



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS FIELD OFFICE, REGION IV
811 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 1000
ARLINGTON TEXAS 76011

4-83-A-10

March 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Eric H. Johnson
FROM: Richard K. Herr *RKH*
SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK ALLEGATION

Received telephone call from Bud Roberds,
RRI for Wolf Creek. (316) 364-8653

He received an allegation March 1, 1983, from
Keith Stiner. Home phone:
(call after 7:00 p.m.)

ALLEGATION: That a Daniel International supervisor in the electrical
department is threatening people (?QC inspectors?) into
signing false statements or they will be fired.

EX: Recently a Mr. Larson was told to inspect an electrical
cable; however, Mr. Larson returned to his supervisor and told
him the cable was covered up in (concrete, dirt or pipe?). The
supervisor told Mr. Larson to sign off on the inspection report
that the electrical cable is OK, or he would be fired!

Talked to Stiner March 8, 1983, and he retracted the allegation concerning
Larson, but stated he doesn't like his supervisor Bill Elliott, an electrical
QC supervisor. We agreed to meet with him during week of March 21, 1983, to
determine if he has additional concerns. (WILL TRY TO TAKE STATEMENT)

I/1
11

NOV 02 1983

In Reply Refer To:
Docket: STN 50-482/83-26

Kansas Gas and Electric Company
ATTN: Glenn L. Koester
Vice President - Nuclear
P.O. Box 208
Wichita, Kansas 67201

Gentlemen:

This refers to the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Board Report of the Wolf Creek Generating Station. The SALP Board met on September 13, 1983, to evaluate the performance of the subject facility for the period August 1, 1982, through July 31, 1983. The performance analyses and resulting evaluations are documented in the enclosed SALP Board Report. These analyses and evaluations will be discussed with you at the Wolf Creek site on November 10, 1983.

The performance of your facility was evaluated in the selected functional areas identified in Section IV of the enclosed SALP Board Report.

The SALP Board evaluation process consists of categorizing performance in each functional area. The categories which we have used to evaluate the performance of your facility are defined in Section II of the enclosed SALP Board Report. Section III of the enclosed SALP Board Report contains a summary of the categories assigned to the various functional areas.

Any comments which you may have concerning our evaluation of the performance of your facility should be submitted to this office by November 30, 1983. Your comments, if any, and the SALP Board Report, will both appear as enclosures to the Region IV Administrator's letter which issues the SALP Report as an NRC Report. In addition to the issuance of the report, this letter will, if appropriate, state the NRC position on matters relating to the status of your safety program.

RPS-C *JS*
SSchum:gb
11/20/83

RPS-C *2*
WDJohnson
11/20/83

RPB2 *W*
JEGagliardo
10/1/83

DDRRP&EP *W*
JEGagliardo
10/1/83

JS
PScheck
11/2/83

W
JHollins
11/2/83

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Comments which you may submit at your option are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be glad to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By
J. E. Gagliardo

J. E. Gagliardo, Acting Chief
Reactor Project Branch 2

- Enclosure:
Appendix - SALP Report 50-482/83-26

bcc:

R. C. Deyoung, IE
J. T. Collins
P. Check

No DMB distribution at this time

APPENDIX

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance

NRC Inspection Report: 50-482/83-26

Docket: 50-482

Licensee: Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E)
Post Office Box 208
Wichita, Kansas 67201

Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station

Appraisal Period: August 1, 1982 - July 31, 1983

Licensee Meeting: November 10, 1983

SALP Board Members: J. E. Gagliardo, Director, Division of Resident,
Reactor Project and Engineering Programs
R. L. Bangart, Director, Division of Vendor and
Technical Programs
W. C. Seidle, Chief, Reactor Project Branch 2
W. D. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Project Section C
B. J. Youngblood, Chief, LB1, NRR
H. W. Roberds, Senior Resident Reactor Inspector
W. S. Schum, Resident Reactor Inspector

Reviewed:

W. D. Johnson
W. D. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Project Section C

11/1/83
Date

W. C. Seidle
W. C. Seidle, SALP Board Chairman

11/1/83
Date

Approved:

J. E. Gagliardo
J. E. Gagliardo, Acting Chief, Reactor Project
Branch 2

11/1/83
Date

8401170394

I. INTRODUCTION

The NRC established a Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. This SALP program is an integrated NRC staff effort to collect available observations and data on a predetermined schedule and to evaluate licensee performance based on these observations and data. Emphasis is placed upon NRC understanding the licensee's performance in the 11 functional areas listed in the body of the report and discussing and sharing this understanding with the licensee. SALP is an integrated part of the regulatory process used to assure licensee's adherence to the NRC rules and regulations. SALP is oriented toward furthering NRC's understanding of the manner in which: (1) the licensee management directs, guides, and provides resources for assuring plant safety; and (2) such resources are used and applied. The integrated SALP assessment is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide meaningful guidance to licensee management related to quality and safety of plant operation, modifications, and new construction.

