

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Nine Mile Point Unit I										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0					PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3		
TITLE (4) Failure to Establish Required Fire Watch																	
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)							
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)				
0 9	2 7	8 5	8 5	0 1 6	0 0	1 0	2 5	8 5					0 5 0 0 0				
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)															
N		20.402(b)				20.405(e)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)			
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(e)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)			
1 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(e)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)			
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)							
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																	
NAME										TELEPHONE NUMBER							
Robert Randall, Supervisor, Technical Support										AREA CODE		3 1 5 3 4 9 - 2 4 4 5					
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																	
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC							
A	K/Q	B/D/M/P	X	9 9 9	N												
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

ABSTRACT

On September 22, 1985 three normally open dampers (BV210-31, BV210-34, BV210-35) failed to isolate on a Halon suppression signal. A fire watch was immediately established and a work request generated to troubleshoot the problem. It was discovered on September 27, 1985 that a wiring change performed on September 18, 1985 on a separate, independent damper caused an interruption to the close initiation circuit from Halon and CO2 suppression to dampers BV210-31, BV210-34, and BV210-35. Technical Specification 3.6.10.2.b requires that a fire watch be posted within one hour if Halon suppression is found inoperable. Therefore, from September 18 to the 22nd Halon suppression in the Auxiliary Control Room was inoperable with no fire watch established. After the wiring correction was made, damper isolation on suppression signal was successfully tested. The system was declared operable and the fire watch was cleared.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Nine Mile Point Unit I	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 5	0 1 6	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

TEXT

On September 22, 1985 dampers BV210-31, BV210-34, and BV210-35 failed to close on a Halon suppression signal from the Auxiliary Control Room during a surveillance test. A continuous fire watch was established, Halon and CO₂ suppression systems were taken out of service and declared inoperable, and a work request written to determine the problem. It was later discovered that it was a wiring change performed on September 18 to a separate, independent damper which kept dampers BV210-31, BV210-34, and BV210-35 from isolating. After the wiring change was corrected, damper actuation upon suppression signal was tested, the system was declared operable, and the fire watch was cleared.

Technical Specification 3.6.10.2.b requires that with a Halon system inoperable, within one hour a continuous fire watch is established. Because the fire watch was established on September 22 when the dampers were found to be inoperable, and it was later determined that the dampers were rendered inoperable on September 18, the Halon suppression system in the Auxiliary Control Room was inoperable from September 18 to September 22 without a fire watch.

ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

Adverse safety consequences could have resulted if a fire had occurred in the Auxiliary Control Room while the dampers were inoperable with no fire watch established. The Halon System would have initiated, but because the dampers would not have isolated, Halon concentration would not have been maintained. The Auxiliary Control Room is equipped with a backup CO₂ fire suppression system which can be manually initiated from the Control Room. In addition, Niagara Mohawk maintains a full time fire department on site which would have been able to enter the Auxiliary Control Room using Scott air packs to take any additional corrective actions and/or verify the fire has been terminated.

Although possible safety consequences did exist, they were minimal because of back up suppression and the availability of trained fire fighting personnel.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The initial corrective actions which occurred on September 22 included posting a fire watch and generating a work request to determine the problem. When it was determined that the cause of the failure was a wiring error, the wiring was corrected and proper damper operation verified.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 5	0 1 6	0 0	0 3	OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTION (cont.)

Additional corrective actions to prevent a similar occurrence include the following. Electrical Maintenance Procedure N1-EMP-44.7 requires the use of elementary diagram and connection diagram to develop a wire list. In the future the wire list will be prepared for this procedure for all safety and non-safety modifications addressed by Technical Specifications. Specific training on this practice for electricians is scheduled for completion by May 1, 1986.

Additionally, during the completion of the NMPC ongoing "as-built" program, elementaries and/or loop diagrams will be prepared for systems addressed by Technical Specifications where they presently don't exist. A quantitative review to determine how many elementaries and/or loop diagrams are needed should be completed by January 1, 1986. The actual completion of the diagrams is scheduled for June of 1986. In addition, system descriptions developed under the engineering assurance program will be utilized in the development of installation plans per AP-6 (Procedure for Modification and Addition) to ensure adequate consideration of operational requirements.

