

256

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2023192301  
USNRC

August 15, 1985

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60602  
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Lawrence Brenner, Esq., Chairman  
Administrative Law Judge  
Atomic Safety and Licensing  
Board  
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Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

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Dr. A. Dixon Callihan  
Administrative Law Judge  
102 Oak Lane  
Oak Ridge, TN 37830

Dr. Richard F. Cole  
Administrative Law Judge  
Atomic Safety and Licensing  
Board  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: In the Matter of Commonwealth Edison Company  
(Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2  
Docket Nos. 50-456 and 50-457) OL

Dear Administrative Judges:

In accordance with the disclosure requirements of the McGuire decision, Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2) ALAB-143, 6 AEC (1973), Commonwealth Edison Company hereby serves on the Licensing Board and the parties the enclosed letter dated May 20, 1985 from C. J. Paperiello to Cordell Reed and the FEMA report attached thereto regarding an October, 1984 offsite emergency preparedness exercise for the LaSalle Nuclear Power Plant. Inasmuch as the exercise involved the participation of Grundy County, which is also part of the Braidwood Station emergency planning zone, and the participation of the State of Illinois, these documents may be relevant to the emergency planning contention.

Very truly yours,

*Joseph Gallo /mg*

Joseph Gallo  
One of the Attorneys for  
Commonwealth Edison Company

8508200448 850815  
PDR ADOCK 05000456  
G PDR

JG/mg

cc: Service List

DS03



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION III  
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD  
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

MAY 23 REC'D

J6M  
BR

MAY 20 1985

Docket No. 50-373  
Docket No. 50-374

Commonwealth Edison Company  
ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed  
Vice President  
Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, IL 60690

Gentlemen:

We have received the enclosed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) letter dated April 15, 1985, and associated final exercise evaluations on the offsite emergency preparedness exercise conducted on October 10-11, 1984, for LaSalle and Grundy Counties and the State of Illinois.

This final exercise evaluation lists one deficiency for Grundy County related to lack of timely EBS activation, thus failing to provide timely notification information to the public. The sirens were sounded within 15 minutes (simulated); however, 30 minutes elapsed before the initial instructional message was announced on the EBS station from the time the sirens were sounded. FEMA has identified this deficiency as one which affects public health and safety. FEMA is performing an evaluation, including the results of the Grundy County participation in the April 1985 Dresden exercise, to determine the overall adequacy of the corrective actions and the status of approval of the offsite plans around LaSalle Station under 44 CFR 350.

This is to notify you that we will determine an appropriate course of action under our regulations for the LaSalle and Dresden Nuclear Generating Stations, which are both affected by Grundy County performance, after receiving the FEMA evaluation of offsite preparedness and the results of the Dresden exercise. We would expect that correction of this deficiency would have been demonstrated during the Dresden exercise which was held on April 23, 1985.

This final exercise evaluation also lists some recommendations (which are referred to in the FEMA evaluation as other deficiencies; e.g., those not affecting public health and safety) regarding the offsite agency responses, and includes the State's schedule of corrective actions for all of the recommendations and the above deficiency.


In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

Commonwealth Edison Company

2 MAY 20 1985

Should you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Mr. M. Phillips of my staff at (312) 790-5530.

Sincerely,



C. J. Paperiello, Chief  
Emergency Preparedness and  
Radiological Protection Branch

Enclosure: As stated

cc w/enclosure:

D. L. Farrar, Director  
of Nuclear Licensing

G. J. Diederich, Plant  
Manager

DMB/Document Control Desk (RIDS)

Resident Inspector, RIII

Phyllis Dunton, Attorney

General's Office, Environmental  
Control Division

D. Matthews, EPB, OIE

W. Weaver, FEMA Region V



# Federal Emergency Management Agency

Washington, D.C. 20472

APR 15 1985

PRIORITY ROUTING	
First	Second
ASST. DIR.	ASST. DIR.
AD. ADMIN.	AD. ADMIN.
AD. INV.	AD. INV.
AD. LEGAL	AD. LEGAL
AD. PLAN. & EVAL.	AD. PLAN. & EVAL.
AD. TECH. & LOG.	AD. TECH. & LOG.
AD. TRAINING	AD. TRAINING
AD. PUBLIC AFF.	AD. PUBLIC AFF.
AD. SAFETY	AD. SAFETY
AD. SECURITY	AD. SECURITY
AD. SPECIAL	AD. SPECIAL
AD. OFFICE	AD. OFFICE
AD. RECORDS	AD. RECORDS
AD. COMM.	AD. COMM.
AD. INFO.	AD. INFO.
AD. RELATIONS	AD. RELATIONS
AD. ASST.	AD. ASST.
AD. CLERK	AD. CLERK
AD. MAIL	AD. MAIL
AD. FILE	AD. FILE

FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan  
Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness  
and Engineering Response  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: *Richard W. Krimm*  
Richard W. Krimm  
Assistant Associate Director  
Office of Natural and Technological  
Hazards Programs

SUBJECT: Exercise Report and Schedule of Corrective Actions for  
the October 10-11, 1984 Exercise of the Offsite Radiological  
Emergency Preparedness (REP) Plans for the LaSalle Nuclear  
Power Plant (NPP)

Attached are two copies of the Exercise Report for the October 10-11, 1984, joint exercise of the offsite REP plans for the LaSalle NPP. This was a partial participation exercise for the State of Illinois, and a full participation exercise for LaSalle and Grundy Counties. The report dated November 26, 1984, was prepared by Region V, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). It was revised March 26, 1985, to reflect clarifications mentioned below. These clarifications surfaced after the original report was completed.

Originally, there were two category A deficiencies, i.e., those affecting the public health and safety, identified during the evaluation of the LaSalle exercise, one each for LaSalle and Grundy Counties. Both deficiencies were related to lack of timely EBS activation, although the underlying cause for the untimeliness was different for each county. However, upon further examination of the exercise observer's notes, it has been decided that the Category A deficiency for LaSalle County should be reduced to a Category B deficiency. The attached exercise reports have been revised to reflect this change and the reasoning explained in the following paragraphs.

In LaSalle County, the directive to activate the prompt alert and notification system (PANS) was received from the State of Illinois at 9:00 p.m. The County EOC staff required seven (7) minutes for proper verification at 9:07 p.m. and an additional fifteen (15) minutes for simulated siren activation at 9:22 p.m. The simulated EBS notification was given at 9:25 p.m. While the time required to initiate public alerting appears to be excessive, there were several mitigating factors. The verification period was appropriate since the situation at the utility had just reached site area emergency. The EOC staff wanted verification that public alerting was necessary at this time. Further, several EOC staff members were engaged in a response to a real-life emergency situation which temporarily diverted their attention and lengthened the time required for verification.



Upon receipt of the verification, the county did simulate activation of the sirens within fifteen (15) minutes. Concurrent with the verification and activation process, EOC staff were preparing the EBS message and it was ready for broadcast prior to siren activation. In fact, an attempt was made at the time of siren activation to read the message to the radio station (simulated). An actual telephone call was made to a person simulating the role of the radio station (Actually the caller was attempting to call a friend who was to simulate the role of the radio station). However, this first attempt at a call resulted in a busy signal. At this point, the EOC staff member could have read the EBS message into the telephone which would have represented timely activation. Instead a second telephone call was made a few minutes later; at that time, the EBS message was read to the person simulating the radio station. (It should be noted that a radio backup exists between the County EOC and the EBS radio station.)

After consideration of these mitigating factors, LaSalle County did demonstrate that it can provide timely public alerting and notification in the event of an emergency at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station. However, because the total PANS required twenty-five (25) minutes for activation, a Category B deficiency exists. It is FEMA's opinion that this deficiency is best corrected by training on the procedures for PANS activation. The certification test of December 4, 1984 provided LaSalle County with an opportunity to successfully demonstrate their implementation procedures. A combination of this test, and both an initial and a follow-up, formal training session conducted with LaSalle County emergency services personnel, is considered adequate corrective actions for this particular deficiency.


Grundy County was cited for a Category A deficiency (NUREG evaluation criterion E.5) because 30 minutes elapsed from the time the sirens were sounded (simulated) until the initial instructional message was forwarded to the EBS station. This deficiency involves the failure to provide timely notification via the EBS. The EBS notification was overlooked until the EOC staff were questioned on this point by the federal evaluator. This deficiency was directly attributable to the turnover of the Grundy County Emergency Services and Disaster Assistance Coordinator just prior to the exercise. This individual has subsequently received training as to the duties and responsibilities of his position with respect to radiological emergency preparedness. Further, Grundy County successfully demonstrated the procedure for activation of the EBS notification during the Prompt Alert and Notification System (PANS) certification test of December 4, 1984. (It is recognized that a PANS certification test does not test timeliness of EBS notification.) Grundy County will be required to successfully demonstrate timely activation of the PANS during the Dresden exercise on April 23, 1985. Grundy County is fully participating in the Dresden exercise and timely public alerting and notification is an exercise objective. (Note too that Grundy County is scheduled to participate in the initial Braidwood exercise in November of this year.)

A final resolution of the Category A deficiency for Grundy County cannot be made until the Dresden exercise in April at which time the County will have as an objective successful demonstration of the public alerting and notification system. Following the exercise, FEMA Headquarters will make a determination regarding the overall adequacy of the corrective actions and the status of approval under FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350.

A copy of the State's schedule of corrective actions is also attached. Since the corrective actions for Grundy and LaSalle Counties are explained in detail in this memorandum, this memorandum and the Illinois proposed corrective action response dated December 20, 1984 are to be considered in conjunction with each other.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division at 646-2861.

Attachments  
As Stated



## Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency

110 East Adams Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706

April 9, 1985

Mr. Gordon Wenger  
Emergency Management Program Specialist  
Region V, Federal Emergency  
Management Agency  
Federal Center  
74 North Washington Street  
Battle Creek, Michigan 49016

Dear Mr. Wenger:

This letter is in response to Mr. Wallace Weaver's January 14, 1985 letter to Charles Jones in which Mr. Weaver requests that the Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency provide a training meeting for the LaSalle County officials.

During February and March, four meetings have been held with the LaSalle County ESDA Coordinator and one with LaSalle County Board Chairman regarding the timely EBS activation. The resulting enhanced proficiency and improved procedures will enable LaSalle County to demonstrate their capability during the next scheduled exercise.

Sincerely,

David L. Wise  
Chief, Division of  
Radiological Emergency  
Planning

DLW/1h

March 23, 1985

Mr. Charles D. Jones  
Director, Illinois Emergency  
Services and Disaster Agency  
110 East Adams Street  
Springfield, Illinois 62706

Dear Mr. Jones:

I have received and reviewed your followup corrective actions dated March 11, 1985 relative to the LaSalle exercise deficiencies. Following discussions with FEMA Headquarters staff and upon further examination of the exercise observer's notes, it has been decided that based on the information discussed below the category A deficiency for LaSalle County will be reduced to a category B deficiency. A copy of five page changes to the LaSalle exercise report reflecting this decision are enclosed with this letter.

In LaSalle County, the directive to activate the PAMS was received from the State of Illinois at 9:00 p.m. The county EOC staff required seven (7) minutes for proper verification and an additional fifteen (15) minutes for simulated siren activation at 9:22 p.m. The simulated ERS notification was given at 9:25 p.m. While the time required to initiate public alerting appears to be excessive, there were several mitigating factors. The verification period was appropriate since the situation at the utility had only just reached site area emergency (8:27 p.m.). The EOC staff wanted verification that public alerting was necessary at this time. Further, several EOC staff members were engaged in a response to a real-life emergency situation which temporarily diverted their attention and lengthened the time required for verification. You will note that upon receipt of the verification, the county did simulate activation of the sirens within fifteen (15) minutes. Concurrent with the verification and activation time, EOC staff were preparing the ERS message and it was ready for broadcast prior to the simulated siren activation. In fact, an attempt was made at the time of the simulated siren activation to simulate reading the message to the radio station. An actual telephone call was made to a person simulating the role of the radio station.

However this first attempt at a call resulted in a busy signal. At this point the EOC staff member could have read the EBS message into the telephone which would have represented timely activation. Instead a second telephone call was made a few minutes later at which time the EBS message was read to the person simulating the radio station. (It should be noted that a radio backup exists between the county EOC and the EBS radio station.)

It is my opinion that after consideration of these mitigating factors, LaSalle County did demonstrate that it can provide timely public alerting and notification in the event of an emergency at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station. However, because the total PAMS required twenty-five (25) minutes for activation, a category B deficiency exists. But this deficiency is best corrected by training on the procedures for PAMS activation not by a demonstration of timeliness. The PAMS certification test of December 4, 1984 provided LaSalle County with an opportunity to successfully demonstrate their implementation procedures. This test combined with the initial and formal training conducted with LaSalle County emergency services personnel and receipt of your report of the LaSalle County training will constitute an adequate corrective action for this particular deficiency.

For Grundy County, final resolution of the category A deficiency cannot be determined until all of the corrective actions have been implemented. This includes a demonstration of successful public alerting and notification by Grundy County during the upcoming Dresden exercise.

I would like to clarify a statement I made in my January 14, 1985 letter to you. I mistakenly noted that during the Prompt Alert and Notification System (PAMS) certification test of December 4, 1984, both LaSalle and Grundy Counties "demonstrated the ability to activate the EBS in a timely manner." The PAMS certification test demonstrates implementation procedures but does not test timeliness. Thus, the requirement for Grundy County to demonstrate timeliness of the alert and notification system during the Dresden exercise.




Upon successful demonstration of public alerting and notification by Grundy County during the Dresden exercise, FEMA Headquarters will determine the adequacy of the corrective actions and issue a statement as to the status of approval under FEMA rule 44 CFR 350. As an interim measure I am providing a copy of your letter with my recommendation for acceptance of your corrective actions to FEMA Headquarters. I will keep you informed as to their actions in this manner. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Wallace J. Weaver, Chairman  
Regional Assistance Committee

Enclosure

FILE -  
MAR 17 1985



## Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency

110 East Adams Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706

March 11, 1985

Mr. Wallace J. Weaver, Chairman  
Regional Assistance Committee  
Federal Emergency Management Agency  
Region V  
300 South Wacker, 24th Floor  
Chicago, IL 60606

Dear Mr. Weaver:

This letter responds to your letter dated January 14, 1985 relative to required corrective actions for the LaSalle exercise deficiencies.

I concur completely that the PANS certification test conducted on December 4, 1984 clearly demonstrated the capability of Grundy and LaSalle counties to activate the EBS in a timely manner in accordance with established procedures. I am certain that the Dresden PANS will be equally satisfactory and effectively demonstrate the capabilities of all three counties in the EPZ. Additionally, I feel confident that Grundy County will perform in a highly satisfactory manner during the Dresden exercise scheduled for April 1985. I appreciate your sharing our concern for this county that is burdened by being impacted by three nuclear power plants.

As you noted in discussing the LaSalle County deficiency, the PANS certification test certainly demonstrated their ability to activate the EBS system in a timely manner. Training sessions with the LaSalle County ESDA Coordinator have already been initiated. A formal training session will be conducted immediately after the Zion exercise and prior to April 1, 1985. A report of this formal training will be provided as requested.

Bulk distribution of the Public Information Booklets was made throughout the EPZ. A summary of this distribution will be provided by Commonwealth Edison and provided to you. Only Quad Cities uses the sophisticated computerized system. The others use a manual system.

Procedures and manpower are available to address deficiency cited under J.10.j. However, the procedures were not implemented nor was mutual aid or state resources requested. This will be demonstrated during the next exercise involving LaSalle County.

Your comment relative to conducting a media briefing for the federal evaluator is well taken. Grundy County will be advised to demonstrate this capability during the Dresden exercise in April, 1985.

Mr. Wallace Weaver


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March 11, 1985

Your assistance in adding to the realism of an exercise by having the message traffic to FEMA acknowledged by the regional communications center is appreciated. We will be sending messages during future exercises with special emphasis on the annual full scale exercise.

Your comments have been constructive and have added to the completeness of our plans. I wish to express my appreciation for your understanding of the difficult burden that is placed on Grundy County. They have a fine new coordinator who will demonstrate a renewed degree of excellence during the forthcoming Dresden exercise in April.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Charles D. Jones".