The integrated review was conducted by a SALP Board composed of NRC personnel who are knowledgeable of the licensee's activities. The SALP Board met on September 13, 1983, to review data and observations and to assess the licensee's performance in 11 areas. This SALP report is the SALP board's assessment of the licensee's safety performance at the Wolf Creek Generating Station, during the period of August 1, 1982, to July 31, 1983.

The results of the SALP Board assessments in the selected functional areas were discussed with the licensee at a meeting held on November 10, 1983.

II. CRITERIA

Licensee performance was assessed in 11 selected functional areas. Each of these functional areas represents an area significant to nuclear safety. Evaluation criteria as listed below were used, as appropriate, in each of the functional area assessments:

1. Management involvement in assuring quality
2. Approach to resolution of technical issues from safety standpoint
3. Responsiveness to NRC initiatives
4. Enforcement history
5. Reporting and analysis of reportable events
6. Staffing (including management)
7. Training effectiveness and qualification

In addition, SALP Board members considered other criteria, as appropriate.

Based upon the SALP Board assessment, each functional area evaluated is classified in one of the three performance categories. The definition of each of these performance areas is:

Category 1: Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate. Licensee management attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear safety; licensee resources are ample and effectively used such that a high level of performance with respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved.

Category 2. NRC attention should be maintained at normal levels. Licensee management attention and involvement are evident and are concerned with nuclear safety; licensee resources are adequate and are reasonably effective such that satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved.

Category 3. Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased. Licensee management attention or involvement is acceptable and considers nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident; licensee resources appear to be strained or not effectively used such that minimally satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved.

III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

In summary, the licensee's performance, as determined during the SALP Board meeting, is shown in the table below, along with the performance category from the previous SALP evaluation period:

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

<u>Functional Area</u>		<u>Performance Category</u> <u>8/1/82 to 7/31/83</u>		<u>Performance Category</u> <u>8/1/81 to 7/31/82</u>
		<u>NOW</u>		
WDS {	A. Containment and Other Safety-Related Structures	3	N/A	1
	B. Piping Systems and Supports	4 2	3	3
	C. Safety-Related Components	4 2	3	2
	D. Support Systems, including Electrical Raceway Supports, and Fire Protection	→ 2	2	2
	E. Electrical Power Supply and Distribution	1	1	2
Jim -	F. Instrumentation and Control Systems		N/A	2
Scott -	G. Preoperational Testing		3	N/A
NAR -	H. Licensing Activities	↑ 1	2	1
Jim -	I. Quality Assurance	2+	2	1
Jim -	J. Management Control	2+	2	1
Jim -	K. Design Control		N/A	N/A

The total NRC inspection effort during this SALP evaluation period consisted of 35 inspections involving a total of 2217 inspector-hours onsite by NRC inspectors.

IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

A. Containment and Other Safety-Related Structures

Essentially all construction activities in this area had been completed prior to this assessment period. The containment post-tensioning system was completed by Inryco, Inc., on October 18, 1982. There were no inspection activities by NRC during this assessment period, and the licensee's performance in this functional area is not evaluated or assigned a performance category.

B. Piping Systems and Supports

1. Analysis

a. Piping Systems

This area has been inspected on a continuing basis by the NRC resident and region based inspectors. In addition, an independent measurement inspection was conducted during the period of June 6-17, 1983, using the NRC Region I mobile, nondestructive examination laboratory. During the assessment period three violations were identified as follows:

- (1) 8312-01 - Radiograph of pipe weld supplied by Dravo Corporation was not acceptable in accordance with Section V of the ASME Code. (Severity Level V)
- (2) 8312-02 - Rejectable linear indication observed in reactor coolant pipe weld No. F-104. (Severity Level IV)
- (3) 8216-01 - Failure to protect stainless steel pipe spool S011 from carbon steel contamination. (Severity Level V)

As of July 31, 1983, about 97 percent of the piping had been installed by the contractor at the Wolf Creek site.

b. Pipe Hangers and Supports

This area has been inspected on a continuing basis by the NRC resident and region based inspectors. The 1982 SALP Report identified concerns regarding inadequate controls of installation, inspection, and materials of safety-related pipe hangers and supports. The constructor committed to a complete revision of the control system procedures and to reinspect approximately 5000 pipe hangers. The committed reinspection has been completed.

