

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

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ATTACHMENT

Attachment to LER 50-368/80-018/03X-2

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

became erratic with flow rate oscillating approximately 20% (between 80% and 100% of rated flow). This indicated that cavitation was occurring in the EFW pumps. The source of the problem was determined to be the EFW suction from the startup and blowdown demineralizers and the operators isolated this source of EFW suction.

Since adequate steam generator level existed to allow natural circulation cooling and S/G levels were above the EFAS setpoint, EFW pumps 2P7A and 2P7B were stopped and vented. These venting operations were performed in series such that EFW flow was never interrupted. There was no complete loss of EFW suction during this event and no automatic switchover to service water suction occurred.

The cause of the cavitation (termed a loss of suction in Revision 0 of this report) was determined to be flashing of the effluent of the startup and blowdown demineralizers, which along with the condensate storage tank (CST), was providing a common suction to the EFW pumps. A possible explanation was considered to be that loss of auxiliary cooling water to the steam generator blowdown heat exchangers might have caused the demineralizer effluent to heatup to the point of flashing. However, a more likely cause appears to be that reported in Revision 0 of this report: Heating of the feedwater train without forced flow allowed hot water to drain back through to the condensate pump discharge line which is also connected to the startup and blowdown demineralizer inlets. This hot water was flashing to steam and passed through the demineralizers and on to the EFW pumps suction. In either case, the corrective action is the same. That is, to isolate the startup and blowdown demineralizer effluent from the EFW suction. The plant startup and emergency feedwater operating procedures require isolation prior to exceeding 10% power. By the time this power level is achieved, feedwater supply will have switched from EFW to main feedwater. During startup, it is desirable to have the EFW system, which is supplying feedwater, aligned to the S/U and blowdown demineralizer inlets to reduce steam generator level fluctuations which occur when cooler water from the CST is used for startup feedwater supply, and to preclude draining down the CST below the limit required by the unit's Technical Specifications. In addition, the S/U and blowdown demineralizer to EFW suction valve actuator has been replaced with a manual operator with position indication in the control room which is checked once per shift in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.



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Docket No. 50-368
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Licensee Event Report
No. 50-368/80-018/03X-2

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.9.1.9(b), attached is the subject report concerning the Emergency Feedwater flow which became erratic during Mode 3 operation, following a loss of offsite power transient. This is an update to a previous report submitted July 14, 1980.

Very truly yours,

J. Ted Enos
J. Ted Enos
Manager, Licensing

JTE:RJS:ds

Attachment

cc: Mr. Norman M. Haller, Director
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