

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 0										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2			
TITLE (4) Containment Isolation Due To Improper Transfer of Shutdown Board																							
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)													
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)											
0	7	1	2	8	5	8	5	0	0	9	0	0	0	8	0	9	8	5	0	5	0	0	0
OPERATING MODE (9) N		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																					
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 1 0		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)									
		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)									
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)									
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)													
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)													
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)													
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)												TELEPHONE NUMBER											
NAME R. C. Steele												AREA CODE 2 0 1 5 7 2 1 9 1 - 1 3 1 5 1 8 1 3											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																							
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC				
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR							
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO											

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 12, 1985, during the unit 2 refuel outage, an inadvertent containment isolation occurred when a personnel error resulted in a 480 V shutdown board being transferred to a deenergized bus. The responsible employee completed retraining instructions on proper transfer of boards on July 18, 1985.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Browns Ferry - Unit 2	0500026085	—	009	—00	02	OF	02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

Units 1 and 2 were in refueling outages, and unit 3 was in cold shutdown.

On July 12, 1985, 480 V shutdown board 2A was transferred from its alternate feeder breaker back to its normal feeder breaker. The normal feeder is fed from shutdown board transformer (TS2A) via 4 KV shutdown board B. At the time of transfer, both reactor protection system (RPS) (JC) motor generator (MG) sets were fed off the 480 V shutdown board 2A, because the power source to transformer TS2A from 4 KV shutdown board B was deenergized to allow maintenance on the transformer. The maintenance was complete, and the operators were in the process of returning the shutdown boards to their normal alignment. The premature transfer on the 480 V shutdown board 2A resulted in deenergizing the board causing the following to occur:

1. Scram signal due to loss of both RPS MG sets.
2. Primary containment isolation (JM) on group 2 (BP), group 3 (CE), group 6 (VA), and group 8 (IG).
3. Standby gas treatment and control room emergency ventilation initiation (BH).
4. Loss of power to reactor building and turbine building exhaust radiation monitors 2-RM-90-140, 141, 142, 143, 157, and 250.

The isolation occurred because the normal supply to the 480 V shutdown board was not verified to be energized prior to the transfer. At the time of transfer instrumentation on the board indicated the normal feed was not energized. The person involved received a written warning and was retrained on the proper methods to transfer boards.

During the event, the affected safety equipment functioned as designed with no adverse effects noted. Since the unit was in a refueling outage, the core was unloaded. Loss of power to MG set is fail safe in the conservative direction.

Responsible Plant Section - Operations

Previous Events - None

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

P. O. Box 2000

Decatur, Alabama 35602

August 9, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 2 -
DOCKET NO. 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-52 - REPORTABLE
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-260/85009

The enclosed report provides details concerning containment isolation
because of improper transfer. This report is submitted in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

R. L. Lewis

R. L. Lewis
Acting Plant Manager
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosures

cc (Enclosures):

Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BFN

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