The NRC inspection effort identified the following violations:

- (1) 8311-01 - Unable to verify the hot and cold setting on spring hangers because of visual obstructions by travel stops being installed. (Severity Level V)
- (2) 8217-01 - Failure to control disassembly of QC accepted pipe hanger No. AE04-H001/292. (Severity Level IV)
- (3) 8318-01 - Replacement of approved material with scrap material for piece 2 of hanger BG04-C033. (Severity Level IV)

As of July 31, 1983, 95 percent of the pipe supports had been installed by the contractor at the Wolf Creek site.

2. Conclusions

This area was assigned a category 3 rating in the previous appraisal period. In this appraisal period four Severity Level IV and two Severity Level V violations were identified. The excessive number of enforcement findings indicate that management has not been sufficiently effective in improving the performance in this area. The licensee is considered by the board to be in a performance category 3 in this functional area.

3. Board Recommendations

a. Recommended NRC Actions

The frequency of region-based inspections should be increased to support the inspection effort by the resident inspector with emphasis on the reinspection effort by the contractor of installed pipe supports identified in the 1982 SALP Report.

b. Recommended Licensee Actions

The licensee management should increase their involvement to ensure that the contractor has implemented corrective action and to support an increase in QA surveillance activities of pipe, and pipe support installation during the final phase of construction.

C. Safety-Related Components

1. Analysis

The review of safety-related components during this inspection period consisted primarily of observations of the contractor's maintenance of installed safety-related components. The inspection effort identified the following violations:

- a. 8304-01 - Failure to provide protection for cleanliness or environmental control for the internal portion of the volume control tank. (Severity Level IV)
- b. 8222-02 - Failure to maintain records of required monthly inspections of installed steam generators. (Severity Level V)
- c. 8222-03 - Failure to maintain records of inspections and inerting gas pressure of the pressurizer. (Severity Level V)
- d. 8222-01 - Failure to implement committed corrective action relative to review of maintenance records for the pressurizer and steam generators. (Severity Level IV)
- e. 8316-01 - Failure to follow procedure for cope minimum radius on accumulator structural steel support. (Severity Level IV)

2. Conclusions

In this area, the identified violations are similar in nature and are indicative that increased licensee management attention is required. The licensee revised the procedures to require approval prior to access to components and a checkoff list to assure proper closure. Implementation of the revised procedures has not been verified by the resident inspector during this assessment period.

The licensee is considered to be in a performance category 3 in this area.

3. Board Recommendations

a. Recommended NRC Actions

The resident inspector should continue to monitor this area with an increased effort to verify implementation of revised procedures.

b. Recommended Licensee Actions

Increased licensee management involvement is needed in this area supplemented by an increase in QA surveillance activities to ascertain that the committed corrective action is being implemented.

D. Support Systems, Including Electrical Raceway Supports, and Fire Protection

1. Analysis

a. Construction Fire Protection

Construction fire protection has been reviewed on numerous occasions during the assessment period. It was determined that adequate fire protection measures have been provided for construction activities which include the following:

- (1) Housekeeping to prevent the buildup of combustibles in construction work areas.
- (2) Posting of fire hazard areas.
- (3) Properly trained and equipped fire watches are maintained during welding activities.

b. Electrical Raceway Supports

The 1982 SALP Report identified deficiencies in the welding of the HVAC hangers which required reinspection of all HVAC hangers and rework as required. The required rework and reinspection was complete as of January 20, 1983.

Review and inspection coverage during this assessment period included welding of electrical raceway supports, installation of anchor bolts, installation of conduit, and installation of junction boxes.

One Severity Level IV violation relative to intermittent fillet welds (8310-01) was identified in this functional area during the assessment period.

2. Conclusion

The licensee's performance in the area of construction fire protection is considered above average. However, during this assessment period, deficiencies were identified relative to intermittent fillet welds of electrical raceway supports which indicates a lack of licensee's control of AWS welding.

The licensee is considered to be in a performance category 2 in this functional area.

3. Board Recommendations

a. Recommended NRC Actions

The resident inspector should continue his inspection effort, supplemented by region based inspection, at regularly scheduled intervals in this functional area during the final phase of construction. Particular attention should be devoted to AWS welding.

b. Recommended Licensee Actions

The licensee should monitor this functional area on a continuing basis supplemented by an increase in surveillance of ongoing activities by quality assurance during the final phase of construction.

E. Electrical Power Supply and Distribution -

1. Analysis

Review and inspection coverage during the assessment period included cable pulling, cable storage, control panel welds, cable routing, and cable terminations. As of July 31, 1983, 95.4 percent of the plant's electrical cable has been pulled and 73.8 percent terminated.

There were no violations or unresolved items identified by the inspection effort of the resident inspector or region based inspectors.

2. Conclusions

The functional area of electrical power supply and distribution is considered to be a category 1 performance by the board.

3. Board Recommendations

a. Recommended NRC Actions

The resident inspector should implement the routine inspection program as work load dictates in this functional area during the the final phase of construction.

b. Recommended Licensee Actions

The licensee should maintain a high level of management involvement throughout the final phase of construction.

F. Instrumentation and Control Systems

1. Analysis

During the assessment period, the licensee's quality assurance personnel performed a surveillance inspection of fabricated and installed instrumentation fittings. The inspection revealed that swagelok fittings had not been properly installed and certain tube ends had not been deburred as required. The installer, Westinghouse, committed to correct these discrepancies and to train personnel on the correct installation of swagelok fittings. The Westinghouse quality control group has developed an installation and inspection checklist for installation of swagelok fittings. This matter was transmitted to the NRC Region IV office as a potential 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) report on February 15, 1983, pending the architect/engineer's (A/E) evaluation. The A/E determined that these discrepancies did not represent a safety concern or affect the safety of future operations. Based on the A/E evaluation, the licensee concluded this matter was not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e), but it indicated a need for more attention to detail in this area.

2. Conclusion

The licensee's performance in this functional area is not evaluated this assessment period since insufficient NRC inspection activity was performed in this area.

G. Preoperational Testing

1. Analysis

This area has been inspected on a continuing basis by the NRC resident inspector. The violations below involve activities in the functional area of preoperational testing:

- a. 8222-01 - Failure to follow the clearance order procedure. (Severity Level IV)
- b. 8302-01 - Quality assurance breakdown for system turnover. (Severity Level III)
- c. 8302-01 - Late reporting of 10 CFR 50.55(e) item. (Severity Level IV)
- d. 8307-01 - Lack of Daniel International Company test control program. (Severity Level IV)
- e. 8314-01 - Failure to provide procedure for startup activities. (Severity Level IV)

The breakdown of quality assurance for the turnover of safety-related systems resulted in escalated enforcement action and imposition of a civil penalty. The significance of the violation is illustrated by numerous discrepancies identified in both the as-built condition of a safety-related system turned over to the startup organization and supporting quality documentation.

2. Conclusions

Although there have been no directly repeated violations, four of the five listed violations deal with either procedural adequacy or procedural compliance. The quality assurance breakdown which led to a civil penalty was primarily a result of inadequate management attention to ensure the construction contractor complied with procedures. The remaining violations all deal with failure to follow or failure to provide procedures for activities that affect quality.

Of the two safety-related preoperational tests conducted during this evaluation period, one remains open and will be completed subsequent to hardware modifications and further testing. The majority of safety-related testing remains to be completed, and exercise of considerable caution is necessary to ensure that safety-related systems are properly and adequately tested within the scheduled time frame.

The preoperational testing functional area performance is considered to be category 3.

3. Board Recommendations

a. Recommended NRC Actions

The level of NRC inspection effort in this functional area should be increased with particular emphasis on region based inspection of systematic procedural compliance in the performance of preoperational tests.

b. Recommended Licensee Actions

Increased management attention to procedural compliance and thorough fulfillment of commitments in a timely and coordinated manner is recommended.

H. Licensing Activities

1. Analysis

Licensing activities that transpired during the reporting period were the review of several SNUPPS items along with some plant-specific issues that were addressed by KG&E. NRR actions

during this review period included evaluating submittals made by SNUPPS and KG&E, conducting site audits at both SNUPPS plants, Wolf Creek and Callaway, and preparing the Technical Specifications which will be used at Wolf Creek.

