

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2		
TITLE (4) Containment Isolation Due to Blown Fuse																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 7	1 8	8 5	8 5	0 3 7	0 0 0	8 0	9 8	5					0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9) N		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0		20.402(b)				20.406(c)				X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
		20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)		
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME R. C. Steele										TELEPHONE NUMBER 2 0 5 7 2 9 - 3 5 8 3						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC						
AY	JM	FU	M1	7 5	No											
AZ	BP	RL	Y	G 0 8 0	Yes											
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 18, 1985, during the unit 1 refueling outage, an inadvertent containment isolation occurred when a wire was pinched and shorted to ground. This isolation closed the shutdown cooling suction isolation valves. During system realignment following the event, problems were encountered in establishing shutdown cooling due to a failed relay in the residual heat removal system isolation circuitry. Shutdown cooling was reestablished by opening the isolated valve from the reactor motor operated valve board. The defective relay in the isolation logic circuitry was replaced, and the system returned to normal configuration.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Browns Ferry - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9	8 5	— 0 3 7	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Units 1 and 2 were in a refueling outage, and unit 3 was in an extended maintenance outage. Unit 1 was in shutdown cooling.

On July 18, 1985, maintenance personnel were performing a fuse (FU) labeling task on 250 V DC battery board 1, panel 9. A wire bundle was loosened to trace a circuit. When the door to panel 9 was closed, a wire in the bundle was pinched, the insulation was cut, and the wire shorted to ground, resulting in blowing of fuse FB-6 on the battery board. The event resulted in loss of reactor protection system motor generator set "B" load breaker (JC) and the following to occur:

1. Group 2 (shutdown cooling) isolation (BP).
2. Group 3 (reactor water cleanup) isolation (CE).
3. Group 6 (ventilation) isolation (VA).
4. Group 8 (transverse incore probe) isolation (IG).

Due caution was not exercised when the panel door was closed with the loosened wire bundle in panel. The personnel involved were cautioned to exercise greater care and attention to the work being performed.

Plant operators successfully reset the isolation signals and returned group 3, group 6, and group 8 components to normal lineup. However, during realignment of group 2 (shutdown cooling), a problem was encountered in reestablishing shutdown cooling. Shutdown cooling suction isolation valve, FCV-74-47, would not respond to the normal control switch on control room panel 9-3. The valve was reopened within 95 minutes of initial isolation by operating the alternate control switch on the 480 V reactor motor operated valve (RMOV) board. Investigation into the problem after establishing shutdown cooling revealed that a defective relay (RLY) was the root cause. Relay 16A-K30 would not energize due to a coil defect. This relay (GE type CR120) is in the residual heat removal (RHR) system isolation circuitry, and its failure results in generating an RHR isolation signal. The defective relay was replaced on the same day, and the circuit verified operable. The control circuit on the shutdown cooling suction isolation valve was then returned to normal.

Unit 1 had been in the shutdown condition since March 1985, and shutdown cooling requirements were very low. Manual operation of the FCV 74-47 was also feasible should the need have arisen to quickly establish shutdown cooling.

Responsible Plant Section - EM

Previous Events - None

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
P. O. Box 2000
Decatur, Alabama 35602

August 9, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555


Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 1 -
DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-259/85037

The enclosed report provides information concerning containment
isolation because of a blown fuse. This report is submitted in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



R. L. Lewis
Acting Plant Manager
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosures

cc (Enclosures):

Regional Administrator
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NRC Resident Inspector, BFN

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