NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Palo Verde Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 5 2 8	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
Continuous Fire Watch Not Performed

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 7	1 3	8 5	8 5	0 4 0	0 0	0 8	1 2	8 5		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
3	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
0 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
William F. Quinn, Manager - Nuclear Licensing (extension 4087)	6 0 2 9 4 3 - 7 2 0 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 13, 1985, the Fire Suppression System (KF) for the Main Steam Support Structure (MSSS) was declared inoperable and the compensatory fire watch that was established was not in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11.2 ACTION STATEMENT A. The fire detection system remained operable.

The cause of the problem was a communications difficulty between Operations and Fire Protection. Concern for the personal safety of a continuous fire watch in the MSSS and the lack of a common understanding of redundant system fire protection resulted in an hourly patrol being established rather than a continuous watch.

To correct the problem, a continuous fire watch was established. The supervisors were counseled on the need to be thorough and conservative in the interpretation of technical specifications. To correct the communication problem the Fire Impairment Form is to be attached to the Technical Specification Component Condition Form. This documents acknowledgement of both Operations and Fire Protection Department of the specified Technical Specification Actions required.

This event had no impact on the safe operation of the plant.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Palo Verde Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 5 2 8	8 5	— 0 4 0	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On July 13, 1985, while the plant was in Mode 3, the isolation valve for the fire sprinkler system (KF) in the Main Steam Support Structure (MSSS) was shut due to leakage from the system relief valve. Since redundant systems or components could be damaged, Technical Specification 3.7.11.2 ACTION STATEMENT A requires that a continuous fire watch be established.

The shift organization communicated with the Fire Protection Supervisor at home to determine the proper application of the Technical Specification. An improper decision was reached to set up an hourly patrol instead of a continuous fire watch.

The fire loading in the MSSS and the existence of partial redundant train fire protection make the decision appear reasonable but not consistent with the Technical Specification Action Statement.

To correct the problem, a continuous fire watch was set up in the MSSS.

To correct the communication problem the Fire Impairment Form is to be attached to the Technical Specification Component Condition Form. This documents acknowledgement of both Operations and Fire Protection Department of the specified Technical Specification Actions required.

The Fire Protection Supervisor has been cautioned concerning the need for conservatism in application of Technical Specifications. He is evaluating the appropriateness of proposing a revision to the Technical Specifications for the MSSS.

This event had no impact on the safe operation of the plant.

Arizona Nuclear Power Project
P.O. BOX 52034 • PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-2034

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

August 12, 1985
ANPP-33196-EEVB/GEC

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 1
Docket No. STN 50-528, License No. NPF-41
Licensee Event Report - Continuous Fire Watch Not Performed
File: 85-056-026; G.1.01.10

Dear Sirs:

Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 85-040-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73. This LER addresses a continuous fire watch not performed. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V Office.

If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me.

Very truly yours,

E. E. Van Brunt

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President
Project Director

EEVB/GEC/dlm
Attachment

cc: J. B. Martin (all W/Attach.)
R. P. Zimmerman
A. L. Hon
E. A. Licitra
A. C. Gehr
INPO Records Center

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