The analysis method used was: (1) select the licensing activities which involved significant staff involvement; (2) obtain comments from staff members who had significant contact with the applicant or its work product for these activities; (3) characterize each licensing activity by a performance category; and (4) assign an overall performance rating based on the individual categories.

2. Conclusions

Based on the evaluation of three attributes of Kansas Gas and Electric's performance for a number of significant licensing activities, an overall rating of 2 is determined. Although this rating is different from that given for the prior SALP period, it does not necessarily represent a decline in the applicant's performance. It does reflect the fact that the number of licensing activities including Technical Specification preparation, during the present rating period were significantly less than the prior cycle and were more difficult to resolve. For those activities evaluated, the applicant demonstrated that its resources are adequate and effective in all licensing areas and that management involvement and attention are concerned with nuclear safety. However, there was no basis which differentiated KG&E's performance from that of other utilities in similar phases of licensing.

3. Board Recommendations

The licensee should place an emphasis on becoming more self sufficient technically and have less reliance on immediate technical assistance. This is especially true in the area of Technical Specification preparation and implementation.

I. QUALITY ASSURANCE

1. Analysis

During this evaluation period, several weaknesses in the implementation of the quality assurance program were evidenced.

a. An inability to achieve timely corrective action to identified discrepancies as demonstrated by:

(1) A Notice of Violation was issued in April 1983 for lack of a DIC test program. QA had identified this problem in September 1982.

- (2) Approximately 20% of 500 QA identified open items found during the preceeding two years remained open at the end of the evaluation period.
- b. Weaknesses in construction quality control:
 - (1) Notice of Violation for quality breakdown
 - (2) Various violations of quality requirements for plant hardware related conditions.
- c. Problems with procedural compliance
- d. Documentation review and system walkdown inspection concerns.

As a result, the licensee has committed to several changes that should increase the overall effectiveness of the quality program. These include but are not limited to:

- o Formation of a QA walkdown surveillance group to provide surveillance coverage of safety-related systems (hardware and documentation).
- o Increase in QA audit section staffing.
- o A nuclear operations/training consultant added to the QA staff.
- o Proposed changes in audit and surveillance procedures to reduce corrective action time.
- o Several procedural and staffing changes in the constructor's organization to ensure a quality product.

2. Conclusions

In spite of the licensee's commitment to changes during the majority of the evaluation period, the quality program was less than fully effective and lacked complete management support. The changes as described and others would appear to be adequate to correct any problems in this area and will be evaluated as they develop.

The licensee is considered to be in a performance category 2 in this area.

3. Board Recommendations

a. Recommended NRC Actions

More emphasis should be placed on inspection efforts which focus more closely on the licensee's QA program, its effectiveness, and the extent to which it is implemented.

b. Recommended Licensee Actions

The licensee should ensure implementation of the proposed changes and provide more management support to the QA organization. In addition, increased management emphasis on procedural compliance would appear to be appropriate.

J. Management Control

1. Analysis

The degree and success of the management controls exerted by the licensee over construction activities at the Wolf Creek nuclear site was not the subject of specific inspections during the evaluation period, but management involvement is considered during certain inspection activities. The management personnel have been cooperative and a contributing factor toward achieving resolution of identified problems during this assessment period. Management has been progressive in staffing of personnel and support organizations to increase visibility of construction activities and decrease the time delay in decision making.

2. Conclusion

The licensee has made commitments to the NRC regarding the management of construction activities at the Wolf Creek nuclear plant and delegated to management the authority to establish and to enforce policies which assure that these commitments are met. The number of violations that were identified by the NRC resident inspectors during the assessment period is an indication of a need for increased management attention to the enforcement of established policies in the following areas:

- a. Installation of piping systems and supports
- b. Maintenance of installed safety-related components

- c. AWS structural welding
- d. Preoperational testing
- e. Quality assurance program implementation with emphasis on timely resolution of identified deficiencies adverse to quality

The licensee is considered to be in performance category 2 in the functional area of management control .

3. Board Recommendations

a. Recommended NRC Actions

The level of NRC inspections should remain consistent with the basic inspection program.

b. Recommended Licensee Actions

Licensee management should increase their involvement in the areas listed above.

K. Design Control

There has been no direct inspection effort by the NRC in the functional area of design control during the evaluation period addressed herein.

The functional area of design control is not assigned a performance category for this assessment period.

V. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES

A. Violations

Functional Areas

Severity Levels I II III IV V

1. Containment and Other Safety-Related Structures
2. Piping Systems and Supports

3 3

<u>Functional Areas</u>	<u>Severity Levels</u>				
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>V</u>
3. Safety-Related Components				3	2
4. Support Systems, including Electrical Raceway Supports, and Fire Protection				1	
5. Electric Power Supply and Distribution					
6. Instrumentation and Control Systems					
7. Preoperational Testing				4	
8. Licensing Activities					
9. Quality Assurance			1		
10. Management Control					
11. Design Control					
TOTALS				1	11 5

B. Licensee Report Data

1. Licensee Event Reports (LER)

(Not applicable)

2. Part 21 Reports

During this assessment period, the licensee submitted no reports in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.

3. Construction Deficiency Reports (CDRs)

The licensee reported forty-one 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) and potential 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) reports during the assessment period. Eight were SNUPPS initiated. This represents a 400 percent increase over the preceeding reporting period, indicating a concentrated effort by

the licensee in reporting construction deficiencies. In the list below, 'W' indicates withdrawn and 'P' indicates potential.

- Suspect potentiometer leads on Foxboro cards
- Restricted movement of nonstationary pipe supports (W)
- GE AKR breaker deficiency
- Failed battery charger lead
- Loose parts in the steam generator (W)
- Discrepancies in the BN system (P)
- Double locknut omitted on II/I small pipe supports
- Insufficient torque on structural bolts/nuts (P)
- U-Bolt material traceability
- Component testing (W)
- 2" Masoneilan Valves
- Garrett solenoid valves
- Workmanship of swagelok fittings (W)
- Foxboro modules
- Ray Miller Corp. (P)
- Brass fitting on diesel fire pump
- Hanger notes and symbols (P)
- Bolt torque on instrument mounts
- GA Technologies RM-23
- Welds on Bergen-Paterson supports (P)

- Power Conversion Products battery chargers (P)
- Structural steel welds (P)
- Stitch welding on electrical raceways & conduit (W)
- Use of teflon tape in the power block
- Containment spray/RHR motor oil problem (W)
- Piping spool piece (W)
- Cutler-Hammer push button switches (P)
- Dead battery on backup emergency diesel fire pumps (W)
- Bergen-Paterson weld beam attachment (P)
- Guyon 1/2" socket coupling (P)
- Vulkene Supreme cable (P)
- Sway strut washers (P)
- Auxiliary feedwater pump shaft
- Limitorque sheared pinion keys in motor operators (P)
- Westinghouse undetectable failure in on-line circuits for relays
- Valve position indication for Westinghouse gate valves
- Anchor Darling check valves
- Reactor trip switchgear
- Westinghouse 7300 process racks
- Yarway valves
- Excessive voltage drop control cables

Listed below is a summary of the results of the NRC inspector's review and status of 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) reports during the assessment period:

Reported items closed	10
Reported items continued in open status	50

C. Licensee Activities

Construction activity has increased during the reporting period to accommodate preoperational testing. As of July 31, 1983, 31 percent of the preoperational testing has been completed, and the licensee has revised the predicted fuel load date from October 1984 to August 1984. *Now late Dec 1984*

D. Inspection Activities

During the August 1, 1982, to July 31, 1983, appraisal period, a total of 2217 inspector-hours were expended on inspections and investigations as follows: (1) 20 periodic inspections were reported by the assigned resident inspectors; (2) nine onsite inspections were conducted by region-based inspectors; (3) five onsite investigations were conducted by region investigators; and (4) an independent measurement inspection was conducted by the Region I NRC mobile, nondestructive examination laboratory.

E. Investigations and Allegations Review

During the assessment period, the resident inspector completed a review of seven allegations resulting from investigations. Two Severity Level IV violations were identified as a result of these reviews.

F. Escalated Enforcement Actions

On March 23, 1983, the Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV office issued a Severity Level III Violation to the Kansas Gas and Electric Company, relative to failure to adequately control activities affecting the quality of safety-related work and proposed to impose a civil penalty in the amount of \$40,000. The civil penalty was imposed by order dated June 30, 1983, and payment was received on July 29, 1983.