Charles D. Jones  
Director

CDJ:ht



## Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region V 300 South Wacker, 24th Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 353-1500

January 14, 1985

Mr. Charles D. Jones  
Acting Director  
Illinois Emergency Services  
and Disaster Agency  
110 East Adams Street  
Springfield, Illinois 62706

Dear Mr. Jones:

This letter is in response to your proposed corrective action dated December 20, 1984 and my conversation with David Wise of your staff concerning the deficiencies for the October 10-11, 1984, LaSalle radiological emergency preparedness exercise. As a result of the letter and conversation, I have amended the required corrective actions for the LaSalle exercise deficiencies. LaSalle County and Grundy County are no longer required to conduct a remedial exercise to correct their category A deficiencies to NUREG-0654 criteria elements E.6. and E.5. respectively.

This amendment to the required corrective action is based on two factors. First, during the LaSalle prompt alert and notification system (PANS) certification test of December 4, 1984, both Counties demonstrated the ability to activate the EBS in a timely manner. Both Counties did so by preparing a "live" test message and broadcasting it through the EBS. Further, Grundy County is scheduled to participate in the Dresden PANS certification test tentatively set for May 7, 1985.

The second factor concerns the nature of the deficiencies themselves. During the LaSalle exercise the sirens were activated in a timely fashion. The deficiencies involve timely activation of the EBS.

In the case of Grundy County, the deficiency is such that it should also be corrected under exercise conditions. I concur with your position that Grundy County will have adequate opportunity to demonstrate its capability during the Dresden exercise in April and the Braidwood exercise tentatively schedule for late 1985. A single issue remedial exercise for Grundy County would be counterproductive.

In the case of LaSalle County, the deficiency is such that it can be corrected by the PANS certification test and a meeting with LaSalle County officials to provide training as to the importance of timely EBS activation. David Wise indicated that such a training session would be scheduled with LaSalle County. Please advise me of the date for this training session by February 1, 1985. This meeting with LaSalle County should be held prior to April 1, 1985 and a report provided to me for the record within two weeks of the meeting.

With respect to the remainder of your proposed corrective actions, they are approved. Please note that there are still two outstanding deficiencies from the July 12, 1983 LaSalle exercise for which we are awaiting implementation of your corrective actions. These deficiencies are discussed on pages 10 and 11 of the October 10-11, 1984 LaSalle exercise report. For NUREG-0654 criteria element G.2. (Illinois), we are awaiting submission of the computerized mailing list similar to that provided for Quad Cities. For NUREG-0654 criteria element J.10.j. (LaSalle County), we are awaiting the plan update scheduled for later this year.


I would like to discuss two of your responses to the cited deficiencies in more detail. For Grundy County (G.3.a. and G.4.b.), you state that the reason these objectives were not demonstrated is because no media representatives were present in the County EOC. While this is true, I remind you that the objectives can still be demonstrated by utilizing the designated press facility and giving at least one media briefing with the federal evaluator serving as a media representative. Further, preparation of media briefings can be demonstrated in the EOC by the appropriate staff.

For the State of Illinois (C.1.a.), I concur with your position that the FEMA Regional Office has not always been responsive to your exercise messages in the past. However, I have taken steps to insure that your messages will be acknowledged in future exercises. This objective is best demonstrated by the State of Illinois at your annual full participation exercise.

Enclosed with this letter are the page changes to the LaSalle exercise report. These revisions are the result of comments from you and FEMA Headquarters. Please incorporate these page changes in your copy of the exercise report and in any additional copies you may have distributed.

If you have any questions, please call me at (312) 886-9530. I am providing a copy of this letter to my Headquarters Office for transmittal of the exercise report and your schedule of corrective actions to the NRC.

Sincerely,




Wallace J. Weaver, Chairman  
Regional Assistance Committee

Enclosure

cc: David Wise





## Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency

110 East Adams Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706

December 20, 1984

Mr. Wallace Weaver  
Chief, Technical Hazards Branch  
Region V, Federal Emergency  
Management Agency  
300 South Wacker Drive  
Chicago, Illinois 60606

Dear Mr. Weaver:

This letter is in response to your letter of November 26, 1984 and the accompanying Report of the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station exercise conducted on October 10-11, 1984.

Attached is our Proposed Corrective Action Response which indicates the schedule for correcting the deficiencies, as you requested in your letter.

Sincerely,

David L. Wise  
Senior Associate Director

DLW/AH/1h

encl

cc: Charles D. Jones  
Gordon Wenger

**UTILITY: LaSalle Nuclear Power Station**

## Summary Listing of Deficiencies

October 10-11, 1984  
(Date)

### A. Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety

Illinois  
(State)

Illinois  
(Community)

NUREG Item	Narrative Statement of Deficiency
---------------	--------------------------------------

Corrective Action Proposed
-------------------------------

Scheduled Date	Actual Date
-------------------	----------------

None

Submitted with IESDA letter of  
12/20/84 (David Wise) to RAC  
Chairman Wally Weaver.

UTILITY: LaSalle Nuclear Power Station

Summary Listing of Deficiencies

October 10-11, 1984  
(Date)

Illinois  
(State)

B. Other Deficiencies

Illinois  
(Community)

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement of Deficiency</u>	<u>Corrective Action Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
C.I.a.	The State did not demonstrate the ability identify need for, request and obtain federal assistance.	This capability will reluctantly be demonstrated during the next regularly scheduled exercise. It would add realism to the exercises if FEMA would respond to the messages or at least acknowledge them. It was because of this demonstrated lack of interest and participation on FEMA's part that no messages were sent.	4/86	

*Submitted by David Wise, IESDA  
by letter of 12/20/84*

UTILITY: LaSalle Nuclear Power Station

Summary Listing of Deficiencies

October 10-11, 1984  
(Date)

Illinois  
(State)

LaSalle County  
(Community)

A. Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement of Deficiency</u>	<u>Corrective Action Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
E.6.	Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System was not accomplished within 15 minutes as stated in NUREG-0654, Appendix 3.	The implementation of the procedures required to activate the system in the allotted time are easily demonstrated. A remedial drill would be counterproductive to the REP program. Seven additional minutes are minimal. FEMA National is requested to adjudicate this ruling prior to our scheduling a remedial drill. The FEMA 43 demonstration on December 4, 1984 showed PNS system capability better than an exercise. The disadvantages of a remedial drill far outweigh the advantages.		

*Submitted by David W. Hill, IESDA  
by letter of 12/20/84.*

UTILITY: LaSalle Nuclear Power Station

Summary Listing of Deficiencies

October 10-11, 1986  
(Date)

Illinois  
(State)

B. Other Deficiencies

LaSalle County  
(Community)

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement of Deficiency</u>	<u>Corrective Action Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
D.3.	Emergency classification placards were not displayed in the Seneca EOC. (Seneca)	The placards are on hand and will be displayed during the next regularly scheduled exercise.	4/86	
J.10.f.	KI was distributed without authorization from the State. (Ransom)	The DCO noticed his error and retrieved the simulated KI tablets within twenty minutes.		

*Submitted by David Wise, IESDA  
by letter 12/24/84*



UTILITY: LaSalle Nuclear Power Station

Summary Listing of Deficiencies

October 10-11, 198  
(Date)

Illinois  
(State)

A. Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety

Grundy County  
(Community)

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement of Deficiency</u>	<u>Corrective Action Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
E.5.	Thirty minutes elapsed from the time the sirens sounded (simulated) until the initial instructional message was forwarded to the EBS radio station.	Implementation of the procedure to forward the message was stressed during County Executive Training. This capability has been demonstrated during several exercises. A remedial drill would antagonize Grundy County unnecessarily. FEMA National is requested to rule on this requirement for a remedial drill. Grundy County is involved in three exercises (EPZ's) and three FEMA 43 demonstrations. Nothing will be gained from a remedial drill, on the contrary, much could be lost.		

*Submitted by David Lee, IESDA  
by letter of 12/20/84*

UTILITY: LaSalle Nuclear Power Station

Summary Listing of Deficiencies

October 10-11, 1984  
(Date)

Illinois  
(State)

Grundy County  
(Community)

B. Other Deficiencies

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement of Deficiency</u>	<u>Corrective Action Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
A.1.d.	It was not readily apparent who was in charge of the total emergency response. As a result, staff briefings were either not held or were ineffective. Individual staff members made decisions which affected the total EOC operation, e.g. message log, status board and message distribution.	The role of the Board Chairman, the ESDA Coordinator and the other key officials will be stressed during the County Executive Training, as will log and status board upkeep and message distribution. The new ESDA Coordinator will use assistants and formalize decision making process for future exercises.		
A.4.	Around-the-clock staffing capability was not demonstrated.	This capability will be demonstrated during the next regularly scheduled exercise.	4/86	
G.3.a. G.4.b.	There were no press briefings held for the media within the Grundy County EOC.	Press briefings are not held in EOC's anywhere. If press representatives arrive at the Grundy County Court House they are escorted to the Board Room which is the designated press center. No media representatives arrived, therefore there were no briefings.		

