

JUL 07 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward C. Wenzinger, Chief
Projects Branch No. 2
Division of Reactor Projects

FROM: James H. Joyner, Chief
Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUBJECT: SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS SALP INPUT FOR SALEM
AND HOPE CREEK

The Security and Safeguards SALP input for Salem and Hope Creek is attached. The input covers the period of December 29, 1991, through June 19, 1993.

Original Signed By:
James H. Joyner

James H. Joyner, Chief
Facilities Radiological Safety
and Safeguards Branch
Division of Radiation Safety
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cc w/attachment:
W. Hehl, DRSS
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RI:DRSS
RSA
Albert/tmh/slj
07/06/93

RI:DRSS
Keimig
07/06/93

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Joyner
07/07/93

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SALP

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey


Assessment Period: December 29, 1991 - June 19, 1993

Board Meeting Date: July 29, 1993

Report Draft Due (SG): July 2, 1993


Report Draft Due (DRP): July 9, 1993

Prepared By:


R. J. Albert, Physical Security Inspector

07-06-93
Date

Reviewed By:


R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section

7/6/93
Date

SECURITY

ANALYSIS

The previous SALP rated this area Category 1. That rating was based on the licensee's maintaining an effective, performance-based security program which, in many areas, exceeded regulatory requirements; and demonstrating sensitivity in effectively managing events that challenged the performance of the security organization. In addition, audits and self-assessments of the security organization, program upgrades and enhancements were indicative of excellent support from both corporate and station management for the security program.

During this SALP period, corporate and station management acted prudently and responsibly in contracting for an independent review of station security and other support programs following the off-duty suicide of a security-force member. The comprehensive, in-depth review did not show any work-related culpability for the suicide. Such an incident could have devastated the security organization if not for significant initiatives by senior management to minimize the impact. Throughout the period, there were no appreciable adverse results from the incident on the morale or performance of the security organization.

Station security management demonstrated initiative in evaluating the effectiveness of the security program and in enlisting the support of corporate and station management for program improvements and enhancements. This initiative was evident when a contractor was brought to the station to provide enhanced tactical training. The training involved defensive strategy, full-scale contingency drills and tabletop analyses of numerous scenarios of the design basis threat. Further initiative was shown in coordinating a security drill among state and local law enforcement agencies, and the security force. The drill was well-planned and executed. It also provided the law enforcement agencies with valuable insight of security procedures and station layout. In addition, excellent management support, throughout the period, was evident for the systematic upgrade of the aging assessment aids and other program enhancements.

The licensee also maintained aggressive, effective audit and self-assessment programs throughout the period. These programs were instrumental in identifying potential weaknesses such as the proper control of safeguards information, and fitness-for-duty (FFD) problems and assisting the licensee in implementing corrective measures before problems developed. Excellent rapport with other plant groups also helped minimize the number and extent of problems.

The FFD program was generally well implemented and comprehensive. However, programmatic problems were identified in the areas of personnel with infrequent, unescorted station access and training for newly appointed supervisors who were responsible for implementing certain aspects of the FFD program. While the licensee identified these problems, they were not effectively resolved before coming to NRC attention. Despite these programmatic problems, the program proved effective in identifying FFD violations. This

was evident, for example, when a supervisor on a tour identified a security officer who did not appear fit for duty. The officer was tested for cause and was found to have exceeded the licensee's limit for alcohol when he reported for duty.

Staffing for the security organization was appropriate. This was evident during the unplanned outage following the turbine accident and two planned refueling outages. Each of the outages required only a small amount of overtime.

A minor supervisory oversight problem was identified by the NRC late in the period when security personnel were observed searching a vehicle contrary to the manner in which they were trained. Generally, however, supervisory oversight of the security force was good, and the security force continued to demonstrate attentiveness to security responsibilities and responsiveness to identified problems. This was evident in the relatively smooth day-to-day on-site operations and prompt and appropriate handling of security threats, such as a telephone bomb threat which targeted the Artificial Island cafeteria and the identification by x-ray of a loaded handgun which was left in a backpack carried into the station through the main access control center. The security force also performed very capably on April 10, 1992, when an apparent lightning strike resulted in a loss of the security computer and during a severe winter storm that occurred March 12-15, 1993, that resulted in significant system degradations.

Training for the security force continued to be well-developed and generally well administered. This was evident, throughout the period, by the high level of performance indicated above and the small number of security personnel errors during the period.

The licensee's event reporting procedures were found to be clear and consistent with NRC reporting requirements. One event was promptly reported to the NRC during this period. It involved the x-ray search detection of the handgun mentioned earlier. The licensee's report was clear, concise and indicated appropriate responses. The licensee's event log was found to be well maintained and utilized for tracking repetitive events.

During this period, the licensee submitted two revisions to the physical security plan and one revision to the training and qualification plan. The revisions were of high quality, technically sound and reflected well-developed policies and procedures.

SUMMARY

In summary, the licensee continued to maintain a very effective and performance-oriented security program. Corporate and plant management attention to and support for the program remained evident throughout the period, particularly, in response to the off-duty suicide of a security force member. Improvements and enhancements to the program were made where necessary, to maintain its effectiveness. Excellent rapport was maintained with other plant groups, to minimize problems. The audit and self-assessment programs remained effective, and enhanced program implementation. Staffing reflected program needs and the training

program was strong. Program plans and procedures were well-written and understood by all concerned and reflected a thorough and comprehensive understanding of regulatory requirements.

Performance Rating:

Board Comments: