



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos.: 50-327/85-31 and 50-328/85-31

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street
Chattanooga, TN 37401

Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328

License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79

Facility Name: Sequoyah 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: September 16-20, 1985

Inspector: J. L. Mathis

10/16/85
Date Signed

Approved by: F. Jape
for F. Jape, Section Chief
Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

10/16/85
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection involved 36 inspector-hours on site reviewing preparations for refueling, followup on IEB 84-03, and followup on inspector identified problems.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *P. R. Wallace, Plant Manager
- *L. M. Nobles, Superintendent of O&E
- *D. L. Cowart, Quality Surveillance
- *H. R. Rogers, Compliance Engineer
- *C. L. Wilson, Nuclear Engineer
- *C. E. Chmielewski, Nuclear Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

K. Jenison
L. Watson

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 20, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection

5. Preparation for Refueling Unit 1 (80705)

The inspector reviewed technical documents related to fuel receipt and refueling to verify that:

1. Changes made to the approved procedures are accurate.

2. Revised vendor technical information pertinent to the procedures has been incorporated in to the latest approved procedures.
3. Procedures contain prerequisites for commencement of refueling activities, including pre-refueling surveillance testing required by Technical Specification.
4. Surveillance required by TS during the conduct of refueling activities.
5. Provisions for inspection of cladding conditions and sampling for fuel bowing, distortion, swelling or crud buildup.
6. Provisions for maintaining proper decay heat removal.
7. Provision for maintaining good housekeeping in the refueling and new fuel storage areas and for control of loose objects.
8. Provision for training and qualifying personnel involved in refueling activities, including adherence to TS requirements and licensed operator requirements.

The inspector did not witness fuel movement because at the time of inspection Unit 1 was in Mode 5. Fuel shuffle is schedule for October 5, 1985.

6. Followup to IEB 84-03 (92703) Units 1 and 2

IE Bulletin 84-03, Refueling Cavity Water Seal, requested licensees to submit a corrective action program for review and approval prior to any fuel handling in the reactor cavity. TVA letters dated October 2, 17 and 26, 1984, provided the requested information. Additional information was requested by NRC Region II management during a telephone conversation with the Sequoyah compliance staff. The Region II staff reviewed the licensee's submittals, dated September 10 and October 1, 1985, which provided the actual measurements of the elevation differences between the reactor vessel flange and the reactor cavity floor for both units.

The gap between the reactor vessel flange and the floor of the reactor cavity was measured and reported by the licensee. The measurement was taken at 18 locations around the vessel flange for both units. The results of the measurements for Units 1 and 2 gap are below:

	<u>Unit 1</u>	<u>Unit 2</u>
Avg. gap size	2.055 inches	1.992 inches
Max. gap size	2.111 inches	2.067 inches

The actual dimensions of the elevation differences between the reactor vessel flange and the reactor cavity floor are given below for Units 1 and 2.

Unit 1

<u>Position</u>	<u>"Y" (inches)</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>"Y" (inches)</u>
1	-.048	12	-.043
2	-.052	13	-.043
3	-.036	14	-.047
4	-.037	15	-.040
5	-.053	16	-.055
6	-.032	17	-.057
7	-.031	18	-.035
8	-.025		
9	+.014		
10	+.025		
11	-.029		

UNIT 2

<u>Position</u>	<u>"Y" (inches)</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>"Y" (inches)</u>
1	-.042	10	-.028
2	-.034	11	-.052
3	-.065	12	-.040
4	-.063	13	-.102
5	-.038	14	-.065
6	-.013	15	-.043
7	-.038	16	-.052
8	-.024	17	-.039
9	-.034	18	-.031

+Y indicates cavity floor high
 -Y Indicates cavity floor low

Based on the actual dimensions, and other testing performed by the licensee, gross failure of the seal is not expected. IEB 84-03 for Units 1 and 2 is closed.

7. Followup on Inspector Identified Problem (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-328/81-43-01, concerning ENDES resolution to deficiency 29 which stated the deficiency was acceptable because the system operated as designed. The inspector reviewed the system description in the FSAR, and test data package W-6.1F agrees. Technical Specification limiting conditions for Operation is followed. IFI 328/81-43-01 is closed.