



SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT □ 6201 S Street, P.O. Box 15830, Sacramento CA 95852-1830, (916) 452-3211
AN ELECTRIC SYSTEM SERVING THE HEART OF CALIFORNIA

RJR 85-539


November 1, 1985

DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
ATTN HUGH L THOMPSON JR
DIVISION OF LICENSING
U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON D C 20555

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SUMMARY AND SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM TRANSIENT OF OCTOBER 2, 1985

Enclosed is an addendum to Attachment 5, Part II, Revision 1 -
Auxiliary Feedwater/Main Feedwater Failure Analysis contained in the
District's letter of October 25, 1985 (RJR 85-531).

The addendum includes the items discussed with various members of our
staffs on November 1, 1985.


R. J. RODRIGUEZ
ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER,
NUCLEAR

Attachment

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ADDENDUM TO ATTACHMENT 5, PART II

AUXILIARY/MAIN FEEDWATER FAILURE ANALYSIS (REFERENCE RJR 85-531)

There are no single failures that will prevent manual initiation of AFW for any given plant conditions. Therefore, feedwater - i.e. main or auxiliary - will always be available to mitigate any accident or transient. The District has reviewed the impact of single failures on the ability to provide main and/or auxiliary feedwater, and the highlights of this review are summarized below.

I: MAIN FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVE

The District believes there is no single failure in the ICS that will cause all main feedwater valves to go closed. It would take a number of component failures for the valves to close and cut off all feedwater. Therefore, the likelihood of this event is very small and does not pose a problem to plant operation. This evaluation is based on Integrated Control System Reliability System Analysis, BAW 1564.

II: MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP CONTROL

Based on Integrated Control System Reliability System Analysis, BAW 1564, there is only one failure which could cause loss of all main feedwater following a reactor trip. This failure would be in the main feed pump speed control circuitry and could reduce both main feed pump speeds to minimum speed. The speed reduction would reduce pump discharge pressure to less than OTSG pressure, thus interrupting main feedwater flow. At min. speed, the District will verify there will be an auto initiate of AFW flow. If required, the District will make, prior to startup, modifications to assure this condition will not cause a loss of all feedwater.