

CHARLES H. CRUSE
Vice President
Nuclear Energy

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway
Lusby, Maryland 20657
410 495-4455



February 5, 1997

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Unit Nos. 1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318
Report of Changes, Tests and Experiments - 10 CFR 50.59

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2), Baltimore Gas and Electric Company hereby submits a report containing brief descriptions of changes, tests, and experiments approved under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.

Attachment (1) of this report includes 50.59 evaluations approved between October 1, 1995 and December 31, 1996. Items in the report are sorted by 50.59 identification number.

Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Charles H. Cruse", is written over a horizontal line. The signature is fluid and cursive.

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CHC/NH/dlm

Attachment: (1) Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments
[10 CFR 50.59(b)(2)]

cc: (Without Attachment)

D. A. Brune, Esquire
J. E. Silberg, Esquire
Director, Project Directorate I-1, NRC
A. W. Dromerick, NRC

H. J. Miller, NRC
Resident Inspector, NRC
R. I. McLean, DNR
J. H. Walter, PSC

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PDR ADOCK 05000317
R PDR

ATTACHMENT (1)

**CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS**

[10 CFR 50.59(b)(2)]

**Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318
February 5, 1997**

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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94-B-081-108-R00

64

Subject: RETIRE UNIT 1 & 2 CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY (CEA) CHANGE MACHINES IN PLACE

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-118

Assoc Doc ID: 94-081-005-00

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: MCR

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 081

Text:

FUEL HANDLING

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY RETIRES THE UNIT 1 & 2 CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY (CEA) CHANGE MACHINES IN PLACE. THE REFUELING MACHINE AUXILIARY HOIST, OR THE CASK HANDLING CRANE IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING, WILL BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A CEA HANDLING TOOL TO MOVE CEA'S BETWEEN FUEL ASSEMBLIES. THE CEA CHANGE MACHINES WILL BE PLACED IN THEIR PARKED POSITIONS, OUT OF THE WAY TO ALL OTHER MACHINE MOVEMENTS. UFSAR SECTION 9 7 3 3 DESCRIBES THE FUNCTION OF THE CEA CHANGE MACHINE AND ITS BASIC OPERATION. THIS UFSAR SECTION WILL BE REVISED TO REFLECT THAT THE REFUELING MACHINE, AUXILIARY HOIST, OR THE CASK HANDLING CRANE IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING, USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CEA HANDLING TOOL PERFORMS THIS FUNCTION. UFSAR FIGURE 9 15 IS A REPRESENTATION OF THE CEA CHANGE MACHINE, AND WILL BE REMOVED. UFSAR FIGURES 9 23 AND 9 28 ARE DRAWINGS OF UNIT 2 AND UNIT 2 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS. THESE TWO DRAWINGS REFERENCE THE CEA CHANGE MACHINES AS AIR LOADS, AND WILL BE MODIFIED TO SHOW THE REMOVAL OF THESE AIR LOADS.

THE CEA HANDLING TOOL AND ITS APPLICABLE PLANT PROCEDURES INCORPORATE ALL OF THE DESIGN FEATURES OF THE ORIGINAL CHANGE MACHINES. THE CEA CHANGE MACHINE W WILL BE PARKED SO THAT IT DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT. A CALCULATION WAS PERFORMED TO DETERMINE THAT DROPPING THE TOOL DURING USE WOULD NOT RESULT IN A CRACK OF THE SPENF FUEL OR REFUELING POOL LINERS. THEREFORE, THE USE OF THE TOOL DOES NOT INVALIDATE ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSES. NO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WERE AFFECTED BY THE CHANGE.

THEREFORE, THIS PROPOSED ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

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10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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94-B-999-103-R01 64

Subject: MODIFY EXISTING ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM TO CONNECT THE SBO DG OC

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-009

Assoc Doc ID: 89-0079

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: FCR

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 024

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

Text:

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY MODIFIES THE EXISTING ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN ORDER TO CONNECT THE STATION BLACKOUT (SBO) DIESEL GENERATOR, DG OC, TO THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES BUSES IN UNIT 1 (EMERGENCY BUS 11 AND 14). THIS ACTIVITY ALSO ADDS THE RACEWAY AND CABLES NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THIS PART OF DG OC. GENERALLY, THIS ACTIVITY WILL BE PERFORMED DURING A UNIT 1 PLANT OUTAGE.

NEW SSC'S ADDED BY THIS ACTIVITY HAVE BEEN EVALUATED TO ENSURE THE EFFECT OF THEIR INSTALLATION (E.G., SEISMIC ADEQUACY OF EXISTING STRUCTURES, HEAT LOADS, CABLE SEPARATION) DO NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS. SSC'S ADDED BY THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT BECOME OPERATIONAL UNTIL TESTING OF DG OC IS COMPLETE. EQUIPMENT IDENTIFIED AS INITIATORS OF ACCIDENTS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, THE PROBABILITY OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS HAS NOT BEEN INCREASED.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY BECAUSE EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO SERVE MITIGATION FUNCTIONS UNDER THESE CONDITIONS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED, AND CONTROL ROOM AND OFFSITE DOSES PREVIOUSLY CALCULATED REMAIN WITHIN THE PREVIOUSLY STATED LIMITS.

INSTALLATION ACTIVITY IS SEQUENCED SUCH THAT ONE EDG WILL BE AVAILABLE TO SUPPLY EMERGENCY POWER TO AN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES BUS FOR UNIT 1, DURING OUTAGE PORTIONS OF THIS ACTIVITY. ADEQUATE ELECTRICAL ISOLATION FOR DG OC WILL BE PROVIDED. NO NEW TYPES OF SYSTEM INTERACTIONS ARE BEING CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT IS NOT CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

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THE MARGIN OF SAFETY EXPRESSED IN THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED, BECAUSE THE ADDITIONAL HEAT LOADS ON THE MCR AND AUXILIARY BUILDING HVAC SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN EVALUATED AND DETERMINED NOT TO EXCEED THE SYSTEMS' DESIGN HEAT REMOVAL CAPACITY. DURING PERIODS WHEN PENETRATIONS IN AREAS PROTECTED BY A HALON SUPPRESSION SYSTEM ARE OPEN, THE HALON SYSTEM WILL BE DECLARED INOPERABLE, AND HOURLY FIRE WATCHES AND BACKUP FIRE SUPPRESSION WILL BE INSTITUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

THEREFORE, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.

(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00003

0001 64

Subject: CTMT PURGE LINES MODIFICATION

Alias: 94-0204-00 (ESP)

POSRC #: 96-092

Assoc Doc ID: 94-0205-00

Revision To: 0001

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

94-0205-01

0000

C

ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: 1CV1411
1CV1413

CNTMT PURGE AIR SUPPLY VLV 12

CNTMT PURGE AIR EXHAUST VLV 12

Org/Div:

System Code: 060

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HEAT AND VENT

Text:

ESP 94-0205 IS A MAJOR MODIFICATION WHICH WILL REMOVE VALVES 1/2 CV 1411 AND 1/2 CV 1413 AND INSTALL BLIND FLANGES. THESE VALVES ARE THE OUTBOARD CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FOR CONTAINMENT PURGE. IN ADDITION, ALL OF THE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR THESE VALVES (E.G., AIR SUPPLY, POWER SUPPLY, CONTROL SIGNALS) WILL BE MODIFIED TO REMOVE OR RETIRE ALL EQUIPMENT WHICH IS NO LONGER NECESSARY. FURTHERMORE, THIS MODIFICATION WILL PROVIDE A PERMANENT MEANS TO RIG AND STORE THE BLIND FLANGE DURING PERIODS IN WHICH IT IS TO BE REMOVED (I.E., MODES 5 AND 6).

THE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY IS ENHANCED BY THE USE OF A MORE RELIABLE MEANS OF ESTABLISHING THE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER. IN ADDITION, THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE METHOD OR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN CONTAINMENT CLOSURE AS REQUIRED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT IMPACT THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, NOR DOES IT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION. HOWEVER, THERE ARE CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WHICH RESULT FROM THIS ACTIVITY AND NECESSITATE AN AMENDMENT TO THE LICENSE. AS SUCH SPECIFIC APPROVAL BY THE NRC IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

MODIFICATION.

LOAD HANDLING ACTIVITIES COMPLY WITH NUREG-0612 AND, IF NECESSARY,
NUREG-0554, AND DO NOT REPRESENT A USQ.

Document ID	Revision	Status					
SE00005	0000	64					
Subject:	HYDROGEN ACCUMULATION IN CONTAINMENT						
Alias:							
POSRC #:	95-123						
Assoc Doc ID:	EOP-13.01	Revision To:	0000	Assoc Stat:	C	Assoc Type:	AVBASIS
	EOP-13.02		0000		C		AVBASIS
	ES199501398		0000		C		ESP
Ref Doc ID:		Rev:		Refer Type:			

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 102

PLANT AREAS

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THIS SAFETY ANALYSIS ALLOWS UFSAR SECTION 14.21 TO BE REVISED TO REFLECT THE REANALYSIS OF THE HYDROGEN ACCUMULATION IN CONTAINMENT DESIGN BASIS EVENT. THE REANALYSIS CONSISTED OF AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF ALL INPUTS AND ASSUMPTIONS IN THE DBE ANALYSIS. THIS IS A REANALYSIS ONLY; NO PLANT MODIFICATIONS ARE NECESSARY. NO CHANGES ARE MADE TO THE OPERATION OR FUNCTION OF: THE HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS, THE CONTAINMENT VENT / HYDROGEN PURGE SYSTEMS, OTHER EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY (OR THE ASSOCIATED SUPPORT SYSTEMS), OR EQUIPMENT EVALUATED IN THE SAR ASSUMED TO BE EVENT INITIATORS.

THE ELECTRIC HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS ARE THE PRIMARY MEANS OF CONTROLLING HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION AFTER A LOCA. THE REANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THAT, EVEN WITH AN INITIAL HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION OF 0.7 V/O, EITHER RECOMBINER WILL MAINTAIN THE HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BELOW 4 V/O, WHEN STARTED APPROXIMATELY ONE DAY AFTER THE POSTULATED LOCA.

IN THE EXTREMELY UNLIKELY EVENT THAT BOTH RECOMBINERS FAIL FOLLOWING A LOCA, THE CONTAINMENT VENT / HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION BELOW 4 V/O. PURGE SHOULD BE INITIATED WHEN A GRAB SAMPLE INDICATES THE HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION IS APPROXIMATELY 3 V/O. THIS IS SOON ENOUGH TO ACCOUNT FOR UNCERTAINTY AND TO MAINTAIN AN APPROPRIATE MARGIN FROM THE ESTABLISHED ACCEPTANCE CRITERION, WHILE MINIMIZING RELEASES TO THE ENVIRONS. IN ALL CASES, THE REANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE PEAK HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION WILL REMAIN BELOW THE CONSERVATIVE 4 V/O LOWER FLAMMABILITY LIMIT. IN ADDITION, THE ASSOCIATED OFF-SITE DOSE IS WELL WITHIN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED AND ACCEPTED LIMITS.

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THE INPUTS AND ASSUMPTIONS REMAIN CONSISTENT WITH SAFETY GUIDE 7, THE SER FOR COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL, THE UFSAR, AND PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THEREFORE, THE LICENSING BASIS IS MAINTAINED. THE ASSOCIATED OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, AND THE RELEVANT EMERGENCY OPERATION AND RESPONSE PROCEDURES WILL BE UPDATE TO REFLECT THE RESULTS OF THE REANALYSIS.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR IS NOT INCREASED. THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAR IS NOT CREATED. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT REDUCED. THEREFORE, NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION IS INVOLVED.
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00007

0000 64

Subject: SWITCHGEAR HVAC CONTROLS REPLACEMENT (ESP 94-0201)

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-143

Assoc Doc ID: 94-0201-00

Ref Doc ID:

Revision: To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 032

Text:

AUX BUILDING AND RADWASTE HEAT & VENT

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONCLUDES THAT THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

THIS MODIFICATION REPLACES THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 SWITCHGEAR HVAC PNEUMATIC CONTROL SYSTEM WITH A DIGITAL ELECTRONIC BASED SYSTEM. THE MOORE PRODUCTS MODEL 348 E FIELD MOUNTED, PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLER IS USED. IEEE 7 - 4 . 3 . 2 - 1993, IEEE STANDARD CRITERIA FOR DIGITAL COMPUTERS IN SAFETY SYSTEMS OF NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATIONS, WAS USED AS GUIDANCE FOR COMMERCIAL GRADE DEDICATION OF THE CONTROLLER SOFTWARE. EPRI TR - 1 0 2 3 2 3, GUIDELINES FOR ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE TESTING IN POWER PLANTS, AND ANSI / IEEE C 37 . 90 . 1 - 1989, IEEE STANDARD SURGE WITHSTAND CAPABILITY TESTS WERE USED AS A GUIDANCE FOR EMI TESTING OF THE CONTROLLER.

THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION SINCE IT DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY SAR ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION NOR DOES IT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OF ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAR.

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

(CMH)

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00013 0000 64

Subject: REMOVE ABANDONED SW CROSS CONNECT PIPING BETWEEN UNIT 1 & 2 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS

Alias:

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

POSRC #: 95-118

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501424-000
Ref Doc ID:Revision To: 0000
Rev:Assoc Stat: C
Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code:
Text:

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REMOVES FLAGS FROM THE UFSAR FIGURE FOR "UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM IN THE TURBINE BUILDING" THAT INDICATE A CROSS CONNECTION TO UNIT 1 AT THE PLANT AIR COMPRESSORS. THE UNIT 1 DRAWING DOES NOT REFLECT THIS CROSS CONNECTION. THE PIPING THAT IS INSTALLED BUT NOT CONNECTED WILL BE REMOVED. THESE LINES APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN USED FOR START UP, AND WERE NOT SUBSEQUENTLY REMOVED.

(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00015 0000 64

Subject: REPLACEMENT OF 11 PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-061

Assoc Doc ID: 89-0173-06
CA00477Revision To: 0000
0001Assoc Stat: C
CAssoc Type: ESP
DCALC

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmti Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: 1COMPPA11

11 PA COMPR

Org/Div:

System Code: 019

COMPRESSED AIR

Text: SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE EXISTING NO. 11 PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR (PAC) WITH A NEW MACHINE. THE NEW COMPRESSOR HAS SUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO MEET PLANT AIR DEMANDS AND WILL BE A CENTRIFUGAL VERSUS RECIPROCATING TYPE COMPRESSOR. THE NEW COMPRESSOR WILL ALSO DELIVER OIL-FREE AIR, WHICH WILL ENHANCE ITS ABILITY TO ACT AS A BACKUP FOR THE INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSORS. REPLACEMENT OF THE PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR ALSO REQUIRES REARRANGEMENT OF THE SERVICE WATER (SRW) COOLING LINES TO THE COMPRESSOR, INCLUDING REMOVAL OF THE EXISTING NO. 11 PLANT AIR AFTERCOOLER (THE NEW COMPRESSOR HAS AN INTEGRAL AFTERCOOLER). THE FUNCTION OF THE PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR AND INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE PLANT AIR, SRW, AND PLANT ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS WILL BE MAINTAINED,

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SO ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING ACCIDENTS AND MALFUNCTIONS EVALUATED IN THE SAR REMAIN VALID. THE PLANT AIR SYSTEMS IS NOT REQUIRED TO PERFORM ANY SAFETY FUNCTION, AND THE PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE SRW AND ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS WILL NOT AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY REQUIRED SAFETY FUNCTION. A NEW FUSED DISCONNECT SWITCH WILL BE INSTALLED TO ALLOW THE OPTION OF PROVIDING 480 VAC POWER DURING OUTAGES. THE DESIGN BASIS FOR THE PLANT ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS WILL BE MAINTAINED, SO ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING ACCIDENTS AND MALFUNCTIONS EVALUATED IN THE SAR REMAIN VALID. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ) NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. NO CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00017 0000 64

Subject: CHANGE DRAWING FIG. 9-21 TO REFLECT GRAVITY DAMPERS AND MANUAL DAMPERS FOR THE AB VENT.

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-131

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501153-000

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 032

Text:

AUX BUILDING AND RADWASTE HEAT & VENT

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY MODIFIES NON SAFETY RELATED AIR OPERATED AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION DAMPERS TO ALLEVIATE MAINTENANCE CONCERNS. SPECIFICALLY, AUXILIARY AND WASTE PROCESSING VENTILATION AIR HANDLING UNIT SUPPLY DAMPERS 1 (2) DAMP 5422 AND 1 DAMP 54 23 ARE MECHANICALLY LOCKED IN THE FULL OPEN POSITION. IN ADDITION, WASTE PROCESSING EXHAUST FAN DAMPERS 1 (2) DAMP 5410 AND 1 (2) DAMP 5411 ARE REPLACED WITH GRAVITY DAMPERS.

THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND SHOWN TO HAVE NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON EITHER THE AUXILIARY AND WASTE PROCESSING VENTILATION AIR HANDLING UNITS OR THE WASTE PROCESSING EXHAUST FANS. IN ADDITION, SINCE THE FUNCTION OF THE AFFECTED DAMPERS IS MAINTAINED, EITHER BY REPLACEMENT DAMPERS OR ALTERNATE MEANS, THE OVERALL FUNCTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NOT AFFECTED. THE MODIFICATION IS ACCOMPLISHED IN A MANNER THAT ENSURES NO IMPACT ON COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THE DAMPERS THEMSELVES AND THEIR DEDICATED CONTROL EQUIPMENT. THE MODIFIED CONFIGURATION POSES NO NEW FAILURE MODES, AND IN FACT ELIMINATES SOME EXISTING FAILURE MODES THROUGH SIMPLICITY OF DESIGN. BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THE ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED

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SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

THIS EVALUATION HAS BEEN PREPARED BECAUSE SAR FIGURE 9 21 DEPICTS 1 (2) DAMP 510, 1 (2) DAMP 5411, 1 (2) DAMP 5422 AND 1 DAMP 54 23 AS AIR OPERATED DAMPERS. THIS FIGURE WILL BE REVISED TO SHOW THE MODIFIED CONFIGURATION.
(CMH)

Document ID Revision Status
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SE00025 0000 64

Subject: REMOVE LAST 2 SENTENCES OF UFSAR SECTION 9.7.3.2 "TRANSFER CARRIAGE" -- REMOVES REQUIREMENT TO PLACE DANGER TAG ON UPENDER

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-126

Assoc Doc ID: CA00568 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: DCALC
ES199501787 0000 C ESP

Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date
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Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

System Code: 081

FUEL HANDLING

Text: THIS ACTIVITY REMOVES THE LAST TWO SENTENCES FROM THE "TRANSFER CARRIAGE" SECTION OF UFSAR 9.7.3.2. THESE TWO SENTENCES DESCRIBE THE FOLLOWING ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS: "DURING NON-REFUELING PERIODS, THE FUEL CARRIER IS EMPTIED, THE TRANSFER CARRIAGE LOWERED TO A HORIZONTAL POSITION, AND A RED DANGER TAG IS PLACED ON THE UPENDER CONTROL PANEL. THE UPENDER CAN BE OPERATED DURING NON-REFUELING PERIODS ONLY IF NO FUEL MOVEMENT IS OCCURRING IN THE SFP." REMOVAL OF THESE TWO SENTENCES FROM THE UFSAR CONSTITUTES A CHANGE TO THE FACILITY PROCEDURES AS DESCRIBED IN THE SAR. THEREFORE, THIS SAFETY EVALUATION IS REQUIRED. CRITICALITY ANALYSES WERE PERFORMED FOR TWO 5.0% U-235 ASSEMBLIES IN THE UPENDER, WITH A THIRD 5% ASSEMBLY BROUGHT NEAR THE UPENDER. THE RESULTS SHOWED THAT BY PROVIDING A MINIMUM DISTANCE OF NO GREATER THAN 5" OR A MINIMUM BORON LEVEL OF NO GREATER THAN 200 PPM LOSS OF SHUTDOWN MARGIN IS NOT POSSIBLE. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ARE IN PLACE WHICH FAR EXCEED BOTH OF THESE REQUIREMENTS. THEREFORE, THIS SAFETY EVALUATION DETERMINES THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS IN PLACE WITHOUT THESE UFSAR SENTENCES ARE SUFFICIENT AND NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION IS INVOLVED.

Document ID Revision Status
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SE00028 0000 62
Subject: REVISE UFSAR TO ADD PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LOW RANGE INSTRUMENTS AS PAM

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-133

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501804-000

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 064

REACTOR COOLANT

Text: SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REVISED THE UFSAR LISTING OF INDICATORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PAM 1 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE VARIABLE TO INCLUDE THE LOW RANGE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS 1(2)PI 103 AND 1(2)PI 103-1. THESE INSTRUMENTS COMBINED WITH THE EXISTING PAM PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS MEET THE RG 1.97 REQUIREMENTS. THIS MODIFICATION WILL IDENTIFY THE EXISTING LOW RANGE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INDICATORS AS PAM 1 QUALIFIED TO THE OPERATORS BY PLACING GREEN DEMARCATION TAPE AROUND THOSE INSTRUMENTS. THESE INDICATORS CAN BE USED BY THE OPERATORS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE WIDE RANGE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INDICATORS DURING EMERGENCY OPERATING CONDITIONS AND PROCEDURES. SINCE THE INSTRUMENTATION CLASSIFIED BY THIS ACTIVITY ALREADY MET THE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS TO BE CLASSIFIED AS PAM 1 AND ARE ALREADY CLASSIFIED AS BEING SR 1E AND 50.49 WHERE NECESSARY, THIS

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

MODIFICATION IS ACCEPTABLE AND DOE SHOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION, NOR DOES IT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DISCUSSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AND THEIR BASES.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00029 64

Subject: TEMPORARILY SUPPLY POWER SIMULTANEOUSLY TO THE AUXILIARIES

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-022

Assoc Doc ID: 89-0079
ES199600250-000Revision To: 0000
0000Assoc Stat: C
CAssoc Type: FCR
ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Grg/Div:

System Code: 024

Text:

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION ADDRESSES THE TEMPORARY CONDITION WHERE THE DIESEL AUXILIARIES FOR TWO DIESELS ARE FED FROM ONE MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (MCC). WHILE DG2A IS BEING TESTED, DG12 WILL BE OPERABLE AND AVAILABLE TO EMERGENCY BUS 21. THIS WILL RESULT IN MCC 214R SUPPLYING BOTH DG2A AND DG12 AUXILIARIES

THIS LINEUP IS CONSISTENT WITH PLAN SEPARATION CRITERIA, AND SUFFICIENT MARGIN EXISTS IN THE ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM TO ALLOW FEEDING OF BOTH THE DG12 AND DG2A AUXILIARIES FROM MCC 214R. SAFETY RELATED PROTECTIVE DEVICES PROVIDED ON MCC 214R AND DIESEL AUXILIARIES (INCLUDING MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS) PROTECT THE EQUIPMENT AGAINST ELECTRICAL MALFUNCTIONS. FURTHERMORE, THE FEEDER BREAKER FROM DG2A TO EMERGENCY BUS 21 WILL BE "RACKED OUT", THUS ISOLATING THE DIESEL FROM THE BUS DURING THIS TEMPORARY CONFIGURATION. THEREFORE, THE PROBABILITY OF MALFUNCTION IS NOT INCREASED.

SINCE EQUIPMENT USED TO MITIGATE MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS IS NOT ADVERSELY IMPACTED BY THIS ACTIVITY, THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS IS NOT INCREASED. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT EQUIPMENT ASSUMED TO BE ACCIDENT INITIATORS. NO NEW SYSTEM INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER SSC'S HAVE BEEN CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY THAT COULD CAUSE A NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT. IN ADDITION, THE DIESEL GENERATORS ARE MITIGATORS OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ACCIDENTS AND CANNOT BECOME ACCIDENT INITIATORS. THUS, THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS IS NOT CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY. TWO EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (ONE OF WHICH IS DG12, THE "SWING

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DIESEL") WILL BE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THE OPERATING UNIT (UNIT 2) AND ONE DIESEL GENERATOR WILL BE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THE UNIT IN SHUTDOWN (UNIT 1); THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THUS, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
(CMH)

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Document ID Revision Status

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SE00032 0000 64

Subject: INTERNAL VIBRATION MONITORING SYSTEM UFSAR CHANGE

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-118

Assoc Doc ID: 95-031-002-00

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: MCR

95-031-002-00

0000

C

ESP

QL00069

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C

QLOG

Pef Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: OCPUIVMS

INTERNAL VIBRATION MONITORING SYS

Org/Div:

System Code: 031

METEOROLOGY TOWER AND MISC. COMPUTERS

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE OBSOLETE INTERNALS VIBRATION MONITORING SYSTEM (IV MS) FOR CNPP UNITS 1 & 2. BECAUSE OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH IV MS, OBSOLESCENCE AND LACK OF VENDOR SUPPORT ARE VIEWED AS POTENTIAL THREATS TO CONTINUED PLANT OPERATION. THE IV MS IS A COMPUTER BASED SYSTEM THAT USES A FOURIER TRANSFORM ANALYZER SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO PROVIDE DATA ON THE STATUS, EXTENT AND CHARACTER OF CORE / CoRE BARREL MOTION. THE REPLACEMENT IV MS IS THE VENDOR'S RECOMMENDED REPLACEMENT WITH SIMILAR DESIGN, BUT ENHANCED CAPABILITY AND MAN MACHINE INTERFACE.

THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND SHOWN TO HAVE NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON EITHER THE IV MS OR ANY INTERFACING SSC. SINCE THE SYSTEM DESIGN AND

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INTERFACES REMAIN THE SAME THE ACTIVITY POSES NO NEW FAILURE MODES. BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THE ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

THIS EVALUATION HAS BEEN PREPARED BECAUSE SAR SECTION 7 9 2 DESCRIBES SWITCH PANEL LIGHTS THAT ILLUMINATE TO INDICATE ABNORMAL CONDITIONS. THE NEW SYSTEM DOES NOT HAVE THESE SWITCH PANEL LIGHTS, BUT INDICATES ABNORMAL CONDITIONS THROUGH ALTERNATE MEANS. SECTION 7 9 2 WILL BE REVISED TO DELETE REFERENCE TO SWITCH PANEL LIGHTS.
(CMH)

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00033 0000 64

Subject: 21 INSTRUMENT AIR DRYER REPLACEMENT (FCR 89 173, SUPPLEMENT 3)

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-123

Assoc Doc ID: 89-0173
89-0173-03Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C
0000 CAssoc Type: FCR
ESP

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 019

Text:

COMPRESSED AIR

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE EXISTING 21 INSTRUMENT AIR DRYER WITH A NEW DRYER IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE RELIABILITY OF THE INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM. THE REPLACEMENT DRYER IS OF THE SAME TYPE AS THE EXISTING DRYER, BUT WITH A LARGER CAPACITY RATING AND IMPROVED MONITORING CAPABILITY. LOCAL FLOW INDICATOR 2 FI 20B1 AND ITS INLET ISOLATION VALVE (2 IA 149) WILL ALSO BE REMOVED UNDER THIS ACTIVITY. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ) NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. NO CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED.
(CMH)

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Document ID Revision Status

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SE00035

64

Subject: ENCAPSULATION TUBE SAFETY EVALUATION

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-027

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501759-000

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 102

PLANT AREAS

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY SHOWS THAT ENCAPSULATION TUBES, WHICH STORE INDIVIDUAL IRRADIATED FAILED FUEL RODS, CAN BE SAFELY STORED IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL IN THE PERIPHERAL GUIDE TUBES OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES OR EMPTY GRID CAGES. ENCAPSULATION TUBES ARE A STANDARD ABB - CE DEVICE FOR STORING FAILED FUEL RODS AND FOR CONTAINING SOLID FISSION PRODUCTS. THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY MODIFYING FUEL HANDLING PROCEDURES FH 120, FH 220, FH 330, FH 340 AND FH 350 TO INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS: (1) BY ADMINISTRATIVELY REQUIRING THAT ONLY FUEL RODS WITH SUFFICIENT CLAD DAMAGE TO ENSURE NO RESIDUAL GAS GAP ACTIVITY BE STORED IN ENCAPSULATION TUBES IN FUEL ASSEMBLIES AND THAT UNDAMAGED FUEL RODS ONLY BE STORED IN THE ENCAPSULATION TUBES IN EMPTY GRID CAGES; (2) FOR ENCAPSULATED FUEL RODS STORED IN THE GUIDE TUBES OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES, BY ADMINISTRATIVELY REQUIRING THAT THE ENCAPSULATED FUEL ROD AND ASSEMBLY INITIAL ENRICHMENTS BE LESS THAN 4 . 35 W/O OR THAT THE EXPOSURE OF THE ENCAPSULATED FUEL RODS AND ASSEMBLY BE GREATER THAN 1530 MWD / MTU, AND FOR ENCAPSULATED FUEL RODS STORED IN THE GUIDE TUBES OF EMPTY GRID CAGES, BY ADMINISTRATIVELY REQUIRING THAT ONLY THE TECH SPEC 5.3.1.1 ENRICHMENT LIMIT OF 4.52 W/O APPLIES; AND (3) BY ADMINISTRATIVELY RESTRICTING THE USE OF HOST ASSEMBLIES IN ISFSI AND THE REACTOR CORE. IN ADDITION, ENCAPSULATION TUBES ARE ADMINISTRATIVELY PROHIBITED FROM BEING PLACED IN THE CENTER GUIDE TUBES OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES OR EMPTY GRID CAGES TO PREVENT AN ENCAPSULATION TUBE FROM BECOMING WEDGED IN THE GRAPPLE OF THE SPENT FUEL HANDLING MACHINE. ENCAPSULATED FUEL IS ADMINISTRATIVELY PROHIBITED FROM EXTENDING ABOVE THE TOP OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL RACKS TO PREVENT THE ENCAPSULATED FUEL ROD FROM INTERFERING WITH THE SPENT FUEL HANDLING MACHINE OR ITS LOAD. UFSAR SECTION 9.7 WILL BE MODIFIED TO INCLUDE A DESCRIPTION OF THE ENCAPSULATION PROCESS AND OF ANY LIMITS IMPOSED BY DOSE, CRITICALITY, THERMAL AND EQUIPMENT INTERFACE ANALYSES. UFSAR SECTION 14.18 WILL BE MODIFIED TO REFLECT THE CHANGE FROM AN ASSEMBLY WITH 176 PINS MAXIMUM TO A WHOLE ASSEMBLY WITH 180 FUEL PINS MAXIMUM LIMITED BY REACTIVITY AND OFFSITE DOSE CONSIDERATIONS. THE TERM "ENCAPSULATED" WILL BE

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CHANGED TO "CLAD" IN UFSAR SECTIONS 3.1 AND 3.3.2.1 TO AVOID CONFUSION. THE
PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00036 0000 64

Subject: ACTIVITY - ES 1995 0 1844 - SIXTEEN FIRE DAMPERS

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-007

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501844-000

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 120

Text:

BARRIERS AND BARRIER PENETRATIONS

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY PROVIDES ENGINEERING TO ABANDON IN PLACE SIXTEEN FIRE DAMPERS IN THE PLANT, BY REPLACING EACH DAMPER'S FUSIBLE LINK WITH A NON FUSIBLE STAINLESS STEEL LINK. THIS ACTIVITY IS REQUIRED TO ADDRESS FIRE DAMPER INSTALLATION CONCERNS. FIRE SEPARATION BETWEEN REDUNDANT COMPONENTS, REQUIRED BY CALVERT CLIFFS APPENDIX R ANALYSIS, IS MAINTAINED BY CREDITING OTHER ASPECTS OF PLANT FIRE PROTECTION, INCLUDING THE CONFIGURATION OF THE ASSOCIATED DUCTWORK. THIS IS SUPPORTED BY A FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING EVALUATION, PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERIC LETTER 86 - 10. THE FUSIBLE LINK IN EACH DAMPER IS REPLACED WITH A STAINLESS STEEL LINK TO ENSURE THAT THE DAMPER STAYS IN THE OPEN POSITION, TO PREVENT INADVERTANT DAMPER CLOSURE FROM AFFECTING VENTILATION SYSTEMS.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR, NOR DOES IT INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY FOR A NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT NO PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASIS SECTION (SECTION 3/4.7.12) IS NOT REDUCED. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT REPRESENT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
(CMH)

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00037

0000 64

Subject: UFSAR FIGURE 9-21 INFO CHANGE FOR SWGR DAMPERS 22B AND 22BA.

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-123

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501466

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 032

Text:

AUX BUILDING AND RADWASTE HEAT & VENT

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION IS ASSOCIATED WITH ESP ES 1995 1466 AND IS PERFORMED BECAUSE UFSAR FIGURE 9-21 (BGE DWG 64 315) AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION, REQUIRES CHANGE TO CORRECTLY SHOW THAT SWITCHGEAR ROOMS VENTILATION FAN 11 (12) HAS A SPLIT DISCHARGE DESIGN WITH TWO SEPARATE GRAVITY DAMPERS, ONE ON EACH FAN DISCHARGE DUCT. THEREFORE, A SECOND GRAVITY DAMPER SYMBOL WITH TAG NUMBER 1 (2) HVAC 22BA HAS BEEN ADDED IN PARALLEL TO 1 (2) HVAC 22B ON FIGURE

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9-21. THERE IS NO SPECIFIC SAR DISCUSSION OR DESCRIPTION REGARDING THE FAN 11 (21) DISCHARGE DAMPERS. OTHER THAN FIGURE 9-21, THERE IS NO OTHER SAR DISCUSSION OR DESCRIPTIONS AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE.

THIS CHANGE TO UFSAR FIGURE 9-21 IS BEING MADE TO REFLECT NEW COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION FOR AN EXISTING HVAC DAMPER AND TO BETTER CLARIFY THE AS BUILT CONDITION BY SHOWING FAN 11 (21) HAS A SPLIT DISCHARGE ARRANGEMENT WITH TWO GRAVITY OPERATED DAMPERS 1 (2) HVAC 22B AND 1 (2) HVAC 22BA IN LIEU OF ONE SINGLE DAMPER. THE PLANT HAS HISTORICALLY REFERRED TO THIS ARRANGEMENT AS A SINGULAR DAMPER UNIT, WITH ONE TAG NUMBER 1 (2) HVAC 22B. SHOWING BOTH DAMPERS WITH UNIQUE EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION WILL MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT THE AS BUILT CONFIGURATION OF THE PLANT.

THE TWO DAMPERS ARE OF THE SAME SIZE AND DESIGN. THE TWO FAN DISCHARGE PATHS RE COMBINE IMMEDIATELY DOWNSTREAM OF THE SUBJECT GRAVITY DAMPERS. THE DAMPERS ARE GRAVITY OPERATED AND RESPOND BY OPENING TO POSITIVE AIR PRESSURE PROVIDED BY THE FAN DISCHARGE. THERE ARE NO PHYSICAL CHANGES BEING MADE TO THE PLANT AND THERE IS NO CHANGE TO THE PERFORMANCE OR OPERATION OF THE SWITCHGEAR VENTILATION SUBSYSTEM. ALL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF THE SWITCHGEAR VENTILATION SUBSYSTEM CONTINUE TO BE MET AND THERE IS NO IMPACT TO ANY OTHER SSC'S. THERE ARE NO AFFECTS ON ANALYZED MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS, AND NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS ARE CREATED. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN USQ.
(CMH)

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00038 0000 64

Subject: SAFETY EVALUATION FOR THE UPGRADE OF THE EDG

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-120

Assoc Doc ID: 93-0203-04

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Org/Div:

System Code: 024

Text:

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY ADDRESSES THE INSTALLATION OF AN UPGRADE KIT ON EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) NO. 11 (2A), 12 (1B) & 21 (2B), PROVIDED BY THE EDG SUPPLIER, THAT INCLUDES REPLACING THE CYLINDER LINERS, PISTONS, SCAVENGING AIR SYSTEM, AND FUEL INJECTORS WITH COMPONENTS OF AN IMPROVED DESIGN. ALSO MODIFICATIONS OF SOME SUPPORTING SYSTEMS ARE INCLUDED. THE INSTALLATION OF THE UPGRADE KIT FACILITATES AN INCREASE TO THE ELECTRICAL CAPABILITY OF EDG'S NO. 11 (2A), 12 (1B) & 21 (2B). THE NEW RATINGS WILL BE; CONTINUOUS - 3000 KW 2000 HOUR - 3300 KW, 200 HOUR - 3500 KW AND 30 MINUTES - 3600 KW. WITH THE INCORPORATION OF FUTURE LOADS (PLANNED AND POTENTIAL), THE MARGINS WITHOUT THIS UPGRADE WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. HOWEVER, WITH THE CAPACITY UPGRADE (FOR EDG'S NO. 11 (2A), 12 (1B) & 21(2B) AND WITH THE FUTURE LOADS ADDED, POSITIVE LOAD MARGINS WILL BE MAINTAINED ON ALL BUSES.

THE PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR ARE NOT IMPACTED BY THIS ACTIVITY BECAUSE THE RELIABILITY OF THE EDG IS NOT IMPACTED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

NO ADDITIONAL FAILURE MODES OF THE EDG ENGINE ARE BEING CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY, AND NO NEW INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SYSTEMS ARE CREATED BY CHANGES COVERED UNDER THIS SAFETY EVALUATION. FURTHERMORE, THE EDG'S ARE ACCIDENT MITIGATORS ARE NOT INITIATORS OF A NEW ACCIDENT. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT HAS NOT BEEN CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

A LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST IS BEING SUBMITTED TO INCREASE THE REQUIRED FUEL OIL VOLUME IN THE FUEL OIL STORAGE TANKS. THE CURRENT QUANTITY OF FUEL OIL REQUIRED TO BE STORED (IN DAY TANKS AND FUEL OIL STORAGE TANKS) BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS SUFFICIENT SINCE THE EDG WILL CONSUME LESS FUEL AT THE EXISTING RATINGS THAN PRIOR TO THE UPGRADE. ONCE THE NEW TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE ISSUED, THE LEVEL IN THE FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK MUST BE INCREASED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MINIMUM FUEL OIL REQUIREMENTS. THE SETPOINT ON THE LEVEL INDICATING SWITCH ON THE NO. 21 FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK WILL BE INCREASED TO SUPPORT THE EDG AT THE HIGHER CAPACITY. THE OPERABILITY AND CAPABILITY OF THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THUS, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED BY THIS ACTIVITY, AND THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00039 0000 64

Subject: THIS ACTIVITY PROVIDES JUSTIFICATION, FROM A SAFETY STANDPOINT, THAT THE ADDITION OF 5 - AP IS ACCEPTABLE AS A
CHEMICAL ADDITIVE....

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-137

Assoc Doc ID: 95-035-001-00

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 035
Text:

CHEMICAL ADDITIONS - TURBINE

NRC SUMMARY:

THE SCOPE OF THIS ACTIVITY IS LIMITED TO AN ASSESSMENT OF 5 AMINO - PENTANOL (5 - AP) WHICH IS EXPECTED TO BE USED AT CCNPP IN A TRIAL DEMONSTRATION IN LATE 1995 OR EARLY 1996. THE PURPOSE OF THIS SAFETY EVALUATION IS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 5 - AP WOULD NOT COMPROMISE THE INTEGRITY OF THE SECONDARY SYSTEM WHICH COULD POTENTIALLY IMPACT PLANT SAFETY. TO DATE, ETA HAS BEEN USED AT A NUMBER OF OPERATING PWR'S IN THE US AND AMP AND 5 - AP HAVE BEEN USED AT THE W Y L F A POWER STATION IN THE UK WITHOUT DELETERIOUS EFFECTS ON PLANT MATERIALS. EPRI STUDIES WITH SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE AMINES HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT PHYSICAL DEGRADATION OF SYNTHETIC MATERIALS USED FOR SEALS AND GASKETS DOES NOT OCCUR EXCEPT AT EXTREMELY HIGH CONCENTRATIONS (I.E., 50 WT %) SEVERAL ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE GREATER THAN THOSE WHICH WOULD BE MAINTAINED IN THE SECONDARY SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH THE EPRI WORK AND ACTUAL PLANT EXPERIENCE HAS ONLY INCLUDED A SMALL NUMBER OF AMINES, THE RESULTS SHOULD BE APPLICABLE TO 5 - AP BASED ON THE EXPECTED APPLICATION AT SIMILAR, LOW PPM DOSAGES AND SIMILAR DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS (E.G., ACETIC AND FORMIC ACIDS) IN THE STEAM GENERATOR. THEREFORE, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ANY DIFFERENCES IN CORROSION OR MATERIAL DEGRADATION RATES SUCH AS THOSE WHICH CAN BE OBSERVED IN CORROSION PRODUCT TRANSPORT STUDIES, POSE AN ECONOMIC RATHER THAN A SAFETY ISSUE. IT IS ALSO, THEREFORE CONCLUDED, THAT USE OF 5 - AP WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE CONSEQUENCE OF A MALFUNCTION.

THE EXISTING CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM CAN BE USED TO FEED 5 - AP INTO THE SECONDARY SYSTEM, THEREFORE THERE ARE NO NEW SYSTEM INTERACTIONS. ALSO, 5 - AP IS OF RELATIVELY LOW VOLATILITY, LOW ACUTE TOXICITY, AND LOW FLAMMABILITY AT AMBIENT TEMPERATURES AND POSES A SMALLER RISK THAN THE PRESENTLY USED CHEMICALS (AMMONIA, MORPHOLINE, HYDRAZINE AND ETA). THEREFORE, IT IS FURTHER CONCLUDED THAT 5 - AP COULD NOT CAUSE AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE FROM THOSE WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN EVALUATED. SINCE THERE IS NO EFFECT ON OFFSITE DOSE CONSEQUENCES DUE TO USE OF 5 - AP AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY, AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IS NOT AFFECTED, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUBJECT ACTIVITY DEFINED IN THIS SAFETY EVALUATION.

CURRENTLY, THE CCNPP UFSAR STATES THAT CHEMICALS (HYDRAZINE AND AMMONIA OR MORPHOLINE) ARE ADDED TO THE CONDENSATE FLOW FOR OXYGEN SCAVENGING AND PH CONTROL. SINCE THIS SAFETY EVALUATION PROPOSES TO ALLOW THE USE OF 5 - AP FOR PH CONTROL, A UFSAR CHANGE IS NECESSARY AND IS INCLUDED AS PART OF THE SCOPE OF THIS ACTIVITY.
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID	Revision	Status
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SE00040	0000	64
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Subject: UPDATED FSAR 14.20 CONTAINMENT RESPONSE SAFETY EVALUATION

Alias:

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

POSRC #: 95-143

Assoc Doc ID: 95-0107
CA00093
ES199501794
Ref Doc ID:Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: DCALC
0000 C DCALC
0000 C ESP
Rev: Refer Type:Sender: Xmtl # Xmtl Date
=====Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 083
Text:

MAIN STEAM

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES THE REANALYSIS OF THE CONTAINMENT RESPONSE TO THE LOSS OF COOLANT AND MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK ACCIDENTS (LOCA AND MSLB), AND THE ASSOCIATED UPDATE TO UFSAR 14.20 AND OTHER AFFECTED PORTIONS OF THE UFSAR AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES. LOCA AND MSLB ARE THE DESIGN BASIS EVENTS (DBE'S) THAT ESTABLISH THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE CONTAINMENT DESIGN AND DETERMINE THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS FOR THE DESIGN OF SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS WITHIN THE CONTAINMENT. THIS ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED TO ENSURE THAT ALL CURRENT AND EXPECTED PLANT CONDITIONS ARE SUFFICIENTLY BOUNDED BY THE INPUTS AND ASSUMPTIONS TO THIS ANALYSIS.

THE LOCA AND MSLB EVENTS HAVE BEEN REANALYZED BY ABB AND BECHTEL USING METHODOLOGY THAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY THE NRC. ABB ANALYZED THE MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE FROM THE RCS (FOR LOCA) AND FROM THE SG (FOR MSLB). BECHTEL ANALYZED THE CONTAINMENT RESPONSE TO THESE EVENTS USING THE MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE FROM ABB AS INPUT.

THE REANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESSURE OF 50 PSIG IS NOT EXCEEDED. THE REANALYSIS ALSO DEMONSTRATES, UPON EVALUATION OF THE PEAK PREDICTED VAPOR TEMPERATURE OF 288 DEGREES FARENHEIT, THAT THE TEMPERATURE OF THE INNER SURFACE OF THE CONTAINMENT WALL, OF STRUCTURAL MEMBERS IN CONTAINMENT, AND OF SAFETY RELATED MECHANICAL COMPONENTS IN CONTAINMENT WILL NOT EXCEED THE RESPECTIVE DESIGN TEMPERATURES FOR THESE COMPONENTS. THE PEAK VAPOR TEMPERATURE FOR THIS ACTIVITY IS 3 DEGREES FARENHEIT HIGHER THAN THE HIGHEST PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED PEAK VAPOR TEMPERATURE (285 DEGREES FARENHEIT). FINALLY, THE REANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES, UPON EVALUATION OF THE ENVELOPING ACCIDENT TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE PROFILES, THAT THE QUALIFICATION OF 10CFR50.49 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IS MAINTAINED.

IN ADDITION TO THE UFSAR CHANGES THAT RELATE TO THE UPDATED CONTAINMENT RESPONSE ANALYSIS, THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES DELETING THE REACTOR COMPARTMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS FROM UFSAR 14.20 BASED ON APPLICATION OF THE LEAK BEFORE BREAK TOPICAL REPORT (CEN - 367 - A).
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00041 64

Subject: 21 AND 22 SALTWATER AIR COMPRESSOR REPLACEMENT

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-017

Assoc Doc ID: 89-0174
89-0174-00
CA00097
CA01383
E-88-015Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: FCR
0000 C ESP
00000 C DCALC
0000 C DCALC
0000 C DCALC

Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

2COMPSWAC21	21 SW AIR COMP
2COMPSWAC21A	21 SW AIR COMP A
2COMPSWAC21B	21 SW AIR COMP B
2COMPSWAC22	22 SW AIR COMP
2COMPSWAC22A	22 SW AIR COMP A
2COMPSWAC22B	22 SW AIR COMP B
2M0405	22 1A SW AIR COMPR MOTOR
2M0405A	22 1A SW AIR COMPR MOTOR A
2M0405B	22 1A SW AIR COMPR MOTOR B
2M1405	21 1A SW AIR COMPR MOTOR
2M1405A	21 1A SW AIR COMPR MOTOR A
2M1405B	21 1A SW AIR COMPR MOTOR B

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Org/Div:

System Code: 019

Text:

COMPRESSED AIR

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE EXISTING SALTWATER SYSTEM AIR COMPRESSORS (SWAC'S) WITH NEW LARGER CAPACITY COMPRESSORS. THE REPLACEMENT SWAC'S ARE TANK MOUNTED RECIPROCATING COMPRESSORS, AS ARE THE EXISTING COMPRESSORS, BUT WILL PROVIDE INCREASED CAPACITY MARGIN FOR SAFETY RELATED AIR DEMANDS. THE NEW COMPRESSORS WILL NOT CAUSE A CHANGE IN THE WAY THAT THE SALTWATER AIR SYSTEM FUNCTIONS. SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS SUPPORTED BY THE SALTWATER AIR SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION IN THE SAME MANNER. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE WAY THESE SYSTEMS ACT TO MITIGATE ACCIDENTS, NOR ARE ANY POSSIBILITIES OF NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS CREATED.

THIS CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ) NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. NO CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED.
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00042 0000 64

Subject: TURBINE VALVE BYPASS VALVE - DECREASED PRESSURE SETPOINT

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-137

Assoc Doc ID: ES199502106

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

Text:

THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES A CHANGE TO TWO PROCEDURES AND THE UFSAR TO REDUCE THE PRESSURE SETPOINT OF THE TBV'S WHEN EITHER TESTING THE TURBINE VALVES OR FOLLOWING A TURBINE VALVE MALFUNCTION. THE CHANGE IN THE SETPOINT WILL REDUCE THE PROBABILITY OF AN AUTOMATIC TRIP. THE SETPOINT IS BEING REDUCED TO JUST ABOVE THE STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE SO THAT THE TBV'S WILL OPEN QUICKLY TO PICK UP THE LOAD IF NECESSARY, THUS, REDUCING THE PROBABILITY OF A TRIP. CHANGES TO THE UFSAR ARE BEING MADE TO MORE EXPLICITLY DESCRIBE THE CHANGES IN THE PRESSURE SETPOINT.

THE CHANGES DO NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION SINCE THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANY OF THE PROBABILITIES, CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ANALYZED ACCIDENTS, OR THE MARGIN OF SAFETY.

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00043 0000 64

Subject: 50.59 EVALUATING A SPARE INVERTER AS THE SOURCE OF POWER FOR THE VITAL PANEL

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-125

Assoc Doc ID: 90-0099

Ref Doc ID: 1-95-0081

Revision To: 0000

Rev: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type: TMOO

Assoc Type: FCR

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: 11INV1Y03A

120V INVTR 13

Org/Div:

System Code: 018

VITAL INSTRUMENT AC

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY WILL TEMPORARILY CONNECT 120 VAC VITAL PANEL 13 FROM A FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT SPARE INVERTER THAT IS SEISMICALLY MOUNTED. THIS CONNECTION WILL BE USED DURING THE OUTAGE AND WILL ONLY BE USED ON ONE PANEL AT A TIME. THIS CONNECTION WILL ALLOW ALL THE EQUIPMENT POWERED FROM THE PANEL TO REMAIN OPERABLE DURING THE INSTALLATION OF A NEW INVERTER. THE SPARE INVERTER IS SIZED TO CARRY THE ENTIRE LOAD OF THE PANLE DURING ANY PLANT CONDITION. ONCE THE INVERTER IS REPLACED THE PANEL WILL BE CONNECTED BACK TO THE NEW INVERTER, THE NORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATION.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ).
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00044 0000 64

Subject: EVALUATE POWERING VITAL PANELS 12 AND 14 FROM THE BACKUP BUS

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-125

Assoc Doc ID: 90-0099

Ref Doc ID: 1-95-0080

1-95-0082

Revision To: 0000

Rev: 000

0000

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type: TMOD

TMOD

Assoc Type: FCR

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: 11NV1Y02A

120V INVTR 12

11NV1Y04A

120V INVTR 14

Org/Div:

System Code: 018

VITAL INSTRUMENT AC

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY WILL TEMPORARILY CONNECT 120 VAC VITAL PANEL 12 OR 14 DIRECTLY TO ITS BACKUP POWER SUPPLY. THIS CONNECTION WILL BE USED DURING THE OUTAGE AND WILL ONLY BE USED ON ONE PANEL AT A TIME. THIS CONNECTION WILL ALLOW ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT POWERED FROM THE PANEL TO REMAIN OPERABLE DURING ANY PLANT CONDITION. ONCE THE INVERTER IS REPLACED THE PANEL WILL BE CONNECTED BACK TO THE INVERTER, THE NORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATION.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ).
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00048 0000 64

Subject: REMOVAL OF SRW PIPING DEAD LEGS

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-140

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501141-000

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

=====

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

1-HB22-1157

SRW SYSTEM PIPING

1-HB22-1159

SRW SYSTEM PIPING

1-HB22-1323

SRW SYSTEM PIPING

1HVSrw-133

11 SRW SUBSYS XCONN

1HVSrw-134

11/12 SRW SUBSYS XCONN

1HVSrw-573

VENT X-CONN HDR BETW 11 A

Org/Div:

System Code: 011

SERVICE WATER COOLING

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION WILL REMOVE DEAD LEG PIPING FROM THE SRW SYSTEM TO AVOID INTERFERENCE DURING THE SERVICE WATER HEAT EXCHANGER REPLACEMENT IN A FUTURE OUTAGE. THREE SECTIONS OF PIPING WILL BE REMOVED UNDER THIS ACTIVITY:

- 1) THE CROSS CONNECT PIPING UPSTREAM OF THE SRW TURBINE BUILDING ISOLATION VALVES (14" HB 22 1323);
- 2) THE SUCTION LEG FROM 11 SRW RETURN HEADER TO 12 SRW PUMP (14" HB 22 1157);
- AND
- 3) THE SUCTION LEG FROM 12 SRW RETURN HEADER TO 11 SRW PUMP (14" HB 22 1159).

THE SOLE FUNCTION OF THE EXISTING PIPING WAS TO PROVIDE PRESSURE BOUNDARY FOR THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM AND TO PROVIDE SEPARATION BETWEEN THE TWO SERVICE WATER SUBSYSTEMS. THE PIPING AND VALVES BEING REMOVED PROVIDE NO FLOW DIRECTION OR FLOW CONTROL FUNCTIONS. THE NEW CAPS AND SPOOLS SATISFY THE

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION CODE. REMOVAL OF THE CROSS CONNECT
DEAD LEGS PROVIDES PHYSICAL SEPARATION BETWEEN THE TWO SUBSYSTEMS. THEREFORE,
THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
(CMH)

NUCLEIS
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10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID	Revision Status
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SF00049                                0000      64
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SE00049 0000 64
Subject: ES199501309, REPLACES THE EXISTING 10" CONCENTRIC, BUTTERFLY VALVE ASSEMBLY WITH A NEW 10" ECCENTRIC HIGH PERFORMANCE BUTTERFLY VALVE ASSEMBLY

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-137

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501309-000

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

REV:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 041

Text:

CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE SERVICE WATER TURBINE BUILDING ISOLATION VALVES, 1 CV 1637 AND 1639, WITH NEW VALVES. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODIFICATION IS TO IMPROVE THE RELIABILITY AND ISOLATION CAPABILITY OF THESE VALVES. THE EXISTING AND REPLACEMENT VALVES ARE AIR ACTUATED BUTTERFLY WAFER STYLE VALVES.

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THE REPLACEMENT VALVES FIT THE EXISTING PIPING WITHOUT MODIFICATION. THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT CHANGE THE PURPOSE OR THE OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF 1 CV 1637 AND 1639 OR THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE WAY THESE VALVES RESPOND TO MITIGATE ACCIDENTS, NOR DOES THIS ACTIVITY CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENT.

THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT REPRESENT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION, BECAUSE THE REPLACEMENT COMPONENTS ARE OF THE SAME BASIC DESIGN AND QUALIFICATION AS THE EXISTING COMPONENTS AND WILL BE INSTALLED PER APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS.
(CMH)

BY GAGGING THIS VALVE IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE ECCS COOLER FUNCTION WILL BE PRESERVED. IN ADDITION, THERE IS NO IMPACT ON THE CAPACITY OR ABILITY OF THE SALTWATER SYSTEM TO PROVIDE COOLING UNDER NORMAL OR ACCIDENT CONDITIONS ASSUMING ANY SINGLE FAILURE IN THE SYSTEM. AS SUCH IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THIS

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ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, NOR DOES IT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY CREDIBLE NEW ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY IS DEEMED NOT TO REPRESENT AN USQ.
(CMH)

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00052 0000 64

Subject: VENT LINES FOR DIESEL GENERATORS

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-130

Assoc Doc ID: 92-024-012-00

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0003

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

Text:

NRC SUMMARY:

ALLOW SEPARATION OF THE EXISTING COMMON VENT LINE FOR THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR'S (EDG) JACKET WATER COOLING AND AIR COOLANT SYSTEM. THE EXISTING CONSTANT VENT CONFIGURATION WILL BE SEPARATED TO PROVIDE INDEPENDENT VENT PATHS FROM THE RESPECTIVE COOLING WATER HEADERS TO THE ASSOCIATED JACKET WATER EXPANSION TANK.

