (including ferrous and nonferrous scrap) and firing range expended brass and mixed metals gleaned from firing range cleanup which do not require demilitarization.

c. QRP Exclusions. The following materials may not be sold through a QRP: precious metals; government furnished materials; hazardous waste (including household hazardous waste); machine parts; electrical components; unopened containers of unused oil, solvents, or paints; and repairable items that have not progressed through the disposal cycle.

d. Demilitarized Materials. Items requiring demilitarization or mutilation prior to sale are not recyclable materials and the proceeds from sale are not eligible for reimbursement to the installation pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 2577 (32 CFR 172).

4. SALE OF RECYCLABLE MATERIALS.

a. General. Any sale of recyclable materials by the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of a military department shall be in accordance with the procedures in Section 203 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. Section 484), as amended.

b. Sales. DLA shall remain the primary agency responsible for the sale of recyclable materials generated from an appropriated funded source (DoD assets). Upon request by the installation, or other Component division, and approval by DLA, an installation may directly sell recyclable materials acquired with appropriated funds if one of the following conditions is met:

(i) direct sale is expected to result in increased proceeds, net of cost, increased efficiency or cost effectiveness, or;

(ii) the sale of a material is expected to result in the direct return of a usable product containing that material.

DLA will authorize the sale of commodities by the installation for a duration to be determined between the two signatories. Materials generated from non-appropriated or personal funds (e.g., post consumer waste from base housing, private homes, and installation concessions) may be sold by the installation program without DLA approval.

5. MANAGEMENT OF PROCEEDS FROM RECYCLED MATERIALS.

a. **Reimbursement.** When DRMS sells materials for the installation, they use DoD 4160.01-M, to return funds to the installation and DoDI 7310.1, for financial accounting procedures. One hundred percent (100%) of the proceeds from the sale of recyclable material at an installation with a QRP shall be credited to the F3875 Budget Clearing Account (Suspense) of the installation. Funds will be maintained and managed at the installation.

b. **Distribution of Proceeds.** The distribution of proceeds for operating a qualified recycling program shall be consistent with 10 U.S.C. Section 2577 (32 CFR 172). Proceeds from the sale of recyclable material shall be used to reimburse the installation level costs incurred in operating the recycling program. After reimbursement of the cost incurred by the installation for operations (i.e., operation and maintenance, and overhead) installation commanders may use up to 50 percent of the remaining sale proceeds for pollution abatement, energy conservation, and occupational safety and health activities. Projects may be funded with these proceeds up to 50 percent of the cost of a minor construction project. Any remaining proceeds may be transferred to installation morale or welfare activities.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR EDUCATION AND TRAINING COMMAND

28 January 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR All Maintenance Personnel

FROM: 97 LG/CC

SUBJECT: Dismantling Significant Military Equipment

1. Effective immediately, there will be no dismantling of surplus aircraft and significant military equipment (SME) to obtain training aids.
2. Disposition of surplus aircraft parts is permitted only through the Defense Reutilization and Marketing organization and not through the base recycling center. Some SME, including aircraft, contain specialized materials. These specialized materials, such as depleted uranium, can become hazardous if not handled correctly.
3. Any further questions can be directed to the following agencies: Environmental Management, ext 7346, for waste disposal issues, and Bioenvironmental Engineering, ext 5494, for radioactive materials issues.

Ronald D Carbon
RONALD D. CARBON, Colonel, USAF
Commander, 97th Logistics Group

cc:
97 SPTG/CC
Ft Sill DRMO

Attach 4

TECHNICAL ORDER IMPROVEMENT REPORT AND REPLY			1. REPORT DATE 29 JAN 97		OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to vary from 3 minutes per response, with an average of 6 minutes per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302, and to OMB, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington DC 20503. Please DO NOT RETURN your form to either of these addresses. Send your completed form to the applicable contractor.						
PART I - REPORT (Use complete 3-4 line address including 9 digit zip code where applicable)						
2. TO (Major Command or equivalent) HQ AMC/LGQP 402 SCOTT DR. UNIT 2A2 SCOTT AFB IL 62225-5308			3. TO (T.O. Manager) WR-ALC/TILT 420 SECOND ST. SUITE 100 ROBINS AFB GA 31098-1640		4. FROM (Prod. Improve. Manager or equivalent) 97 LG/LGMSQ 212 S. 7TH ST. SUITE 180 ALTUS AFB OK 73523-5307	
5. BASIC DATE OF T.O. 1 Jul 89		6. DATE/NO. OF CHANGE 28 Oct 96 CHG 29		7. PAGE NUMBER 2-79		8. PARAGRAPH NO. N/A
9. FIGURE NO. 2-8						
10. TECHNICAL ORDER DATA						
DOC IDENT		TECHNICAL ORDER NUMBER			IMPROVEMENT REPORT NUMBER	
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45						
X Y A H		1 C - 1 4 1 B - 4 - 2			2 0 1 0 0 9 7 A M W 7 0 1 1 R	
11. BRIEF SUMMARY OF DEFICIENCY AND RECOMMENDED CHANGE (Use continuation sheet, if needed) DEFICIENCY: THERE ARE NO WARNINGS OR CAUTIONS IN THIS T.O. TO ADVISE PERSONNEL OF THE PRECAUTIONS TO TAKE WHEN COMING INTO CONTACT WITH THE DEPLETED URANIUM BALANCE WEIGHTS LOCATED IN THE AILERONS AND ELEVATORS.						
12. SUGGESTION NUMBER						
13. REPORTED BY (Initiator's Signature, Office Symbol, Phone) <i>George H. Selvidge</i> GEORGE H. SELVIDGE, WG-10, LGMSQ, 5757			14. APPROVED BY (Supervisor's Signature) <i>James E. Rollins</i>		15. PIM OR EQUIVALENT (Signature) <i>William B. Warner</i>	
16. MAJOR COMMAND ACTION		A. CHECK APPLICABLE BLOCK <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVED <input type="checkbox"/> DISAPPROVED		B. CMD CONTROL POINT (Signature, Office Symbol, DSN)		C. DATE
PART II - REPLY						
17. TO HQ AMC/LGQP 402 SCOTT DR. UNIT 2A2 SCOTT AFB IL 62225-5308			18. TO 97 LG/LGMSQ 212 S. 7TH ST. SUITE 180 ALTUS AFB OK 73523-5307		19. FROM (Technical Content Mgr)	
20. ACTION TAKEN AND STATUS						
TR CODE		DATE RECEIVED YR MO DAY		DATE TO MGR YR MO DAY		(RESERVED)
46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80						
D A A						
TR CODE		DATE FROM MGR YR MO DAY		ACTION TAKEN		RESOLUTION DATE YR MO DAY (RESERVED)
46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80						
D B A						
21. REMARKS (Use continuation sheet, if necessary)						
22. SUGGESTION BENEFITS ARE: INTANGIBLE (Complete blocks below) TANGIBLE (Value, see remarks)						
23. VALUE OF INTANGIBLE BENEFITS: MINOR HIGH SUBSTANTIAL EXTENDED BROAD GENERAL						
24. EXTENT OF INTANGIBLE BENEFITS APPLICATION: LIMITED EXTENDED BROAD GENERAL						
25. DATE OF REPLY		26. TECHNICAL CONTENT MANAGER (Signature, Office Symbol, DSN)			27. APPROVED BY (Supervisor's Signature)	

Attach 5



State of Utah

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL

168 North 1950 West

Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4850

(801) 536-4250

TDD: 536-4414

Fax: (801) 531-8128

William J. Sinclair

Director