*Submitted by David Wise,  
IESDA by letter 8/12/20/84*

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EXERCISE REPORT

LASALLE NUCLEAR POWER STATION  
Commonwealth Edison Company

JOINT EXERCISE  
(Partial Participation)

Location of the Plant: State of Illinois, LaSalle County, Brookfield  
Township

Date of Report: November 26, 1984

(March 26, 1985--Revisions to Pages 5,18,19,34,35)  
Exercise Date: October 10-11, 1984

Participants Included: State of Illinois, Grundy and LaSalle Counties,  
Grand Ridge, Marseilles, Ransom and Seneca, and  
Commonwealth Edison Company

State and Local  
Governments That Should  
Have Participated  
But Did Not: None

PREPARED BY:  
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, REGION V  
NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS DIVISION  
300 SOUTH WACKER DRIVE  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60606

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## I. EXERCISE SUMMARY

### State of Illinois

The exercise was partial participation for the State of Illinois. The State staff was to demonstrate a total of seven objectives; five applicable to the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Springfield and four applicable to the News Media Center, Mazon, Illinois.

The Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA) staff at the Springfield EOC demonstrated the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. The EOC staff coordinated the sectors to be evacuated and the timing for the evacuation with the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS).

The State Warning Point/Communication Center in the EOC is manned on a 24-hour basis. The staff used the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS), radio systems, commercial telephone and other land-line systems to communicate with the utility, the Counties, and with the News Media Center.

The EOC staff coordinated the simulated activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System with the local units of government. A medical support drill was conducted September 13-14, 1984, by the Streator Hospital, Streator, Illinois. As this drill did not occur in conjunction with this exercise, it was not evaluated by Federal observers.

One objective to be demonstrated at the State EOC was to identify the need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance. This objective was not demonstrated.

The News Media Center was able to communicate with the State EOC, the County EOCs and with the utility. There is datafax capability with the State EOC. The State public information staff demonstrated the ability to brief the media. As the exercise progressed, use was made of visual aids to demonstrate various aspects of the station and there was coordination of information between the State and utility spokespersons before release to the media and the public.

### LaSalle County

The EOC was staffed after the NARS message designating the "Alert" classification was received and verified. The EOC staff included all organizations designated in the plan. Civil Air Patrol volunteers and "HAM" radio operators also participated in the exercise. The capability to operate the EOC on an extended basis was demonstrated. The ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities was demonstrated by the County Board Chairman, the ESDA Coordinator and the other key EOC staff. The County Board Chairman was the individual in charge of the emergency response, as designated in the plan. This corrected a previously noted deficiency. Briefings were held to update the EOC staff on the exercise situation. Messages received in the EOC were logged, reproduced and distributed to appropriate EOC staff.

The County EOC was furnished, spacious, well-lighted and had enough telephones and other amenities to accommodate the needs of the agencies and organizations present. There were message boards, where events were posted and kept up-to-date by individuals assigned these responsibilities within the EOC. There was a display of all necessary maps depicting the plume EPZ (with sectors labeled), evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points, radiological monitoring points, and population by evacuation sectors.

The County has the capability to communicate with all the appropriate organizations through the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS), commercial telephone, radio and datafax.

The message to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System was received at 9:00 p.m., verified at 9:07 p.m. with the sirens being activated at 9:22 p.m. and the EBS activated at 9:25 p.m. The EBS messages were clear and described the areas by familiar boundaries and landmarks. This corrects the deficiency noted in the last exercise concerning the effective use of instructional messages. The October 2, 1984 test of the outdoor siren system is included as part of this report. (See Attachment 1)

The ability to supply and administer potassium iodide to emergency workers by the IDNS representative in the EOC was simulated.

There was a demonstration of capability to brief the media in a clear manner. The ability to provide advance coordination of information released as demonstrated by the County Radiological Officer who was delegated responsibility as the County Information Officer. This was accomplished through the voluntary participation of outside observers who played the role of individuals representing the press. The participant role-play included unrehearsed questions to which the Information Officer capably responded.

The ability to determine and implement the appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry were demonstrated by removal of roadblocks, buses returning people to their homes and decontamination of the buses. These items were not objectives of this exercise but were injected as free play items (simulated) to correct the deficiency from the previous exercise.

The LaSalle ESDA Coordinator demonstrated the capability to coordinate the recovery and reentry phase in a well organized manner.

The following municipalities in LaSalle County play an active role in radiological emergencies at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station. Each municipality staffs their own EOC and have established communications. Each municipality is written into the County plan and supports the County emergency response.

## Grand Ridge

The Public Officials of Grand Ridge are serious regarding their participation in activities pertaining to an emergency at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station. There are personnel available to conduct operations over an extended period of time. They are well trained and eager to demonstrate their knowledge and capability.

## Marseilles

The EOC began staffing activity during the "Unusual Event" classification and was fully staffed at the "Alert" classification. The Police dispatcher verified calls from the LaSalle County EOC. Facilities, equipment, HAM radio operators and the availability of support personnel were demonstrated. Access to cable TV is a means to communicate with the Marseilles population.

## Ransom

The capability to activate and staff the EOC was fully demonstrated. The Mayor was in charge of the operations and was familiar with his duties and the duties of his staff. He involved the staff in the decision-making process. The EOC staff were able to communicate with the other jurisdictions by commercial telephone and radio. Potassium iodide was issued prematurely; then recalled and reissued when ordered by IDNS.

## Seneca

Upon the evaluator's arrival at the Seneca EOC, the staffing activity had been completed. Copies of the NARS reports indicated all calls were verified. Staff discussions were held prior to implementing any protective actions. Facilities, equipment and the availability of support personnel were demonstrated. Direct communication with the LaSalle County EOC was used to supplement NARS messages as necessary.

## Grundy County

Grundy County demonstrated the ability to mobilize the emergency response staff and activate facilities. All staff members, with the exception of a school representative, reported to the EOC. The ability to maintain 24-hour staffing was not demonstrated. The ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities was not fully demonstrated.

There was a demonstration of EOC facilities and displays to support emergency operations. The EOC emergency response staff demonstrated a capability to communicate with those organizations intended to provide support to the emergency response.

The activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System was simulated and exceeded the 15 minute requirement limit. It took approximately 30 minutes to disseminate the initial instructional message through the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). There was no announcement to the EOC staff that the Prompt Alert and Notification System had been activated.

The EOC status board indicated a simulated evacuation of the affected population was completed before the activation of the EBS facet of the Prompt Alert and Notification System. It is not possible for the evacuation to have been completed before the people had been notified to take these protective actions.

The County has a supply of potassium iodide available for distribution and discussed how its use would be implemented. The ability to brief the media at the EOC and to coordinate this information with the appropriate officials was not demonstrated. Upon receipt of the reentry and recovery message, the County discussed procedures for the public to follow in returning to their homes.

## II. EXERCISE REPORT

### A. Introduction

#### 1. Exercise Background

This was the fourth full participation exercise for LaSalle County resulting from a simulated accident at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station. Previous exercises were: December 4, 1980; April 14-15, 1982; and July 12, 1983.

This was the second full participation exercise with the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station for Grundy County. The first was the exercise of December 4, 1980. In a meeting held January 6, 1982, FEMA Region V granted an exception for Grundy County's involvement in the April 14-15, 1982 exercise to be limited to communications. For the exercise of July 12, 1983, there was an oral granting of exception from participation because Grundy County would exercise their full capability in the September 15, 1983 Dresden exercise.

#### 2. Participating and Non-Participating State and Local Governments

The Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station impacts LaSalle and Grundy Counties and the municipalities of Grand Ridge, Marseilles, Ransom and Seneca within LaSalle County.

The following Illinois Counties located in the 50-mile EPZ did not participate in the exercise: Kendall, Livingston, Bureau, Cook, DeKalb, DuPage, Ford, Iroquois, Kane, Kankakee, Lee, Marshall, McLean, Putman, Will and Woodford.