Attendee List

11-10-83

Name	Title	Company
Forrest Rhodes	Plant Manager	WCGS-KGE
M.G. Williams	Supt Reg. and Adm	WCGS-KGE
Walter Watson	Mr. Nuclear	✓
Gene Rathbun	Mgr Licensing	KGE
Otto Maynard	Licensing	KGE
Melvin L. Johnson	Mgr Nuclear Plant Engineering	KGE
Earl W. Creel	Mgr. QA	KGE
JOHN A. BAILEY	Asst. Mgr. Nuc. Plant Engr.	KGE
FRED R. FAIST	Asst. LEAD SYSTEM TEST SUPERVISOR	KGE SLU
RICK MAYS	PROJECT FIELD ENG. SUPV.	KGE CONST
KENNETH ELLISON	SLU TECHNICAL SUPPORT SUPV	KGE
MENZO A. CLINTON	ENGINEERING / SYSTEMS	DIC
L.C. EASTERWOOD	Proj. Quality MGR	DIC
R.M. GRANT	Quality MGR.	KGE
G.L. Fouts	Const. Mgr.	KGE
LEONARD A. GABRYELSKI	KGE CONST	KGE
W.J. RUDOLPH II	MANAGER QA (WCGS)	KGE
DANA CRAWFORD	DIRECTOR, Nuclear Power	KCP&L
Bob Rives	Group VP	KGE
Bob Hagan	Manager Nuclear Services Chairman of NSRC	KGE
PETER VAN NORT	VP	WOLF CREEK TEAM (D)
JOHN G. BERRA	FED CONSTR MGR	WOLF CREEK TEAM (KGE)
JIM HARVEY	PROJ. MGR.	DIC
JOE MULNOLLAND	Mgr. Pow. Support Engr	KEPCO
TERRY GARDNER	LEAD SYSTEMS TEST SUPERVISOR	KGE (B)
Charles M. Herbst	Asst. Project Eng	Bechtel
Bernard Ruddick	V.P. - Engr	KGE
William G. Eales, Jr.	QA Coordinator	KGE

Attendance List

Name	Title	Company
Harley Macklin	Manager Fossil Prod	KG&E
GLENN H. KOESTER	VP-NUCLEAR	KG&E
KENT BROWN	GROUP VP	KG&E
Joe Holonich	Project Manager	NRC
Wilson Caddman	President	KG&E
Richard Terrell	Secretary and QA Comm	KG&E
F. J. DUDDY	PROJECT DIRECTOR	KG&E
Charles Ross	Ex. V. P.	KEPCo
K.A. WHITTLESEY	INSPECTOR	NRC
W. S. SCHUM	RRI gen	NRC
W. D. Johnson	Sect. chief	NRC
J. E Gasliardo	DRR + EP	NRC
J. COLLINS	Regional ADMINISTRATOR	NRC
B. J. Youngblood	Dir. Lic. Branch #1	NRC
R.J. GLOVER	KG&E STARTUP MGR	KG&E



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV
PARKWAY CENTRAL PLAZA BUILDING
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 1000
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011

VISIT TO WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION
DECEMBER 6-7, 1984

COMMISSIONER LANDO ZECH
TECHNICAL ASSISTANT MAX CLAUSEN

December 6, 1984

1:35 p.m. Arrival KCI via TWA 371
 Met by Richard P. Denise, RIV

1:45 p.m. Depart for Wolf Creek Site via Rental Auto
 Driven by R. P. Denise

4:00 p.m. Arrive at Wolf Creek EOF to Tour EOF and
 Reactor Simulator

5:00 p.m. Depart for Ramada Inn, Emporia, KS
 via Rental Auto

6:45 p.m. Arrive Ramada Inn

7:15 p.m. Dinner with R. Denise and W. Guldemon (SRI)

December 7, 1984

7:00 a.m. Depart Ramada Inn via Rental Auto
 Driven by R. P. Denise

7:45 a.m. Arrive at Wolf Creek Site for Badging

8:00 a.m. Meeting with NRC Staff at Task Force Trailer for
 Discussion of Plant Inspection Status

8:30 a.m. Meeting with KG&E for Briefing on Plant Status
 and Schedule
 - Administration Building

9:00 a.m. Start Plant Tour

- Technical Support Center
- Turbine Building
- Rad Waste Building
- Control Room
- Fuel Building
- Auxiliary Building
- Containment Building
- Drive to ESWS Building and General Site

1:15 p.m. Exit Meeting with NRC Tour Participants

- Task Force Trailer

1:30 p.m. Exit Meeting with KG&E

- Administration Building

1:45 p.m. Depart WCGS Site via Rental Auto

 Driven by R. P. Denise

4:15 p.m. Arrive KCI

4:55 p.m. Depart KCI via TWA 158