THIS EVALUATION SUPERSEDES 50.59 LOG NUMBER 92 B 024 182 R02. THIS ORIGINAL 50.59 HAS BEEN MARKED UP AND MODIFIED TO ALLOW PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODIFICATION, APPROVED IN MCR 92 024 012 01, ON THE #12 EDG. IT WAS NOTED DURING THE POST MODIFICATION TESTING FOLLOWING THIS INSTALLATION THAT THE CONSTANT VENT LINE CONNECTING THE AIR COOLANT RETURN HEADER TO THE JACKET WATER COOLING EXPANSION TANK CAUSED AIR TO BE VACUUM DRAGGED FROM THE TOP OF THE TANK DIRECTLY INTO THE COOLANT RETURN HEADER. IT WAS DETERMINED THIS WAS A RESULT OF THE RETURN HEADER PRESSURE BEING BELOW ATMOSPHERIC. THIS CONDITION WAS CORRECTED FOR THE #12 EDG BY CUTTING AND PLUGGING THE AIR COOLANT RETURN HEADER VENT LINE UNDER MCR 92 024 012 02. REVISION 003 TO THE ABOVE MENTIONED ESP / MCR WILL TIE THE RETURN AND SUPPLY INTERCOOLER VENT HEADERS TOGETHER AND ROUTE THEIR COMMON DOWNSTREAM LINE BACK TO THE EXPANSION

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TANK. THEREFORE, THIS REVISION WILL HAVE ONLY TWO SEPARATE LINES VENTED BACK TO THE EXPANSION TANK, NOT THREE, AND WILL ALLOW THIS MODIFICATION ON ALL THREE EDG'S. THIS WILL STILL PREVENT AIR ENTRAINMENT IN THE JACKET WATER COOLING SUBSYSTEM SINCE THE JACKET COOLING SUBSYSTEM VENT LINE WILL STILL BE SEPARATED FROM THE INTERCOOLER COMMON VENT LINE.

THE CONSTANT VENT LINES ARE CATEGORIZED AS SAFETY RELATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CCNPP MASTER EQUIPMENT LIST. THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION WILL UTILIZE PIPING, FITTINGS AND COMPONENTS WHICH ARE SIMILAR TO THE MATERIALS THAT WERE SPECIFIED FOR THE ORIGINAL COMMON VENT LINE.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AS DEFINED BY 10 CFR 50.59 AND DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00054 64

Subject: SAFETY EVALUATION TO SUPPORT NON-MOD 93-099.

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-137

Assoc Doc ID: ES199500930

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 045

FEEDWATER

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY IS A NON MOD CHANGE TO SECTION 10.2.2.2 OF THE UFSAR. INCLUDED IN THIS SECTION OF THE UFSAR IS A DESCRIPTION OF THE STEAM SOURCES AVAILABLE TO DRIVE THE FEEDWATER PUMP'S TURBINE. IT IS MENTIONED THAT AUXILIARY STEAM FROM THE AUXILIARY BOILER IS ALSO A SOURCE, AND IS ALWAYS AVAILABLE. THIS ACTIVITY DELETES THE REFERENCE TO THE AUXILIARY STEAM FROM THE AUXILIARY BOILER ALWAYS BEING AVAILABLE.

AUXILIARY STEAM IS NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLE BECAUSE, LIKE ALL SYSTEMS, IT MAY BE OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE. THIS DOES NOT IMPACT THE RELIABILITY OF THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMPS, NOR DOES IT IMPACT THE SAFETY OF THE PLANT. PER OI-12A ("FEEDWATER SYSTEM"), WHICH IS REFERENCED BY OP-2 ("PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD"), AUXILIARY STEAM FROM THE AUXILIARY BOILER IS ONLY SUPPLIED TO THE SGFP'S DURING STARTUP TO TAKE THE PLANT UP TO 5% POWER. THIS SOURCE IS ONLY USED WHEN HOT REHEAT IS NOT AVAILABLE FROM THE OTHER UNIT THEREFORE, IF AUXILIARY STEAM IS NOT AVAILABLE THE ONLY CONSEQUENCE IS THE DELAY OF A UNIT STARTUP. STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP OPERATION WILL NOT BE AFFECTED DURING PLANT OPERATION, THE SGFP'S THEMSELVES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT, OR BRING THE PLANT INTO A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID	Revision Status				
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SE00055	0000 64				
Subject:	TEMPORARY REMOVAL OF INSULATION FROM 11 STEAM GENERATOR				
Alias:					
POSRC #:	95-133				
Assoc Doc ID:	ES9300001	Revision To:	0000	Assoc Stat:	C
Ref Doc ID:	1-95-0158	Rev:	0000	Refer Type:	TMOD
				Assoc Type:	ESP
					TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS
Sender				Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 064
Text:

REACTOR COOLANT

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES THE TEMPORARY REMOVAL OF UP TO FIVE (5) INSULATION PANELS (90 . 6 FT-(SQUARED)) FROM 11 STEAM GENERATOR (SG) WITH UNIT 1 OPERATION IN MODES 3, 4, 5, 6 AND DEFUELED. THE LOCATION OF INSULATION REMOVAL IS IN THE REGION OF THE SG TRANSITION WELDS. ESFAS AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM TESTING WILL BE PROHIBITED FOR THE DURATION OF THIS ACTIVITY.

NON DESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION OF THE TRANSITION REGION OF 11 SG IS REQUIRED AND SCHEDULED FOR PERFORMANCE DURING THE UNIT 1 1996 REFUELING OUTAGE. THIS ACTIVITY WILL BE PERFORMED FOR INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE PLANNING PURPOSES TO DETERMINE THE CONDITION OF EXISTING INSULATION PANELS AND TO ASSESS THE FEASIBILITY OF REMOVING PANELS IN THIS AREA WITHOUT AFFECTING ADJACENT PANELS. THIS ACTIVITY WILL ONLY BE PERFORMED IF UNIT 1 IS FORCED INTO AN OUTAGE PRIOR TO THE 1996 SPRING REFUELING OUTAGE FOR REASONS OTHER THAN THIS ACTIVITY.

THIS EVALUATION DEMONSTRATES THAT THE ABILITY OF 11 SG TO PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUNCTION IS NOT COMPROMISED BY THE INSULATION REMOVAL. THE PROBABILITY OF THERMAL SHOCK TO 11 SG (DUE TO INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION) HAS BEEN EVALUATED. IN ADDITION, THERE IS SUFFICIENT CONTAINMENT COOLING AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THIS PLANNED ACTIVITY SUCH THAT THE ADDITIONAL HEAT LOAD CREATED BY THE REMOVAL OF THE SPECIFIED INSULATION WILL NOT IMPACT THE FUNCTION OF OTHER SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.
(CMH)

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Search Process Adhoc Report
10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

01/22/1997
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10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00056 64

Subject: SITE DRAWINGS UFSAR FIGURES 1-1 AND 1-2 (TRANSPORTATION FACILITY, NOF PARKING LOTS, CHEMISTRY ANALYTICAL SERVICES STRUCTURE)

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-017

Assoc Doc ID: 61502SH0001
61502SH0002
ES199502040Revision To: 0012
0005
0000Assoc Stat: C
C
CAssoc Type: BGEDRWG
BGEDRWG
ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 102

PLANT AREAS

Text:

SUMMARY (FOR WRC REPORT)

UPDATED UFSAR FIGURES 1 - 1, SITE PLAN, AND 1 2, PLANT PROPERTY AND BUILDINGS SHOW LOCATIONS OF ADDED OR REPLACED SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURES AND CURRENT USES OF EXISTING SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURES. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT A USQ BECAUSE THE ADDED FACILITIES HAVE BEEN ANALYZED AND SHOWN NOT TO BE A USQ BY PREVIOUS 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS, OR ARE FAR ENOUGH AWAY FROM THE PLANT AND NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED TO ANY SYSTEMS USED TO PROTECT THE PLANT FROM ANY DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00057 64

Subject: SPARE THE EXISTING 4/0 POWER CABLE TO THE 21 PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR AND CONNECT A NEW 350 MCM POWER CABLE BETWEEN BREAKER 52 - 2423 AND THE EXISTING 21 PAC.

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-009

Assoc Doc ID: 89-0173-08
Ref Doc ID:Revision To: 0000
Rev:Assoc Stat: C
Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: 2MB423 21 PA COMP MTR

Org/Div:

System Code: 019 COMPRESSED AIR

Text: THIS ACTIVITY DISCONNECTS AND SPARES IN PLACE THE EXISTING 4/0 POWER CABLE TO THE 21 PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR, (PAC) AND CONNECTS IN ITS PLACE A NEW 350 MCM POWER CABLE. THE 350 MCM CABLE USES INSULATION AND JACKET MATERIALS WHICH ARE APPROVED FOR USE AT CCNPP AND IS PROPERLY RATED FOR VOLTAGE AND AMPACITY. THIS ACTIVITY IS IN PREPARATION TO REPLACE THE EXISTING 21 PAC (125 HP MOTOR) WITH A NEW 21 PAC (200 HP MOTOR) WHICH REQUIRES A 350 MCM POWER CABLE. UPON COMPLETION OF THE CABLE REPLACEMENT, THE 350 MCM POWER CABLE WILL CONNECT BREAKER 52 -24 23 TO THE EXISTING 21 PAC (125 HP MOTOR). THIS CABLE REPLACEMENT DOES NOT INVOLVE A UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID	Revision	Status
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SE00058 0000 64

Subject: THIS ACTIVITY EVALUATES DISABLING #12 HOT LEG RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR (RTD) FOR CHANNEL D OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS).

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-140

Assoc Doc ID: ES9300001

Ref Doc ID: 1-95-0163

Revision To: 0000	Assoc Stat: C	Assoc Type: ESP
Rev: 0000	Refer Type: TMOD	TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: 1TE122HD 12A RC T-HOT ELMNT

Org/Div:

System Code: 058 REACTOR PROTECTIVE

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY EVALUATES DISABLING A PRIMARY SYSTEM RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR (RTD) INPUT TO THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS). THE SYSTEM AVERAGES THE TEMPERATURE OF THE 11 AND 12 HOT LEG RTD'S FOR FOUR DIFFERENT CHANNELS. THIS ACTIVITY REMOVES ONE RTD FROM ONE OF THE CHANNELS SO THAT THREE OF THE CHANNELS WILL STILL HAVE A T (HOT) AVERAGE (TWO INPUTS) AND ONE CHANNEL WILL HAVE A SINGLE T (HOT) INPUT. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, THE OUTPUT OF THE TEMPERATURE TRANSMITTER INTO RPS WILL BE DISABLED. THIS WILL ALLOW THE LOOP INDICATIONS TO BE UNAFFECTED. THIS ACTIVITY WILL MAINTAIN FOUR OPERABLE RPS CHANNELS AND TWO OPERABLE SUB COOLED MARGIN MONITORS (SCMM).

THE FUNCTION OF RPS WILL BE UNAFFECTED BECAUSE THE TWO HOT LEGS ARE AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TEMPERATURE, THEREFORE SYMMETRICAL EVENTS WILL BE DETECTED BY THE SINGLE RTD. THERE ARE NO ASYMMETRICAL EVENTS THAT RELY ON T (HOT) INPUTS TO TRIP THE REACTOR.

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

BASED ON THE ABOVE EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR, NOR DOES IT CREATE A NEW TYPE OF ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION NOT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
(CMH)

Document ID	Revision Status								
SE00059	0000	64							
Subject:	SAFETY EVALUATION FROM ES 1995 00 930 ALLOWS CHANGE TO UFSAR FIGURE 10A.6								
Alias:									
POSRC #:	95-143								
Assoc Doc ID:	ES199501454-000		Revision To:	0000	Assoc Stat:	C	Assoc Type:	ESP	
Ref Doc ID:									

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 028

AUXILIARY STEAM

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REVISES THE PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE RATINGS OF A PORTION OF AUXILIARY BOILER DRAIN PIPING. IN SUPPORT OF THIS CHANGE THIS ACTIVITY REVISES UFSAR FIGURE 10 . 6 WHICH IS THE SIMPLIFIED P & ID OF THE AUXILIARY

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

BOILER SYSTEM. IN THIS FIGURE A PIPING SPEC CHANGE BOUNDARY BETWEEN GB - 7 AND HB - 16 PIPING WILL BE MOVED. THE BOUNDARY IS CURRENTLY LOCATED AT A NORMALLY OPEN DRAIN VALVE OFF OF THE AUXILIARY BOILER HEADER, AND IS BEING MOVED TO STEAM TRAP 0 ST 1E55 WHICH IS DOWNSTREAM OF THIS VALVE.

THIS ACTIVITY IS IN RESPONSE TO RESEARCH DONE FOR ISSURE REPORT IRO 055 308 WHICH IDENTIFIED THAT THE PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE RATINGS FOR A PORTION OF AUXILIARY BOILER DRAIN PIPING WAS GREATER THAN THAT SPECIFIED BY DESIGN DRAWING M 601. SPECIFICALLY, THE PIPING IN QUESTION IS CURRENTLY DESIGNATED AS HB 16 PIPING (FULL VACUUM, 104 DEGREES F) WHILE THE ACTUAL CONDITIONS ARE CLOSER TO GB 7 RATINGS (225 PSIG, 380 DEGREES F). THE PIPING IN QUESTION WAS EVALUATED AND FOUND ACCEPTABLE FOR THE HIGER RATINGS, SINCE THE PIPING IS FULLY QUALIFIED FOR THE NEW PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE RATINGS THE PROBABILITY OF MALFUNCTION IS NOT INCREASED. THE PIPING IN QUESTION IS 2" NPS, THE ENERGY RELEASE FROM THIS LINE SIZE IS ENVELOPED BY PREVIOUS HELB ANALYSES; THEREFORE, THE CONSEQUENCES OF A PIPE BREAK ARE NOT INCREASED, AND WILL NOT LEAD TO A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. SINCE THE AUXILIARY BOILER SYSTEM IS NOT USED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT, AND ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BRING THE PLANT INTO SAFE SHUTDOWN THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT IS NOT INCREASED. FINALLY, SINCE THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CHANGE THE OPERATION OF THE AUXILIARY BOILER SYSTEM, AND ALL PIPING DESIGN REQUIREMENTS ARE MET, NO NEW TYPE OF FAILURE MODE IS CREATED. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status
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SE00061 0000 64

Subject: THIS ACTIVITY MODIFIES NON SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES (FRV'S).

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-004

Assoc Doc ID: ES199500963-000

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 045

FEEDWATER

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY MODIFIES NON SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FRV ACTUATORS FAIL AS IS FEATURE TO ALLEVIATE MAINTENANCE CONCERNS. SPECIFICALLY, THE FRV ACTUATOR LOCKING SOLENOID VALVES ARE REPLACED WITH AIR ACTUATED SPRING RETURN BALL VALVES CONTROLLED BY A 3 WAY SV.

THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND SHOWN TO HAVE NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE FRV ACTUATORS OR THE FRV'S THEMSELVES. IN ADDITION, SINCE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE FRV'S ARE MAINTAINED, THE OVERALL FUNCTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE FEED-WATER CONTROL AND INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEMS ARE NOT AFFECTED. THIS MODIFICATION IS ACCOMPLISHED IN A MANNER THAT ENSURES NO IMPACT ON COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THOSE DIRECTLY AFFECTED. THE NEW CONFIGURATION POSES NO NEW FAILURE MODES. BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT REDUCED.

THIS EVALUATION HAS BEEN PREPARED BECAUSE SAR FIGURES 7 14A AND 7 14B DEPICT THE FRV ACTUATOR BLOCKING SV'S. THESE FIGURES WILL BE REVISED TO SHOW THE MODIFIED CONFIGURATION.
(CMH)

Document ID Revision Status
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SE00062 0000 64

Subject: ESTABLISH FLUSH FLOW PATH THROUGH 22 HPSI PUMP.

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-140 & 95-141

Assoc Doc ID: ES9300001

Ref Doc ID: 2-95-0152

Revision To: 0000

Rev: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type: TMOD

Assoc Type: ESP

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 052
Text:

SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

NRC SUMMARY:

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS TO ALLOW THE FLUSH OF NO. 22 HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION (HPSI) PUMP FROM THE NORMAL SUCTION FLOW PATH. A SECTION OF THE PUMP'S DOWNSTREAM PIPING HAS BEEN REMOVED AND THE WATER FROM NO. 21 REFUELING WATER TANK (RWT) WILL BE GRAVITY DRAINED THROUGH THE PUMP'S DISCHARGE FLANGE. AN APPROPRIATE FLUSH RIG WILL BE ATTACHED TO THE PUMP'S DISCHARGE FLANGE AND WILL DIRECT THE FLUSH WATER TO THE ROOM SUMP. AN OPERATOR WITH DIRECT CONTACT TO THE CONTROL ROOM WILL BE STATIONED AT THE PUMP'S INLET ISOLATION VALVE TO STOP THE FLUSH SHOULD THE SIAS SIGNAL BE ACTUATED OR SHOULD THE LEVEL IN NO. 21 RWT FALL BELOW 462 INCHES OF INDICATED LEVEL (2 LIA 4142 LOW LEVEL ALARM SETPOINT). THE AFFECTED ECCS SUBSYSTEM WILL BE INOPERABLE FOR THE DURATION OF THIS FLUSHING ACTIVITY.

THE REASON FOR THIS ACTIVITY IS TO VERIFY THE CLEANLINESS OF NO. 22 HPSI PUMP INTERNALS. RECENT PROBLEMS WITH DEBRIS IN THE PUMP'S MINIFLOW LINE HAS MADE THE PUMP'S MINIFLOW LINE HAS MADE THE PUMP'S CLEANLINESS SUSPECT. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE CH 1 102. SYSTEMS CLEANLINESS, FLUSHING SHOULD BE PERFORMED WITH GRADE A FLUSH WATER. BECAUSE THIS QUALITY OF WATER IS NOT READILY AVAILABLE, A WAIVER WILL BE OBTAINED TO ALLOW THE USE OF SYSTEM WATER TO PERFORM THE FLUSH. THE SI SYSTEM IS EXPLICITLY SHOWN IN UFSAR FIGURE 6 - 10. THIS SAFETY EVALUATION IS BEING PERFORMED BECAUSE THE SYSTEM AS SHOWN IN THIS FIGURE IS BEING TEMPORARILY ALTERED.

THE REFUELING WATER TANK LEVEL WILL BE MAINTAINED AT OR ABOVE ITS MINIMUM LEVEL BY HAVING AN OPERATOR WHO IS IN CONTACT WITH THE CONTROL ROOM STATIONED AT NO. 22 HPSI PUMP INLET ISOLATION VALVE. SHOULD A SIAS BE RECEIVED OR THE TANK LEVEL DROP TO UNACCEPTABLE LEVELS, THE FLUSH WILL BE TERMINATED. THEREFORE WE ARE NOT AFFECTING THE OPERABILITY OF THIS SYSTEM AND THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR IS NOT INCREASED. ALSO, THE EXISTING MALFUNCTIONS ARE BOUNDING AND THE SYSTEM IS NOT AN ACCIDENT INITIATOR. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAR IS NOT CREATED. THERE IS NO EFFECT ON OFFSITE DOSE CONSEQUENCES DUE TO THIS ACTIVITY AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY, AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT AFFECTED. THEREFORE, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUBJECT ACTIVITY.
(CMH)

NUCLEIS
Search Process Adhoc Report
10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00063 0000 64

Subject: REPLACE RMS RECORDERS

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-011

Assoc Doc ID: 91-0251
91-0251-001Revision To: 00000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: FCR
0000 C ESP

Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date
=====

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: ORR11 AREA RAD MONITORING REC
ORR12 RE AREA RAD COMMON SENSE
1RR11 1 RE AREA RADN MON RECORD
1RR12 RE AREA RAD MON RECORDER
2RR21 2 RE AREA RADN MON RECORD
2RR22 RE AREA RAD PROCESS MON R

Org/Div:

System Code: 077 AREA RADIATION MONITORING

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES RMS RECORDERS 0 RR 11, 1 RR 11 AND 1 RR 21 WITH
WESTRONICS MODEL 3200 SERIES RECORDERS. RECORDER POINTS ARE CONSOLIDATED ON

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

THE NEW RECORDERS TO ALLOW THE REMOVAL OF RECORDERS 0 RR 12, 1 RR 12 AND 2 RR 22. FINALLY, SR 1E ISOLATORS ARE INSTALLED TO PROVIDE SEPARATION BETWEEN THE SR CONTAINMENT AREA MONITORS AND THE RECORDERS, WHICH ARE DOWNGRADED TO THIS ACTIVITY.

THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND SHOWN TO HAVE NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE RMS RECORDERS. IN ADDITION, SINCE THE FUNCTION OF THE RECORDERS AND ALL OTHER MONITORS ARE MAINTAINED, THE OVERALL FUNCTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE RMS IS NOT AFFECTED. THIS MODIFICATION IS ACCOMPLISHED IN A MANNER THAT ENSURES NO IMPACT ON COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THOSE DIRECTLY AFFECTED. SEISMIC CRITERIA FOR THE CONTROL ROOM PANELS IS ALSO MAINTAINED. THE NEW CONFIGURATION POSES NO NEW SIGNIFICANT FAILURES MODES. BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

THIS EVALUATION HAS BEEN PREPARED BECAUSE SAR SECTION 7.5.8 LISTS AS A CATEGORY 3 VARIABLE; "PLANT RELEASE POINTS RADIATION" WITH 1 R 12 AND 2 R 12 PROVIDING PART OF THE INDICATION. THIS TEXT WILL BE REVISED TO SHOW THE MODIFIED CONFIGURATION, USING 1 RR 11 AND 2 RR 21 AS REPLACEMENTS.
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00064 0000 64

Subject: REPLACE 480V TRANSFORMERS U-440-11A AND U-440-15

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-011

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501405-001

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender

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Xmtl #

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Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Org/Div:
System Code: 102
Text:

PLANT AREAS

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES CLASS 1E UNIT SERVICE TRANSFORMER U 440 11A AND NSR UNIT SERVICE TRANSFORMER U 440 15. THE REPLACEMENT TRANSFORMER FOR U 440 11A IS A CLASS 1E, SEISMIC CLASS 1 TRANSFORMER. THE REPLACEMENT TRANSFORMER FOR U 440 15 IS AN INDUSTRIAL GRADE TRANSFORMER. BOTH NEW TRANSFORMERS HAVE THE SAME ELECTRICAL RATING AS THE OLD TRANSFORMERS. THE OLD TRANSFORMERS ARE OIL FILLED, SELF COOLED AND THE NEW TRANSFORMERS ARE DRY TYPE, SELF COOLED. THE SAR DESCRIPTION IS BEING REVISED TO REFLECT THIS CHANGE IN TRANSFORMER COOLING METHOD. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT REQUIRE A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE AND IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00069 0000 64

Subject: INCREASE THE LEVEL 1 BISTABLE SETPOINT

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-027

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501755-000

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 058

REACTOR PROTECTIVE

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THIS MODIFICATION IMPROVES THE ACCURACY OF THE LEVEL 1 BISTABLE BY MOVING THE INPUT OF THE LEVEL 1 BISTABLE FROM A POINT UPSTREAM OF THE NUCLEAR CALIBRATE POTENTIOMETER TO A POINT DOWNSTREAM OF THE POTENTIOMETER (THIS CHANGE PROVIDES DAILY CALIBRATION). THIS MODIFICATION ALSO REVISES THE LEVEL 1 BISTABLE SETPOINT FROM 13% TO 14% TO GIVE THE OPERATOR MORE MARGIN TO THE LOSS OF LOAD TRIP ENABLE SETPOINT WHEN BRINGING THE TURBINE ON LINE DURING START UP (WHILE MAINTAINING SUFFICIENT MARGIN TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMIT OF 15% POWER). A REVIEW OF THE SAR AND UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONCLUDED THAT THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES REMAIN VALID AND NO REVISIONS OF THE SAR ARE REQUIRED.

IT IS ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE MODIFICATION TO THE LEVEL 1 BISTABLE DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION SINCE IT IMPROVES THE BISTABLE ACCURACY, THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE BISTABLE IS NOT CHANGED, AND THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION MARGIN OF SAFETY IS NOT REDUCED.

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00070 0000 64

Subject: INCREASE HOT LEG RTD TIME CONSTANT TO 25 SECONDS

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-009

Assoc Doc ID: CA01085
ES199502084-000Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: DCALC
0000 C ESP

Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date
=====Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

System Code:
Text:

THIS ACTIVITY INCREASES THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE HOT LEG EFFECTIVE TIME CONSTANT FROM 12 SECONDS TO 25 SECONDS. THIS ACTIVITY ALSO SUPPORTS A SETPOINT CHANGE WHICH INCREASES THE TOTAL TIME CONSTANT OF THE HOT LEG RTD LAG MODULES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE NEW ANALYSIS VALUE. IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE TIME CONSTANT OF THE LAG MODULES, RESISTANCE COEFFICIENTS WILL BE INSTALLED ON THE EXISTING LAG MODULES. THE IMPACT OF A LONGER RESPONSE TIME HAS BEEN EVALUATED FOR ITS IMPACT ON THE SAFETY ANALYSIS. A RE-ANALYSIS OF THE EXCESS LOAD EVENT DEMONSTRATES THAT THE INSTALLED THERMAL MARGIN PRESERVED BY THE LCOS AND COLR LIMITS BOUNDS THE ROM FOR THE RE-EVALUATED EXCESS LOAD EVENT. ADDITIONALLY, THE RESISTANCE COEFFICIENTS TO BE INSTALLED ON THE HOT LEG LAG MODULES HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO MEET THE SAME QUALITY REQUIREMENTS AS THE ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT. THEREFORE, THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONCLUDES THAT THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00072 0000 64

Subject: 50.59 TO ALLOW PROCESSING OF LIQUID WASTE IN THE MPF

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-010

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501461-000

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 102

Text:

PLANT AREAS

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY EVALUATES THE PROCESSING OF LIQUID WASTE IN DECONTAMINATION AREA OF THE MATERIALS PROCESSING FACILITY (MPF) IN PREPARATION FOR OFFSITE SHIPMENT. THE VOLUME OF LIQUID WASTE IN THE MPF WILL BE LIMITED TO TWO 55 GALLON DRUMS (ONE BEING PROCESSED AND ONE STAGE FOR PROCESSING).

PERIODICALLY, LIMITED QUANTITIES OF LIQUID WASTE, INCLUDING MIXED WASTE, MUST BE PROCESSED IN PREPARATION FOR OFFSITE SHIPMENT. CURRENTLY, THIS PROCESSING MUST BE DONE IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING. IN ORDER TO REMOVE THIS PROCESSING ACTIVITY FROM THE AUXILIARY BUILDING, THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN EVALUTED TO DEMONSTRATE THE ACCEPTABILITY OF PROCESSING LIMITED QUANTITIES OF LIQUID WASTE IN THE MPF.

THE INITIAL BATCH LIQUID WASTES TO BE PROCESSED IN THE MPF WILL BE PROCESSED TO COMPLY WITH THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE STATE

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OF MARYLAND AND BGE, DATED MARCH 28, 1995. THIS MEMORANDUM REQUIRES BGE TO MAKE GOOD EFFORTS TO DISPOSE OF MIXED WASTE WITHIN THE SHORTEST TIME FRAME POSSIBLE AFTER GENERATION.

WHEN REQUIRED, SUBSEQUENT BATCHES OF LIQUID WASTES WILL BE PROCESSED IN THE MPF. THE QUANTITY OF THIS LIQUID WASTE WILL BE LIMITED SO THAT CURIE CONTENT AND BTU CONTENT WILL BE WITHIN THE EVALUATED LIMITS.

THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.
(CMH)

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00073 64

Subject: SIDE STREAM MONITOR - SW / SRWHX

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-033

Assoc Doc ID: ES9300001
Ref Doc ID: 2-96-0007Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP
Rev: 0 Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 102
Text:

PLANT AREAS

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION REVIEWS A TEMPORARY ALTERATION TO ALLOW THE SIDE STREAM MONITOR TO BE PLACED IN THE UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM. THE SIDE STREAM MONITOR MEASURES THE FOULING OF THE SERVICE WATER HEAT EXCHANGER TUBES. THE CURRENT LOCATION IS FAR REMOVED FROM THE HEAT EXCHANGERS AND THE RELOCATION MAY PROVIDE MORE ACCURATE FOULING MEASUREMENT.

THE TA AND ASSOCIATED PIPING ARE INSTALLED AS SAFETY RELATED - PRESSURE BOUNDARY AND MEET THE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR THE EXISTING PIPING SYSTEM. THE CONNECTIONS TO THE EXISTING SYSTEM HAVE BEEN REVIEWED FOR ALL POSSIBLE DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND HAVE BEEN DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABLE. THE ELECTRICAL POWER IS PROVIDED BY A NON SAFETY RELATED WELDING RECEPTACLE. THE MONITOR HAS NO INTERACTION WITH ANY OTHER SYSTEM OR EQUIPMENT WHICH IS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE RESULTS OF THE FLOODING ANALYSIS OR SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSES. THE BYPASS OF THE MAXIMUM SSM FLOW (20 GPM) HAS BEEN REVIEWED AGAINST THE POSSIBLE POST ACCIDENT SCENARIOS AND DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABLE. THE SSM CAN BE MANUALLY ISOLATED IN THE EVENT OF A PIPING OR HOSE FAILURE. THEREFORE, THE INSTALLATION OF THE SIDE STREAM MONITOR IN THE UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM IS ACCEPTABLE AND DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION, NOR DOES IT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DISCUSSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND THEIR BASES.
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00075 0000 64

Subject: ALLOW USE OF TEMPORARY SWITCHES FOR FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM INTERLOCKS

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-037

Assoc Doc ID: ES9300001

Ref Doc ID: 1-95-0141

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type: TMOD

Assoc Type: ESP

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 070

REFUELING POOL

Text:

THIS ACTIVITY CONSISTS OF A TEMPORARY ALTERATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE A CONTINGENCY FOR FAILED LIMIT SWITCHES ON THE FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM. IN PREVIOUS OUTAGES, SWITCH FAILURES HAVE CAUSED DELAYS IN FUEL MOVEMENT SINCE THE SWITCHES PROVIDE VARIOUS CONTROL FUNCTIONS. MANUAL TEMPORARY SWITCHES WILL BE USED TO PERFORM THE FUNCTION OF EACH OF THE LIMIT SWITCHES SHOULD ONE OF THE LIMIT SWITCHES FAIL. IN THIS MANNER, THE ASSOCIATED INTERLOCK WILL BE IN PLACE UNTIL THE OPERATOR CONSCIOUSLY OVERRIDES IT WITH THE SWITCH. THE SWITCH IS DESIGNED SUCH THAT THE OPERATOR MUST CONTINUALLY DEPRESS THE SWITCH TO SATISFY THE INTERLOCK.

THE OPERATION OF THE SWITCH WILL BE CONTROLLED BY THE SYSTEM OPERATING INSTRUCTION. THE OPERATING INSTRUCTION WILL BE CHANGED TO ENSURE THAT THE MANUAL TEMPORARY SWITCH IS OPERATED ONLY AFTER VISUAL VERIFICATION THAT THE EQUIPMENT IS IN THE PROPER POSITION. ADDITIONALLY, THE OPERATOR WILL VERIFY THAT HYDRAULIC PRESSURE CHANGES ARE CONSISTENT WITH FULL VERTICAL OR HORIZONTAL POSITION. SINCE THE OPERATOR WILL ENSURE THAT THE INTERLOCK IS SATISFIED, THE PROBABILITY OF A FUEL HANDLING MALFUNCTION IS NOT AFFECTED. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SG

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00076 0000 64

Subject: WRNI PDIL CIRCUIT SETPOINT CHANGE AND RELOCATION OF SUR ENABLE ANNUNCIATOR SIGNAL

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-018

Assoc Doc ID: ES199502281-000

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:	1NI001	WRNI CHANNEL A
	1NI002	WRNI CHANNEL B
	1NI003	WRNI CHANNEL C
	1NI004	WRNI CHANNEL D

Org/Div:

System Code: 078

NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

RAISING THE SETPOINT FOR THE WRNI CHANNELS A, B, C AND D FOR THE FLUX TRIP 2 (FT2) BISTABLE WILL DELAY ENABLING THE PDIL CIRCUIT UNTIL START UP HAS ACHIEVED A STABLE CRITICAL CONDITION. ALSO, RELOCATION THE START UP RATE (SUR) ANNUNCIATION CIRCUIT FROM FT2 TO FT1 BISTABLE IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SETPOINT FOR THE SUR ANNUNCIATION CIRCUIT. THE FUNCTION OF THE SUR CIRCUIT WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. IMPLEMENTING THIS ACTIVITY. IMPLEMENTING THIS ACTIVITY WILL PREVENT EXCESSIVE ALARMS WHICH DISTRACT THE OPERATORS FROM START UP ACTIVITIES.
(CMH)

Document ID Revision Status
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SE00076 0001 62
Subject: UNIT 2 WRNI PDIL SETPOINT CHANGE

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-113

Assoc Doc ID: ES199502281-001
Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP
Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date
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10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: 2N1001 2 NI WIDE RANGE LOG POWER
2N1002 2 NI WIDE RANGE LOG PWR CH B NI
2N1003 2 NI MIS WIDE RANGE LOG PWR INDIC CH C
2N1004 2 NI WIDE RANGE LOG POWER

Org/Div:

System Code: 078

Text:

NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION

RAISING THE SETPOINT FOR THE WRN1 CHANNELS A, B, C, AND D FOR THE FLUX TRIP 2 (FT2) BISTABLE WILL DELAY ENABLING THE PDIL CIRCUIT UNTIL START-UP HAS ACHIEVED A STABLE CRITICAL CONDITION. ALSO, RELOCATING THE START-UP RATE (SUR) ANNUNCIATION / ENABLE CIRCUIT FROM FT2 TO FT1 BISTABLE IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SETPOINT FOR THE SUR ANNUNCIATION / ENABLE CIRCUIT. THE FUNCTION OF THE SUR CIRCUIT WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. IMPLEMENTING THIS ACTIVITY WILL PREVENT EXCESSIVE ALARMS WHICH DISTRACT THE OPERATORS FROM START-UP ACTIVITIES.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00077 64

Subject: CHANGE EOC MTC TO -3.0

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-015

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501532-000

Ref Doc ID: 50.59

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type: RL

Assoc Type: ESP

RECORDS LIST

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

Text:

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERED THE PROPOSED CHANGE TO THE MOST NEGATIVE MTC COLOR LIMIT FOR UNIT 1 CYCLE 12 AND UNIT 2 CYCLE 11 ALONG WITH OTHER NEW CHANGES. A REVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 14 SAFETY ANALYSIS REVEALED THAT THE FOLLOWING EVENTS REQUIRED CONSIDERATION:

1. REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DEPRESSURIZATION
2. EXCESS LOAD EVENT (HFP)
3. EXCESS LOAD EVENT (H2P)
4. CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY DROP EVENT
5. EXCESS FEEDWATER HEAT REMOVAL
6. ASYMMETRIC STEAM GENERATOR EVENT
7. MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK

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8. STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE

SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS / EVALUATIONS CONCLUDED THAT CURRENT UFSAR RESULTS (DNB AND LHR S A F D L's, PEAK RCS PRESSURE, AND OFFSITE DOSES) REMAIN VALID AND THAT NO CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AND COLR LIMITS, OTHER THAN THE CHANGE OF THE MOST NEGATIVE MTC LIMIT, WERE REQUIRED.

IN ADDITION TO THE CHAPTER 14 EVENTS, AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGES ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE BORIC ACID STORAGE TANK WAS PERFORMED. THAT ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE PRESENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONTINUE TO YIELD ACCEPTABLE RESULTS. THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGES ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE REFUELING WATER TANK WAS REVIEWED. THAT REVIEW CONCLUDED THAT THE PRESENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONTINUE TO YIELD ACCEPTABLE RESULTS.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE RESULTS AND A THOROUGH EVALUATION OF THE QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO A NEGATIVE 50.59 FINDING, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THE MTC AND OTHER NEW CHANGES (I.E., THOSE NOT PREVIOUSLY APPROVED) DO NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00079 0000 64

Subject: ALLOW THE USE OF RCP SHAFT CLAMP

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-022

Assoc Doc ID: ES199600287-000

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 064

REACTOR COOLANT

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

ESP ES 1996 00 287 INSTALLS CLAMPS TO RESTRAIN THE RCP SHAFT IN ORDER TO FACILITATE REMOVAL OF THE RCP MOTOR IN MODES 5 & 6. THE ACTIVITY IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO RESTRAIN THE SHAFT AGAINST AXIAL MOTION THAT WILL OTHERWISE OCCUR ON REMOVAL OF THE MOTOR WITH THE RCS PRESSURIZED. AXIAL MOTION WILL RESULT IN SEAL DAMAGE AND COULD RESULT IN A BREACH OF THE RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY.

THE CLAMPS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED FOR A THRUST LOAD CORRESPONDING TO AN RCS PRESSURE OF 500 PSI CONCURRENT WITH THE DESIGN BASIS SEISMIC EVENT. THE ANALYSIS PROVIDES QUALIFICATION OF THE CLAMP COMPONENTS AS WELL AS THE PUMP COMPONENTS TO WHICH THE CLAMPS ARE ATTACHED. CLAMP MATERIALS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CODE OF RECORD, ASME B & PV SECTION III SUBSECTION NF, AND STRESS INTENSITIES ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVISION 1 OF THE SAME CODE. STRESSES ARE CONSERVATIVELY LIMITED TO S (M) VALUES RATHER THAN AISC BASED ALLOWABLES TO RECOGNIZE THAT FAILURE OF THE CLAMPS REPRESENTS A DIRECT BREACH OF THE RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY RATHER THAN AN INDIRECT BREACH IN THE CASE OF NORMAL SUPPORTS FOR CLASS 1 SYSTEMS.

SAFETY EVALUATION SE 000 79 CONCLUDES THAT THE ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ). EXISTING ACCIDENTS ANALYZED IN THE SAR ARE NOT

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AFFECTED, AND NO NEW ACCIDENT CONDITIONS ARE INTRODUCED. THE ACTIVITY DOES
NOT VIOLATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.
(CMH)

Document ID Revision Status
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SE00080	0000	64
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Subject: TEMP ALT 1 - 96 - 0014

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-022

Assoc Doc ID: 61176SH0003

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0012

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: BGEDRWG

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 102

Text:

PLANT AREAS

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY TEMPORARILY RE POWERS THE #11 CONTROL ROOM HVAC COMPRESSOR FROM
480 VOLT BUS 11B WHILE BUS 11A IS OUT OF SERVICE. TEMPORARY POWER AND CONTROL
CABLES ARE INSTALLED SUCH THAT THE POWER SOURCE AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS ARE
UNCHANGED. THE INSTALLATION MEETS DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRICAL

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SEPARATION AND SEISMIC CRITERIA AND ELECTRICAL LOADING WAS REVIEWED SUCH THAT THE DESIGN FUNCTION OF THE CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM IS UNCHANGED. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT REQUIRE A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE AND IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
(CMH)

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10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00083 0000 64
Subject: PROTECTIVE TRIPS FOR DG 1A - RECONCILIATION

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-028

Assoc Doc ID: 89-0079

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: FCR

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 024

Text:

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

NRG SUMMARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION UPDATES INFORMATION REGARDING DIESEL GENERATOR PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS PROVIDED IN THE "DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT SACM DIESEL GENERATOR AND MECHANICAL DESIGN REPORT". THE DESIGN REPORT STATES THAT A "HIGH LT COOLANT TEMPERATURE" TRIP EXISTS AS PROTECTIVE FUNCTION; HOWEVER, IT IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE DESIGN. ADDITIONALLY THE DESIGN REPORT DOES NOT INCLUDE "EXHAUST GAS TEMPERATURE (HIGH)," "HT COOLANT TEMPERATURE, HIGH-HIGH," "LVDT FAILURE," "LOAD SHARING CONTROL FAILURE," AND "ELECTRONIC GOVERNOR 24 VDC POWER SUPPLY FAILURE" PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS WHICH DO EXIST IN THE ACTUAL DESIGN.

THE VARIOUS PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS FOR THE DIESEL GENERATORS PROTECT THE DIESEL GENERATORS FROM SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE AND AID IN THE DIAGNOSIS AND IDENTIFICATION OF ROOT CAUSES FOR MALFUNCTIONS OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR. CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDANCE IN REGULATORY GUIDE 1.9, DRAFT REVISION 3 DATED APRIL 1992, BYPASSING OF SOME OF THESE PROTECTIVE TRIPS HAS BEEN PROVIDED IN ORDER TO PREVENT SPURIOUS OPERATION OF A TRIP CIRCUIT FROM PREVENTING THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FROM PERFORMING ITS FUNCTION. THE "EXHAUST GAS TEMPERATURE (HIGH)," "HT COOLANT TEMPERATURE, HIGH-HIGH," "LVDT FAILURE," "LOAD SHARING CONTROL FAILURE," AND "ELECTRONIC GOVERNOR 24 VDC

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POWER SUPPLY FAILURE" PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS ARE BYPASSED UPON A SIAS, BUS UNDERVOLTAGE, OR MANUAL EMERGENCY START SIGNAL AND THUS DO NOT INTERFERE WITH DIESEL OPERATION DURING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS. THE CIRCUITS AND COMPONENTS RELATED TO THESE PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS ARE SAFETY RELATED, ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE USED FOR THE OTHER PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS PROVIDED, AND ARE BYPASSED IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO THOSE USED FOR THE OTHER PROTECTIVE TRIPS NOT RETAINED UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

ALTHOUGH SHUTDOWN OF THE DIESEL ON HIGH LT COOLING WATER TEMPERATURE IS NOT PROVIDED, AN ALARM AND INDICATION OF HIGH LT COOLING WATER TEMPERATURE IS PROVIDED TO THE OPERATOR AND CAN AID IN THE DIAGNOSIS AND IDENTIFICATION OF ROOT CAUSES OF MALFUNCTIONS OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR. OTHER PROTECTIVE TRIPS EXIST WHICH PROTECT DIESEL COMPONENTS AGAINST EFFECTS WHICH CAN RESULT FROM ELEVATED LT COOLANT TEMPERATURES.

THEREFORE THE PROBABILITY OF MALFUNCTIONS OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY IS NOT INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY. SINCE THE "EXHAUST GAS TEMPERATURE (HIGH)," " HT COOLANT TEMPERATURE, HIGH-HIGH," "LVDT FAILURE," "LOAD SHARING CONTROL FAILURE," AND "ELECTRONIC GOVERNOR 24 VDC POWER SUPPLY FAILURE" PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS ARE BYPASSED DURING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, THEY DO NOT AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS.

AS THIS ACTIVITY ONLY AFFECTS THE PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS DISABLED DURING EMERGENCY OPERATION OF DG 1A, WHICH IS AN ACCIDENT MITIGATOR AND NOT AN ACCIDENT INITIATOR, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT.

NO NEW SYSTEM INTERACTIONS ARE CREATED AS THIS ACTIVITY IS SPECIFIC TO THE DG 1A SYSTEM ONLY. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW ACCIDENTS AND MALFUNCTIONS IS NOT CREATED.

THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DISCUSS THE NUMBER OF REQUIRED EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT SHUTDOWN AND OPERATING CONDITIONS. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT THE NUMBER OF DIESEL GENERATORS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT PLANT OPERATIONS. THEREFORE THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN AS EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00084 0000 64

Subject: EXTEND UNIT 1 CYCLE 12 TO 21 G W D / M T U

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-028

Assoc Doc ID: ES199600378-000

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 084

REACTOR VESSEL INTERNAL

Text: EXTEND UNIT 1 CYCLE 12 TO 21 G W D / M T U

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

PREVIOUS SAFETY ANALYSES ASSUMED AN END OF CYCLE BURNUP OF 20 434 MWD/T
DUE TO DELAYING START OF REFUELING OUTAGE, THE PROJECTED EOC IS NOW BETWEEN
20 434 AND 21 000 MWD/T.

Document ID Revision Status
===== =====
SE00085 0000 64
Subject: TEMPERATURE CHANGE IN DG 1A BUILDING SWGR ROOMS

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-037

Assoc Doc ID: 89-0079 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: FCR
Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 024

Text: EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY ALLOWS THE MINIMUM INTERIOR DESIGN TEMPERATURE OF THE NON 1E PANEL AND 1E SWITCHGEAR ROOMS TO BE DECREASED FROM 50 DEGREES F TO 32 DEGREES F FOR DG 1A BUILDING HVAC OPERATION IN EMERGENCY MODE DURING DESIGN BASIS WINTER CONDITIONS (I.E., MINIMUM OUTDOOR TEMPERATURES OF 0 DEGREES F). THE TEMPERATURE OF THE ROOM DURING NON EMERGENCY MODE OF HVAC IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. VENDOR DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED, REVIEWED AND APPROVED TO DOCUMENT THAT EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY WILL FUNCTION SATISFACTORILY AT THIS LOWER TEMPERATURE.

A CALCULATION HAS BEEN PERFORMED WHICH SHOWS THAT THE DECREASE IN THE TEMPERATURE OF THE NON 1E PANEL AND 1E SWITCHGEAR ROOMS DOES NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN THE ADJACENT ROOMS AT THEIR EXISTING DESIGN TEMPERATURES. THUS THE EQUIPMENT HOUSED IN ADJACENT ROOMS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY AND WILL FUNCTION AS DESIGNED.

SINCE NO EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY IS LOCATED IN THE NON 1E PANEL ROOM AND EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY LOCATED IN THE 1E SWITCHGEAR ROOM AND ADJACENT ROOMS WILL FUNCTION AS DESIGNED, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ACCIDENTS AND MALFUNCTIONS.

SINCE NO PHYSICAL MODIFICATIONS ARE MADE TO THE PLANT, NO NEW INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SYSTEMS ARE CREATED. IN ADDITION, NO WET PIPING IS LOCATED WITHIN THESE ROOMS, SO THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF PIPE FREEZING. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE THE POTENTIAL FOR CONDENSATION BECAUSE THE VENTILATING AIR BEING HEATED PRIOR TO ENTERING THE ROOMS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH NORMAL AIR MOVEMENT AND EQUIPMENT INTERNAL HEAT GENERATION,

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PREVENTS CONDENSATION FORMATION. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS HAS NOT BEEN CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF DIESEL GENERATORS WILL BE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT PLANT OPERATION AND SHUTDOWN CONSISTENT WITH THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. THUS, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED BY THIS ACTIVITY.
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID	Revision Status
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SE00086	64

Subject: IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVOLUTION METHODOLOGY FOR STEAM LINE BREAK FOR UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 AND UNIT 2 CYCLE 11

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-025

Assoc Doc ID:	CA01335	Revision To:	0000	Assoc Stat:	C	Assoc Type:	DCALC
	CA01336		0000		C		DCALC
	CA01761		0000		C		DCALC
	CA01763		0000		C		DCALC
	ES199502064-000		0000		C		ESP
	ES199502064-001		0000		C		ESP

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 058

Text:

REACTOR PROTECTIVE

THIS 50.59 ADDRESSES THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVOLUTION METHODOLOGY FOR THE STEAM LINE BREAK ANALYSES. FOR UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 AND UNIT 2 CYCLE 11, THE USE OF THE CONVOLUTION METHODOLOGY RESTORES THE LIMITS ON FXY AND FR TO 1.70. IN ADDITION, THIS 50.59 EVALUATES CHANGES TO THE TM/LP AND APD TRIP SETPOINTS AND THE N FACTOR VS FXYT TRADE OFF CURVE.

Document ID	Revision Status
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SE00087 0000 64

Subject: REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ROTATING ASSEMBLY

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-089

Assoc Doc ID: ES199600480-000

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

Text:

THIS ACTIVITY ALLOWS THE USE OF A MODIFIED BYRON JACKSON REACTOR COOLANT PUMP (RCP) ROTATING ASSEMBLY. THE MODIFIED ROTATING ASSEMBLY UTILIZES A WELDED ATTACHMENT VERSUS THE BOLTED IMPELLER TO SHAFT ATTACHMENT IN THE EXISTING ROTATING ASSEMBLY DESIGN. IN PAST INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE, BROKEN CAPSCREWS AND DRIVE PINS (USED TO BOLT THE IMPELLER TO THE SHAFT AND TO TRANSMIT TORQUE TO THE IMPELLER) HAVE BEEN FOUND ON BYRON JACKSON PUMPS, WHICH LED THE COMPANY TO RECOMMEND AN ALTERNATE METHOD OF LOCKING THE CAPSCREWS (VIA LOCKWIRE).

IN 1986, ABNORMAL VIBRATIONS OF 12A RCP WERE NOTICED AND WERE PARTIALLY ATTRIBUTED TO BROKEN AND MISSING LOCKWIRE. FCR 86-162 ADDRESSED THIS PROBLEM BY REPLACING THE CAPSCREWS AND CHANGING FROM LOCKWIRE TO WELDED LOCKING CLIPS. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH FCR 86-162 RESOLVED THE IMMEDIATE CONCERN OF THE BOLTING LOCKWIRE FAILURES, IT DID NOT ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF IMBALANCES DUE TO THE ROTATING BOLTED CONNECTIONS. THIS ACTIVITY ADDRESSES BOTH OF THESE CONCERNS.

NO CHANGES TO THE FUNCTION OF THE PUMP IMPELLER RESULT FROM THIS REPLACEMENT, AND PUMP PERFORMANCE IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

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CHANGES IN SHAFT THRUST ARE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE THRUST BEARING. THUS THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DESIGN FLOW RATE IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

THE MATERIALS USED FOR THE NEW ROTATING ASSEMBLY ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THOSE OF EXISTING RCP COMPONENTS AND ARE SUITABLE FOR USE IN THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT. THE STRENGTH OF THE WELDED ASSEMBLY IS EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN THAT OF THE BOLTED CONNECTION.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT FLOW TO THE SHAFT SEAL. NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE WEIGHT OF THE ROTATING ASSEMBLY RESULT FROM ITS REPLACEMENT, AND THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE RCP IS NOT AFFECTED. THE EXISTING RCP SUPPORTS ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR USE WITH THE MODIFIED RCP. THUS, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY.

THE UFSAR DESCRIBES THE LOSS OF COOLANT FLOW EVENT (ATTRIBUTABLE TO A LOSS OF POWER TO THE RCPS) AND THE SEIZED ROTOR EVENT (ATTRIBUTABLE TO MECHANICAL FAILURE OF THE SHAFT OR A LOSS OF COOLING WATER FLOW TO THE PUMP SEALS) WHICH INVOLVE THE RCPS. THIS ACTIVITY ONLY REPLACES THE ROTATING ASSEMBLY OF THE RCPS AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE SYSTEMS THAT PROVIDE POWER TO OPERATE THE RCPS. THEREFORE, THE PROBABILITY OF A LOSS OF POWER TO THE RCPS IS NOT INCREASED. ADDITIONALLY, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT ADVERSELY IMPACT COOLING TO THE PUMP SHAFT SEALS PROVIDED BY THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM NOR DOES IT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF FAILURE OF THE PUMP SHAFT PUMP IMPELLER INTERFACE, AS THE STRENGTH OF THE WELD IS AS GREAT AS THAT OF THE BOLTED ASSEMBLY. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR.

SINCE THE CHANGE IN THE WEIGHT OF THE PUMP COMPONENTS REPLACED BY THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT THAN THE EXISTING COMPONENTS, THERE WILL NOT BE A SIGNIFICANT AFFECT ON PUMP COAST DOWN. THUS, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CHANGE THE INITIAL CONDITIONS AND INPUT PARAMETERS USED FOR ANALYSIS OF THE ACCIDENT. FURTHERMORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CHANGE THE ASSUMPTIONS USED FOR CALCULATING THE DOSE CONSEQUENCES GIVEN IN THE UFSAR. PLANT COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO INITIATE MITIGATION EQUIPMENT AND PLANT COMPONENTS CREDITED FOR EVENT MITIGATION ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY AS IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE LOW COOLANT FLOW SIGNAL, THE TRIP BREAKERS, OR THE CEAS. THEREFORE, THE CONTROL ROOM AND OFFSITE DOSES ARE NOT AFFECTED, AND THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS.

NO CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE MADE BY THIS ACTIVITY. SINCE THE DESIGN FLOW RATE OF THE RCPS IS NOT CHANGED, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT THE LIMITS FOR THERMAL POWER, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE, OR HIGHEST OPERATING LOOP COLD LEG COOLANT TEMPERATURE AS GIVEN IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CHANGE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NUMBER OF OPERABLE REACTOR COOLANT SHUTDOWN COOLING LOOPS FOR THE APPLICABLE MODES OF OPERATION. ACTIONS CONSISTENT WITH THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WILL BE TAKEN DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME IN WHICH THE RCP SHAFT IMPELLERS ARE BEING REPLACED. THUS, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00088 0000 62
Subject: DG OC TIE IN TO BUS 21

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-128

Assoc Doc ID: 89-0079-60

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

Text:

SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY MODIFIES THE EXISTING ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN ORDER TO CONNECT THE STATION BLACKOUT (SBO) DIESEL GENERATOR, DGOC, TO THE EMERGENCY BUS 21. THIS ACTIVITY ALSO ADDS THE RACEWAY AND CABLES NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THIS PART OF THE PHASE-IN OF THE DGOC.

NEW SSCS ADDED BY THIS ACTIVITY HAVE BEEN EVALUATED TO ENSURE THE EFFECT OF THEIR INSTALLATION (E.G., SEISMIC ADEQUACY OF EXISTING STRUCTURES, HEAT LOADS, CABLE SEPARATION) DO NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS. SSCS ADDED BY THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT BECOME OPERATIONAL UNTIL TESTING IS COMPLETE. EQUIPMENT IDENTIFIED AS INITIATORS OF ACCIDENTS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, THE PROBABILITY OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS HAS NOT BEEN INCREASED.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY BECAUSE EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO SERVE MITIGATION FUNCTIONS UNDER THESE CONDITIONS HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED, AND CONTROL ROOM AND OFFSITE DOSES PREVIOUSLY CALCULATED REMAIN WITHIN THE PREVIOUSLY STATED LIMITS.

BECAUSE NO MODIFICATIONS ARE MADE TO EMERGENCY BUS 24 DURING THIS ACTIVITY, AT LEAST ONE EDG WILL BE AVAILABLE TO SUPPLY EMERGENCY POWER TO AN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES BUS FOR UNIT 2, DURING OUTAGE PORTIONS OF THIS ACTIVITY. MODIFICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH REMOVING DG1B FROM EMERGENCY BUS 21 WILL REQUIRE DG1B TO BE OUT OF SERVICE. ACTIONS CONSISTENT WITH THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WILL BE TAKEN DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME WHEN ONLY ONE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR IS AVAILABLE TO UNIT 1, WHICH MAY BE AT POWER.

