

July 26, 1985  
(NMP2L 0455)

Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region I  
Division of Reactor Projects  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Re: Nine Mile Point - Unit 2  
Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is an interim report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the problem concerning the reactor core isolation cooling/high pressure core spray pump condensate storage tank suction line elevation versus suppression pool level. This problem was reported via tel-con to T. Silko of your staff on June 25, 1985.

Very truly yours,

*C. V. Mangano*

C. V. Mangano  
Vice President  
Nuclear Engineering and Licensing

CVM/GG/c1a  
(0273T)

xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

R. A. Gramm, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

Project File (2)

8508190427 850726  
PDR ADOCK 05000410  
S PDR

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION  
NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-410

Interim Report for a Problem  
Concerning Reactor Core Isolation Cooling/High Pressure Core Spray Pump  
Condensate Storage Tank  
Suction Line Elevation Versus  
Suppression Pool Level (55(e)-85-20)

Description of the Problem

A review of the suction lines to the reactor core isolation cooling system identified a potential path for suppression pool water to flow outside of secondary containment to the condensate storage tank located in the condensate storage tank building.

The reactor core isolation cooling system normally takes suction from the condensate storage tank. In the event of a low level in the condensate storage tank, reactor core isolation cooling main pump and pressure pump suction will be switched to the suppression pool. For this to occur, 2ICS\*MOV136 opens to allow flow from the suppression pool and, upon fully opening, signals 2ICS\*MOV129 to close. Valve 2ICS\*MOV129 is the only automatic isolation of the reactor core isolation cooling pump suction line from the condensate storage tank available during changeover to suction from the suppression pool. Although there are check valves downstream of the condensate storage tank and reactor core isolation cooling pressure pump located upstream of the suppression pool tie-in, an alternate suction line from the suppression pool to the maintenance pump was added as a result of General Electric's AID 57. During a Loss-of-Coolant-Accident, if valve 2ICS\*MOV129 were to fail to fully close during changeover to suppression pool suction, there would be a potential flow path created through the alternate suction line that could allow suppression pool water to flow through the pressure pump suction line or minimum flow line towards the condensate storage tank. A single failure of a power supply breaker common to 2ICS\*MOV136 and 2ICS\*MOV129 or other failures could result in both valves failing in the open position. The matter is still under investigation, and a final report will be submitted by December 16, 1985. This problem is not applicable to high pressure core spray.