

From: Marc Dapas  
To: ABB, WLA, JLC1, JAG - *Arthur Beach, William Afelson, James Caldwell,*  
Date: 12/16/96 1:31pm *John Rhee*  
Subject: Highlights from the LaSalle Independent Safety Assessment Exit Mtg

Attached are some highlights from the exit meeting for the LaSalle Independent Safety Assessment (ISA) which was conducted Friday morning (12/13). I have also attached some highlights from my meeting with the site VP, Bill Subalusky, on Friday afternoon following the routing resident exit meeting. If you have any questions, please call. Thanks.

For Donna Skay and Larry Rossbach, some of the information in the attachments that relates to conclusions provided by the ISA team, appears sensitive, e.g. "The team questioned the ability of the licensee to safely operate the plant". We need to be careful what we include in a Director's Highlight in light of the distribution.

CC: NCD2.CH1.MPH, DEH, WND2.WNP3.DMS6, WND2.WNP3.LWR, ...

#### MANAGEMENT MEETING ON COMED INDEPENDENT SELF ASSESSMENTS

On December 23, 1996, the Regional Administrator, A. Bill Beach, and members of the Region III staff met with Harold Keiser, ComEd Chief Nuclear Operating Officer, Thomas Maiman, ComEd Senior Vice President for Nuclear Operations, William Subalesky, LaSalle Site Vice President, John Mueller, Zion Site Vice President, members of the ComEd staff, and representatives from ComEd's Independent Self Assessment (ISA) Team to discuss the ISA's findings at LaSalle and Zion and ComEd's resultant corrective action plans. Warren Fujimoto, ISA Team Leader, and ISA Team members Jack Sieber, Fred Dacimo, and John Durham conducted a presentation of the ISA findings in the areas of Engineering, Operations, and Organization and Management. Among the items noted by the ISA were: short term focus in Engineering that resulted in not dealing with long term problems; instances of unauthorized design changes; concerns with configuration management, understanding design and licensing requirements; ineffective work management; frequent management changes, low standards, and ineffective leadership; lack of understanding or commitment to operational excellence; production focused mentality; significant gap between bargaining unit and management; ineffective training; unprofessional behavior by operating crews; weak management skills and a poor management selection process. Following the ISA presentation, ComEd delineated plans for improvement that included keeping both LaSalle units shut down until the ability to operate properly had been sufficiently demonstrated.

ComEd - ISA meeting

New people - Kaiser, Marion

Ken Carr

Mike Sing - Outages

Lon Waldinger - Safety Oversight

John Carlin - SQV

Mullen

~~Hansen~~ - Zion VP

Shtalensky - LaSalle VP

Stanley - Brunswick

12/23/96

- ① Review of TSLs at all stations
- ② Nuclear work request process
- ③ PIF process
- ④ PORC effectiveness
- ⑤ SC-SQ process
- ⑥ Open mode

Self identification - ISA teams - expires 1/8 & 1/9 - public  
- 3 areas - Eng, Ops, Org & Mgmt

Eng = John Durham 23 yr. - 1<sup>st</sup> 12 CP&L (Bourneau & Robinson)

+ Impell, Consultant

- Ben Dore - 22 yr.

Zion - J. Heaser - Palo Verde Eng Mgr.

{ 2 more

LaSalle - Dan Bens - Design Eng - Grand Gulf

{ + 1 more

Eng Org at Zion & LaSalle = Already demonstrated not successful  
in processing design auth/safety

concerns A/11

- Eng. primarily focussed on short term  
have dealt of long term problems
- LaSalle - instances of unauthorized change changes
  - more significant at LaSalle
  - Config mgmt, concerns of understanding design & licensing  
Sys eng. - all weaker at LaSalle
  - ↳ need to take hard look to determine safe to operate

Engs. =

- ① Design info hard to retrieve - DBDs - not done or not up date
- ② FSAB not maintained
- ③ Set pts - non concerns
- ④ Inst Data sheets inconsistent of as built - LaSalle
- ⑤ Q-List not complete - Zion
- ⑥ Safety Eval - not adequate, not thorough  
↳ LaSalle - In line SP reviews  
- TSIs
- ⑦ Sys Eng. - Sys. parameters inconsistently monitored/trended
  - Reacting to daily crises - firing Mgr
  - Only partly qualified
  - Poor turnover
  - Of experience not used - examples
  - Don't have understanding / Ability to look at open work items
- ⑧ Work mgmt - Not effective. > 1200 backlog, not completely known what means?
- ⑨ Long standing material cond problems - Vent @ both, Rodmors Zion

10. Conf. mgmt breakdown - more prevalent at La Salle
11. UFSAB discrepancies
12. Past leadership - ineffective, low standards, roles not understood  
reactive vs proactive, no teamwork  
frequent mgmt changes,
13. In house engg. capability - hasn't been effective
14. Krsg. leadership not championed  
- insufficient resources to address long standing problems

Ops

- ① Lack of understanding / buy-in for operational excellence  
*why?*  
- insulated culture - don't understand industry status
  - ▶ production focussed mentality
  - ▶ short term perspective - work around
  - ▶ number of mgmt changes - this too will pass - wait it out
  - ▶ La Salle denial  
"Ops doesn't believe op. excellence leads to production perf."
  - ▶ Op. eval = got 7 - must be OK.
- ② — Major gap between bargaining unit & mgmt
  - Gap between SR NSOs & CR supt.
  - PIF sup. IP'd to Union vs into Station supt. - La Salle
  - why?*
    - mgmt credibility, frequent changes
    - Feeling corporate direction was "Don't rock the boat"
    - 1<sup>st</sup> line supt. = poor understanding of contract
    - No mutual dependence feeling - (Us - them)

③ Training - Not effective, not viewed as a tool, but as a requirement

- Simulator fidelity, non-licensed op training poor

- NSOs not comm

Why 1. Low standards - haven't recognized environment changes

2. Training viewed as ~~RR~~ R - Fun

3. La Salle - poor instructor proficiency

Training - Marginal @ Eon; broken at La Salle.

④ Accountability

- Unprofessional behavior at both plants - poor turnovers, poor announcements response

- La Salle - Unsat

- Crews - no defense in depth - STA not understood role, didn't perform; NSOs not proactive in providing info to CR Supv.

- Crews failed on ATWS scenario - failed to drive rods 72 hours of CR observations

- non licensed rounds = marginally acceptable

Org. & Mgmt. - Warren Fujimoto

- Overall - why perf. not achieved

- = Leadership, standards, mgmt skills

- ↳ deficient - production, cost driven

- little appreciation for good perf: low cost

- no mgmt responsibility for results

- low respect for training

- lack of leadership > yielded absent teamwork

Standards → Tolerant of deficient conditions

- Accountability means discipline vs high stds
- Engrs. not viewed as important
- Ops not gatekeeper for safety

Managt Skills weak - Numerous personnel changes

- Environment of distrust, hindered communications
- Chg. mgmt - by trial & error
- Poor mgmt selection process - person good in 1 spot may not be in another

Plans from here:

La Salle: 3 prong approach:

- 1) Fundamentals: Pwr. attendance, safety, and doc.
- 2) Improvement planning
- 3) Long term changes

No intention of SLL until ready to operate properly

SBM switches - plan to replace 1500

Elon: Use <sup>150</sup> as basis for Business Plan

Unitizing - U1 + U2 ngrs.

Satisfactory has been Elon's hallmark vs excellence