

October 30, 1996

Mr. Richard Blubaugh  
Vice President of Environmental  
and Government Affairs  
Atlas Corporation  
370 Seventeenth Street, Suite 3050  
Denver, Colorado 80202

SUBJECT: OPEN ISSUE ON SLOPE STABILITY

Dear Mr. Blubaugh:

Open issue 7 of the Draft Technical Evaluation Report (DTER) for Atlas Corporation's (Atlas') proposed reclamation plan for uranium mill tailings at its Moab, Utah site, is the capability of the slopes of the disposal cell to endure geologic processes including settlement. In response to that issue, Atlas has provided additional information to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission including a report prepared by your consultant, Woodward-Clyde, "Evaluation of Potential Surface Deformation Related to Salt-Dissolution Subsidence at the Atlas Tailings Site, Moab, Utah" dated July 8, 1996. In that report, a procedure developed by Bray et al is used to evaluate potential deformation of the tailings pile surface.

The enclosed October 22, 1996, letter from Grand County Councilman Peter Haney provides information indicating that the Bray et al procedure may not be appropriate for the Atlas site. Since the capability of the slopes to withstand potential offsets at depth is important in assessing the cell design, either provide responses to the points raised in Mr. Haney's letter, or justify how cell design meets Criterion 6 of 10 CFR Part 40, Appendix A.

Please either provide a response to this request within 30 days or advise me within 30 days of when you will provide your response. If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Myron Fliegel, NRC's project manager, at (301) 415-6629.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By:]  
Joseph J. Holonich, Chief  
Uranium Recovery Branch  
Division of Waste Management  
Office of Nuclear Material Safety  
and Safeguards

Docket No.: 40-3453  
License No.: SUA-917  
Enclosure: As stated

cc: See attached list  
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22 Oct 96

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Mail Stop TWFN 7J-9  
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Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Evaluation of Potential Surface Deformation Related to Salt-Dissolution Subsidence  
at the Atlas Tailings Site, Moab, UT, 8 Jul 96, Woodward-Clyde Federal Services.

Dear Mr. Holonich:

I was recently able to obtain a copy of the above report. In reviewing it I feel that the deformation analysis using the simplified approach of Bray *et al.* is not adequate for the complexities of the Atlas site for the following reasons.

1.) Bray himself states that, "The phenomenon of earthquake rupture propagation through soil is quite complex and is not well understood at this time." Bray then concludes, "Of course, given the complexity of fault rupture propagation, the results of this study must be applied with the use of good engineering judgment. Further study regarding the reliability of these analytical procedures would be useful to investigate aspects of the problem not addressed in this study." Bray's analyses are not established fact as alluded to by the above report, they are relatively recent studies with considerable variability and uncertainty.

2.) Aspects of the problem not addressed in the above study which are present at the Atlas site are as follows:

- a.) The Bray analysis described is for modeling fault rupture propagation through clays, not alluvium and tailings.
- b.) The tailings pile nonlinear stress-strain behavior was not adequately modeled. Averaging 17 samples is not characteristic of the Atlas tailings site. The range for coarse tailings is 3.35 to 19.47 among 7 bore holes. Triaxial compression tests are not

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representative for the Atlas site because of the unconstrained free face of the the tailings pile with minimal lateral confining forces. (see attached figure A) The Bray model would be more applicable to subgrade disposal.

c.) The error bars from the Bray model were not used, only the medium.

d.) The conclusion that the area of potential maximum subsidence most likely does not extend beneath the tailing cap is contraindicated by figure 4, section B-B' of the report.

e.) The angle of dip of the fault plane is important to the corresponding area of surface displacement. What is the angle of dip of the fault plane at the Atlas site? (see Bray fig. 7)

f.) Inclusion of the alluvium in the total thickness of the overburden calculations does not take into account the preferential plane of weakness developed through the alluvium and probably present at or near the surface.

In conclusion, even though I question the unqualified absolute use of Bray's Finite Element Prediction model for this specific site; when one looks at the data presented, there are predictable ruptures in the 2 faces of the tailings pile where the pile intersects the plane of the buried escarpment. This does not support the report's final conclusion that the potential for differential offsets reaching the surface of the pile as a result of salt dissolution over the next 1000 years is negligible.

