

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

June 26, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II

Attn: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:


BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - ATTACHED PIPING POTENTIAL SAFETY
CONCERN - NCR BLN NEB 8008 - ELEVENTH INTERIM REPORT

On November 21, 1980, R. W. Wright, NRC-OIE Region II, was informed that the subject nonconformance was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). This was followed by our interim reports dated December 19, 1980; April 2 and July 17, 1981; February 17, June 22, and October 14, 1982; May 23 and November 17, 1983; and January 5 and July 6, 1984. Enclosed is our eleventh interim report. We consider 10 CFR Part 21 to be applicable to this nonconformance. We expect to submit our next report on or about December 29, 1986.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



J. W. Hufham, Manager
Licensing and Risk Protection

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Mr. James Taylor, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

H. B. Barkley, Manager
205 Plant Project Services
P.O. Box 10935
Lynchburg, Virginia 24506-0935

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Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
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ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
ATTACHED PIPING POTENTIAL SAFETY CONCERN
NCR BLN NEB 8008
10 CFR 50.55(e)
ELEVENTH INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Babcock and Wilcox (B&W), Lynchburg, Virginia, has uncovered an inconsistency between the assumptions relative to pipe breaks in the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) analysis and the structural analysis of certain connecting pipes in the affected or broken loop. The LOCA analysis did not assume a consequential failure of piping caused by a LOCA pipe break. Certain piping and instrumentation connections to the reactor coolant system (RCS) might not have been adequately designed to maintain function or to resist consequential failures as a result of the LOCA break in the RCS. Consequential failures of these piping connections could present an inconsistency with the emergency core coolig system (ECCS) analysis performed for Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN).

Interim Progress

As specified in previous interim reports, the completed analyses show that the stress levels in all piping and instrumentation connections to the RCS are acceptable except for the incore piping.

Interim report No. 10 dated July 6, 1984 indicated that the subject nonconformance report (NCR) will be resolved by making use of the "leak before break" (LBB) criterion. The LBB criterion will eliminate primary piping breaks and thereby eliminate the load component causing the incore piping to be overstressed.

Once the NRC has approved application of the LBB criterion to primary piping at plants with B&W NSSS, B&W is to confirm that the LBB criterion does in fact resolve the incore piping overstress problem. B&W has submitted its LBB evaluation report for the primary piping (BAW-1847) to the NRC. The NRC provided comments on BAW-1847 on March 12, 1985. J. F. Walter's (B&W Project Manager for Owners Group Engineering Services) letter to G. S. Vissing (NRC Project Manager for B&W Owners Group) dated April 25, 1985, responded to the NRC's comments.

B&W estimates that the NRC will complete its review of BAW-1847 by July 1986. We expect to receive B&W's confirmation that the LBB criterion resolves BLN NEB 8008 by September 30, 1986.

TVA will submit the next report upon resolution of the comments arising from the application of LBB to BLN. The submittal is expected to be on or about December 29, 1986.