#### 3. List of Evaluators

For this exercise, there was a total of ten Federal evaluators observing off-site exercise activities. Of these, seven, including the Exercise Director, were FEMA Region V staff and three were contract evaluators from Argonne National Laboratory. The evaluators were assigned as follows:

Gordon Wenger	FEMA	Offsite Exercise Director
Ray Kellogg	FEMA	Evaluation Team Leader, State of Illinois
John Schad	FEMA	Evaluator, News Media Center
Ed Robinson	FEMA	Evaluation Team Leader, LaSalle County
Woodie Curtis	FEMA	Evaluator, LaSalle County



James Opelka	Argonne	Evaluator, Ransom
Walter O'Keefe	FEMA	Evaluator, Grand Ridge
William Knoerzer	Argonne	Evaluator, Marseilles and Seneca
Robert Shapiro	FEMA	Evaluation Team Leader, Grundy County
Bill Gasper	Argonne	Evaluator, Grundy County

#### 4. Evaluation Criteria

The criteria used for evaluation of this exercise was developed from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." The "Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations," dated June 1983, was used for the exercise evaluation. The exercise and this report are under the policy and guidance of the memorandum of August 5, 1983.

#### 5. Summary of Exercise Objectives

The exercise objectives were to demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities; staff round-the-clock; coordinate and make decisions; communicate with appropriate organizations; alert the public and disseminate instructional messages within 15 minutes; decision-making on the issuance and administering of potassium iodide; brief the media; ability to provide advance coordination of information released; rumor control; adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for contaminated injured individuals; need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance; and determine and implement appropriate measures for recovery and reentry.

A full listing of the objectives selected for demonstration during this exercise is included in paragraph II.A.9. of this section

#### 6. Summary of Scenario

The State scenario called for an "Alert" to occur between 6:31-7:30 p.m. The State was notified at 7:11 p.m. The "Site Area Emergency" was scheduled to occur between 8:15-8:45 p.m. The State was notified at 8:24 p.m. The "General Emergency" classification was scheduled to occur between 9:45-10:15 p.m. The State EOC was notified of the "General Emergency" at 9:45 p.m.

The planned scenario events were sufficient to allow for the full demonstration of the selected exercise objectives. Protective action recommendations were required for both LaSalle and Grundy Counties.

7. Description of State and Local Resources Planned to be used in the Exercise.

During the exercise, the State of Illinois, LaSalle County, including the communities of Grand Ridge, Ransom, Seneca, and Marseilles, and Grundy County used their existing emergency operations centers and emergency response vehicles, equipment and communications.

8. Significant Deficiencies Noted in Past Exercises

a. State of Illinois

G.2. During the exercise of July 12, 1983, the FEMA Region V evaluators scheduled previous to the exercise, sufficient time to conduct a random survey of public use areas. This survey indicated a lack of posted information in those areas likely to be frequented by persons traversing through the area. Endeavors should be made to encourage the owners of restaurants, service stations, motels, campgrounds, and other public use facilities in the areas affected by the EP2, to distribute copies of the "What to Do in Case Of....." pamphlet to area travelers visiting these establishments.

This remains a deficiency.

b. LaSalle County

E.7. During the exercise of July 12, 1983, the EBS instructional prescribed messages from the plans were used when the State ESDA recommended protective actions. The first message indicated sheltering out to two miles when the State ESDA recommendation had been to evacuate out two miles. Both messages as released to EBS did not describe the areas involved in terms of familiar landmarks, boundaries, or outline evacuation routes to be used to accomplish the evacuation. All specific information should be included in instructional EBS messages in synchronization with the Prompt Alert and Notification System.

This deficiency was corrected during the exercise of October 10-11, 1984.

M.1. During the exercise of July 12, 1983, the reentry phase was delayed at the County due to a communication problem relating to the use of the new NARS form. The message received a 11:56 a.m. was not interpreted as the authorization to begin reentry at the County. This caused a 20 minute delay in the implementation procedures following reentry/recovery. Adding a space on the NARS form to clearly identify reentry would alleviate a delay such as the one experienced during this exercise.



This deficiency was corrected during the exercise of October 10-11, 1984.

----- A.1.d. The LaSalle County ESDA Coordinator was in charge of the EOC during the exercise which is in conflict with the plan. The plan indicates the County Board Chairman will be in charge. The plan needs to be updated to reflect the chain of command as implemented during the exercise, or the County Board should command his role during subsequent exercises.

This deficiency was corrected during the exercise of October 10-11, 1984.

E.6. The coordination procedures outlined for dissemination of information to the public was remiss during the exercise of July 12, 1983. Messages are to be transmitted to the EBS station from three sources, LaSalle and Grundy Counties and the State, with callback procedures if any of these sources are tardy. Since many of the procedures involved were not demonstrated, it cannot be determined that the sirens and the EBS message would have been coordinated and the EBS messages would have been ready when the sirens were sounded. The recommendation is made to continue training in the coordination of EBS messages and siren activation.

The Prompt Alert and Notification requirement was not fully accomplished in LaSalle County during the October 10-11, 1984 exercise. This remains a deficiency.

J.10.j. During the exercise of July 12, 1983, it was noted that the area to be evacuated in the EPZ is criss-crossed with minor roads on a one-mile grid which require roadblocks. The County Sheriff's Department units available to man roadblocks are limited. Therefore, only the major roads can be blocked. State or mutual aid assistance should be requested. Procedures to request manpower and equipment should be annexed to the current plan.

This remains a deficiency.

c. Grundy County

There were no deficiencies from the last exercise. (See paragraph II.A.1. of this section.)

9. Exercise Objectives List

Objectives for this exercise were selected from among the 35 standard objectives listed in Tab "M" of the Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations dated June 1983. The objectives numbers listed below correspond to Tab "M".

a. State of Illinois

The State of Illinois selected seven objectives, including those applicable to the News Media Center, to be demonstrated during the exercise. The following five objectives were partially or fully demonstrated as planned:

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.

24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.

25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.

The following exercise objective was not successfully demonstrated:

32. Demonstrate ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.

The following exercise objective could not be observed on the day of the exercise:

31. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.

b. LaSalle County

LaSalle County selected thirteen objectives to be demonstrated during the exercise. The following nine objectives were partially or fully demonstrated as planned:

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.

24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear,  
----- accurate and timely manner. Grundy County

25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.

26. Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

The following three objectives were not successfully demonstrated:

4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.

22. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.

The following exercise objective could not be observed on the day of the exercise:

31. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.

c. Grundy County

Grundy County selected thirteen objectives to be demonstrated during the exercise. The following seven objectives were partially or fully demonstrated as planned:

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.

22. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.

26. Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement  
----- appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

The following five exercise objectives were not  
successfully demonstrated:

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and  
maintain staffing around the clock.

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to  
coordinate emergency activities.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the  
10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional  
message, within 15 minutes.

24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear,  
accurate and timely manner.

25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of  
information released.

The following exercise objective could not be observed on  
the day of the exercise:

31. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and  
procedures for handling contaminated individuals.

B. Narrative

1. State of Illinois

a. Activation and Staffing

Not an objective for this exercise.

b. Emergency Operations Management

The Illinois ESDA staff at Springfield demonstrated the ability to make decisions and coordinate emergency activities. The staff coordinated with IDNS on the areas to be evacuated and the time for evacuation. The State did not request Federal assistance.

DEFICIENCY

C.1.a. The State did not demonstrate the ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.

RECOMMENDATION

The ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance should be demonstrated at the next exercise involving full participation by the State of Illinois.

c. Facilities

Not an objective for this exercise.

d. Communications

The State Warning Point/Communication Center in the EOC is manned on a 24-hour basis. The staff used the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS), radio systems, commercial telephone and other land-line systems to communicate with the utility, the Counties, and the News Media Center.

e. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations

Not an objective of this exercise for the State of Illinois. The State did provide appropriate protective action recommendations for implementation by LaSalle and Grundy Counties.

f. Public Alerting and Instruction

The State EOC staff coordinated the simulated activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System with the local units of government.

g. Protective Actions

Not an objective of this exercise.

h. Radiological Exposure Control

Not an objective of this exercise.

i. Media Center

The News Media Center is located in the utility's EOF. Phones were provided for the media. The primary means of communications between the News Media Center and the State EOC, local EOCs and the EOF are by telephone. Other means of communications available are radio and datafax.

Media kits containing information on the utility, nuclear power stations, the local area and radiation were available. Media briefings were conducted. They were accurate and complete and avoided the use of unexplained technical jargon. The visuals used to describe various aspects of the Station were good but not used to the best advantage early in the exercise.