Boring B-14 list three samples with Strain(%) of 4.12, 5.83 and 7.18, with an average of 5.7. Using Bray's model the corresponding height of rupture zone would be 17 +/- 2 times the offset, which would be 15-19 meters and 30-38 meters for offsets of 1 and 2 meters, respectively. As the boring is less than 15 meters above the surface, rupture would occur near this boring with less than 1 meter offset within the 1000 year time frame. 1 meter of offset is also less than the 1.33 meter/1000 years offset Grand County has observed with the Northwest Pipeline data previously submitted. It is important to note that B-14 is very likely on the fault plane as evidenced by figure 4, section B-B'. Also the use of triaxial compression tests from this boring is not representative due to the free face and the lack of lateral confining forces, the actual strain(%) number is undoubtedly less and thus rupture would occur sooner. How much further up through the face and perhaps top of the pile might the rupture propagate once it has breached the slopes of the pile?

Boring B-13 list two samples with Strain (%) of 13 and 15 , with an average of 14. the corresponding height of rupture zone would 8 +/- 2 times the offset, which would be 6-10 meters and 12 to 20 meters for offsets of 1 and 2 meters, respectively. Given that the height of B-13 is roughly 32 meters then it could take as long as 4000 years and as short as 2000 years before the rupture reaches the top surface of the pile. Again it is important to note that B-13 is very likely near the fault plane as evidenced by figure 4, section B-B'. The use of triaxial compression tests from this boring is probably not representative again due to the free face of the pile and minimum of lateral confining forces, the actual Strain(%) number would be less and thus rupture would occur sooner. Despite the fact that rupture may not occur within the 1000 year time frame at the B-13 boring, (depending also on how fast the ruptures that will definitely occur propagate on both slopes of the tailings pile that intersect the buried escarpment plane of offset), isn't there something in the regulations that state that a proposal requiring active maintenance is not


a permitted alternative? At the very least, shouldn't these absolutely predictable maintenance costs be assessed and compared in the final fiscal analysis of the two alternatives?

What happens once the surface has been breached? Doesn't it then slip against the remaining pile at a rate close to the subsidence rate for eternity? Eventually, what would prevent this quarter of the pile from ending up in the Colorado River in 10-20,000 years?

Meanwhile what happens to the tailings pile erosion protection as the rock apron designed to protect the pile from the forces of the Colorado River is also sinking from 1-2 meters/1000 years? As the base of the pile is 2 meters above the average river flow of 4200 cfs, what happens in 1000 to 2000 years when the river begins flowing against the pile on a daily basis and freezing against the pile each winter? This is assuming that the rock apron performs as designed, which I feel is doubtful. The entire bank on the tailings side of the river has exposed tamarisks roots, indicating erosion on an annual basis. Yet there are large areas of bank aggradation on the opposite side of the river.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this additional report that was issued after the draft TER was issued.

Sincerely,

  
Peter Haney

cc: w/enclosures


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Ted Johnson  
Woodward-Clyde Federal Services




Figure A.

— shear failure over time


10H:3V  
Tailings Pile  
over buried  
escarpment



(a)



(b)




- 1 Tension Failure
- 2 Stress Level = 75%
- 3 Stress Level = 85%
- 4 Shear Failure


- 1 Tension Failure
- 2 Stress Level = 75%
- 3 Stress Level = 85%
- 4 Shear Failure

of the tension cap


LESS OFFSET AT GROUND SURFACE



LESS OFFSET AT GROUND SURFACE




WARPING OF SURFACE




ough Soil: (a) Stiff Earth Materials, Steep  
(c) Ductile Earth Materials

nificant fault movement by warping  
ar surfaces.  
ential movement across a fault zone  
break so that the problem is likely  
ie remainder of the movement can


LESS OFFSET AT GROUND SURFACE



(a)



(b)



(c)

FIG. 7. Path of Normal Fault Rupture through Soil: (a) Stiff Earth Materials, Steep Dip; (b) Stiff Earth Materials, Shallow Dip; (c) Ductile Earth Materials