ELECTRICAL ISOLATION CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDANCE OF NUMARC 87-00 IS PROVIDED FOR DGOC. NO NEW TYPES OF SYSTEM INTERACTIONS ARE BEING CREATED BY THIS

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ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT IS NOT CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY EXPRESSED IN THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED, BECAUSE: (1) REQUIREMENTS OF THE CALVERT CLIFFS FIRE PROTECTION PLAN WILL BE IMPLEMENTED WHEN FIRE RATED STRUCTURES ARE PENETRATED; (2) THE ADDITIONAL HEAT LOADS ON THE MCR AND AUXILIARY BUILDING HVAC SYSTEMS (OCCURRING WHEN DGUC IS RUNNING AND THE ADDITIONAL CABLING IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING MAY BE ENERGIZED) HAVE BEEN EVALUATED AND DETERMINED NOT TO EXCEED THE SYSTEMS' DESIGN HEAT REMOVAL CAPACITY; (3) EITHER THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS WILL BE AVAILABLE OR ACTIONS CONSISTENT WITH THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WILL BE TAKEN.

THEREFORE, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00090 64

Subject: REMOVAL OF INSULATION FROM 21 STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN PIPING

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-018

Assoc Doc ID: ES9300001

Ref Doc ID: 2-96-0015

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type: TMOO

Assoc Type: ESP

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 169

INSULATION, PIPE

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

A STEAM LEAK HAS BEEN DISCOVERED ON THE SURFACE BLOWDOWN LINE OF 21 STEAM GENERATOR (SG) AT THE TEE OF THE NITROGEN SUPPLY LINE. THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES THE TEMPORARY REMOVAL OF INSULATION FROM THE SURFACE BLOWDOWN LINE AT THE TEE OF THE NITROGEN SUPPLY LINE IN ORDER TO REPAIR THIS LEAK WITH UNIT 2 OPERATION IN MODES 3, 4, 5, 6, AND DEFUELED. IT INCLUDES THE REMOVAL OF UP TO TEN FEET (10') OF INSULATION FROM THE SURFACE BLOWDOWN LINE (2" EB - 6 - 2015) AND ALL OF THE INSULATION FROM THE NITROGEN SUPPLY LINE (1" EB - 6 - 2009). TEMPORARY SHIELDING WILL BE ERECTED TO PREVENT DIRECT IMPINGEMENT OF INADVERTENT SPRAY WATER ON THE EXPOSED PIPING, OR ESFAS AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM TESTING WILL BE PROHIBITED FOR THE DURATION OF THIS ACTIVITY.

THIS EVALUATION DEMONSTRATES THAT THE ABILITY OF 21 SG TO PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUNCTION IS NOT COMPROMISED BY THE INSULATION REMOVAL. IT ALSO DEMONSTRATES THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT CONTAINMENT COOLING AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THIS PLANNED ACTIVITY SUCH THAT THE ADDITIONAL HEAT LOAD CREATED BY THE REMOVAL

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OF THE SPECIFIED INSULATION WILL NOT IMPACT THE FUNCTION OF OTHER SAFETY
RELATED EQUIPMENT.
(CMH)

Document ID	Revision Status
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SE00092      0000      64

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Subject: #11 & 12 EDG FUEL OIL FLUSHING OF PIPING

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-023

Assoc Doc ID: EN-1-102
Ref Doc ID: 1-95-0176

Revision To: 0300 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: NPIP
Rev: 0000 Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 023

Text:

DIESEL OIL SYSTEM

NRC SUMMARY

THIS TA ALLOWS FLUSHING OF TWO DIESEL FUEL OIL LINES (ONE AT A TIME) FROM 11 AND 12 FUEL OIL STORAGE TANKS (FOSTS). THESE LINES ARE ALTERNATE FUEL OIL SUPPLY LINES TO 11 AND 12 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDGS) AND ARE NORMALLY ISOLATED. TO REMOVE WATER AND SEDIMENT, THE LINES WILL BE FLUSHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS TA.

THE SEGMENT OF THE SUPPLY LINE BEING FLUSHES IS 2" IN DIAMETER. THE 2" LINES BRANCH OFF FROM THE 3" MAIN SUPPLY HEADER (11 FOST) AND THE 6" MAIN SUPPLY HEADER (21 FOST). THE VOLUME OF EITHER OF THE 2" LINES IS LESS THAN 8 GALLONS. TO ENSURE ALL CONTAMINANTS ARE THOROUGHLY FLUSHED, FUEL OIL SEVERAL TIMES THE LINE'S VOLUME WILL BE FLUSHED. A VACUUM TRUCK, DESIGNED FOR CLEAN-

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ING OF FUEL OIL SYSTEMS, WILL BE USED. THE HOSE FROM THE VACUUM TRUCK WILL BE CONNECTED TO THE PIPING DOWNSTREAM OF MANUAL VALVE 11 DFO 152 AND 12 DFO 152. THESE TWO VALVES ARE THE ISOLATION VALVES IN A 1" FLUSH LINE FOR THE INLET STRAINERS TO 11 AND 12 DIESEL FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMPS. ONE FUEL OIL LINE WILL BE FLUSHED AT A TIME WHEN THEIR ASSOCIATED EDG IS OUT OF SERVICE. THIS TYPE OF PROCEDURE IS COMMON INDUSTRY PRACTICE FOR CLEANING FUEL OIL PIPING AND TANKS.

THE 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION IS BEING WRITTEN BECAUSE THE DESIGN OF THE FUEL OIL STORAGE SYSTEM, AS DESCRIBED IN CHAPTER 8 OF THE UFSAR, IS BEING TEMPORARILY ALTERED.

THIS TA WILL BE IMPLEMENTED THE UNIT 1 1996 RFO. UNIT 1 WILL BE IN MODES 5, 6 OR DEFUELED AND UNIT 2 MAY BE OPERATING OR SHUTDOWN. CONTROLS WILL BE REQUIRED BY THE TA TO ENSURE THAT THE MINIMUM FOSTS VOLUME AS SPECIFIED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT VIOLATED. FURTHERMORE, THE TA ENSURES THAT THE OPERABLE PORTION OF THE FUEL OIL SYSTEM AND THE OPERABLE EDGS ARE NOT AFFECTED.

THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAR IS NOT CREATED. THERE IS NO AFFECT ON OFFSITE DOSE CONSEQUENCES DUE TO THIS ACTIVITY AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY, AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IS NOT AFFECTED. THEREFORE, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUBJECT ACTIVITY.
(SG)

Document ID	Revision Status				
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SE00094	0000 64				
Subject:	TEMP MOD TO REMOVE SHIELD BLOCKS FROM UNIT 1 EQUIPMENT HATCH				
Alias:					
POSRC #:	96-024				
Assoc Doc ID:	ES199502150	Revision To:	0000	Assoc Stat:	C
Ref Doc ID:	1-96-0015	Rev:	0	Refer Type:	TMOD
				Assoc Type:	ESP
					TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 059
Text:

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES A TEMPORARY ALTERATION WHICH ALLOWS THE CONCRETED SHIELD BLOCKS LOCATED IN THE UNIT 1 BUTLER BUILDING IN FRONT OF THE EQUIP. HATCH TO BE REMOVED UP TO 14 DAYS PRIOR TO THE SHUTDOWN OF U1 FOR ITS RFO. THE CONCRETE SHEILDING BLOCKS NOW IN PLACE IN FRONT OF THE U1 AND U2 EQUIP. HATCHES WERE ORGINALLY INSTALLED TO REDUCE THE HIGH NEUTRON AND GAMMA DOSES SEEN IN AND AROUND THE BUTLER BUILDINGS FOLLOWING INITIAL STARTUP OF THE

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PLANTS. THIS CONCERN WITH HIGH DOSE RATES DURING NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS HAS LARGELY BEEN ELIMINATED BY THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW NEUTRON SHIELD SURROUNDING THE RV. THEREFORE, UNDER NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS IT IS NO LONGER NECESSARY TO KEEP THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS IN PLACE TO BE ABLE TO KEEP OCCUPATIONAL DOSES ALARA AND TO NOT EXCEED TO 10 CFR 20 LIMITS. REMOVAL OF THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS MAY RESULT IN A POST-LOCA INCREASE IN ON-SITE DOSE, BUT WILL NOT RESULT IN AN INCREASE TO THE OFF-SITE DOSE TO ANY MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT. LIKEWISE, REMOVAL OF THESE SHIELD BLOCKS WILL NOT RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN THE POST-LOCA DOSE TO ANY SR EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO OPERATE TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT SUCH THAT THE EQ OF SUCH EQUIPMENT CAN NO LONGER BE DEMONSTRATED. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT PRECLUDE ACCESS TO ANY PLANT AREA SUCH THAT ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT MAY NO LONGER BE TAKEN. THEREFORE, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS NO LICENSING REQUIREMENT TO HAVE THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS IN PLACE FOR PURPOSES OF MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00096 0000 64

Subject: UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 RELOAD CORE DESIGN

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-029

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501258-002

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERED THE OPERATION OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 13. MODIFICATIONS TO THE FUEL ASSEMBLY, THE RELOAD CORE DESIGN, AND THE PRESENCE OF OTHER CORE COMPONENTS (UP TO FOUR TEST CAPSULES) WERE CONSIDERED. THE USE OF A SECOND FULL BATCH OF ERBIUM FOR UNIT 1 AS A BURNABLE ABSORBER WAS CONSIDERED. A SAFETY EVALUATION (SE00086 REV 0) TO RESTORE F (R) (T) AND F (XY) (T) LIMITS EQUAL TO 1.70 AND TO REVISE THE LSSS AND LCO COLR LIMITS WAS PREVIOUSLY APPROVED. THE SAFETY EVALUATION FOR THE USE OF FOUR LEAD FUEL ASSEMBLIES IN UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 MUST BE APPROVED PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 RELOAD (SE 000 97 REV 0 FROM ES 1995 0 1 2 5 8 - 003). A UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION OF 2486 PPM IS REQUIRED. THESE NEW LIMITS WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE COLR. THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 SAFETY ANALYSES ACCOUNTED FOR ALL RELOAD CORE DIFFERENCES, AND ALSO EVALUATED THE INCLUSION OF UP TO FOUR TEST CAPSULES IN THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 CORE. RE ANALYSIS OF THE PRE TRIP STEAM LINE BREAK AND BORON DILUTION (ONLY MODE 6)

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EVENTS INDICATED THAT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED RESULTS ARE MORE LIMITING. THE RESULTS OF ALL ANALYSES OF RECORD CONSERVATIVELY APPLY TO UNIT 1 CYCLE 13. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT OPERATION OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00096 0001 64

Subject: UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 RELOAD CORE DESIGN - REVISED REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-033

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501258-004

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERED THE OPERATION OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 13. MODIFICATIONS TO THE FUEL ASSEMBLY, THE RELOAD CORE DESIGN AND THE PRESENCE OF OTHER CORE COMPONENTS (UP TO FOUR TEST CAPSULES) WERE CONSIDERED. THE USE OF A SECOND FULL BATCH OF ERBIUM FOR UNIT 1 AS A BURNABLE ABSORBER WAS CONSIDERED. A SAFETY EVALUATION (SE00086, REV 0) TO RESTORE THE F (R) (T) AND F (XY) (T) LIMITS EQUAL TO 1.70 AND TO REVISE THE LSSS AND LCO COLR LIMITS WERE PREVIOUSLY APPROVED. THE SAFETY EVALUATION FOR THE USE OF FOUR LEAD FUEL ASSEMBLIES IN UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 MUST BE APPROVED PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 RELOAD (SE 000 97, REV 0 FROM ES 1995 0 1 2 5 8 -003). A UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION OF 2386 PPM IS REQUIRED. THESE NEW LIMITS WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE COLR. THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 SAFETY ANALYSES ACCOUNTED FOR ALL RELOAD CORE DIFFERENCES, AND ALSO EVALUATED THE INCLUSION OF UP TO FOUR TEST CAPSULES IN THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 CORE.

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RE ANALYSIS OF THE PRE TRIP STEAM LINE BREAK AND BORON DILUTION (ONLY MODE 6) EVENTS INDICATED THAT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED RESULTS ARE MORE LIMITING. THE RESULTS OF ALL ANALYSES OF RECORD CONSERVATIVELY APPLY TO UNIT 1 CYCLE 13. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT OPERATION OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00097 0000 64

Subject: UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 LEAD FUEL ASSEMBLIES

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-029

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501258-003

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 084

REACTOR VESSEL INTERNAL

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERS THE USE OF FOUR ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING LEAD FUEL ASSEMBLIES (LFA'S). THE LFA'S WILL RESIDE IN NON LIMITING LOCATIONS IN THE CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 CORE DURING CYCLES 13, 14, AND 15. DATA FROM THE LFA'S IS INTENDED TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW AND IMPROVED FUEL DESIGNS AND FUEL EVALUATION METHODOLOGIES TO ACHIEVE HIGHER BURNUPS, IMPROVE FUEL RELIABILITY, INCREASE THERMAL MARGIN AND ATTAIN OVERALL BETTER FUEL CYCLE ECONOMICS. DESIGN FEATURES CHANGES INCLUDE A SHORTER FUEL ROD LENGTH, A THINNER CLAD, A LARGER AND HEAVIER FUEL PELLET, AND THE USE OF ADVANCED GRIDS WITH STRAIGHT STRIPS, MIXING VANES AND IMPROVED ROD SUPPORT SYSTEMS. THE LFA'S ARE ALSO HOST TO A DEMONSTRATION OF ADVANCED CLADDING MATERIALS. SPECIFIC NRC APPROVAL OF A SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT AND A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE WAS OBTAINED WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF ADVANCED ZIRCONIUM BASED CLADDING MATERIALS IN THE LFA'S. THE RELOAD ANALYSES PERFORMED FOR UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 BOUND THE LFA'S. USE OF THE LFA'S IN UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 WAS FOUND TO NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. (CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID	Revision	Status
=====	=====	=====
SE00098	0000	64
Subject:	FUEL TRANSFER TUBE BELLOWS REPAIR	
Alias:		

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

POSRC #: 96-025

Assoc Doc ID: 93-068-001-00
Ref Doc ID:Revision To: 0003 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP
Rev: Refer Type:

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
=====	=====	=====

Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 068
Text:

SPENT FUEL STORAGE

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ESP (MCR) 93 068 001 ALLOWS THE INSTALLATION OF AN EPOXY PATCH ON THE TYPE 1 FUEL TRANSFER TUBE BELLWS. THIS WILL ALLOW A PRESSURE BOUNDARY TEST OF THE INNER PLY OF THE TYPE 1 BELLWS. A STRUCTURALLY SOUND INNER PLY WILL ENABLE THE TYPE 1 BELLWS TO FUNCTION AS DESIGNED. ALSO, THIS ESP (MCR) ALLOWS THE INSTALLATION OF A RELIEF VALVE (RV) ON THE INSTRUMENT AIR LINE THAT SUPPLIES BOTH UNIT 1 AND 2 TYPE 1 BELLWS. THE RV HAS BEEN SIZED TO PRECLUDE THE TYPE 1 BELLWS FROM EXCEEDING THE DESIGN PRESSURE.

REVISION 3 OF THIS ESP IS ISSUED TO SPECIFICALLY REMOVE THE SCOPE OF WORK ASSOCIATED WITH ADDING A NEW TEST CONNECTION (COUPLING AND THREADED PLUG) ONTO THE TYPE 2 BELLWS OF THE UNIT 1 FUEL TRANSFER TUBE THAT WAS APPROVED BY REVISION 0 OF THIS ESP (MCR) AND SAFETY EVALUATION 93 1 068 148 R00. THE OUTER PLY OF THE TYPE 1 BELLWS OF THE UNIT 1 FUEL TRANSFER TUBE WAS SUCCESSFULLY REPAIRED AND THE INNER PLY PRESSURE BOUNDARY WAS SUCCESSFULLY PRESSURE TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ETP 95 30, WITHOUT THE NEED OF THE NEW TEST CONNECTION ON THE TYPE 2 BELLWS. BASED ON THESE SUCCESSFUL RESULTS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THERE IS NO LONGER A NEED FOR INSTALLATION OF A TEST CONNECTION ON THE TYPE 2 BELLWS SIDE OF THE FUEL TRANSFER TUBE; THEREFORE, BOTH PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEM ENGINEERING HAVE REQUESTED THAT THE SCOPE OF THE TEST CONNECTION MODIFICATION BE DELETED FROM THIS ACTIVITY.

SAFETY EVALUATION 93 1 068 148 R00 WAS REVIEWED AND APPROVED IN JUNE 1994 FOR THE ESP (MCR) 93 068 001 MODIFICATION ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE FUEL TRANSFER TUBE BELLWS.

AS A RESULT OF REVISION 3 OF THIS ESP, SAFETY EVALUATION SE 000 98 HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT APPROVAL OF THE REVISED WORK SCOPE FROM THAT IDENTIFIED IN PREVIOUSLY APPROVED SAFETY EVALUATION 93 1 068 148 R00. OTHER THAN DELETING TEXT REFERENCE TO THE TEST CONNECTION ITSELF, THIS CHANGE IN SCOPE HAS NO IMPACT ON THE CONCLUSIONS OR RESULTS OF SAFETY EVALUATION 93 1 068 148 R00.

REFUELING OPERATIONS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES (THE ONLY APPLICABLE TECH SPECS FOR THIS ACTIVITY) REMAIN UNCHANGED AND ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED IN ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY MEETS CODE REQUIREMENTS AND HAS BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

IT IS NOT IN VIOLATION WITH THE SAR. IT HAS BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE THAT NO NEW FAILURE EFFECTS ARE CREATED. THE DESIGN INPUT REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN ANSI N 45.2-11 HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND ADDRESSED IN THE ESP (MCR). THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
(CMH)

Document ID Revision Status

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SE0010J 0000 64

Subject: 50.59 FOR DFW CONTROLLER UPGRADE

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-027

Assoc Doc ID: ES199600012-000

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

=====

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

1FIC1105

1FIC1106

1FIC1111

1FIC1121

1HIC4516

11 SG FD WTR BYPASS VLV

12 SG FW WTR BYPASS VLV

MN FEEDWTR VLV CONTROLLER

MN FEEDWTR VLV CONTROLLER

11 SG FD PP A TURB SPD CNTR

0/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

1HIC4517	12 DG F ₂ PMP B TURB SPD CNTR
1PDI4516	11 S/G F ₂ CV D/P
1PDI4517	12 S/G FW CV D/P

Org/Div:

System Code: 045

Text:

FEEDWATER

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS MODIFICATION UPGRADES THE DIGITAL FEEDWATER CONTROL STATIONS THAT INTER-FACE WITH THE MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES, THE BYPASS FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES, AND THE FEEDPUMPS. A FOURTH CONTROL STATION WILL BE UPGRADED AND MODIFIED SO THAT IT WILL NORMALLY BE A DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE INDICATOR FOR THE DP ACROSS THE MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE, AND IN ALTERNATE MODE, IT WILL BE A BACKUP CONTROLLER FOR THE MAIN AND BYPASS VALVE CONTROL STATIONS. ALL FOUR CONTROLLERS ARE OBSOLETE FISCHER & PORTER (F&P) CONTROLLERS. THEY WILL BE UPGRADED TO CURRENT F&P MODELS THAT HAVE AN APPROVED MAN MACHINE INTERFACE AND IMPROVED CPU PERFORMANCE. THE REPLACEMENT CONTROLLERS WILL ALSO HAVE THEIR I/O SIGNALS FILTERED FOR IMPROVED EMI/RFI COMPATIBILITY.

THERE ARE NO CHAPTER 14 EVENTS OR ACCIDENT MITIGATING FUNCTIONS AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ).
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00100 0001 62

Subject: 50.59 FOR DFW CONTROLLER UPGRADE

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-125.

Assoc Doc ID: ES199600012-002

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: 1FIC1105
1FIC110611 SG FD WTR BYPASS VLV
12 SG FW WTR BYPASS VLV

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1FIC1111	MN FEEDWTR VLV CONTROLLER
1FIC1121	MN FEEDWTR VLV CONTROLLER
1HIC4516	11 SG FD PP A TURB SPD CNTR
1HIC4517	12 DG FD PMP B TURB SPD CNTR
1PDI4516	11 S/G FW CV D/P
1PDI4517	12 S/G FW CV D/P
2FIC1105	STM GEN 21 FEEDWTR BYPASS
2FIC1106	STM GEN 22 FEEDWTR BYPASS
2FIC1111	21 FW S/G VLV FLO INDIC C
2FIC1121	22 FW S/G VLV FLO INDIC C
2HIC4516	21 FW SGFPT SPD HIC
2HIC4517	22 FW SGFPT SPD HIC
2PDI4516	STM GEN 11 FW CV D/P
2PDI4517	STM GEN 22 FW CV D/P

Org/Div:

System Code: 045

Text:

FEEDWATER

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS MODIFICATION UPGRADES THE DIGITAL FEEDWATER CONTROL STATIONS THAT INTER-FACE WITH THE MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES, THE BYPASS FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES, AND THE FEEDPUMPS. A FOURTH CONTROL STATION WILL BE UPGRADED AND MODIFIED SO THAT IT WILL NORMALLY BE A DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE INDICATOR FOR THE DP ACROSS THE MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE, AND IN ALTERNATE MODE, IT WILL BE A BACKUP CONTROLLER FOR THE MAIN AND BYPASS VALVE CONTROL STATIONS. ALL FOUR CONTROLLERS ARE OBSOLETE FISCHER & PORTER (F&P) CONTROLLERS. THEY WILL BE UPGRADED TO CURRENT F&P MODELS THAT HAVE AN APPROVED MAN MACHINE INTERFACE AND IMPROVED CPU PERFORMANCE. THE REPLACEMENT CONTROLLERS WILL ALSO HAVE THEIR I/O SIGNALS FILTERED FOR IMPROVED EMI/RFI COMPATIBILITY.

THERE ARE NO CHAPTER 14 EVENTS OR ACCIDENT MITIGATING FUNCTIONS AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ).
(CMH)

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID	Revision Status
=====	=====
SE00102	0000 62
Subject:	TEMPORARY TURBINE TRIP REMOVAL
Alias:	

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

POSRC #: 96-029

Assoc Doc ID: 63196SH0004C

Ref Doc ID: 2-96-0020

Revision To: 0012

Rev: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type: TMOD

Assoc Type: BGEDRWG

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: 2LS1448

Org/Div:

System Code: 046

21B ES LP FWH TURB TRIP H

EXTRACTION STEAM

Text: SUMMARY:

THIS 10CFR50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION EVALUATES THE EFFECT OF TEMPORARILY MODIFYING THE MAIN TURBINE CONTROL TRIP LOGIC. THE SCOPE OF THE PHYSICAL ALTERATION IS LIMITED TO LIFTING LEADS OF 2-LS-1448, TO ENABLE THE CRAFT TO TROUBLESHOOT A PROBLEM ON THE 21B FEEDWATER HEATER. THE FUNCTION OF THE LEVEL SWITCH WILL BE PERFORMED BY OPERATIONS / MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL DEDICATED TO THE TASK. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ALTERATION DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. REVISIONS TO THE UFSAR OR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REQUIRED.

Document ID	Revision Status
=====	=====

SE00105 64

Subject: MODIFY THROTTLE CONTROLS ON CAC INLET CV'S

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-067

Assoc Doc ID: ES199600308-000

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 011

SERVICE WATER COOLING

CURRENTLY EACH CAC INLET CONTROL VALVE (CV) IS AN 8" BUTTERFLY TYPE WITH AN AIR OPERATOR. THE CV IS NORMALLY OPEN WITH THE OPERATOR VENTED TO ATMOSPHERE VIA A THREE WAY SOLENOID VALVE. UPON RECEIPT OF A SIAS THE SOLENOID VALVE REDIRECTS THE SWAC AIR TO THE CV OPERATOR WHICH SHUTS THE VALVE AGAINST A MECHANICAL STOP. THE MECHANICAL STOP, WHICH IS PHYSICALLY INSTALLED IN THE VALVE OPERATOR, PREVENTS THE OPERATOR SPRING FROM FULLY STROKING THE VALVE, HENCE, THE VALVE SHUTS TO THE PREDETERMINED THROTTLE POSITION. UPON RECEIPT OF RAS THE SOLENOID VALVE REPOSITIONS TO VENT OFF THE AIR FROM THE ACTUATOR AND THE CV RETURNS TO ITS NORMALLY OPEN POSITION. THE EXISTING THROTTLE SETTING IS BASE DON THE REQUIREMENT OF REMOVING THE HEAT LOAD ASSUMED IN

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THE CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE ANALYSIS WHILE MAINTAINING SRW TEMPERATURE LOW ENOUGH TO SUPPORT CONTINUOUS EDG OPERATION.

THIS ACTIVITY PROVIDES A MORE PRECISE METHOD OF CONTROLLING SRW FLOW TO THE CACS (POST ACCIDENT). THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE ADDITION OF A FIC, I/P TRANSDUCER AND VALVE POSITIONER TO THE INLET CV CONTROL LOOP IN LIEU OF THE EXISTING MECHANICAL STOP. IN ADDITION, MANUAL CONTROL OF SRW FLOW TO THE CACS IS ALSO AVAILABLE WITH THE USE OF A HAND CONTROL STATION.

INTRINSIC TO THE PROPOSED DESIGN IS THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE METHOD OF FLOW CONTROL DURING SIAS. THE EXISTING MECHANICAL STOP SETTING (CURRENT VALVE THROTTLE POSITION) IS BASED ON THE MOST CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATE OF PUMP PERFORMANCE WHICH RENDERS GREATER RANGE OF FLOW UNCERTAINTY UPON THROTTLE. THE NEW DESIGN UTILIZES THE FEEDBACK LOOP BASED ON THE ACTUAL SRW FLOW TO THE CACS INDEPENDENT OF PUMP PERFORMANCE. THESE DESIGN CHANGES WILL RESULT IN AN IMPROVED SRW CONFIGURATION FOR MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED DESIGN BASIS EVENTS INSIDE CONTAINMENT.

SINCE THE PROBABILITY OF A PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTION OF CACS AND EDGS HAVE BEEN INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY, THIS ACTIVITY DOES INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. BASED ON THIS ANALYSIS, THERE IS NO NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENTS HAVE BEEN CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY, AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES IS NOT REDUCED.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00106 0000 64

Subject: DIESEL GENERATOR PROJECT DESIGN REPORT REVIEW

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-0045

Assoc Doc ID: 89-0079

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: FCR

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

=====

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 024

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

Text:

THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES THE REVIEW OF THE FOUR (4) DESIGN REPORTS SUBMITTED

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AND APPROVED BY THE NRC (VIA SAFETY EVALUATION REPORTS [SERS] AGAINST THE ACTUAL FINAL SACM SAFETY-RELATED (SR) DIESEL GENERATOR DESIGN BEING INSTALLED AT CCNPP. THIS SAFETY EVALUATION ADDRESSES THE DIFFERENCES IDENTIFIED AS A RESULT OF THIS REVIEW.

Document ID Revision Status
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SE00107 0000 64

Subject: MODIFICATION TO THE MSIV HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-040

Assoc Doc ID: ES199600212-000

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date
=====

Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code:

Text:

THIS ACTIVITY INSTALLS A 3/8" PIPE CONNECTION AT THE TOP OF UNIT 1 AND 2 MSIV HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR. A 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION IS REQUIRED SINCE UFSAR FIGURE 10-3 WILL BE REVISED TO SHOW THE HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR MODIFICATION. THIS MODIFICATION TO THE RESERVOIR DOES NOT AFFECT THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE ACTUATOR AND THEREFORE DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AS DEFINED BY 10CFR50.59.

Document ID Revision Status
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SE00107 0001 62

Subject: ALLOW PIPE CONNECTION ON TOP OF MSIV RESERVOIR

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-120

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Assoc Doc ID: ES199600212-000
Ref Doc ID:Revision To: 0001 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP
Rev: Refer Type:

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
=====	=====	=====

Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 083
Text:

MAIN STEAM

SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY INSTALLS A 3/8" PIPE CONNECTION AT THE TOP OF THE UNIT 1 AND 2 MSIV HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR IN ACCORDANCE WITH ES 199600212 000 AND ES 199600212 000, REV. 0001. REVISION 0001 ALLOWS THE USE OF A QUICK DISCONNECT FITTING AT THE PIPE CONNECTION ON THE TOP OF THE RESERVOIR AND THE DRAIN CONNECTION AT THE BOTTOM OF THE RESERVOIR. THE QUICK DISCONNECT IS ALLOWED IN PLACE OF THE PIPE CAP. A 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION IS REQUIRED SINCE UFSAR FIGURE 10-3 WILL BE REVISED TO SHOW THE HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR MODIFICATION. THIS MODIFICATION TO THE RESERVOIR DOES NOT AFFECT THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE ACTUATOR AND THEREFORE DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AS DEFINED BY 10CFR50.59.