Public instructions were announced from the News Media Center. The representatives giving the briefings asked the media's cooperation in disseminating that information to the public.

An interesting feature of the exercise was the participation of four journalism students who played media representative roles. This provided some good exchanges during briefings.

j. Recovery and Reentry

Not an objective of this exercise for the State of Illinois. The State forwarded a recovery and reentry order to the Counties for implementation.

k. Scenario

The scenario provided sufficient activity for the State of Illinois to demonstrate the objectives selected for this exercise.

2. LaSalle County

a. Activation and Staffing

The initial call to activate the EOC went out at 7:25 p.m. during the "Alert" classification at the direction of the LaSalle County ESDA Coordinator. A call-list was used to contact the EOC emergency workers. The EOC was completely



staffed at 8:30 p.m. All organizations designated in the plan were represented in the EOC.

In addition to the regular staff, the "HAM" radio club was represented and 23 volunteers from the Civil Air Patrol were present. The Civil Air Patrol personnel were used as messengers and kept the status board up-to-date.

The ability for round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by shift change for some positions and by showing a roster for the balance of the positions. The second shift was briefed and phased into the EOC operation. The staff was enthusiastic and knowledgeable of the work required of them.

b. Emergency Operations

The County Board Chairman is the individual in charge of the operations (as reflected in the County plan), with authority to delegate the responsibility to others. The Chairman delegated his responsibilities to the ESDA Coordinator who was effectively in charge of the emergency response.

There were periodic briefings held to update the staff on the progress of the exercise play and to allow their input regarding updates on their respective organization's participation in the exercise. The staff was involved in decision-making with major decisions having been made by the ESDA Coordinator.

There were copies of the plan available for reference. Message logs were kept with messages being reproduced and disseminated to the EOC staff. The dissemination of messages was efficiently accomplished.

Access into the EOC was controlled by the Civil Air Patrol. Personal identification was required, in addition to being on the roster of individuals authorized entry.

c. Facilities

The County EOC is located in the lower level of the County Governmental Complex. It is spacious, well lighted and sufficiently furnished. There are enough telephones (17) to accommodate the needs of the County representatives and organizations in the EOC. There was a message board clearly visible to the working group. The emergency classification levels were posted. The EOC facility can support extended operations. There is no back-up power.

d. Communications

The primary communication with the State EOC and licensee is the NARS. The backup system for the State EOC and



licensee is radio. The local EOC, EOP, EBS Station and media center can be contacted by telephone and radio. Datafax is available for contacting the media center. "HAM" operators are also used for communications. Local units of government in LaSalle County can be tied together for a conference call.

e. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations

Not an objective of this exercise.

f. Public Alerting and Instruction

The call initiating activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System was received at 9:00 p.m. and verified at 9:07 p.m. by the Sheriff's Dispatcher. The sirens were activated and vehicles dispatched for route alerting at 9:22 p.m. The EBS message was transmitted at 9:25 p.m. The message utilized familiar boundaries to notify the public of what areas to evacuate. The EBS was activated three other times during the course of the exercise. This was done so the public would be updated as to the status of the accident and to inform them as to what to do.

DEFICIENCY

E.6. Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System was not accomplished within 15 minutes as stated in NUREG-0654, Appendix 3. (While the time required to initiate public alerting appears to be excessive, there were several mitigating factors. The verification period was appropriate since the situation at the utility had only just reached site area emergency. Further, several EOC staff members were engaged in a response to a real-life emergency situation which temporarily diverted their attention. An attempt was made at the time of siren activation to read the EBS message to the simulated radio station. However the line of the person simulating the radio station was busy and the call could not be completed until three minutes later. Thus this deficiency has been classified as a category B deficiency.)

RECOMMENDATION

The Prompt Alert and Notification System, as stated in the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA), LaSalle Vol. III, should be activated within 15 minutes as required by NUREG-0654. The State of Illinois should conduct the appropriate training to ensure proper EBS activation.

g. Protective Action

A deficiency from the previous exercise, concerning the planning and resources to control access to the evacuated area, remains. The revised planning and resources must be demonstrated in the next exercise involving LaSalle County.

#### h. Radiological Exposure Control

----- Although not an objective of this exercise, the staff of the EOC were issued dosimeters, record keeping cards and TLDs by the Civil Air Patrol volunteers who controlled access to the EOC. There were a number of dosimeter chargers on hand (Bendix CDV-742). The issuance of dosimeters was restricted to the EOC staff and observers and was sufficient in numbers, with some reserves. The County Radiological Officer briefed the staff on the need to wear the dosimeter, record keeping and its purpose.

A supply of potassium iodide is kept in the ESDA Coordinator's office for distribution to the EOC staff. Key County organizations, e.g. County Sheriff's office and Superintendent of Highways, have KI for distribution to their emergency workers. There was dummy KI (M&M candy) on hand within the EOC for the purpose of the exercise. An IDNS representative was at the EOC and explained the issuance and use of KI by emergency workers.

#### i. Media Relations

The Training Center room in the County Governmental Complex is the space set aside for press briefings. A briefing was conducted by the County Radiological Officer with the participation of outside observers acting as the press representatives. The briefing was accurate and complete, with the avoidance of technical jargon. There were County maps displayed that depicted the 10 mile EPZ by evacuation sectors, shelter locations, etc. The information released was consistent with that which had been announced and discussed in the EOC.

#### j. Recovery and Reentry

There was a simulation of the dispatch of personnel of the County Sheriff's Department and the County Highway Department to man access control points and set up roadblocks in conjunction with the simulated evacuation. At the point of recovery and reentry, the County Sheriff simulated contact with his emergency field staff that manned the roadblocks to determine the traffic flow back into the evacuated area. The representative from Kline Bus Company reported that he had contacted his bus operators to return to the shelters and provide transportation to all evacuees needing transportation for the return to their homes and to inform him when they completed their tasks. The ESDA Coordinator announced that reentry had been completed with all evacuees needing transportation returned to their homes, roadblocks removed and traffic flow in and out of the previously evacuated areas returned to normal.

#### k. Scenario

The scenario was realistic, tested areas of earlier

### 3. Grand Ridge

#### a. Activation and Staffing

The Grand Ridge EOC was fully staffed in support of the emergency response. Being an all volunteer community, the participation was exceptional. The entire group is to be commended for their service.

#### b. Emergency Operations Management

The mayor turned over the operations to the Fire Chief. The plan was followed and discussion preceded decisions affecting operations and the community. It was observed that the leadership took the drill seriously.

#### c. Facilities

The EOC is a small 9' x 10' office. There is a potential for expansion which will afford a greater operational area. The EOC staff did well under crowded conditions. The change of classification was posted and updated. They did not use a status board.

#### d. Communications

Communication was primarily by phone and fire/police radio through LaSalle County. The phones worked well and use of the radio was demonstrated. At approximately 10:30 p.m., a HAM radio operator from Streator arrived, providing another communication link.

#### e. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation

Not an objective of this exercise.

#### f. Public Alerting and Instruction

At the time of the "General Emergency", the mayor, fire and police chiefs and school superintendent discussed the written plan. The EOC Staff demonstrated that they were familiar with the appropriate response activities.

#### g. Protective Action

Not an objective of this exercise.

#### h. Radiological Exposure Control

Discussion with the Fire Chief indicates most of the volunteer firemen do participate in radiological training. Retraining is held on a periodic basis.

1. Media Relations

Grand Ridge has an Information Officer who works closely with the County.

j. Recovery and Reentry

There was a discussion regarding reentry and indication that if it occurred Grand Ridge officials knew what they would do. Basically, it would be to provide police checkpoints and guidance to returning evacuees.

k. Scenario

Grand Ridge is eight miles west from the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station. Prevailing winds are generally from the southwest. As this was the case in this exercise, there were long periods of inactivity due to the lack of required protective actions for Grand Ridge. However, the scenario did provide local authorities with the opportunity to demonstrate their emergency response capabilities.

