



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION														
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TEXT														

On July 17, 1985 at 1318 CDT, a Main Steamline Isolation Signal (MSIS) was initiated while performing a functional test on Steam Generator (S/G) 1B Pressure Protection Channel III. At the time of the MSIS the unit was in Mode 5. In this condition, the Low Steamline Pressure Safety Injection Signal is disabled by protective interlock P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure less than 1930 psig), and the Steamline Pressure Rate (pressure decrease greater than 100 psig in 50 sec.) MSIS is enabled.

Prior to the functional test being initiated, a redundant S/G steamline rate bistable was in a tripped condition due to a failed circuit card and the appropriate Technical Specification Action Requirements were being followed.

Prior to commencing the test the control systems technician (CST) received authorization from the Shift Engineer and briefed the Shift Control Room Engineer and Unit One Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) on the test. The Unit One NSO placed orange stickers on the Annunciators and Indicators listed in the procedure to denote items involved in the test. In accordance with the procedure the Solid State Protection System was placed in the Multiplex (MPX) A&B mode and the bistable trip status lights verified. An incorrect note in the procedure allowed the procedure to be continued with a redundant steamline pressure rate bistable tripped.

When the instrument loop was placed in test, the two out of three coincidence logic was satisfied and MSIS generated. The three open Main Steamline Isolation valves closed as required. The fourth valve was closed and out of service. The Unit One NSO notified the CST of the MSIS and the loop was returned to service. Normal system alignment was restored in accordance with station procedures.

This event caused no effect on plant or public safety as plant systems responded as required.

To prevent recurrence, the functional test procedures for S/G pressure protection channels have been revised to provide the correct status of the S/G pressure bistables. This event has been reviewed within the Instrument Maintenance Department stressing the Engineered Safeguards Feature Actuation Signal logic differences that exist while in a shutdown condition. The Operating Department will review this as part of the station's required reading program.

Previous occurrences: None



**Commonwealth Edison**  
Byron Nuclear Station  
4450 North German Church Road  
Byron, Illinois 61010

August 14, 1985

LTR: BYRON 85-1150

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report from Byron Generating Station is being transmitted to you in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) which requires a 30 day written report.

This report is number 85-071-00; Docket No. 50-454.

Very truly yours,

R. E. Querio  
Station Superintendent  
Byron Nuclear Power Station

REQ/gt

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report No. 85-071-00

cc: J. G. Keppler, NRC Region III Administrator  
J. Hinds, NRC Resident Inspector  
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