Document ID	Revision	Status
=====	=====	=====
SE00109	0000	64

Subject: INCREASE CRS AND PURGE ISOLATION VALVE RESPONSE TIME IN UFSAR

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-054

Assoc Doc ID: ES199600817-000
Ref Doc ID:Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP
Rev: Refer Type:

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
=====	=====	=====

Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 060
Text:

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HEAT AND VENT

THIS ACTIVITY INCREASES THE CONTAINMENT SIGNAL RESPONSE TIME IN UFSAR TABLE 7-4 AND THE ISOLATION TIME FOR THE PURGE AIR INLET AND OUTLET VALVES GIVEN IN TABLE 5-3 OF THE UFSAR FROM 7 SECONDS TO 15 SECONDS. THE CONTAINMENT RADIATION SIGNAL IS REQUIRED TO CLOSE THE 48" CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVES ON HIGH RADIATION LEVELS IN CONTAINMENT DURING REFUELING OPERATIONS. THIS ACTIVITY BUILDS ADDITIONAL MARGIN INTO THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR THE CONTAINMENT RADIATION SIGNAL STP. THE CONTAINMENT WILL CONTINUE TO BE

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ISOLATED BY AN AUTOMATIC SIGNAL WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME IN COMPARISON WITH THE TOTAL RELEASE TIME ASSUMED IN THE ANALYSIS REVIEWED AND ACCEPTED BY THE NRC. WHILE NO INCREASED RELEASE FROM CONTAINMENT IS EXPECTED, ANY ADDITIONAL RELEASE FROM CONTAINMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY IS INSIGNIFICANT AND NOT RECOGNIZED WITHIN THE MEANING OF 50.59. THEREFORE, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT AND DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00111 64

Subject: ALLOW OPERATIONS TO GAG OPEN O-PO-5371 DAMPER UNDER TA 1 - 96 - 0092

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-041

Assoc Doc ID: 60723SH0004

Ref Doc ID: 1-96-0092

Revision To: 0033

Rev: 0

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type: TMOO

Assoc Type: BGEDRWG

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

=====

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 030

Text:

CONTROL ROOM HVAC (CNTRL RM & SERV BLDG)

NRC SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY PROPOSES TO GAG DAMPER O DAMP 5371 TO ITS FAIL SAFE POSITION WHICH IS OPEN. THIS DAMPER IS PART OF THE CR / CSR HVAC SYSTEM. THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE SPREADING ROOMS VENTILATION SYSTEM IS COMPRISED OF FANS, FILTERS, DAMPERS, HEATING AND COOLING COILS AND INSTRUMENTATION WHICH SUPPLY FILTERED AND TEMPERED AIR TO THE CONTROL ROOM AND THE CABLE SPREADING ROOMS. AIR CONDITIONS IS REQUIRED IN THESE AREAS TO LIMIT THE TEMPERATURE UNDER WHICH THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE SPREADING ROOM INSTRUMENTATION MUST OPERATE. IN ADDITION, EMERGENCY OPERATION OF THE C / R HVAC SYSTEM IS REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF A LOCI TO RECIRCULATE SOME AIR THROUGH A SELF CONTAINED POST LOCI FILTER SYSTEM. GAGGING OPEN DAMPER O DAMP 5371 WILL ALLOW REPAIR WORK TO BE PERFORMED TO PISTON OPERATOR O PO 5371. WORK UNDER THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION (1 96 0092) ENSURES A REDUNDANT PATH IS MAINTAINED THROUGH THE RETURN FAN DUCT SYSTEM SHOULD UNIT 11 RETURN FAN BE NEEDED IN A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. THIS ACTIVITY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6.1 BY MAINTAINING THE REQUIRED REDUNDANCY AND DIVERSITY FOR THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE SPREADING ROOM HVAC SYSTEM. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT COOLING TO THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE SPREADING ROOM WILL NOT BE ADVERSELY IMPACTED AND THAT THE CONTROL ROOM REMAINS HABITABLE FOR OPERATIONS PERSONNEL FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY AND / OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

TANK IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT DEBRIS AND SEDIMENT FROM ENTERING THE SUCTION PIPING BY SLOPING THE FLOOR AWAY FROM THE SUCTION LINE AND LOCATING THE SUCTION LINE 7.5" ABOVE THE FLOOR. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANALYZED MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS, AND NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS ARE CREATED. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A USQ.

Document ID	Revision Status				
SE00164	0001 62				
Subject:	FAIL OPEN 1(2) CV 1581, 1584, 1589, 1592				
Alias:					
POSRC #:	96-0156				
Assoc Doc ID:	61058ASH0001	Revision To:	0037	Assoc Stat:	0
	63058ASH0001		0040		0
Ref Doc ID:	1-96-0201	Rev:	0000	Refer Type:	TMOD
	2-96-0124		0000		TMOD
	DE01961		0000		DMLS
					DEPARTMENT MEMO LOGGING SYSTEM
Sender		Xmtl #		Xmtl Date	

Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 011
Text: SUMMARY: SERVICE WATER COOLING

THIS ACTIVITY CHANGES THE POSITION OF (1)2CV1581, (1)2CV1584, (1)2CV1589, (1)2CV1592 DURING SIAS FROM MODULATING TO FULLY OPEN. BASED ON THE ENGINEERING EVALUATION PERFORMED IN TEMPORARY ALTERATION # 2 96 0124, AND 1 96 0201, SRW TEMPERATURE CAN BE MAINTAINED IN THE DESIGN LIMIT PROVIDED THE PRESCRIBED OPERATING LIMITS ARE OBSERVED DURING THE TIMEFRAME THAT THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION IS EFFECTIVE.

Total Hits: 103

*** END ***

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ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION. NOR DOES THIS ACTIVITY CREATE A NEW MALFUNCTION OR
ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR. TA
1 92 0096 DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED IN THE TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS BASES. THEREFORE, IT MAY BE CONCLUDED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
(CMH)

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00112 0000 64

Subject: POWER 11 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP FROM A TRAIN

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-55

Assoc Doc ID: ES199600927-000

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

Text:

SUMMARY:

POWER 11 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP FROM THE UNIT 1 "A" TRAIN BY CROSS-
CONNECTING THE REACTOR MCCS. PUMP BREAKER 52-1411 IS ENERGIZED FROM LOAD
CENTER BUS 14A, WHICH IS BACK FED VIA MCCS 104R AND 114R. THESE ARE
POWERED FROM LOAD CENTER BUS 11B BY 52-1119. THIS DIFFERS FROM THE NORMAL
ELECTRICAL LINEUP IN THAT THESE TWO TRAINS ARE SEPARATE AND THIS PUMP IS
NORMALLY POWERED BY THE "B" TRAIN. THIS ACTIVITY SUPPORTS A CHANGE TO
01-27D UNDER PCR 96 - 1306 AND WILL ONLY BE USED WHILE IN MODES 5 AND 6
WITH 4KV BUS 14 OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE PURPOSES.

BASED ON THE SAFETY EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED
SAFETY QUESTION, INVOLVE A CHANGE IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS/ LICENSE

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CONDITIONS OR BASES, OR REQUIRE A CHANGE OR ADDITION TO THE UFSAR/USAR.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION BECAUSE
CREDIT CAN BE TAKEN FOR NUMEROUS DESIGN FEATURES OF THE ELECTRICAL
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND DUE TO COMPENSATORY MEASURES IN PLACE.

Document ID Revision Status
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SE00114 64

Subject: ALLOW USE OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP FOR SDC.

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-050

Assoc Doc ID: 60731SH0001 Revision To: 0059 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: BGEDRWG
60731SH0002 0031 C BGEDRWG
60731SH0003 0020 C BGEDRWG

Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date
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Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 052
Text:

SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY IS A PROCEDURE CHANGE TO 01-3B WHICH ALLOWS A CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP TO BE SUBSTITUTED FOR A LPSI PUMP FOR REACTOR COOLANT CIRCULATION DURING SDC OPERATION. SECTION 9.2.2 OF THE UFSAR DESCRIBES SHUTDOWN COOLING OPERATION, AND INCLUDED IN THAT IS A STATEMENT THAT THE LPSI PUMPS CIRCULATE THE RACTOR COOLANT THROUGH THE SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS. THE UFSAR IS TO BE REVISED TO STATE THAT A CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP MAY ALSO BE USED TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION.

THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE DESIGN RATINGS ENVELOPE THE PRESSURE/ TEMPERATURE CONCDITIONS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING OPERATION, THEREFORE, THE SYSTEM QUALIFICATION IS NOT IMPACTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRE A MINIMUM SDC FLOW OF 1500 GPM. STP - 073 M TESTS THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS IN NEARLY AN IDENTICAL LINE-UP AS SHUTDOWN COOLING OPERATION, AND FLOWS OF 1500 GPM ARE CONSISTENTLY ACHIEVED. FURTHERMORE, THE STP LINEUP ONLY USES ONE OF THE FOUR INJECTION LOOPS WHILE ALL FOUR INJECTION LOOPS ARE OPEN DURING SDC OPERATION. THE AFFECT OF USING ONLY ONE INJECTION LOOP IS TO GREATLY INCREASE FRICTION LOSSES AND HENCE REDUCE FLOW. ALSO, SECTION 6. 10. B. 1 OF 01-3B REQUIRES THAT A MINIMUM FLOW OF 1500 GPM BE VERIFIED WHILE IN THIS LINEUP. THEREFORE, IT MAY BE CONCLUDED THAT THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS WILL SATISFY THE

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MINIMUM 1500 GPM FLOW REQUIREMENT. FINALLY, THERE ARE NO MINIMUM FLOW CONCERNS AS THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP DESIGN FLOWRATE IS VERY CLOSE TO THE 1500 GPM FLOW REQUIREMENT. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID Revision Status

SE00115

64

Subject: TEMPORARY ALTERATION 1-96-0073
TEMPORARY REMOVAL OF INSULATION ON THE REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER, PRESSURIZER MANWAY COVER, 11 AND 12 STEAM GENERATOR SECONDARY MANWAY COVERS, 1RV200, 1MOV403, AND 1FW130 TO SUPPORT HOT RETORQUING AND INSPECTIONS

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-053

Assoc Doc ID: ES9300001
Ref Doc ID: 1-96-0073

Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP
Rev: Refer Type: TMOD TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: 1CKVFW-130 12 SG FW HDR CKV
1HXCVCCL/DR11 11 CVC L/D REGEN HX
1HXRC11 11 MAIN STEAM GENERATOR
1HXRC12 12 MAIN STEAM GENERATOR
1MOV403 PWR OP RLF ISOL
1PZVRC11 PRESSURIZER
1RV200 PZR SAFETY RV

Org/Div:

System Code: 041 CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)
045 FEEDWATER
064 REACTOR COOLANT

Text: NRC SUMMARY:

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS THE TEMPORARY REMOVAL OF INSULATION FROM VARIOUS EQUIPMENT IN CONTAINMENT IN SUPPORT OUTAGE MAINTENANCE WITH UNIT 1 IN MODES 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 AND DEFUELED. THE INSULATION REMOVAL ENCOMPASSES THE REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER, THE PRESSURIZER MANWAY COVER, 11 AND 12 STEAM GENERATOR SECONDARY MANWAY COVERS, VALVES 1 RV 200, 1 MOV 403, AND 1 FW 130 AND CONNECTING PIPING. IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT SPRAY, IF CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM OR ESFAS TESTING IS PERFORMED THAT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO CAUSE AN INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY WHILE THIS ACTIVITY IS IN PROGRESS, THE SPRAY HEADER WILL BE ISOLATED FROM THE DISCHARGE OF THE AFFECTED CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP.

THE ABILITY OF THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT TO PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUNCTION IS NOT COMPROMISED BY THE INSULATION REMOVAL. THE PROBABILITY OF THERMAL SHOCK TO THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT (DUE TO INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION) HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO NOT INTRODUCE ANY SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE EFFECTS. IN ADDITION, THERE IS SUFFICIENT CONTAINMENT COOLING

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AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THIS PLANNED ACTIVITY SUCH THAT THE ADDITIONAL HEAT
CREATED BY THE REMOVAL OF THE SPECIFIED INSULATION WILL NOT IMPACT THE
FUNCTION OF OTHER SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.
(CMH)

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Document ID Revision Status

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SE00116 0000 64

Subject: ADD PROCEDURE CHANGES TO OI-2B FOR OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY.

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-065

Assoc Doc ID: UFSAR

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 1900

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: UFSAR

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 041

Text:

CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

THE CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) WAS DESIGNED WITH OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY AS INDICATED BY THE FOUR "MODES" OF OPERATION DESCRIBED IN THE UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR). FLOW PATH FLEXIBILITY WAS ALSO A PART OF PLANT DESIGN, BUT IS NOT DESCRIBED IN THE UFSAR. THIS SAFETY EVALUATION INVESTIGATED WHETHER A CLARIFICATION OF THE "PROCEDURES" DESCRIBED IN THE UFSAR INVOLVES AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ). THE CLARIFICATION REGARDS THE OPERATION OF THE CVCS WHEN CHANGING THE BORON CONCENTRATION OF THE REACTOR COOLANT.

THE UFSAR CURRENTLY DESCRIBES THE INJECTION FLOW PATH FROM THE MAKE-UP SOURCE TO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) VIA THE VOLUME CONTROL TANK (VCT) AND THE CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO DISCUSSION OF THE VALVE LINE-UP THAT BYPASSES THE VCT AND PROVIDES FOR MAKE-UP DIRECTLY TO THE CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER ("DIRECT FEED"). "DIRECT FEED" PROVIDES MORE TIMELY REACTIVITY CONTROL "FEEDBACK" SINCE IT INCREASES THE CHANGE RATE OF THE RCS BORON CONCENTRATION. QUICKER "FEEDBACK" IS ADVANTAGEOUS DURING CERTAIN PLANT CONDITIONS.

THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE

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SAR IS NOT INCREASED. THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAR IS NOT CREATED. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT REDUCED. THEREFORE, NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION IS INVOLVED.

Document ID Revision Status
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SE00117 0000 64

Subject: ADOPT A 46 METHODOLOGY AS ALTERNATE MEANS OF SEISMIC QUALIFICATION

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-060

Assoc Doc ID: ES199601058-000 Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP
Ref Doc ID: Rev: Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date
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Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 190 MULTI-SYSTEM
Text: PROPOSED ACTIVITY:

THE PURPOSE OF THIS ACTIVITY IS TO INCORPORATE THE USE OF THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION UTILITY GROUP'S (SQUG) SEISMIC VERIFICATION METHODOLOGY, HERE IN AFTER REFERRED TO AS THE "A-46 METHODOLOGY", AS AN ALTERNATE MEANS FOR VERIFYING THE SEISMIC ADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT AND OTHER PLANT COMPONENTS AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. THE A-46 METHODOLOGY WAS DEVELOPED BY SQUG AS AN INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO THE RESOLUTION ON UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE (USI) A-46 "VERIFICATION OF SEISMIC ADEQUACY OF MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IN OPERATING PLANTS". THE NRC HAS IDENTIFIED USI A-46 AS BEING APPLICABLE TO CCNPP UNITS 1 & 2. FOR THE RESOLUTION OF USI A-46, THE NRC HAS ENDORSED THE USE OF THE GENERIC IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE (GIP), REVISION 2 CORRECTED FEBRUARY 14, 1992, AS CLARIFIED BY THE NRC STAFF IN SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 2 (SSER-2) ISSUED MAY 22, 1992. THIS ENDORSEMENT WAS TRANSMITTED TO ALL A-46 UTILITIES IN SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 TO GENERIC LETTER 87-02.

ONE OF THE PRIMARY INPUTS USED TO DEVELOP THE GIP IS EPRI REPORT NP-7149 - D "SUMMARY OF THE SEISMIC ADEQUACY OF TWENTY CLASSES OF EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF NUCLEAR PLANTS". THE 20 CLASSES OF EQUIPMENT IS QUITE BROAD AND ENVELOPES THE MAJORITY OF ALL PLANT EQUIPMENT AT CCNPP. THE USE OF THE ALTERNATE SEISMIC VERIFICATION METHOD AT CCNPP CAN BE USED TO ADDRESS ALL 20 CLASSES OF EQUIPMENT, TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS, AND CABLE AND CONDUIT RACEWAYS COVERED BY THE GIP, EXCEPT FOR THE FOLLOWING ITEMS / SYSTEMS:

1. AUXILIARY FEED WATER ACTUATION SYSTEM
2. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTALLED PER FCR

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87 - 0087

3. REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 CATEGORY I (PAM1) INSTRUMENTATION
4. RVLMS INSTRUMENTATION COVERED BY TMI ACTION PLAN ITEM II.F.2
(ALREADY DESIGNATED PAM1, THEREFORE, COVERED BY NO. 3, ABOVE.)
5. ALL SAFETY RELATED ITEMS / EQUIPMENT FOR THE EDG 1A AND ITS
ASSOCIATED BUILDING.

FOR THE ABOVE ITEMS / SYSTEMS, CCNPP HAS PREVIOUSLY COMMITTED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF IEEE-344 (1975 OR 1987) FOR SEISMIC QUALIFICATION PURPOSES. SSER-2 STATES THAT THE NRC EXPECTS THESE PRIOR COMMITMENTS TO BE MAINTAINED. HOWEVER, THAT DOES NOT PRECLUDE FUTURE LICENSE REVISIONS ON THE PART OF CCNPP TO SEEK RELIEF FROM THOSE COMMITMENTS. FOR MATTERS RELATED TO VERIFYING THE SEISMIC ADEQUACY OF ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT COVERED BY THE A-46 METHODOLOGY A UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ) IS NOT INVOLVED. THE NRC APPROVED THE USE OF THE A-46 METHODOLOGY AT CCNPP IN ITS ISSUANCE OF SSER-2.

THE A-46 METHODOLOGY IS NOT LIMITED TO EQUIPMENT ITEMS ON THE SEISMIC SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL). IT CAN ALSO BE USED FOR ANY EQUIPMENT ITEM (EXCEPT AS NOTED ABOVE) FOR WHICH SEISMIC VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED PROVIDED THE EQUIPMENT ITEM IS COVERED BY THE GIP. THE ALTERNATE SEISMIC VERIFICATION METHOD APPLIES TO EXISTING EQUIPMENT INSTALLED IN CCNPP AS WELL AS NEW AND REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT FOR NEW AND REPLACEMENT TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS. THE CRITERIA IN THE GIP FOR TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS ARE INTENDED FOR EXISTING COMPONENTS ONLY, NOT NEW INSTALLATIONS.

SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REVISES THE PLANT LICENSING BASIS TO PERMIT THE USE OF THE A-46 METHODOLOGY, AS EMBODIED IN THE GENERIC IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE (GIP), REVISION 2 CORRECTED FEBRUARY 14, 1992, AS AN ALTERNATE METHOD FOR VERIFYING THE SEISMIC ADEQUACY OF MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. THE ALTERNATE SEISMIC VERIFICATION METHOD APPLIES TO ALL 20 CLASSES OF EQUIPMENT, TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS, AND CABLE AND CONDUIT RACEWAYS COVERED BY THE GIP FOR WHICH SEISMIC VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED. HOWEVER, THE A-46 METHODOLOGY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO NEW AND REPLACEMENT TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS AND EQUIPMENT WHERE CCNPP HAS MADE PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS TO THE NRC FOR SEISMIC VERIFICATION. THIS INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING ITEMS / SYSTEMS:

1. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION SYSTEM
2. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTALLED PER FCR
87 - 0087
3. REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 CATEGORY I (PAM1) INSTRUMENTATION
4. ALL SAFETY RELATED ITEMS / EQUIPMENT FOR THE EDG 1A AND ITS
ASSOCIATED BUILDING.

Document ID	Revision Status
SE00118	64
Subject:	REPLACE THE 4 KV UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-084

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501679-001
Ref Doc ID:Revision To: 0000
Rev:Assoc Stat: C
Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 004

Text:

ELECTRICAL 4 KV TRANSFORMERS AND BUSES

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE EXISTING 4KV UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS THAT PROVIDE AN UNDERVOLTAGE SIGNAL TO ESFAS, WITH NEW SOLID STATE RELAYS. THE NEW RELAYS WILL HAVE NEW SET POINTS THAT ENVELOPE THE EXISTING SET POINTS AND MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED IN THE ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INSPECTION (EDSFI). THE NEW SET POINTS WILL ENSURE THAT ALL OF THE PLANT SAFETY EQUIPMENT WILL START, RUN, AND CONTINUE TO OPERATE UNDER ALL ANTICIPATED PLANT CONDITIONS.

THIS ACTIVITY WILL REQUIRE THE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE RELAYS BE REVISED IN SAR. THIS ACTIVITY WILL ALSO REQUIRE THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TO BE REVISED TO INCLUDE THE SET POINTS UNDER THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES INSTRUMENTATION SECTION.

THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID	Revision Status
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SE00122 0000 64

Subject: CHANGE ICI REQUIREMENT IN UFSAR FOR UNIT 2 CYCLE 11.

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-075

Assoc Doc ID: ES199601213-000
Ref Doc ID:Revision To: 0000
Rev:Assoc Stat: C
Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 078

Text:

NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERS THE RELAXATION IN THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF OPERABLE INCORE DETECTOR STRINGS AND SEGMENTS FROM 75% TO 40%. AN EVALUATION WAS PERFORMED AND COMPENSATING ACTIONS TAKEN TO ENSURE THE VALIDITY OF THE SURVEILLANCE'S PERFORMED USING THE INCORE DETECTOR SYSTEM. THE COMPENSATING ACTIONS INCLUDE APPLYING A 1% PENALTY TO THE MEASURED PLHR AND POWER PEAKING FACTORS IN ORDER TO ACCOUNT FOR ANY POTENTIAL INCREASE IN

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MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY. ALSO COMPENSATION ACTIONS INCLUDE INCREASING SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY OF THE POWER PEAKING FACTORS FROM EVERY 31 DAYS TO EVERY 15 DAYS OF MODE 1 OPERATION. THE REVIEW CONCLUDED THAT THE PROPOSED CHANGE WILL NOT REQUIRE CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE PROPOSED CHANGE DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION BECAUSE IT DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, NOR DOES IT INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE DEFINED MARGIN OF SAFETY.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00123

64

Subject: TEMPORARY TENT IN PROTECTED AREA

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-066

Assoc Doc ID: EN-1-100

Ref Doc ID: 1-96-0109

Revision To: 0500

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type: TMOD

Assoc Type: NPPI

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 102

Text:

PLANT AREAS

THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES A TEMPORARY ALTERATION WHICH ALLOWS THE INSTALLATION OF UP TO TWO TEMPORARY TENTS LOCATED BETWEEN THE SSB AND NSF INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS 50.59 IS TO ENSURE THAT THE TEMPORARY TENTS DO NOT MOVE FROM THEIR PRESCRIBED LOCATION. INADVERTANT RELEASE OF THE TENTS DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS SUCH AS HIGH WINDS, COULD CAUSE THE TENTS TO INTERFERE WITH SUCH THINGS AS EDG EXHAUST AND PLANT VENTILATION. AND TENT POLES COULD ACT AS TORNADO MISSILES IF NOT SUFFICIENTLY SECURED TO THE GROUND. CONTINGENCIES WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE THAT THE TENTS ARE ADEQUATELY SECURED FOR MILD WEATHER INCLUDING A MODERATE RAIN. THE CONTINGENCY WILL INCLUDE A WEATHER WATCH WHICH WILL INCLUDE AN UPPER LIMIT FOR WIND SPEED AND ADVERSE FORECASTS SUCH AS TORNADOES AND HURRICANES. UPON NOTIFICATION OF ADVERSE CONDITIONS, THE TENTS WILL BE COLLAPSED AND SECURED WITHIN A PRESCRIBED TIME PERIOD.

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00124

64

Subject: GAG OPEN 1 - DAMP - 5372 UNDER TA 1 - 96 - 0111

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-068

Assoc Doc ID: 60723SH0004

Ref Doc ID: 1-96-0110

Revision To: 0033

Rev: 0

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type: TMOO

Assoc Type: BGEDRWG

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

Text:

TA 1 - 96 - 0110 WILL GAG OPEN CR HVAC RETURN FAN #12 SUCTION DAMPER 0 - HVAC - 5372. TO ACHIEVE THIS ACTIVITY THE DAMPER WILL BE MECHANICALLY GAGGED OPEN AND THE INSTRUMENT AIR LINE TO THE SOLENOID VALVE WILL BE DETACHED AND CAPPED. DETACHING THE AIR LINE WILL PLACE THE DAMPER IN ITS FAIL-SAFE POSITION WHICH IS OPEN (LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR OPENS THE DAMPER; AIR CLOSSES THE DAMPER). MECHANICALLY GAGGING THE DAMPER WILL ENSURE THAT THE DAMPER STAYS IN A FIXED POSITION (OPEN).

SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY PROPOSES TO GAG DAMPER 0 - DAMP - 5372 TO ITS FAIL SAFE POSITION WHICH IS OPEN. THIS DAMPER IS PART OF THE CR/CSR HVAC SYSTEM. THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE SPREADING ROOMS VENTILATION SYSTEM IS COMPRISED OF FANS, FILTERS, DAMPERS, HEATING AND COOLING COILS, AND INSTRUMENTATION WHICH SUPPLY FILTERED AND TEMPERED AIR TO THE CONTROL ROOM AND THE CABLE SPREADING ROOMS. AIR CONDITIONING IS REQUIRED IN THESE AREAS TO LIMIT THE TEMPERATURE UNDER WHICH THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE SPREADING ROOM INSTRUMENTION MUST OPERATE. IN ADDITION, EMERGENCY OPERATION OF THE CR HVAC SYSTEM IS REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF A LOCI TO RECIRCULATE SOME AIR THROUGH A SELF CONTAINED POST-LOCI FILTER SYSTEM.

GAGGING OPEN DAMPER 0 - DAMP - 5372 WILL ALLOW REPAIR WORK TO BE PERFORMED. WORK UNDER THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION (1 - 96 - 0110) ENSURES A REDUNDANT PATH IS MAINTAINED THROUGH THE RETURN FAN DUCT SYSTEM SHOULD UNIT #12 RETURN FAN BE NEEDED IN A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. THIS ACTIVITY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3 / 7.6.1 BY MAINTAINING THE REQUIRED REDUNDANCY AND DIVERSITY FOR THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE SPREADING ROOM WILL

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NOT BE ADVERSELY IMPACTED AND THAT THE CONTROL ROOM REMAINS HABITABLE FOR OPERATIONS PERSONNEL FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY AND / OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION. NOR DOES THIS ACTIVITY CREATE A NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR. TA 1 - 96 -0110 DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES. THEREFORE, IT MAY BE CONCLUDED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN U S Q.