4. Marseilles

a. Activation and Staffing

Activation was completed by 8:15 p.m. The only organization not represented in the EOC was the Superintendent of Schools. The activation of the EOC was directed by the Mayor at the "Alert" classification. The Fire Chief stated this allows the EOC staff to get up-to-date information on equipment and personnel available. Shift change was indicated by a roster.

b. Emergency Operations Management

The Marseilles Mayor was in charge of the EOC. The Fire Chief served as his deputy. Two copies of the plan were available. A message log was kept in the Dispatcher's area. Messages were distributed. Security was established at the entrance to the EOC.

c. Facilities

The EOC is housed in the Marseilles Fire Department/City Hall Building. The room is large and well lighted. Three large tables allowed the staff easy access to each other. Carpeting and acoustic ceiling tile keep noise down. Two 10 button phones were used for contacting the Police Dispatcher's office. All messages in and out of the EOC were processed by the dispatcher. The status board and County and EPZ maps hung on the EOC walls. There were separate signs to indicate the classification level. They are posted above the status board. Additional information could have been included on the status board.

d. Communications

----- The EOC communications were handled by the Police Dispatcher. The dispatcher lives above the Police Department, providing 24-hour capability. The phone is the primary link to the LaSalle County EOC. There is a primary and secondary radio link to the County. The dispatcher has a list of phone numbers for the school principals and a convalescent home.

The HAM radio operator was posted by the EOC Security Desk. The mayor has access to Cable TV for messages to the Marseilles population. The EOC experienced difficulty in obtaining responses to requests for information from the LaSalle County EOC.

e. Dose Assessment

This was not an objective of this exercise.

f. Public Alerting and Instruction

The City of Marseilles is divided into four sections. All emergency personnel are schooled in route alerting for each sector. No maps of the routes are available for the route alerting personnel. The Fire Chief feels dry runs of route alerting routes are sufficient.

The local convalescent home is notified of each classification and has its own plan. A senior citizen apartment complex is alerted by a door knocking procedure. Route alerting messages were formulated by ESDA. The Illinois State Park in the EPZ is the responsibility of the State and County law enforcement.

g. Protective Actions

Not an objective of this exercise.

h. Radiological Exposure Control

The supply of KI was observed and proper handling was demonstrated. All staff and support personnel in the EOC were issued 0-200 mr dosimeters and TLD badges. Separate dosimeter and record keeping cards were assigned to emergency response vehicles. Commonwealth Edison Company goes to Marseilles and holds radiological exposure control training.

i. Media Relations

If contact with the media became necessary, the Marseilles Mayor would handle this in the Court Chambers. The chambers are in another part of the Fire Department/City Hall Building.



j. Recovery and Reentry

-----  
The EOC received the exercise termination message and the staff proceeded to shut down the EOC. No additional recovery and reentry activities were required

k. Scenario

The scenario objectives were generally met. Expanding the activity within some of the objectives would allow a fuller response to be demonstrated.

5. Ransom

a. Activation and Staffing

The EOC was activated at 7:30 p.m. and the Village Mayor arrived about 8:30 p.m. The call which initiated activation of the EOC was received by the Fire Chief about 7:10 p.m. All organizations were represented except the schools. HAM radio operators were present.

Round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by double staffing. Both shifts displayed knowledge of their duties.

b. Emergency Operations Management

The Mayor was effectively in charge of the operations at the EOC. He held periodic briefings which could have been more detailed. Information received from the NARS should be discussed during briefings. Staff were involved in decision making when appropriate. Plans and procedures were available at the EOC but did not always require implementation.

Changes in classification and protective actions were received at Ransom within ten (10) minutes of the initiation of a NARS message. Message logs were kept. Access to the EOC was well controlled.

c. Facilities

The EOC at Ransom can support extended operations. It has sufficient furniture, space, lighting and telephones. Back-up power, and batteries for emergency lighting were available but not demonstrated. The emergency classifications were posted. The status board was clearly visible and an attempt was made to keep it up-to-date on significant events. However, the status board was not always filled out at a sufficient level of detail. Plume EPZ, evacuation routes, access control points, and population by area maps were posted. The maps showing relocation centers were available but not posted.

d. Communications

----- Communications were primarily with the LaSalle County EOC by telephone. Backup communication, using HAM operators, was demonstrated. Backup communication using the fire radio network was not demonstrated. Telephone and fire radio could be used to contact local schools. Communication with other local EOCs was possible using telephone, HAM and fire radio. Only the HAM radio to other EOCs was demonstrated.

e. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation

Not an objective of this exercise.

f. Public Alerting and Instruction

The plan indicates at "General Emergency" or the protective action recommendation, the town of Ransom would conduct route alerting, with a prescribed message and give the local EBS stations a message to broadcast. They did neither because Ransom was not in an affected sector. The plan should be reviewed to insure the appropriateness of both LaSalle County and Ransom contacting the EBS.

g. Protective Action

Not an objective of this exercise.

h. Radiological Exposure Control

The person responsible for radiological exposure control is not sufficiently trained. He is not familiar with the record keeping forms. He distributed KI at 9:07 p.m. without authorization from the State. He recalled the KI at 9:20 p.m. but some emergency workers had already simulated taking the KI.

DEFICIENCY

J.10.f KI was distributed without authorization from the State.

RECOMMENDATION

Further training should be provided for the Radiological Officer. This training should include all aspects of radiological exposure control, e.g. the use of KI and record keeping.

i. Media Relations

Not observed.



j. Recovery and Reentry

----- No recovery and reentry activities were required.

k. Scenario

The scenario was sufficient to demonstrate the capability of the local authorities to respond to a radiological emergency.

6. Seneca

a. Activation and Staffing

The activation and staffing procedures were not observed as the observer arrived after EOC activation. The Police Chief took an active role in running the EOC. The dispatcher has a list of all EOC personnel.

b. Emergency Operations Management

The EOC staff worked in unison to respond to the emergency. The Police Chief was in charge of EOC operations.

c. Facilities

A U-shaped table had the EOC staff centrally located in the operations room. Four phones and the Police Chief's radio were available for communications. The dispatcher is a live-in across the street above the Police Department which affords 24- hour coverage. The status board and County and EPZ maps were readable.

Classification placards were not displayed. Security was established by the door to the EOC. Carpeted floors and accoustic ceiling tile kept noise to a minimum. The manual start generator is to be replaced by an automatic relay-self start generator. The entire exercise was video taped for post exercise evaluation.

DEFICIENCY

D.3. Emergency classification placards were not displayed in the Seneca EOC.

RECOMMENDATION

Emergency classification placards should be conspicuously displayed within the EOC.

d. Communication

Phone lines are the main link to the LaSalle County EOC. Various primary and secondary radio links are available to the fire, police and ambulance services. Communication capability between Grundy County and LaSalle County is available. A datafax machine is in the Dispatch office and in the EOC.

The HAM radio (Starved Rock Repeater Network) was activated. A status check and message transmission were observed. The transmissions were interspersed twice with the comment: "This is a Test".

e. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation

Not an objective for this exercise.

f. Public Alerting and Instruction

Public alerting and instruction were simulated. Messages were provided to the Seneca EOC by LaSalle County ESDA. Alert routing maps and precripted messages were available. Seneca is divided into four sectors, A, B, C, and D. This is the same nomenclature used on the EPZ sector maps. It is recommended Seneca sectoring be changed to a numerical system to avoid possible confusion.

g. Protective Action

Not an objective for this exercise.

h. Radiological Exposure Control

All EOC staff and support personnel were provided with 0-200 mr dosimeters. Ten more dosimeters were available for distribution. Fresh batteries for dosimeter chargers were available. Ten bottles of KI were available.

i. Media Relations

There was a person at the Media Center but there was no activity observed. A small County map was on the wall behind the media person. It was not easy to read.

j. Recovery & Reentry

Not observed.

k. Scenario

The scenario objectives were generally met. Expanding the activity within some of the objectives would allow a fuller response to be demonstrated.

## 7. Grundy County

### a. Activation and Staffing

A continuous communication link with the utility is maintained by the Sheriff's Dispatch office. At approximately 6:25 p.m. on the day of the exercise, the dispatch office received notice of an "Unusual Event" at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station and notified the County ESDA Director. A call list is utilized to notify the emergency response staff with full activation of the EOC at the "Site Area Emergency". The EOC was fully staffed, less the school representative, by 9:15 p.m. Around-the-clock staffing was not demonstrated.

#### DEFICIENCY

A.4. Around-the-clock staffing capability was not demonstrated.

#### RECOMMENDATION

A shift change to show a capability for around-the-clock staffing (24-hours) should be demonstrated during the next exercise involving Grundy County.

### b. Emergency Operations Management

It was not readily apparent who was actively in charge of the total emergency response. There is a definite need for such leadership so that the combined efforts of the entire emergency response staff can be more effectively used to respond to the emergency.