Document ID	Revision Status				
SE00127	0000 64	Subject:	ALLOW USE OF U-BEND STABILIZERS IN S/G		
		Alias:			
		POSRC #:	96-071		
		Assoc Doc ID:	ES199601032-000	Revision To:	0000
		Ref Doc ID:		Assoc Stat:	C
				Refer Type:	ESP
Sender				Xmtl #	Xmtl Date

Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 064
Text:

REACTOR COOLANT

DURING THE 1996 UNIT 1 RFO EDDY CURRENT INSPECTIONS OF THE STEAM GENERATOR TUBES, SIX DIFFERENT TUBES WERE IDENTIFIED WITH INDICATIONS OF CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACKING HIGH IN THE VERTICAL SECTION OF THE TUBE BUNDLE. THE TUBES WILL BE PLUGGED AND REMOVED FROM SERVICE. PRIOR TO PLUGGING, THESE TUBES WILL REQUIRE STABILIZATION OF THE DEFECTIVE AREA OF THE TUBE. REACHING THIS LOCATION HIGH IN THE VERTICAL SECTION OF THE TUBE BUNDLE WILL REQUIRE THE USE OF A MUCH LONGER STABILIZER THAN USED BEFORE, SUCH AS THE FRAMATOME (FTI) U-BEND CABLE STABILIZER THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS MODIFICATION ACTIVITY. SINCE TUBE STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES ARE NO LONGER APPLICABLE ONLY IN THE VICINITY OF THE TUBESHEET REGION, BUT NOW EXTEND HIGH INTO THE VERTICAL SECTION OF THE TUBE BUNDLE AS A RESULT OF THIS ACTIVITY, IT IS NECESSARY TO CHANGE THE UFSAR 4 1 3 2 TO REMOVE "IN THE TUBESHEET REGION" FROM THE STABILIZER DISCUSSION. THIS SAFETY EVALUATION REVIEWS THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES OF USING THE U-BEND CABLE STABILIZERS TO STABILIZE STEAM GENERATOR TUBES WITH DEGRADATION HIGH IN THE VERTICAL SECTION OF THE TUBE BUNDLE.

THE U-BEND CABLE STABILIZERS ARE LONGER VERSIONS OF THE CABLE STABILIZERS ALREADY APPROVED FOR USE IN THE CNPP STEAM GENERATORS. THE STABILIZERS WILL BE INSTALLED IN TUBES ALREADY DESIGNATED FOR PLUGGING AND REMOVAL FROM SERVICE. THEREFORE THIS ACTIVITY HAS NO IMPACT ON THE HEAT TRANSFER CAPABILITIES OF THE STEAM GENERATORS OR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE RCS OR SECONDARY SIDE SYSTEMS. EACH U-BEND CABLE STABILIZER IS LIGHT-WEIGHT (APPROXIMATELY 25 LBS) AND WILL HAVE AN INSIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE STEAM GENERATOR OR TUBE SUPPORTS. THE STABILIZERS HELP RESTORE THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF A DEGRADED TUBE WITH

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INDICATION OF CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACKING. FIV ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED THAT VERIFIED ACCEPTABLE FLUID ELASTIC STABILITY, DISPLACEMENTS, AND VIBRATIONS CHARACTERISTICS UNDER DESIGN FLOW CONDITIONS, EVEN IF THE CRACK COMPLETELY SEVERED THE TUBE, AND THERE WAS NO CONCERN RELATED TO TUBE CONTACT WITH AN IN-SERVICE TUBE. HIGH SECONDARY SIDE FLOW TRANSIENTS (SUCH AS MSLB) WERE ALSO EVALUATED FOR EFFECT ON THE STABILIZED TUBE. VERTICAL MOTION OF A TUBE IS RESTRICTED BY THE ASSOCIATED "BATWING" AND VERTICAL SUPPORTS IN THE UPPER U-BEND REGION OF THE TUBE BUNDLE. SHOULD THE FLUID FORCES BE SUFFICIENT ENOUGH TO DEFLECT THE STABILIZED TUBE AND MAKE CONTACT WITH ANOTHER TUBE ABOVE, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE LOADS WOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE IN-SERVICE TUBE. IT IS LIKELY THAT ANY DEFLECTION ENCOUNTERED WOULD END AT THE TERMINATION OF THE TRANSIENT AND THE STABILIZED TUBE WOULD RETURN TOWARD ITS ORIGINAL POSITION, BREAKING CONTACT WITH THE IN-SERVICE TUBE. EVEN IF THE TUBE REMAINED IN CONTACT WITH AN IN-SERVICE TUBE AND THE STEAM GENERATOR WAS PLACED BACK INTO OPERATION, ANY FIV RELATED WEAR WOULD TAKE PLACE OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. TUBE DEGRADATION AND/OR TUBE CONTACT WILL BE DISCOVERED BY NORMAL STEAM GENERATOR TUBE EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION ACTIVITIES LONG BEFORE IT CAN PROGRESS TO A TUBE FAILURE.

IF THE TUBE ADJACENT TO THE STABILIZED TUBE WERE TO FAIL AS A RESULT OF WEAR FROM THE STABILIZED TUBE, THERE WOULD BE PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAKAGE FROM THE RCS. THIS WOULD RESULT IN AN EVENT SIMILAR TO THE ONE ALREADY ANALYZED IN THE UFSAR CHAPTER 14.15, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE (SGTR) EVENT. THAT ANALYSIS ASSUMED DOUBLE-ENDED TUBE RUPTURE AS A DESIGN BASIS SGTR EVENT AND RESULTED IN MAXIMUM 0-2 HOUR SITE BOUNDARY DOSES SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN THE GUIDELINES OF 10 CFR 100.

BASED ON THIS SAFETY EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE USE OF FTI U-BEND CABLE STABILIZERS TO STABILIZE A DEGRADED STEAM GENERATOR TUBE DOES INCREASE NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A TUBE RUPTURE MALFUNCTION, DOES NOT CREATE A SAFETY CONCERN, DOES NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION, NOR DOES IT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00128 64

Subject: REMOVE SHIELD BLOCKS FROM U-2 EQUIPMENT HATCH

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-076

Assoc Doc ID: ES9300001

Ref Doc ID: 2-96-0035

Revision To: 0000

Rev: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type: TMOD

Assoc Type: ESP

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code:

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Text: THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES A TEMPORARY ALTERATION WHICH ALLOWS THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS LOCATED IN THE UNIT 2 BUTLER BUILDING IN FRONT OF THE EQUIPMENT HATCH TO BE RELOCATED FOR UP TO 14 DAYS FOR MEASUREMENT OF THE EQUIPMENT HATCH NOZZLE DIMENSIONS. THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION SUPPORTS A PLANT MODIFICATION TO INSTALL A NEW EQUIPMENT HATCH WHICH WILL GREATLY INCREASE OUTAGE FLEXIBILITY AND COULD RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN OUTAGE CRITICAL PATH.

THE CONCRETE SHIELDING BLOCKS NOW IN PLACE IN FRONT OF THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 EQUIPMENT HATCHES WERE ORIGINALLY INSTALLED TO REDUCE THE HIGH NEUTRON AND GAMMA DOSES SEEN IN AND AROUND THE BUTLER BUILDINGS FOLLOWING INITIAL STARTUP OF THE PLANTS. THIS CONCERN WITH HIGH DOSE RATES DURING NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS HAS LARGELY BEEN ELIMINATED BY THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW NEUTRON SHIELD SURROUNDING THE REACTOR VESSEL. THEREFORE, UNDER NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS IT IS NO LONGER NECESSARY TO KEEP THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS IN PLACE TO BE ABLE TO KEEP OCCUPATIONAL DOSES ALARA AND TO NOT EXCEED THE 10 CFR 20 LIMITS.

REMOVAL OF THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS MAY RESULT IN A POST-LOCA INCREASE IN ON-SITE DOSE, BUT WILL NOT RESULT IN AN INCREASE TO THE OFF-SITE DOSE TO ANY MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT. LIKEWISE, REMOVAL OF THESE SHIELD BLOCKS WILL NOT RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN THE POST-LOCA DOSE TO ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO OPERATE TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT SUCH THAT THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SUCH EQUIPMENT CAN NO LONGER BE DEMONSTRATED. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT PRECLUDE ACCESS TO ANY PLANT AREA SUCH THAT ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT MAY NO LONGER BE TAKEN. THEREFORE, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS NO LICENSING REQUIREMENT TO HAVE THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS IN PLACE FOR PURPOSES OF MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT.

Document ID Revision Status
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SE00130 0000 62

Subject: INSTALL BLIND FLANGE ON RV 115

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-0148

Assoc Doc ID: M-90-164
Ref Doc ID: 2-95-0140Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: 0 Assoc Type: DCALC
Rev: 0000 Refer Type: TMOO TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date
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Other refs:
Pers Refs:

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 041

Text:

CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

SUMMARY:

THE PURPOSE OF TEMPORARY ALTERATION 2 95 0140 IS TO INSTALL A FREEZE SEAL IN THE DISCHARGE PIPING OF VCT RELIEF VALVE 2RV115. THIS VALVE IS BEING REPLACED DURING MODE 5, 6 OR DEFUELED WHEN THE UNIT 2 CVCS WILL BE TAGGED OUT OF SERVICE; HOWEVER, THE DISCHARGE PIPING IS IN THE WPS, WHICH IS COMMON TO BOTH UNITS CANNOT BE TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE.

THE FREEZE SEAL HAS BEEN EVALUATED AS EQUIVALENT TO A SYSTEM BOUNDARY ISOLATION VALVE. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, THAT ARE EQUIVALENT TO SUCH A VALVE, AND WERE DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABLE. THE FREEZE SEAL WILL HAVE NO DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE PIPING SYSTEM. IF LIQUID NITROGEN SUPPLY TO THE FREEZE SEAL WERE LOST, INTEGRITY OF THE FREEZE SEAL WILL BE MAINTAINED FOR AT LEAST 1 HOUR. DURING THIS TIME A BLIND FLANGE WOULD BE INSTALLED ON THE RELIEF VALVE OUTLET PIPING. THEREFORE, IF THE FREEZE SEAL INTEGRITY WERE NOT RE-ESTABLISHED, THE BLIND FLANGE WOULD PROVIDE PRESSURE BOUNDARY. ALL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF THE RC WPS PIPING ARE MET, WPS PIPING IS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED AND MEETS SEISMIC REQUIREMENTS. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANALYZED MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS, AND NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS ARE CREATED. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A USQ.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00131 64

Subject: EVALUATION OF CONNECTING PIPE DRAINS TO FILL EMERGENCY SUMP PIPING

Alias:

POSRC #: 95-084

Assoc Doc ID: ES199601451-000

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 052

Text:

SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

THIS ACTIVITY WILL PROVIDE A MEANS OF FILLING THE CONTAINMENT EMERGENCY SUMP PIPING WITH AMBIENT WATER WHILE AT POWER. THIS WILL ADDRESS CONCERNS THAT THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION MOVES COULD BE SUBJECT TO "THERMALLY INDUCED PRESSURE LOCKING" CAUSED BY HOT REACTOR COOLANT ENTERING THE SUMP AT THE BEGINNING OF A LOCA. STAINLESS STEEL TUBING WILL BE USED TO CONNECT TOGETHER THE TWO NORMALLY CLOSED DRAIN VALVE TAIL PIPES THAT ARE LOCATED ON EACH SIDE OF THE CTMT SUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES. WHEN THE DRAIN VALVES ARE OPENED

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THE CONTAINMENT SUMP MOV CAN BE OPENED AND WATER FROM THE RWT WILL FILL THE SUMP PIPING. WHEN THE EMERGENCY SUMP PIPING IS FULL, WATER WILL SPILL FROM THE EMERGENCY SUMP AND INTO THE NORMAL SUMP. THE HIGH LEVEL ALARM IN THE NORMAL SUMP WILL ALLOW OPERATORS TO KNOW THAT THE EMERGENCY SUMP IS FULL AND CLOSE THE MOV AND THE DRAIN VALVES. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT ALTER THE FUNCTION OF ANY ECCS EQUIPMENT. IT DOES NOT CAUSE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION TO BE LOST, AND IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE ANALYSIS OF ANY ACCIDENTS. THEREFORE THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00133 0000 64

Subject: RETIRE IN PLACE O R I 7 0 2 8 AND O R E 7 0 2 8

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-096

Assoc Doc ID: ES199600595-000

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: ORE7028

MISC WASTE EVAP RM RAD MONITOR

ORI7028

MISC WASTE EVAP RM AREA MON

Org/Div:

System Code: 077

AREA RADIATION MONITORING

Text:

THIS ACTIVITY RETIRES THE AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM FOR 11 MISCELLANEOUS WASTE EVAPORATOR (MWE).

THE MWE IS RETIRED IN PLACE AND ITS AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM IS NO LONGER NEEDED. THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE MWE AREA RADIATION MONITOR SYSTEM ARE THE LOCAL DETECTOR, LOCAL INDICATOR, AND REMOTE INDICATOR IN THE CONTROL ROOM. THESE COMPONENTS WILL BE DISABLED.

THE MWE IS LOCATED WITHIN THE CONCRETE WALLS OF ITS OWN ROOM. SINCE THE MWE IS NO LONGER USED AND THE MONITOR IS SHIELDED FROM OTHER SSCS, I.E., ONLY SERVES TO SUPPORT THE MWE, THE AREA RADIATION MONITOR IS NO LONGER REQUIRED.

THIS EVALUATION HAS BEEN PREPARED TO ALLOW REVISING UFSAR SECTION 7 5 8. THIS SECTION LISTS AREA RADIATION MONITOR 7028 AS A CATEGORY 3 VARIABLE. THIS TEXT WILL BE REVISED TO SHOW THE MODIFIED CONFIGURATION.

THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT DEGRADE THE RELIABILITY OR INCREASE THE CHALLENGES OF ANY ITS SSCS. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS.

BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00134 0000 64

Subject: SUPPLY TEMPORARY POWER TO THE UNIT 1 POLAR CRANE FROM EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR BACKED BUS 11A.

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-091

Assoc Doc ID: 61009

Ref Doc ID: 1-96-0138

Revision To: 0030

Rev: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type: TMOO

Assoc Type: BGEDRWG

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender

Xmti #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 005

Text:

ELECTRICAL 480V TRANSFORMERS AND BUSES

THIS ACTIVITY TEMPORARILY POWERS THE UNIT 1 POLAR CRANE FROM AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR BACKED BUS. THE POLAR CRANE WILL BE POWERED FROM 480 VAC CUBICLE 52 1103 VIA A SAFETY RELATED CIRCUIT BREAKER. THE ADDITIONAL LOAD ON 480 VAC BUS 11A WILL BE A TEMPORARY CHANGE TO UFSAR FIGURE 8-3. THE ALLOWABLE MODES FOR INSTALLATION ON THIS TEMPORARY ALTERNATION ARE MODES 5, 6, AND DEFUELED.

THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION IS DESIRED BECAUSE THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) WILL BE IN A REDUCED INVENTORY CONDITION DURING MAINTENANCE OF 11B REACTOR COOLANT PUMP. MORE RELIABLE POWER FOR THE POLAR CRANE IS DESIRED TO ALLOW FOR CLOSURE OF THE RCS IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER.

THE LOADS ON THE SYSTEM HAVE BEEN EVALUATED AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. THE LOADS ON 480V BUS 11A WILL MAINTAIN THEIR RELAY / BREAKER PROTECTION AND WILL BE CONNECTED TO THE 480V BUS THROUGH A SAFETY RELATED BREAKER. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00135 0000 64

Subject: REPLACEMENT OF THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORS AND INSTALLATION OF THE N-16 MONITORS

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-095

Assoc Doc ID: 91-0251-003

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

1RE5421	MN STM LINE 11 EFF RAD MONITOR
1RE5422	MN STM LINE 12 EFF RAD MONITOR
1RIC5421	11 MAIN STM HDR RAD MONITOR
1RIC5421A	11 MN STM LINE EFFL RAD IND CONTROL
1RIC5422	1 RE MN STM HDR RADN MON
1RIC5422A	12 MN STM LINE EFFL RAD IND CONTROL
1RIT5421	11 MN STM LINE EFFL RAD MON
1RIT5421A	11 MN STM LINE EFFL RAD MON
1RIT5422	12 MN STM LINE EFFL RAD MON
1RIT5422A	12 MN STM LINE EFFL RAD MON
1RR5420	U1 SG11&12 MN STM RAD MONI REC
1YX1X5421	1-RIT 5421 PREAMP
1YX1X5421A	1-RIT 5421A PREAMP
1YX1X5422	1-RIT-5421 PREAMP
1YX1X5422A	1-RIT-5422A PREAMP
2RE5421	21 RE MN STM LINE EFFL RA
2RE5422	22 RE MN STM LINE EFFL RA
2RIC5421	21 RE MN STM HDR RADN MON
2RIC5421A	21 MN STM EFFL RAD IND CNTRL
2RIC5422	22 RE MN STM HDR RADN MON
2RIC5422A	22 MN STM EFFL RAD IND CNTRL
2RIT5421	21 MN STM LINE EFFLUENT RADMON
2RIT5421A	21 MN STM LINE EFFLUENT RADMON
2RIT5422	22 MN STM LINE EFFLUENT RADMON
2RIT5422A	22 MN STM LINE EFFLUENT RADMON
2RR5420	2 RE MN STM RADN MON RECO

Org/Div:

System Code: 077
079AREA RADIATION MONITORING
PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING

Text:

PROPOSED ACTIVITY:
THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE MAIN STEAM LINE (MSL) EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITORS.

THE EXISTING EQUIPMENT, AS DESCRIBED IN THE SAR, CONSISTS OF A DETECTOR, RATEMETER AND A RECORDER FOR EACH MAIN STEAM LINE WHICH PROVIDE INDICATION, TRENDING AND ALARM FUNCTIONS. THIS SAFETY EVALUATION IS FOR UNITS 1 AND 2. UNIT 2 DESIGN WILL BE ISSUED WITH SUPPLEMENT 4.

A UFSAR CHANGE REQUEST IS INCLUDED WITH THIS ESP TO CHANGE THE SAR TO DESCRIBE THE NEW EQUIPMENT AND RANGES.

THE NEW EQUIPMENT IS CONFIGURED AS (TYPICAL):
(FIGURE INSERTED HERE)

SECTION 7.5.8, POST ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION, DESCRIBES THIS INSTRUMENTATION AS PAM-2. THE NEW EQUIPMENT WILL BE PAM-2. BOTH THE EXISTING AND NEW MONITORS SATISFY THE REG 1.97 REQUIRED RANGE (0.1 MICROCURIES PER CC TO 10E3 MICROCURIES PER CC) FOR THIS VARIABLE.

THE AFFECTED EXISTING EQUIPMENT IS 1(2)RE5421, 1(2)RIC5421, 1(2)RE5422, 1(2)RIC5422, AND 1(2)RR5420. THE NEW RE WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE SAME

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LOCATION OF THE OLD RE (REUSE THE DETECTOR ENCLOSURES). THE NEW RICS AND RR WILL BE INSTALLED ON A TEMPORARY RACK BEHIND 2C26 UNTIL THEY ARE PERMANENTLY LOCATED BY SUPPLEMENT 004 OF THIS MODIFICATION. THE PREAMPLIFIERS AND LOCAL RATEMETERS WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE CABLE SPREADING ROOM.

SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE EXISTING MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORING EQUIPMENT. THESE INSTRUMENTATION LOOPS ARE CLASSIFIED AS SR-PAM2.

THIS MODIFICATION IS ACCOMPLISHED IN A MANNER THAT ENSURES NO IMPACT ON COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THOSE DIRECTLY AFFECTED. SEISMIC CRITERIA FOR THE CONTROL ROOM PANELS IS ALSO MAINTAINED. THE NEW CONFIGURATION POSES NO NEW SIGNIFICANT FAILURE MODES. BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

THIS EVALUATION HAS BEEN PREPARED BECAUSE SAR SECTIONS 4.3, 7.5.2, 10.1, 10.5, 11.1, 11.2, FIGURE 11.4, AND APPENDIX 10A ARE IN NEED OF REVISION TO IDENTIFY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ACTIVITY. THE TEXT AND FIGURE REVISIONS WILL REFLECT THE MODIFIED CONFIGURATION.

Document ID	Revision Status				
SE00137	0000 64	Subject:	TEMPORARY FLOW PATHS IN MISC. WASTE SYSTEM		
		Alias:			
		POSRC #:	96-096		
		Assoc Doc ID:	60735SH0002	Revision To:	0029
		Ref Doc ID:	1-96-0089	Assoc Stat:	C
				Rev:	0000
				Refer Type:	TMOD
				Assoc Type:	BGEDRWG
					TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 071
Text:

LIQUID WASTE

THE TEMPORARY ALTERATION PROVIDES THE DESIGN TO INSTALL A TEMPORARY FLOWPATH IN THE MISCELLANEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM (MWS). THE TEMPORARY FLOWPATH WILL REDIRECT THE AUXILIARY BUILDING GRAVITY DRAINS, AND THE PUMPED SUMPS FROM THE INLET OF BASKET STRAINER O BS 2199 TO 11 MISCELLANEOUS WASTE RECEIVER TANK (MWRT). THIS WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY CONNECTING A TEMPORARY HOSE BETWEEN THE COVER PLATE OF O BS 2199 AND THE MANWAY COVER AT 11 MWRT.

THIS TA WILL ALLOW FOR ISOLATION AND REPAIR (WELDING) OF SYSTEM LEAKS AT O MWS 508 AND ASSOCIATED MWS PIPING.

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY RESULTS IN A CHANGE TO THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT'S DESCRIPTION OF THE METHOD OF PERFORMING THE FUNCTION OF THE MWS, SPECIFICALLY UFSAR FIGURE 11-2.

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THE TEMPORARY FLOW PATH CONFORMS TO THE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORIGINAL CODES AND STANDARDS. THE FLOW FROM THE AUXILIARY BUILDING GRAVITY DRAINS AND PUMPED SUMPS ARE DIRECTED TO THE SAME TANK AS BEFORE. THE TEMPORARY HOSE HAS SUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO ACCOMMODATE THE SYSTEM FLOW RATE. THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT CREATE A NEW OR DIFFERENT RADIOACTIVE RELEASE EVENT.

THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT DEGRADE THE RELIABILITY OR INCREASE THE CHALLENGES OF ANY ITS SSCS. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY MET THE DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS.

BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00138 0000 62

Subject: DESIGN FOR CONTAINMENT SUMP COVER

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-116

Assoc Doc ID: ES199502396-000

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 052

SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

Text: ALICE C A R S O N 301 - 417 - 4212
(BECHTEL)

SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY ADDS A PERMANENT DEBRIS COVER OVER THE CONTAINMENT EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION SUMP IN LIEU OF THE EXISTING TEMPORARY DEBRIS COVER WHICH MUST BE ERECTED AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH OUTAGE AND DISMANTLED AT THE END OF EACH OUTAGE. THIS DEBRIS COVER IS SUPPORTED OFF OF THE EXISTING SCREEN BOX OVER THE SUMP. THE SCREEN BOX HAS BEEN EVALUATED FOR THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT OF THE DEBRIS COVER AND HAS FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. THE DEBRIS COVER IS DESIGNED SAFETY RELATED SEISMIC CATEGORY I AND IS FABRICATED FROM STAINLESS

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STEEL WHICH IS SUITABLE FOR USE IN THE POST-LOCA ENVIRONMENT.

THE DEBRIS COVER HAS BEEN EVALUATED FOR ITS IMPACT ON PUMP SUCTION FROM THE CONTAINMENT SUMP AND HAS BEEN FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. THE DEBRIS COVER IS DESIGNED CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDANCE OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1.82 AND IS INTENDED TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF CLOGGING THE SUMP WITH OUTAGE GENERATED DEBRIS. THE COVER MAY ALSO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF GRAVITY DRIVEN DEBRIS FROM CLOGGING THE TOP OF THE SCREEN BOX IN A POST-LOCA ENVIRONMENT.

AS THE DEBRIS SCREEN IS DESIGNED SAFETY-RELATED SEISMIC CATEGORY I, IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDANCE IN REGULATORY GUIDE 1.82, IS FABRICATED FROM SUITABLE MATERIALS, AND HAS BEEN FOUND NOT TO ADVERSELY IMPACT THE FLOW FROM THE CONTAINMENT SUMP TO THE PUMP SUCTION, THE ADDITION OF THE DEBRIS SCREEN DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS OR CREATE NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS.

NO CHANGES TO THE NUMBER OF OPERABLE SYSTEMS REQUIRED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE MADE BY THIS ACTIVITY. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY CHANGES TO PIPING OR COMPONENTS IN THE SAFETY INJECTION OR CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEMS AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY TO ALIGN THESE SYSTEMS TO THE CONTAINMENT SUMP WATER SOURCE IN POST-RAS (RECIRCULATION ACTIVATION SIGNAL) OPERATION. AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, THE DEBRIS SCREEN HAS BEEN DESIGNED AND LOCATED AS NOT TO ADVERSELY IMPACT FLOW FROM THE CONTAINMENT EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION SUMP TO THE PUMP SUCTION. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SINCE THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS AND DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00139 62

Subject: INSTALL 2 RV 4164

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-129

Assoc Doc ID: ES199601617-000

Ref Doc ID:

Revision To: 0000

Rev:

Assoc Stat: C

Refer Type:

Assoc Type: ESP

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: 2RV4164

Org/Div:

System Code: 052

Text:

21 RWT HEAT EXCHANGE RELIEF VALVE

SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

SUMMARY:

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

RELIEF VALVES 1(2)RV 4164 ARE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION FOR 11 AND 21 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANKS HEAT EXCHANGERS. THE DESIGN ENGINEERING FOR THE INSTALLATION OF BOTH RELIEF VALVES WAS PROVIDED UNDER FCR 75 1108. HOWEVER, ONLY 1RV 4164 WAS INSTALLED PRIOR TO THE FCR CLOSEOUT. THIS ESP PROVIDES THE DESIGN ENGINEERING TO ALLOW THE INSTALLATION OF 2RV 4164.

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY RESULTS IN A CHANGE TO THE SAR DESCRIPTION OF THE METHOD OF PERFORMING THE FUNCTION OF THE SSC AS DESCRIBED IN UFSAR FIGURE 6-10.

IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE TANK CONTENTS FROM FREEZING IN THE WINTER, A PUMP PROVIDES CIRCULATION THROUGH AN EXTERNAL HEAT EXCHANGER. THE RWT CONTENTS ARE CIRCULATED THROUGH THE TUBE SIDE, HOT WATER FROM THE PLANT HEATING SYSTEM FLOWS THROUGH THE SHELL SIDE. SURVEILLANCE OF THE TANKS CONTENTS IS REQUIRED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE RWT IS VENTED TO ATMOSPHERE; HOWEVER, THE EXTERNAL HEAT EXCHANGER CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THE RWT. RELIEF VALVE 2RV 4164 FUNCTION TO PROVIDE OVER PRESSURE PROTECTION TO 21 RWT HX IN THE EVENT THE TUBE SIDE IS ISOLATED FROM THE RWT WHILE HOT WATER FROM THE PLANT HEATING SYSTEM IS SUPPLYING THE SHELL SIDE.

THE INSTALLATION OF AN OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION DEVICE IS REQUIRED BY THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION CODE OF THE RWT HX. THE RELIEF VALVE (2RV 4164) AND THE ASSOCIATED SETPOINT CONFORMS TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORIGINAL DESIGN CODES AND STANDARDS.

THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT DEGRADE THE RELIABILITY OR INCREASE THE CHALLENGES OF ANY ITS SSCs. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY MET THE DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND REGULATIONS.

BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

Document ID	Revision Status
=====	=====
SE00141	0000 62

Subject: REPLACEMENT OF THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORS AND INSTALLATION OF THE N-16 MONITORS. PERMANENT INSTALLATION OF RATEMETERS AND RECORDERS ON CONTROL ROOM PANELS 2C24B AND 2C26. AND CONSOLIDATION OF DATA POINT RECORDERS.

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-152

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Assoc Doc ID: 91-0251-004
Ref Doc ID:Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP
Rev: Refer Type:

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 079
Text:

PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING

SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES THE EXISTING MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORING EQUIPMENT AND MAIN VENT WIDE RANGE NOBLE GAS RECORDERS. THESE INSTRUMENTATION LOOPS ARE CLASSIFIED AS SR-PAM2.