Periodic briefings did not commence until after the "General Emergency" was declared. Initial briefings to the staff were not conducted upon their arrival to the EOC. Staff members were not asked to provide the entire staff with information relative to their organization's contribution to the emergency response.

A message log was not maintained according to the Assistant County ESDA Director because there were not enough messages to warrant it. A status board was not maintained until the "Site Area Emergency" was declared. The Red Cross representative was unable to obtain a timely answer from the County ESDA Coordinator as to which shelters should be activated.

Copies of NARS messages were made available to the EOC staff following the receipt of the transmission. Initially, there were time lags between the receipt of information and the distribution of copies to the EOC staff.

## DEFICIENCY

A.l.d. It was not readily apparent who was in charge of the total emergency response. As a result, staff briefings were not held or were ineffective. Individual staff members made decisions which affected total EOC operations, e.g. message log, status board and message distribution.

## RECOMMENDATION

A specific individual as stipulated in the plan is to be in charge to give leadership to the EOC staff. Initial briefings to the staff just arriving at the EOC are essential in order for the staff members to contribute more readily to the emergency response. Briefings by each of the organizations are also essential in order to keep the staff fully apprised of response activities. A message log of incoming and outgoing messages should be maintained as they are a basic management tool and would provide easy access to a specific message without having to read through several messages to locate a particular one. It would be best to maintain a status board with concise emergency information so that arriving staff can obtain a quick reference to the status of the emergency.

### c. Facilities

The Grundy County EOC is located in the County Courthouse basement in a multiple room complex. The rooms are small yet seemingly did not inhibit the staff's ability to implement emergency response procedures. If necessary, arrangements could be made to provide the necessary amenities to support an extended stay of the staff.

There were maps posted in the EOC depicting evacuation routes, shelters, access control points and other pertinent data for use by decision-makers. Controlled access to the EOC was maintained by a "Special" police force.

### d. Communication

The primary communication system used for initial notification of the County and subsequent updates in station status is the NARS. This dedicated open line is manned by Sheriff's dispatch personnel on a 24-hour basis and was monitored by EOC staff to ensure accurate transmission of data. Primary communications between agencies and organizations is commercial phone lines. Each agency is provided with a telephone.

### e. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation

Not an objective for this exercise.

f. Public Alerting and Instruction

Sample public instructional messages contained in the plan were used during the exercise. They contained appropriate information for the public to take the necessary protective actions. These messages were utilized for emergency radio broadcasts as well as route alerting. Evacuation of all sectors to two miles and sectors C, D, and E to five miles was (simulated) accomplished before the activation of the sirens. Release of EBS messages was not accomplished until thirty minutes following the activation of the sirens.

Route alerting was simulated following each activation of the sirens. A limited area, involving seven (7) houses which are located outside the area covered by the siren system, were alerted by a Sheriff's vehicle equipped with a public address system. The precise times at which route alerting was simulated is unknown due to the fact that the Sheriff did not maintain a log nor was it recorded anywhere within the EOC.

DEFICIENCY

E.5. Thrity minutes elapsed from the time the sirens sounded (simulated) until the initial instructional message was forwarded to the EBS radio station.

RECOMMENDATION

The EBS must be activated within 15 minutes from the time the Prompt Alert and Notification System message is received from the State. The State of Illinois should conduct the appropriate training to ensure proper EBS activation and Grundy County must demonstrate this capability at the upcoming Dresden exercise in April 1985.

g. Protective Actions

Not an objective for this exercise.

h. Radiological Exposure Control

A supply of KI is available for emergency workers and would be distributed by the Grundy County Sheriff's Department. A recommendation to take KI (simulated) was announced during the "Site Area Emergency" classification.

i. Media Relations

The objectives associated with media relations were not demonstrated at the Grundy County EOC. There were no provisions made to establish any form of contact with the media.

### DEFICIENCY

G.3.a. and G.4.b. There were no press briefings held for the media in the Grundy County EOC.

### RECOMMENDATION

Press briefings should be prepared and presented. This is to be demonstrated at the next exercise involving Grundy County.

#### j. Recovery and Reentry

Upon receipt of the recovery and reentry message, the County briefly discussed the procedures for the public to return to their homes.

It is recommended that the staff consider arrangements be made to provide the public with information on safety precautions during the public's return to their homes, possible health effects of low level exposure and availability of compensation for financial losses sustained, if any.

#### k. Scenario

The sequence of events dictated by the scenario activated the EOC. Due to the large amount of simulated events, particularly those in the field, the activities in the EOC were limited.

It is recommended that future scenarios provide for additional real demonstration of field activities which will, in turn, increase the amount of emergency response demonstrated at the EOC.



III. Summary Listing of Deficiencies



UTILITY: LaSalle Nuclear Power Station

Summary Listing of Deficiencies

October 10-11, 1984  
(Date)

A. Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety

Illinois  
(State)

Illinois  
(Community)

<u>NUREG</u> <u>Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement</u> <u>of Deficiency</u>	<u>Corrective Action</u> <u>Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled</u> <u>Date</u>	<u>Actual</u> <u>Date</u>
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None

UTILITY: LaSalle Nuclear Power Station

Summary Listing of Deficiencies

October 10-11, 1984  
(Date)

B. Other Deficiencies

Illinois  
(State)

Illinois  
(Community)

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement of Deficiency</u>	<u>Corrective Action Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
C.1.a.	The State did not demonstrate the ability identify need for, request and obtain federal assistance.			
G.2.	A survey of public use areas indicated a lack of information which would be available to transients. (July 12, 1983 exercise.)			

UTILITY: LaSalle Nuclear Power Station

Summary Listing of Deficiencies

Illinois  
(State),

October 10-11, 198  
(Date)

LaSalle County  
(Community)

A. Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety

<u>NUREG</u> <u>Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement</u> <u>of Deficiency</u>	<u>Corrective Action</u> <u>Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled</u> <u>Date</u>	<u>Actual</u> <u>Date</u>
None				

UTILITY: LaSalle Nuclear Power Station

Summary Listing of Deficiencies

Illinois  
(State)

LaSalle County  
(Community)

October 10-11, 1983  
(Date)

B. Other Deficiencies

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement of Deficiency</u>	<u>Corrective Action Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
D.3.	Emergency classification placards were not displayed in the Seneca EOC. (Seneca)			
E.6.	Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System was not accomplished within 15 minutes as stated in NUREG-0654, Appendix 3.			
J.10.f.	KI was distributed without authorization from the State. (Ransom)			
J.10.j.	The Sheriff's Department units available to man roadblocks are limited. Therefore, only the major roads can be blocked. State or mutual aid assistance should be requested. (July 12, 1983 exercise)			

UTILITY: LaSalle Nuclear Power Station

Summary Listing of Deficiencies

Illinois  
(State)

October 10-11, 1984  
(Date)

Grundy County  
(Community)

A. Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety

<u>NUREG</u> <u>Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement</u> <u>of Deficiency</u>	<u>Corrective Action</u> <u>Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled</u> <u>Date</u>	<u>Actual</u> <u>Date</u>
E.5.	Thirty minutes elapsed from the time the sirens sounded (simulated) until the initial instructional message was forwarded to the EBS radio station.			

UTILITY: LaSalle Nuclear Power Station

Summary Listing of Deficiencies

October 10-11, 1984  
(Date)

Illinois  
(State)


B. Other Deficiencies

Grundy County  
(Community)

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement of Deficiency</u>	<u>Corrective Action Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
A.1.d.	It was not readily apparent who was in charge of the total emergency response. As a result, staff briefings were either not held or were ineffective. Individual staff members made decisions which affected the total EOC operation, e.g. message log, status board and message distribution.			
A.4.	Around-the-clock staffing capability was not demonstrated.			
G.3.a.	There were no press briefings held for the			
G.4.b.	media within the Grundy County EOC.			



#### IV. Attachments



**LaSalle County**  
**Emergency Services and Disaster Agency**

Mr. David Wise  
Illinois ESDA  
960 N. Route 47  
Morris, Illinois 60450

November 15, 1984

Dear Mr. Wise,

This letter is to inform you that to the best of my knowledge sirens within the LaSalle 10 mile EPZ operated properly when tested on October 2, 1984. This encompasses those sirens in the Grundy County portion of the EPZ.

Sincerely,

*Emerson Tidd*

Emerson Tidd

ET/1h