THIS MODIFICATION IS ACCOMPLISHED IN A MANNER THAT ENSURES NO IMPACT ON COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THOSE DIRECTLY AFFECTED. SEISMIC CRITERIA FOR THE CONTROL ROOM PANELS IS ALSO MAINTAINED. THE NEW CONFIGURATION POSES NO NEW SIGNIFICANT FAILURE MODES. BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

THIS EVALUATION HAS BEEN PREPARED BECAUSE SAR SECTIONS 4.3, 7.5, 10.1, 10.5, 11.1, 11.2, FIGURE 11.4, AND APPENDIX 10A ARE IN NEED OF REVISION TO IDENTIFY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ACTIVITY. THE TEXT AND FIGURE REVISIONS WILL REFLECT THE MODIFIED CONFIGURATION. ALL CHANGES TO THE SAR HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN SUPPLEMENT 003 AND 004 OF THIS ACTIVITY.

Document ID	Revision Status
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SE00142
Subject: 50.59 FOR REPLACEMENT OF THE LRNI DRAWERS FOR RRS

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-0130

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501044-000
Ref Doc ID:Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP
Rev: Refer Type:

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
=====	=====	=====

Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 078
Text:

NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION

SUMMARY:

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

THIS ACTIVITY WILL REPLACE THE U1 AND U2 LINEAR POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION (PRNI) DRAWERS IN THE REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM (RRS) FOR CHANNELS X AND Y WITH NEW ANALOG ELECTRONICS DRAWERS PROCURED THROUGH SPECIFICATION SP 0797 REV 2 FROM GAMMA-METRICS (GM). WHILE THE NEW PRNI DRAWERS WILL FIT IN THE SAME LOCATIONS AS THE EXISTING DRAWERS, THE DESIGN HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO SIMPLIFY MAINTENANCE AND CALIBRATION, AND ENHANCE THE VISUAL APPEARANCE. THESE PRNI DRAWERS ARE SCHEDULED TO BE REPLACED WHILE AT POWER. HOWEVER, IF NECESSARY, THEY CAN BE REPLACED WHILE THE UNIT IS IN ANY MODE.

BASED ON THE FACTS THAT THE NEW RRS PRNI DRAWERS WILL PERFORM THE SAME FUNCTIONS AS THE EXISTING RRS PRNI DRAWERS, THAT THERE ARE NO NEW ACCIDENTS OR MALFUNCTIONS INTRODUCED BY THIS ACTIVITY, AND THAT THE RRS PRNI DRAWERS ARE NEITHER AN INITIATOR OR MITIGATOR OF AN ACCIDENT, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INTRODUCE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ).

Document ID Revision Status

=====

SE00143 62

Subject: EVALUATE TRANSFER OF THROTTLE FUNCTION FROM 2 CV-5208 TO 2 CV-5163

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-119

Assoc Doc ID: ES9300001

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 012

Text:

SALT WATER COOLING

THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION WILL TRANSFER THE THROTTLE FUNCTION FOR THE CONTROL OF SALTWATER FLOW TO THE 22 COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER FROM 2-CV-5208 TO THE ADJACENT VALVE 2-CV-5163. SALTWATER CONTROL VALVE 2-CV-5208 HAS BEEN EXPERIENCING STROKE PROBLEMS. ATTEMPTS TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL. THE VALVE BODY NEEDS TO BE REPLACED AND THIS IS ONLY POSSIBLE WHEN THE SALTWATER SYSTEM IS IN OVERBOARD MODE. OPERATIONS HAS BEEN EXERCISING THE VALVE DAILY TO ENSURE FUNCTION. TO REMOVE THE BURDEN FROM OPERATIONS CREATED BY THE DAILY STROKING OF THE VALVE, AND TO MAINTAIN FLOW CONTROL SHOULD THE VALVE DEGRADE FURTHER, THE CONTROL FUNCTION OF 2-CV-5208 WILL BE MOVED TO 2-CV-5163. 2-CV-5208 WILL BE FAILED OPEN. THIS WILL MAKE THE ALIGNMENT OF THE 22 TRAIN MIMIC THE ALIGNMENT OF 21 TRAIN. THE 21 TRAIN IS COMPRISED OF AN INLET CV, A LOCKED

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OPEN MANUAL AND A FLOW CONTROL VALVE. THE 22 TRAIN WILL APPEAR TO HAVE AN INLET CV, A FLOW CONTROL VALVE AND A "LOCKED OPEN" VALVE. IN THIS CONFIGURATION BOTH TRAINS WILL HAVE THE SAME DEGREE OF REDUNDANCY, AND RESISTANCE TO FAILURE. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW MALFUNCTION OR CHANGE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN EVALUATED MALFUNCTION. THE SALTWATER SYSTEM IS NOT AN ACCIDENT INITIATOR, THIS IS NOT CHANGED. THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW ACCIDENT IS NOT CREATED AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT ARE NOT CHANGED. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CHANGE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID	Revision Status				
=====	=====				
SEG0144	0000 62				
Subject:	COVER PLATE FOR CAVITY COOLING FANS INLET PLENUM DUCTWORK				
Alias:					
POSRC #:	96-117				
Assoc Doc ID:	60723SH0003	Revision To:	0016	Assoc Stat:	C
Ref Doc ID:	2-96-0037	Rev:		Refer Type:	TMOD
	2-96-0038				TMOD
				Assoc Type:	BGEDRWG
					TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS
					TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 066
Text:

CAVITY COOLING SYSTEM

SUMMARY:

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS THE INSTALLATION OF TEMPORARY ALTERATIONS (TA) WHICH WILL INSTALL A PLATE TO COVER THE OPENING IN THE CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM DUCTWORK AFTER REMOVAL OF THE UNIT 1 (2) CAVITY COOLING FANS/MOTORS FOR MAINTENANCE WORK. THIS COVER PLATE ASSEMBLY WILL BE ATTACHED TO THE CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM DUCTWORK PLENUM AT THE INLET SIDE OF THE CAVITY COOLING FAN AND WILL REMAIN IN PLACE ONLY FOR THE DURATION OF THE MAINTENANCE WORK. PLACING A COVER PLATE ON THE OPENING WILL ALLOW FOR THE CONTINUED USE OF THE CONTAINMENT AIR FANS WITHOUT LARGE VOLUMES OF AIR BYPASSING THE DUCTWORK. THIS WILL ALSO HELP TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY FOR PROTECTION OF PERSONNEL WORKING IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE CAVITY COOLING FAN. THIS 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION IS APPLICABLE TO THOSE TAs ENVELOPING THE CHANGES DESCRIBED IN THIS EVALUATION.

DURING THE INSTALLATION PERIOD OF THE TEMPORARY ALTERATIONS, THE APPLICABLE UNIT WILL BE IN EITHER MODES 5, 6, OR DEFUELED.

THIS 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION IS GENERATED BECAUSE THE SAR DESCRIPTION OF THE CAVITY COOLING SYSTEM AS DEPICTED ON UFSAR FIGURE 9 20A IS TEMPORARILY AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY.

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THERE ARE NO NEW SYSTEM INTERACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH ALLOWING THE USE OF A DUCT COVER PLATE ASSEMBLY TO BE TEMPORARILY INSTALLED TO SUPPORT MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES ON THE CAVITY COOLING FANS. THERE ARE NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS CREATED AS A RESULT OF THE SUBJECT TA ACTIVITY. ALSO, THERE IS NO AFFECT ON OFFSITE DOSE CONSEQUENCES AS A RESULT OF THE SUBJECT TA ACTIVITY. SINCE THE PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF A PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION HAVE NOT BEEN INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY, SINCE NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS HAVE BEEN CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY, AND SINCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES IS NOT REDUCED, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.

Document ID Revision Status

SE00145 0000 62
Subject: FCR 86-0118, 2A, 1B, AND 2B EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AUTO BAR MODIFICATION

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-0125

Assoc Doc ID: 86-0118-02

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender Xmtl # Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 024

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

Text: SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY MODIFIES EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS 2A, 1B AND 2B TO ALLOW A CONTROLLED CRANKSHAFT ROLL OR BARRING, USING AIR FROM A DIESEL STARTING AIR RECEIVER TANK AS THE MOTIVE FORCE FOR ROTATION. BARRING IS RECOMMENDED BY THE EDG MANUFACTURER TO REMOVE EXCESS LUBRICATING OIL THAT COLLECTS IN THE EXHAUST PORTS AND EXHAUST MANIFOLD AFTER THE ENGINE HAS COMPLETED THE OPERATING CYCLE. THIS CONTRIBUTES TO EXCESS SMOKE AND POSSIBLE FIRES UPON STARTING OF THE ENGINES. DURING THE BARRING OPERATION, THE AFFECTED EDG IS DECLARED INOPERABLE, OUT OF SERVICE. THE HAZARDS, PHYSICAL DIFFICULTY AND EDG UNAVAILABILITY TIME ASSOCIATED WITH MANUAL BARRING MAKES IT DESIRABLE TO "AIR BAR" THE ENGINE, USING THE STARTING AIR SYSTEM.

A NEW BYPASS LINE WITH MANUAL BYPASS VALVES SHALL BE INSTALLED TO ALLOW BYPASSING OF THE EXISTING MANUAL AIR START SOLENOID VALVES, 2 SV 4831, 1 SV 4835 AND 2 SV 4839 ON 2A, 1B AND 2B EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS, RESPECTIVELY. THE BYPASS LINE WILL BRANCH OFF THE EXISTING DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING AIR CHECK VALVE TEST ISOLATION VALVE ON THE MANUAL AIR START SUPPLY LINE AND BRANCH BACK INTO THE STARTING AIR SUPPLY HEADERS,

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UPSTREAM OF THE AIR START SOLENOID VENT VALVE FOR EACH DIESEL. THE THROTTLE BYPASS VALVE IN THE LINE ENABLES A VARIABLE SUPPLY OF AIR TO BE DELIVERED TO THE ENGINE CYLINDERS WITHOUT OPENING THE AIR START SOLENOID VALVE. THIS, IN TURN, WILL ALLOW AN AIR CONTROLLED BARRING OF THE ENGINE. A PRESSURE GAUGE WILL ALSO BE INSTALLED DOWNSTREAM OF THE THROTTLE VALVE TO ALLOW THE OPERATOR CONSTANT MONITORING OF THE AIR PRESSURE BEING DELIVERED TO THE ENGINE CYLINDERS.

ALSO, A NORMALLY OPEN ISOLATION GLOBE VALVE WILL BE INSTALLED TO ISOLATE THE STARTING AIR DRIVEN REAR MAIN BEARING OIL BOOSTER CYLINDER. THIS WILL PREVENT OIL FROM BEING EVACUATED FROM THE OIL BOOSTER SO THE ENGINE REMAINS READY FOR AN EMERGENCY START AFTER BARRING IS COMPLETE. ENGINE OPERATION IS REQUIRED TO REFILL THIS CYLINDER IF IT IS EVACUATED. A HANDSWITCH AND APPROPRIATE WIRING WILL BE ADDED TO THE CONTROL CIRCUITRY OF THE EDG'S TO PREVENT INADVERTENT STARTING OF THE EDG DURING THE AIR BAR OPERATION AND TO SHUT THE AIR START VENT VALVE TO ALLOW THE HEADER TO PPESSURIZE. THE NEW HANDSWITCH IS ISOLATED FROM THE CONTROL CIRCUITRY DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF THE EDG BY NORMALLY OPEN CONTACTS ON THE EXISTING LOCAL/REMOTE HANDSWITCH.

THE FUNCTION OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS AND INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE EDGS AND PLANT EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS WILL BE MAINTAINED, SO ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING ACCIDENTS AND MALFUNCTIONS EVALUTED IN THE SAR REMAIN VALID. THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY REQUIRED SAFETY FUNCTIONS OF THE EDGS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THESE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS.

THIS CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ) NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. NO CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED.

Document ID	Revision Status
=====	=====
SE00146	0000 62
Subject:	REMOVAL OF BLEEDER TRIP VALVE AIR ASSIST CYLINDER FOR NEW MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE.
Alias:	
PGSRC #:	96-119

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Assoc Doc ID: ES199601899-000
Ref Doc ID:Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP
Rev: Refer Type:

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
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Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 046
Text:

EXTRACTION STEAM

THE REMOVAL OF THE COUNTERWEIGHT ARMS AND AIR ASSIST CYLINDERS ON ANY ONE OF THE BTVS ALTERS THE DESIGN OF THE BTV AS DESCRIBED IN THE UFSAR (FIGURE 10-5 OR 10 10 AND SECTION 5.3.1.2). THIS SAFETY EVALUATION PROVIDES THE BASIS DOCUMENTATION THAT WILL SUPPORT MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE VALVE 18A. THE OPERATION OF THE BTV IS NOT CREDITED AS AN ACCIDENT MITIGATOR AND ITS FAILURE TO CLOSE DOES NOT INITIATE ANY ACCIDENTS NOT PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED IN THE CHAPTER 14 ANALYSIS, THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY DESCRIBED IN THE SAR.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AS DEFINED BY 10CFR50.59.

Document ID	Revision Status
=====	=====
SE00147	0000 62

Subject: USE OF PORTABLE AIR COMPRESSOR AS A BACKUP TO PLANT AIR WHILE IN MODES 1 AND 2

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-0127

Assoc Doc ID: ES199601829-000
Ref Doc ID:Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C Assoc Type: ESP
Rev: Refer Type:

Sender	Xmtl #	Xmtl Date
=====	=====	=====

Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 019
Text:

COMPRESSED AIR

SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY ALLOWS THE CONNECTION OF A PORTABLE AIR COMPRESSOR TO EITHER UNIT'S PLANT AIR SYSTEM TO ACT AS A BACKUP TO THE OPERATING INSTALLED PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR WHEN THE OTHER INSTALLED PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR IS UNAVAILABLE. USE OF THE PORTABLE AIR COMPRESSOR IS INTENDED AS A CONTINGENCY MEASURE TO INCREASE THE RELIABILITY OF THE PLANT AIR SYSTEM WHILE ONE PLANT AIR COMPRESSOR IS UNAVAILABLE. USE OF THE PORTABLE AIR COMPRESSOR AS A CONTINGENCY BACKUP WILL BE ALLOWED IN ANY PLANT OPERATING MODE. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ) NOR REDUCE

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.
NO CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00149 0000 62
Subject: REPLACE TRANSFORMER U-440-24B

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-134

Assoc Doc ID: E3199600218-001

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 005

ELECTRICAL 480V TRANSFORMERS AND BUSES

Text: SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY REPLACES CLASS 1E UNIT SERVICE TRANSFORMER U-440-24B. THE REPLACEMENT IS A CLASS 1E, SEISMIC CLASS 1 TRANSFORMER. THE NEW TRANSFORMER HAS THE SAME ELECTRICAL RATING AS THE OLD ONE. THE OLD TRANSFORMER IS OIL FILLED, SELF COOLED AND THE NEW TRANSFORMER IS A DRY TYPE, SELF COOLED. THE SAR DRAWING IS BEING REVISED TO REFLECT THIS CHANGE IN TRANSFORMER COOLING METHOD. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT REQUIRE A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE AND IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID Revision Status

=====

SE00155 62

Subject: BY PASS THE EDG NON-ESSENTIAL TRIPS ON AN UNDERVOLTAGE SIGNAL

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-0147

Assoc Doc ID: ES199600862-000

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: 0

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code: 024
Text:

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

SUMMARY:

IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY TO TRIP THE FAIRBANKS EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDG), 1B, 2A OR 2B, ON ONE OF THE THREE NON-ESSENTIAL TRIPS (LOW JACKET COOLANT PRESSURE, HIGH JACKET COOLANT TEMPERATURE, AND CRANKCASE PRESSURE) DURING AN UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION. IF A TORNADO OCCURRED IN FRONT OF THE EDG DOORS THE AMBIENT PRESSURE WOULD DROP FAST ENOUGH NOT TO ALLOW THE EDG CRANKCASE PRESSURE TO EQUALIZE PROPERLY. THE CRANKCASE PRESSURE SENSORS WOULD READ A DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE AND ASSUME THAT THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN THE CRANKCASE PRESSURE THAT WAS DUE TO ENGINE PROBLEM. THE EDG WOULD TRIP AND BE UNAVAILABLE TO SUPPLY POWER DURING THIS ACCIDENT CONDITION.

THIS ACTIVITY PROVIDES A BLOCK SIGNAL TO THE NON-ESSENTIAL TRIPS ON THE THREE EDGS. ON A BLOCK SIGNAL FROM THE LOAD SHED VERIFICATION INDICATION RELAY (INDICATION RELAY), WHICH WILL MIMIC AN UNDERVOLTAGE SIGNAL, THE FOLLOWING EDG TRIPS WILL BE BLOCKED: LOW JACKET COOLANT PRESSURE, HIGH JACKET COOLANT TEMPERATURE, AND CRANKCASE PRESSURE. THESE EDG TRIPS PROVIDE EQUIPMENT PROTECTION FOR THE ENGINE. IN AN ACCIDENT SCENARIO, IT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE EDG OPERATE AND NOT TRIP THAN TO CONSIDER THE ECONOMIC RISK OF DAMAGING THE MACHINE.

A MALFUNCTION OF THE RELAY WILL RESULT IN EITHER THE EDG NOT TRIPPING ON A NON-ESSENTIAL TRIP WHEN REQUIRED OR THE RELIANCE ON A TWO OUT OF THREE TRIP LOGIC TO PREVENT NUISANCE TRIPPING IF THE RELAY DOES NOT BLOCK THE NON-ESSENTIAL TRIPS. THE DESIGN FUNCTION OF THE EDG DURING AN ACCIDENT IS NOT AFFECTED.

THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00157 0000 62

Subject: EQUIPMENT HATCH RADIATION SHIELDING

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-143

Assoc Doc ID: ES199502468-005

Revision To: 0000 Assoc Stat: C

Assoc Type: ESP

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: 1D00R67
2D00R67CNTMT EQUIPMENT HATCH
CNTMT EQUIPMENT HATCH

Org/Div:

System Code: 059

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

Text:

SUMMARY:

THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS OUTSIDE THE EQUIPMENT HATCH OPENING WERE
ELIMINATED BASED UPON RE-EVALUATION OF THE MAXIMUM HYPOTHETICAL LOCA
EFFECTS. REVISED THE APPROPRIATE UFSAR FIGURES TO SHOW THE REMOVAL OF
THE CONCRETE SHIELD BLOCKS FROM THE OUTSIDE OF THE EQUIPMENT HATCH AREA.
THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS WITH THIS ACTIVITY.

Document ID Revision Status

SE00158 0000 62

Subject: SAFETY EVAL FOR NEW LRNI DRAWERS FOR UNIT 1 AND 2 RPS

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-157

Assoc Doc ID: ES199501044-001

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: 0

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID: SE00142

Rev: 0000

Refer Type: 50.59

SAFETY EVALUATIONS

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment: 1N1005 CHANNEL A PWR RNG SFTY NI
1N1006 CHANNEL B PWR RNG SFTY NI
1N1007 CHANNEL C PWR RNG SFTY NI
1N1008 CHANNEL D PWR RNG SFTY NI
2N1005 2 NI POWER RANGE SAFETY C
2N1006 2 NI POWER RANGE SAFETY C
2N1007 2 NI POWER RANGE SAFETY C
2N1008 2 NI POWER RANGE SAFETY C

Org/Div:

System Code: 058

REACTOR PROTECTIVE

078

NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION

Text:

SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY WILL REPLACE THE U1 AND U2 LINEAR POWER RANGE NUCLEAR

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

INSTRUMENTATION (PRNI) DRAWERS IN THE REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM (RPS) FOR CHANNELS A, B, C, AND D WITH NEW ANALOG ELECTRONICS DRAWERS PROCURED THROUGH SPECIFICATION SP 0797 REV 2 FROM GAMMA METRICS (GM). WHILE THE NEW PRNI DRAWERS WILL FIT IN THE SAME LOCATION AS THE EXISTING DRAWERS, THE DESIGN HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO SIMPLIFY MAINTENANCE AND CALIBRATION, AND ENHANCE THE VISUAL APPEARANCE. THESE PRNI DRAWERS ARE SCHEDULED TO BE REPLACED WHILE AT POWER. HOWEVER, IF NECESSARY, THEY CAN BE REPLACED WHILE THE UNIT IS IN ANY MODE.

BASED ON THE FACTS THAT THE NEW RPS PRNI DRAWERS WILL CONTINUE TO MEET THE DESIGN BASES FOR THE EXISTING RPS PRNI DRAWERS, THAT THERE ARE NO NEW ACCIDENTS OR MALFUNCTIONS INTRODUCED BY THIS ACTIVITY, AND THAT THE RPS PRNI DRAWERS ARE NEITHER AN INITIATOR OR MITIGATOR OF AN ACCIDENT, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INTRODUCE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ).

Document ID	Revision Status				
SE00160	62				
Subject:	UNDERGROUND FUEL OIL PIPING				
Alias:					
POSRC #:	96-139				
Assoc Doc ID:	60484	Revision To:	0008	Assoc Stat:	C
	60736		0028		C
Re: Doc ID:	1-96-0187	Rev:	0001	Refer Type:	TMOD
				Assoc Type:	BGEDRWG
					BGEDRWG
					TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS
Sender		Xmtl #		Xmtl Date	

Other refs:
Pers Refs:
Equipment:
Org/Div:
System Code:
Text:

SUMMARY:

THIS EVALUATION PROVIDES THE ENGINEERING TO ALLOW THE REMOVAL OF DIRT FROM THE HB-5 UNDERGROUND FUEL OIL PIPING TO INVESTIGATE THE LINE FOR POTENTIAL OIL LEAKS.

OIL SOILED DIRT WAS DISCOVERED WHILE INSTALLING ANODES IN FRONT OF THE #21 DIESEL OIL TANK. IR1 050 755 WAS WRITTEN TO ADDRESS THIS CONCERN. SYSTEM ENGINEERING WOULD LIKE TO UN EARTH THE OIL LINES TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION OF THE OIL LEAK. IN DOING SO, THE OIL PIPING WILL BE EXPOSED TO THE AIR AND WILL NOT BE PROTECTED FROM TORNADO AND HURRICANE LOADS. THE SAR DISCUSSES THE ABILITY OF CAT I STRUCTURES AND SUPPORTING COMPONENTS TO RESIST IMPACT FROM MISSILES.

THEREFORE, THERE IS NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

10/01/1995 THRU 12/31/1996

Document ID Revision Status

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SE00161

0000 62

Subject: BYPASS LINE FOR 1/2 MOV 651 ADN 652

Alias:

POSRC #: 96-0157

Assoc Doc ID: ES199600343-000

Revision To: 0000

Assoc Stat: 0

Assoc Type: ESP

Ref Doc ID:

Rev:

Refer Type:

Sender

Xmtl #

Xmtl Date

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Other refs:

Pers Refs:

Equipment:

Org/Div:

System Code: 052

Text:

SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

SUMMARY:

THIS ACTIVITY PROPOSES TO INSTALL A BYPASS LINE ACROSS THE UPSTREAM SEAT OF 1 (2)MOV-651 AND 652.

THESE MOTOR OPERATED VALVES ARE THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM SUCTION LINE ISOLATION VALVES. THE FUNCTION OF THE BYPASS LINE IS TO PROVIDE A RELIEF PATH FOR THE FLUID TRAPPED IN THE BONNET CAVITY THUS ELIMINATING THE POTENTIAL FOR PRESSURE LOCKING OF THESE VALVES.

THIS 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION IS NEEDED SINCE THE SAR 'S DESCRIPTION OF THE SDC IS ALTERED BY THIS MODIFICATION. SPECIFICALLY UFSAR FIGURES 5-10, 6-1 AND 6-10 WILL BE REVISED TO DEPICT THE BYPASS LINE.

THE SHUTDOWN COOLING (SDC) SYSTEM IS USED TO REMOVE CORE DECAY HEAT AND REACTOR COOLANT SENSIBLE HEAT DURING PLANT COOLDOWNS AND COLD SHUTDOWNS. THE SYSTEM ALSO COOLS THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY WATER DURING CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM (CSS) OPERATION POST RECIRCULATION ACTUATION SIGNAL (RAS) AND MAINTAINS REFUELING TEMPERATURE DURING REFUELING OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, THE HEAT EXCHANGERS CAN BE USED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING (SFPC) WHEN THE COMPLETE CORE IS REMOVED FROM THE REACTOR VESSEL AND TEMPORARILY STORED IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP).

THE SDC SYSTEM SUCTION LINE HAS TWO HEADER ISOLATIONS VALVES, SI-652 AND SI-651. THESE VALVES ARE MOTOR OPERATED CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES. MOV 652 IS LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT NEAR THE ASSOCIATED RCS HOT LEG AND MOV 651 IS LOCATED IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING INSIDE THE PENETRATION ROOM. BOTH VALVES ARE 12" GATE VALVES WITH A SINGLE DISC WHICH IS WEDGED CLOSE, BY THE MOTOR OPERATOR, BETWEEN TWO SEATS.

RECENT INDUSTRY CONCERNS HAS IDENTIFIED THESE VALVES AS BEING SUSCEPTIBLE FOR PRESSURE LOCKING. PRESSURE LOCKING CAN OCCUR WHEN THESE FLEXIBLE GATE

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VALVES ARE CLOSED AND A HIGHER PRESSURE FLUID IS TRAPPED IN THE BONNET CAVITY AS COMPARED TO THE SYSTEM PRESSURE. ONE SCENARIO LEADING TO THIS TYPE OF BINDING OCCURS WHEN THE VALVE IS CLOSED WITH THE SYSTEM PRESSURE AT HIGH PRESSURE FOLLOWED BY A DECREASE IN THE SYSTEM PRESSURE. THE HIGHER PRESSURE FLUID TRAPPED IN THE BONNET WILL FORCE BOTH SIDES OF THE DISC AGAINST THE SEATS, CAUSING THE DISC SEAT FRICTION FORCES TO RESIST VALVE REOPENING. ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS WHEN THE CLOSED GATE VALVE WITH LIQUID TRAPPED IN THE BONNET CAVITY IS SUBJECTED TO A TEMPERATURE INCREASE. THE BONNET FLUID WILL TRY TO EXPAND DUE TO THE TEMPERATURE INCREASE. IF THE VALVE BONNET IS LEAK TIGHT, THE FLUID CANNOT EXPAND SO THE PRESSURE IN THE BONNET INCREASES. THE RESULTANT PRESSURIZATION OF THE BONNET CAVITY MAY PREVENT THE VALVE FROM OPENING.

THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT DEGRADE THE RELIABILITY OR INCREASE THE CHALLENGES OF ANY ITS SSCS. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND REGULATIONS.

BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

Document ID	Revision Status				
SE00163	0000 62	Subject:	ABANDON SAMPLE THIEF IN 1A FOST.		
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Equipment: 1TKDFO10025 1A DFO STORAGE TK
Org/Div:
System Code: 023 DIESEL OIL SYSTEM
Text: SUMMARY:

THE PURPOSE OF THIS ACTIVITY IS TO APPROVE ABANDONING A THIEF THAT WAS LOST IN THE 1A FOST BECAUSE IT IS NOT A SAFETY CONCERN AND IT IS NOT ECONOMICAL TO RETRIEVE IT.

THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF THE 1A FOST IS TO STORE FUEL AND PROVIDE A SUCTION FLOW PATH TO THE TRANSFER PUMPS. LEAVING THE THIEF IN PLACE IS NOT A CONCERN BECAUSE THE THIEF WILL NOT AFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE TANK OR IMPEDE THE FLOW PATH TO THE FUEL OIL DAY TANK FOR THE 1A DIESEL. THE THIEF WAS SHOWN TO BE INERT IN THE FUEL OIL TANK ENVIRONMENT. ALSO, THE